Some observations on the problem of evil

[UndercoverElephant]

ExitDose,

Maybe you are giving me a dose of my own medicine. Often on this board people who encounter me do not know whether I am a theist or an atheist, an idealist or a materialist. This time you are doing it to me. I don't know which side you are on. I cannot tell whether you are defending God's omniscience or arguing he cannot exist.

Geoff

 

[ExitDose]

ExitDose,

You seem to be making something dead simple sound really complicated.

Geoff's simple, easily understood, prima facie CORRECT claim was:

Before you roll a dice, you cannot know the outcome of the roll.

That's exactly the statement that I was addressing.

What???

What are you talking about? What has this sentence got to do with my claim? Answer: nothing. Before you roll a dice, you cannot know the outcome of the roll. Who said anything about "answers"? Not me. Do you think a 6-sided-die is "a question"?? You have introduced the concept of "correct answers" and then seem to be claiming that this has something important to do with my claim. It doesn't.

That is my counter. Would replacing "answer" with "result" help out here? Was it really that difficult to understand the wording? Now, please, care to respond with something more substantive than "it doesn't make sense"; it's a childish waste of both our times.

WTF??? "correct"? What are you talking about? Beforehand, no dice has been rolled. Period. There are no "answers" and nothing to be "correct". If there is no question, then there is no answer.
...
So what?

So, if there is no new information then there is no negation of omniscience. Seeing as I was addressing the following statement(in its complete form):

This is one of the biggest contradictions in mainstream theology. The claim that humans have free will (which is an essential Christian claim) and the claim that God has perfect knowledge of the future (which is not an essential Christian claim but is believed by the vast majority of Christians anyway) are logically incompatible. One of them must be false.

As this carries the possibility of multiple paths, in that there was the chance that the others could have legitimately come to fruition, then all are equally true both before and after the decision is made because under replication the same result isn't guaranteed to materialize. Each is accurate, the only difference is the frame of referrence(see the loops example in my previous post), of which omniscience should grant knowledge of. If a God can know all possible paths these decisions might lead, it would then have all knowledge. Omniscience. By granting that there is a determined result of what that choice might be you've conducted a bait-and-switch between a truly probabilistic event(or choice specifically) and a deterministic event.

Why? What does "perfect information about all these outcomes" mean?

You seem to grasp the concept of "perfect knowledge". Why can't you understand that "perfect information" is synonymous? Are you so easily thrown?

 

[ExitDose]

ExitDose,

Maybe you are giving me a dose of my own medicine. Often on this board people who encounter me do not know whether I am a theist or an atheist, an idealist or a materialist. This time you are doing it to me. I don't know which side you are on. I cannot tell whether you are defending God's omniscience or arguing he cannot exist.

Geoff

Considering the cross you're nailing yourself to; atheist would not be my first guess.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So, if there is no new information then there is no negation of omniscience. Seeing as I was addressing the following statement(in its complete form):

Of course there is new information. After the dice has been rolled, the new information was "I rolled a six". I might add that this is a bit confusing since I was talking about free will, not probability. God does not know the outcome of a human free will decision, but not for the same reason that I do not know the outcome of the dice roll. The dice roll could well have been purely deterministic. The same does not apply to a free will decision, which is neither random nor (empirically) deterministic.

As this carries the possibility of multiple paths, in that there was the chance that the others could have legitimately come to fruition, then all are equally true both before and after the decision is made because under replication the same result isn't guaranteed to materialize.

Sorry, but you have lost me again. After you have rolled a six (or made a free will decision) then one outcome has come to fruition and the others have not. So they are not all "equally true" after the event. One of them is true, and all the others are false.

Each is accurate...

"accurate"? Another meaningless word has been introduced.......

, the only difference is the frame of referrence(see the loops example in my previous post), of which omniscience should grant knowledge of. If a God can know all possible paths these decisions might lead, it would then have all knowledge.

No it would not. In the case of the free will decision, it simply does not know what decision the human will make. Nothing and nobody can know that, because it is not pre-determined.

Omniscience. By granting that there is a determined result of what that choice might be you've conducted a bait-and-switch between a truly probabilistic event(or choice specifically) and a deterministic event.

You seem to grasp the concept of "perfect knowledge".

Do I? I am suspecting that you are attributing to me something I have not said and do not believe, but I still can't actually tell.

Why can't you understand that "perfect information" is synonymous?

It's not synonymous. Not remotely.

Are you so easily thrown?

Perhaps I should open this up to other people reading this.

If anybody else can explain to me WTF exitdose is talking about, I'd love to hear it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Considering the cross you're nailing yourself to; atheist would not be my first guess.

Well I can assure you I am not a Christian, so no crosses.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

ExitDose,

Let's start again, again. This time forget the dice roll, and just concentrate on a human free will decision in a non-deterministic universe. Please explain to me how an omniscient being can have perfect knowledge of the future if the future is not-predetermined. You appear to be saying that in this case, the best that the omniscient being can do is to know all the potential decisions the human could make. You then describe this as "perfect knowledge of the future". That is total nonsense. The omniscient being still knows everything which can be known (all the possible outcomes) but it cannot possibly know which outcome is going to manifest, because it has not happened yet and until the human being is presented with the choice, it cannot be known what the choice will be. It follows, logically, that God cannot have perfect knowledge of the future.

If the future is indeterminate, not even an omniscient being can know it.

I cannot believe that any person in their right mind would argue with this, yet I am presented with a person who is doing exactly that.

Geoff.

 

[chriswl]

The question here is whether the coma might be for a greater good. The fact that a person is in a coma may very well affect the actions of others and the coma may therefore result in a greater good, as much as you'd like to deny it.

OK, this is my last attempt at clarifying the coma argument for you. From here on, if you don't get it you just don't get it. The argument has nothing to do with whether the coma itself is for the greater good. I'm saying that the suffering that the patient may or may not be experiencing while in a coma (we don't know in any particular case whether he is) could not be for the greater good. Is that clear?

The PoE attempts to disprove the possibility of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God by suggesting that under no circumstances could an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God allow suffering.

No, it's broader than that. If there is an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God then we must live in the best of all possible worlds. So "natural evil" is not just allowable, it must be necessary to the perfection of the world. One fewer child in Africa experiencing one one fewer day without food must diminish the perfection of our world. It needs to be demonstrated how this could possibly be the case, not just for some but for every incidence of suffering there has ever been. I can respond, how could the world possibly be set up in this way? Just as I can say how can the moon possibly be made of cheese?

The statement "It is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese" is not merely an opinion, but a statement that in fact, the moon cannot possibly be made of green cheese. You've previously stated that, even though the evidence indicates that the moon is probably not made of green cheese, it is possible that the moon actually is made of green cheese. So, the statement "The moon is not made of green cheese" is probably true, but the statement "It is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese" is absolutely false.

If you really think that the moon is only "probably" not made of cheese then I can see why we disagree. I am a hard atheist with regards to the Great Cheese Moon, you are an agnostic. This probably parallels our views on the existence of God.

Of course theists make a positive claim that an omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God exists, and of course it is up to them to prove their claim. However, the PoE doesn't simply discount the theist claim for lack of evidence, but actually makes its own positive claim: that it is impossible that an omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God exists.

I got the impression you were an agnostic, but you argue like a Christian. You're inserting the redundant notion of impossibility to transform it into a positive claim. The PoE argument draws attention to a serious problem for the positive claims of Christianity - that God's behaviour in creating this imperfect world seems at odds with his supposed perfect goodness. The response that all suffering is for the greater good is not in itself an answer to this - it is just a dismissal of the problem, an assumption that there is an answer but that we don't know what it is. On its own it's not even an argument. Most arguments against the PoE actually attempt to explain how all suffering could be for the greater good.

The theists have many answers to why there would be so much suffering in a world created by such a God, one of which is that the suffering is for the greater good and therefore isn't evil at all. The ball would now be in your court to prove otherwise if you wish to promote the PoE.

I can only do that when they have explained how it is that they think suffering leads to the greater good. Unlike you, they actually attempt to do this - they don't just try to dodge the question.

 

[Bri]

How about this:

God is omnipotent and thus can do anything that is logically possible.
God is omnibenevolent and thus must do good when it is able to.
Therefore, god cannot not do good when it is able to.
Therefore, god cannot be omnipotent.

Omnibenevolence is generally understood to mean that God does good, not that God doesn't have the power to not do good if he chose. I don't think anyone (particularly theists) seriously considers omnibenevolence to be a restriction on God's power.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

Omnibenevolence is generally understood to mean that God does good, not that God doesn't have the power to not do good if he chose. I don't think anyone (particularly theists) seriously considers omnibenevolence to be a restriction on God's power.

Well, see if you can understand what I am getting at. You claim that god can do evil, but it simply never chooses that. Indeed, your definition would include a statement to the effect that it never will choose to do anything but good.

What is the difference between actually having no choice, and having the choice dictated by the definition?

If god actually did less than the greatest good, just because it wanted to, then it would cease to be your god, correct?

 

[rocketdodger]

There is no cop-out here - you've already accepted why God can't make a stone so heavy that he himself cannot lift it - because to do so would require God being illogical.

No, this case is different. The paradox of the stone arises from one attribute. This one arises from the incompatability of two.

I claim it is a cop-out because as long as one depends on arguments like this, they can claim any arbitrary attribute of god and claim it doesn't contradict anything else. Its an infinite game of making exceptions. What is the point of a god if you have to make a bazillion exceptions for it to make sense?

 

[rocketdodger]

As this carries the possibility of multiple paths, in that there was the chance that the others could have legitimately come to fruition, then all are equally true both before and after the decision is made because under replication the same result isn't guaranteed to materialize. Each is accurate, the only difference is the frame of referrence(see the loops example in my previous post), of which omniscience should grant knowledge of. If a God can know all possible paths these decisions might lead, it would then have all knowledge. Omniscience.

ExitDose - how is the "multiple paths" universe compatible with free will?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No, this case is different. The paradox of the stone arises from one attribute. This one arises from the incompatability of two.

I claim it is a cop-out because as long as one depends on arguments like this, they can claim any arbitrary attribute of god and claim it doesn't contradict anything else. Its an infinite game of making exceptions. What is the point of a god if you have to make a bazillion exceptions for it to make sense?

I must have missed something. Did you see my post about the incoherence of the concept of "absolute good"? There are not two attributes here. There is no such thing as "absolute goodness" because "good" and "bad" are things decided upon by human beings. So there cannot be anything which is incompatible with God being absolutely good. There is no such thing, any more than there is such a thing as a stone so heavy that God can't lift it.

 

[chriswl]

I must have missed something. Did you see my post about the incoherence of the concept of "absolute good"? There are not two attributes here. There is no such thing as "absolute goodness" because "good" and "bad" are things decided upon by human beings. So there cannot be anything which is incompatible with God being absolutely good. There is no such thing, any more than there is such a thing as a stone so heavy that God can't lift it.

So you are saying that God cannot be omnibenevolent because the notion just makes no sense?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So you are saying that God cannot be omnibenevolent because the notion just makes no sense?

That is pretty close to it, yes. For God, what is good is what is good for the whole system - and that means everything, or at least everything which lives. Anything less would be taking sides, and God can't do that, regardless of what OBL and GWB believe. So from the point of view of any particular individual, God cannot be omnibenevolent. Only if one identifies with the whole system can God be viewed in such a way.

 

[Bri]

OK, this is my last attempt at clarifying the coma argument for you. From here on, if you don't get it you just don't get it. The argument has nothing to do with whether the coma itself is for the greater good. I'm saying that the suffering that the patient may or may not be experiencing while in a coma (we don't know in any particular case whether he is) could not be for the greater good. Is that clear?

I'll have to admit that I still don't get it. I assume you're saying that the inspiration only comes from the assumption that the coma victim is suffering, because we don't know if they are really suffering. Of course, if coma victims don't suffer, then it's a poor example because the coma isn't evil by your definition. If the coma victim is actually suffering, then it's still a poor example because it may lead to a greater good and therefore doesn't illustrate your point.

So whether or not I get it, it's a poor example of obvious suffering that doesn't lead to a greater good. Please choose another more obvious example from among the "countless" examples that you know.

No, it's broader than that. If there is an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God then we must live in the best of all possible worlds. So "natural evil" is not just allowable, it must be necessary to the perfection of the world. One fewer child in Africa experiencing one one fewer day without food must diminish the perfection of our world.

So prove that this isn't the case, that we don't live in the best of all possible worlds.

It needs to be demonstrated how this could possibly be the case, not just for some but for every incidence of suffering there has ever been.

No, it is up to the PoE proponent to demonstrate how this could not possibly be the case.

I can respond, how could the world possibly be set up in this way? Just as I can say how can the moon possibly be made of cheese?

You have already admitted that the moon could possibly be made of cheese. By the same token, it is possible that the world is set up in this way. If you wish to prove that either are impossible, please do so.

If you really think that the moon is only "probably" not made of cheese then I can see why we disagree.

You said this yourself, I'm afraid:

Unless you can think of a way in which this might be so it is as idle as saying that the moon might be made of cheese. After all an omnipotent God could surely arrange this (the cheese is just below the suface, which is why we've not seen it).

See, you already admitted that it is possible that the cheese is just below the surface of the moon. Unlikely, but possible.

I am a hard atheist with regards to the Great Cheese Moon, you are an agnostic. This probably parallels our views on the existence of God.

I'm not a pure agnostic on the question of cheese on the moon. I believe that there is no cheese because the evidence indicates that there is no cheese, but cannot state that my belief is a fact (i.e. I cannot discount the possibility entirely).

I got the impression you were an agnostic, but you argue like a Christian. You're inserting the redundant notion of impossibility to transform it into a positive claim. The PoE argument draws attention to a serious problem for the positive claims of Christianity - that God's behaviour in creating this imperfect world seems at odds with his supposed perfect goodness.

No, the PoE inserts the notion of impossibility.

The claim of the PoE is hardly serious unless it's impossible that it could be otherwise. If it's possible that it could be otherwise, then certainly an omnipotent God could and would achieve it. Therefore, unless you can prove that it's impossible for it to be otherwise, the PoE is a non-issue and the "serious problem" is easily dismissed.

The response that all suffering is for the greater good is not in itself an answer to this - it is just a dismissal of the problem, an assumption that there is an answer but that we don't know what it is.

Now I think you're starting to understand. It is also possible that there's no problem. Unless you can prove that there is a problem.

On its own it's not even an argument. Most arguments against the PoE actually attempt to explain how all suffering could be for the greater good.

Few, if any, arguments against the PoE attempt to explain how all suffering could be for the greater good. It is enough of an argument against the PoE to show that it is possible (or, more accurately, to show that it isn't impossible as the PoE suggests).

I can only do that when they have explained how it is that they think suffering leads to the greater good. Unlike you, they actually attempt to do this - they don't just try to dodge the question.

Since I'm not omniscient and don't know for a fact that suffering always leads to the greater good, I can't possibly explain how suffering leads to the greater good. God works in mysterious ways, and all that.

I can only say that until it can be proven that it's impossible that all suffering leads to the greater good, then it's possible that it does.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Well, see if you can understand what I am getting at. You claim that god can do evil, but it simply never chooses that. Indeed, your definition would include a statement to the effect that it never will choose to do anything but good.

What is the difference between actually having no choice, and having the choice dictated by the definition?

The only difference is that it is possible for God to be omnibenevolent and omnipotent at the same time since omnibenevolent doesn't mean "unable to do evil." Omnibenevolent simply means "perfectly good," which would likely not apply to a being that doesn't have the power to choose evil.

If god actually did less than the greatest good, just because it wanted to, then it would cease to be your god, correct?

If an omnibenevolent, omnipotent being exists, then it would likely have the capacity to do less than the greatest good, but if it chose to do less than the greatest good, then it would cease to be omnibenevolent (if that was your question).

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

I'll have to admit that I still don't get it.

No, you don't.

Please choose another more obvious example from among the "countless" examples that you know.

What would be the point? You would conveniently refuse to understand that too. You have no intention of questioning your beliefs here - you just want to argue.

You have already admitted that the moon could possibly be made of cheese.

No, that was a hypothetical example, dependent on a God who doesn't exist.

No, the PoE inserts the notion of impossibility.

Whether I have to show that something is impossible depends on exactly what I am claiming. I don't want to play this game, beloved of Christians, of "who is making a positive claim" where we try to paraphrase each other's positions to look like positive claims that then need to be proven (a dubious assumption, anyway).

The PoE is a problem that Christianity must address. It challenges them (and anyone who wants to argue their case) to provide an answer that isn't just an assumption that the problem can somehow be answered in ways that we don't understand. That is obviously a non-answer. If this was the only answer that Christianity had it would be in an even worse state than it is. There are much better answers than that. I just still don't think they work.

Therefore, unless you can prove that it's impossible for it to be otherwise, the PoE is a non-issue and the "serious problem" is easily dismissed.

LOL. Easily dismissed?? It's the single biggest philosophical problem Christianity has and one of the most common reasons people give up on the religion. Why would anyone assume that God's goodness manifests itself in ways that we cannot see and is somehow at work in even the vilest atrocities, rather than concluding that he is not good after all (or doesn't exist)?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It certainly is relevant. I never was a Christian, but as I stated at the beginning of this thread, it was this problem that provided the foundation for my 100% confidence that atheism was correct for the first 33 years of my life. My favourite line was "If there is a God in charge of this unbelievably tragic mess, then that God must be the most obscene thing in existence" or something along those lines. It is a very powerful argument, or at least it looks that way until you try to get to grips with some of the issues raised in this thread. Even now, though I am no longer an atheist, the existence of this problem still restricts my notion of what God could be to something which accounts for the problem of evil - and in such a way that my position still looks like a form of atheism as far as many Christians are concerned.

 

[rocketdodger]

I must have missed something. Did you see my post about the incoherence of the concept of "absolute good"? There are not two attributes here. There is no such thing as "absolute goodness" because "good" and "bad" are things decided upon by human beings. So there cannot be anything which is incompatible with God being absolutely good. There is no such thing, any more than there is such a thing as a stone so heavy that God can't lift it.

But you don't need to define good and evil in absolute terms. Any way one defines them it puts god in the pickle of not being able to do whatever it wants to.

According to our logic, if god is absolutely good, there can be only ONE choice for it to make at any given moment -- this is what the "absolute" refers to.

The paradox of the stone doesn't really have anything to do with omnipotence. The fact that a stone too heavy to lift is a logical impossibility holds regardless of how we define omnipotence. Therefore, the solution to the paradox, that such a stone is logically impossible, isn't dependent upon the attributes we give god.

On the other hand, labeling god omnipotent and omnibenevolent creates a paradox that is completely dependent upon those two labels taken together. As such, it's solution is completely different from the paradox of the stone. It is exactly the same as saying "I drive red cars only" and "today I drove a yellow car." Taken independently, both of those statements are logically possible. Taken together, one of them must be false.

 

[rocketdodger]

If an omnibenevolent, omnipotent being exists, then it would likely have the capacity to do less than the greatest good, but if it chose to do less than the greatest good, then it would cease to be omnibenevolent (if that was your question).

Yes that is my question.