I agree. But referring to DNA as 'self-encoding' involves making a tacit teleological assumption, implying that self-replication is an explicit design feature. Using the term: 'information' involves similar assumptions, an idea Dennett expressed in Brainstorms (and one I have referred to before):Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
But what does teleology have to do with it? There is no teleology involved in biological life
"Any time a theory builder proposes to call any event, state, structure, etc., in any system (say the brain of an organism) a signal, or message or command or otherwise endows it with content, he takes out a loan on intelligence. He implicitly posits along with his signals, messages, or commands, something that can serve as a signal-reader, message-understanderer, or commander, else his "signals" will be for naught, will decay unrecieved, uncomprehended. This loan must be repaid eventually by finding and analyzing away these readers or comprehenders; for, failing this, the theory will have among its elements unanalyzed man-analogues endowed with enough intelligence to read the signals, etc., and thus the theory will postpone answering the major question: what makes for intelligence?"
Hammegk's objection (that referring to DNA as 'self-encoding' implies an underlying sentience) seems valid, and if we seek to solve this difficulty by attributing to something sufficient intelligence to render nucleotide base sequences into 'information', we may have to make that something the entire system, rather than just the DNA (but even then, we still haven't really avoided some teleological implications).