Split Thread Science cannot explain consciousness, therefore....

[Tassman]

All right. According you if you are unable to prove that impressions are caused by external world you are not saying the truth. You cannot prove it. Therefore you are not saying the truth.

I think it would be better to search for a less drastic criterion of truth. Perhaps your concept of truth is useful in natural sciences but it is not operational in the study of consciousness.

For example:



Truly? And what have to be done with all this?
https://philpapers.org/browse/attention-and-consciousness-in-psychology

Once again: Psychology studies the behaviour of conscious entities, not consciousness itself. It belongs in the arena of the social sciences, which study people and societies and their behaviour NOT the material world. The brain is demonstrably part of the material world.

OTOH The role of the natural sciences is to study the material world. So, unless you’re presenting a dualistic argument that ‘mind’ is a separate entity from the ‘material brain’, then ‘consciousness’ is firmly in the realm of the physical, natural sciences such as biology...hence my argument that the mind and consciousness can be reduced to the neurological function of the material brain and nervous system.

It is amazing that you have not understand yet that solipsism is not a dualism.
I have not seen any “argument” of yours about the “reducible” mental features. You only announce your particular beliefs.

I would be more convinced you were not arguing for 'dualism' if you had not repeatedly implied a dualistic separation between body and mind, e.g.: # 1293: “The problem of the relations between mind and brain is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one”. And: #1294: “there are a lot of books and articles and diverse theories about the relation between mind and brain there is a problem whether you want admit it or not”.

There is only a problem if you separate body and mind. There is no such separation.

 

[David Mo]

There absolutely is and I just provided it to you.

If you take a view of the Great Pyramid with your video camera, where is the impression of this perfectly consistent view, in your camera or outside the camera?

Let us use a neutral word: "head". You are seeing a perfectly consistent view of your computer at work. Where is the impression of your view, in your head or outside your head?

 

[David Mo]

Once again: Psychology studies the behaviour of conscious entities, not consciousness itself.

https://philpapers.org/browse/cognitive-models-of-consciousness

Really amazing! This whole series of articles talking about how consciousness works doesn't refer to consciousness! What about?

OTOH The role of the natural sciences is to study the material world. So, unless you’re presenting a dualistic argument that ‘mind’ is a separate entity from the ‘material brain’, then ‘consciousness’ is firmly in the realm of the physical, natural sciences such as biology...hence my argument that the mind and consciousness can be reduced to the neurological function of the material brain and nervous system.

The solipsist denies that the “material world” exists. It is only an idea. Your argument is not valid for the solipsist because it starts from an idea —external world or matter— that he doesn’t accept. If you want argue against him you have to begin attacking his disbelief.

I would be more convinced you were not arguing for 'dualism' if you had not repeatedly implied a dualistic separation between body and mind, e.g.: # 1293: “The problem of the relations between mind and brain is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one”. And: #1294: “there are a lot of books and articles and diverse theories about the relation between mind and brain there is a problem whether you want admit it or not”.

The existence of a problem is not the solution of this problem. Materialist’s solution is that only material world exists. Solipsist’s solution is that only mental world exists. Materialism and solipsism are opposite kinds of monism; they are not dualisms.

 

[David Mo]

Curious why you think this begs the question.

If we are brains in a vat, then the statement "we are brains in a vat" refers not to actual physical vats but vat-dream vats. The statement would be false.

Only if we are not brains in a vat would the statement "we are brains in a vat" refer to actual physical vats.

Your/Putnam's argument begs the question because you assume that truth means correspondence with the thing as external thing. Solipsist can hold a different concept of truth. Internal consistence, for example. This is not strange. Neopositivists defend this concept of truth.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coherence_theory_of_truth

When I was a student I had endless discussions with supporters of coherence theory. Neopositivists. Neopositivists are not solipsists, but they are first cousins. I can assure you they were tough guys.

 

[David Mo]

I'm such an optimist.

Your optimism was unfouded. I am sorry.

 

[IanS]

Yes IanS, that is what I'm saying, I was quite clear.

In the BIV I was explaining and linked to, the part you highlighted:
"The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person" is indeed a given, it is part of the thought experiment.

What is your problem with that exactly? It is a thought experiment after all?

In any case...

Putnam's argument.
You seem to say that you understand his argument and agree with it.

Here: BIV

That seems to be the consensus.
You might be one of few people who understand his argument and agree, I don't know.
I certainly don't understand it.*

What do you think it actually means?
I there really an experiment I can do to make sure I'm not a BIV?
How does the experiment work?


* Honestly I didn't really try. I just read enough to confirm that it does not pertain to what I was explaining.

NO! .... look;- as someone else remarked to David Mo "it's beginning took as if you are not arguing in good faith"! ... I quoted to you above the "Conclusion" paragraph from that article, which makes absolutely clear that Putnam's philosophical "proofs" have at the very least cast serious doubt on the validity of the BIV argument. Here again is the conclusion -


Conclusion
The brain-in-a-vat hypotheses are crucial for the formulation of skeptical arguments concerning the possibility of knowledge of the external world that are modelled on the Cartesian Evil Genius argument. We have seen that the BIV hypothesis may well be refutable, given semantic/content externalism and given the assumption that one has a priori knowledge of some key semantic properties of one's language (or, alternatively, a priori knowledge of the contents of one's mental states). Even if Putnamian arguments fail to rule out all versions of the brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, their success against the radical BIV hypothesis would be significant. Further, these arguments highlight a novel view of the relations between mind, language, and the external world.

What is said in the article is that Putnam showed with philosophical "proofs" that the basis assumption of saying "The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person", is proved wrong! Putnam showed why the BIV does NOT have the same experiences as a human brain in a body living the real world. It's not me who has to say that, I do not have to say that I agree with Putnam or with the articles author (I do not think that Philosophical "proofs" are ever worth much if anything at all) - I am just producing an article by a senior professorial academic philosopher who describes Putnam's "proofs" in detail, and who says that modern-day (as of 2002 revised in 2011) philosophers do now accept that Putnam's proofs against the BIV are probably correct, so that at the very least (according to the article) the BIV argument is now seriously in doubt ... and in particular it's in doubt because Putnam's proofs showed that the BIV cannot experience the same things as a human brain functioning normally in a living body.

As for you picking out parts of the article which talk about initial objections to Putnam's papers, what the article actually says that it was found that with some simplifying alterations to parts of Putnam's original "proofs", those initial objections were either removed, or else at least rendered dubious ... so that the final conclusion is the one that the articles author gave above, and that very clearly says that serious doubt has now been raised for the entire basis of the BIV argument, and it presents that as the current position now accepted by philosophy in general.

 

[Cheetah]

This thread is confusing because it is in the philosophy section but the subject "Science cannot explain consciousness" is in my opinion all about science and does not really involve philosophy.

Some "philosophy" enters in defining consciousness, which there have been many threads about and no satisfying conclusion in sight.
We should just adopt a circular definition. I propose "the human experience of I" and leave philosophy out of it. I don't mean that broadly, as in things you experience with your senses but what it feels like to be a human and conscious, an individual. Whatever science finds to explain "the human experience of I" is consciousness. I'll call it C_s.

From a philosophy perspective the "I" that is conscious, is the thing in control, the thing behind your eyes looking out at the world, using your senses, considering situations, making decisions and pulling the strings to make your body take action. I'll call it C_p.
It is not surprising that the human experience of C_s is the same as C_p.

There is confusion in this thread between what is being discussed and argued about, C_s or C_p
A C_s post answered, however carefully and correctly from a philosophy perspective, will be utterly unsatisfying. A science rely to a C_p argument won't make any sense.
C_p can never trust it's senses completely since they are secondhand, it might even be a solipsist. C_s evolved in my opinion because the world is real and having C_s gives us an edge.


There is a lot of science that shows disparities between C_s and C_p. A large part of the "I am in control and making conscious decisions before taking action" seems to be an illusion. C_s also seems to be to a large degree in "more than one mind" and possibly also an illusion.
I also believe there are many hints as to why we experience a C_p.

How about we distinguish clearly between the two and shift slightly to discussing the differences between C_s and C_p and what science has to say about C_s?

Just a suggestion, I feel this should be about science.

 

[Cheetah]

IanS, you are doing exactly this:

If I said:

"If you hopped on a moonbeam all the way to TRAPPIST-1, spent a day sightseeing and then caught a moonbeam back home, you will only be away for a day but on earth 80 years and a day will have passed"

What will be the value in pointing out "you can't hop on a moonbeam", "TRAPPIST-1 is 39.6 ly away, not 40" etc.
That is irrelevant to the point I was making (relativity), it's a thought experiment.

Even if you presented rock solid proof a real BIV is impossible, it will not change the argument/point.
The argument/point is theoretical.
There is NO real BIV in a thought experiment.

 

[Tassman]

https://philpapers.org/browse/cognitive-models-of-consciousness

Really amazing! This whole series of articles talking about how consciousness works doesn't refer to consciousness! What about?

Psychologists do not tell us how consciousness arose; this is the province of natural science, not behavioural science. In psychology the existence of consciousness is assumed.

The solipsist denies that the “material world” exists. It is only an idea. Your argument is not valid for the solipsist because it starts from an idea —external world or matter— that he doesn’t accept. If you want argue against him you have to begin attacking his disbelief.

AFAICT solipsism is an incoherent theory.

The existence of a problem is not the solution of this problem. Materialist’s solution is that only material world exists.

There is no problem existing...not unless one regards body and mind as separate entities. There is no logically coherent alternative to materialism.

Solipsist’s solution is that only mental world exists. Materialism and solipsism are opposite kinds of monism; they are not dualisms.

See above.

 

[Cheetah]

AFAICT solipsism is an incoherent theory

Could you explain please.
True Solipsism, a real existing solipsist in a real "solipsist universe" might sound implausible*, but solipsism does not seem incoherent to me. I don't know the language of philosophy well though, it might have a specific meaning.

*It might not actually be more implausible than the real material universe imho.

 

[David Mo]

...so that the final conclusion is the one that the articles author gave above, and that very clearly says that serious doubt has now been raised for the entire basis of the BIV argument, and it presents that as the current position now accepted by philosophy in general.

I am surprised that you use the opinion of a philosophical article who considers "doubtful" "the strong" version of the brain in the vat argument -which is but a metaphor not strictly solipsist- in support of your categorical assertions that science proves that solipsism is false.

This is a non sense.

It would be more useful if we discuss Putnam's argument that is a clear petitio principi. See my comment above.

 

[David Mo]

Psychologists do not tell us how consciousness arose; this is the province of natural science, not behavioural science. In psychology the existence of consciousness is assumed.

This is rigurously false. Have you seen the abstracts of the articles referenced? Many of them are about how different features of conscience arouse. Others about the relation mind-brain directly. They are psychological or philosophical articles. None of them is formulated in a physicalist language.

AFAICT solipsism is an incoherent theory.

Amen.

There is no problem existing...not unless one regards body and mind as separate entities. There is no logically coherent alternative to materialism.

Amen.

See above.

Where? What of your articles of faith?


Science idolatry is not science.

 

[Belz...]

Are you saying the mind is the frame of reference for determining what is outside and inside the mind? It's impossible to know or experience anything outside the mind.

Irrelevant, as I've explained. Have you understood what I said? Because from your answer you don't seem to have.

If you take a view of the Great Pyramid with your video camera, where is the impression of this perfectly consistent view, in your camera or outside the camera?

Let us use a neutral word: "head". You are seeing a perfectly consistent view of your computer at work. Where is the impression of your view, in your head or outside your head?

I'm sure you think they are clever, but I assure you neither of these questions even make sense. You don't seem to understand what I mean by "consistency" at all.

 

[Cheetah]

Rebuttal to a solipsist:
Do you feel shame?

 

[LarryS]

Rebuttal to a solipsist:
Do you feel shame?

It's curious that solipsism keeps coming up in these threads - it can only be applied after great effort and imagination, then once introduced, it takes great effort to get rid of it. Interesting because materialists keep bringing it up when solipism can only exist in a materialist framework.

 

[LarryS]

IanS, you are doing exactly this:



Even if you presented rock solid proof a real BIV is impossible, it will not change the argument/point.
The argument/point is theoretical.
There is NO real BIV in a thought experiment.

I'd have happily paid a dollar - to have been in the room when Einstein introduced the train/lightening thought experiment - - - and someone yells out "that impossible"

 

[LarryS]

Irrelevant, as I've explained. Have you understood what I said? Because from your answer you don't seem to have.



I'm sure you think they are clever, but I assure you neither of these questions even make sense. You don't seem to understand what I mean by "consistency" at all.

Perhaps I understand what you're saying, maybe not - - - I do not see how defining 'outside' the mind as that which is 'consistent', and defining 'consistent' as that which is 'outside' the mind constitutes a frame of reference, or is anything useful.

 

[Belz...]

Perhaps I understand what you're saying, maybe not - - - I do not see how defining 'outside' the mind as that which is 'consistent', and defining 'consistent' as that which is 'outside' the mind constitutes a frame of reference, or is anything useful.

You don't think having a reliable standard to determine what's real and imagined to be useful?

Fine, then. Suit yourself.

 

[LarryS]

You don't think having a reliable standard to determine what's real and imagined to be useful?

Fine, then. Suit yourself.

So I don't like your standard - and you interpret that to mean I don't think having a standard is useful?

 

[Belz...]

So I don't like your standard - and you interpret that to mean I don't think having a standard is useful?

You've rejected literally the most basic form of knowledge as not useful. It stands to reason that you don't find knowledge useful at all.

But for those of us who find it useful, we need to be able to tell real from not real, and I've given you a very reliable way to do so.