Split Thread Science cannot explain consciousness, therefore....

[IanS]

Incidentally re the complaint that Tony Bruekner (who apparently wrote that summarising BIV article that I linked from Stamford) quote “is not a modern-day philosopher”, he (Tony Brueckner) apparently died on 7th April 2014 … here is a brief statement about his death from the Chancellor of the Univ. of California -

https://chancellor.ucsb.edu/memos/?4.16.2014.Sad.News...Professor.Anthony.Brueckner


Opening extract (just to save one dissenter here from even the most minimal task of lifting his finger to click a link and check a few short sentences) -

April 16, 2014
TO THE CAMPUS COMMUNITY Office of the Chancellor University of California, Santa Barbara

Dear Colleagues:
It is with great sorrow that I write to share with you the regrettable news that our colleague Anthony Brueckner, professor of philosophy, passed away April 7 at home with his family.

Dr. Brueckner joined our campus as a visiting associate professor in 1987 after having taught at Yale University and, briefly, at the University of Arkansas. He was a tireless and admired colleague, and served as chair of our Department of Philosophy for four years.
….
…. etc,
Sincerely,
Henry Yang Chancellor

Disclaimer - I had never heard of Tony Bruckner, because I really have no interest in what philosophy academics may say.

 

[Myriad]

Think of this as a "thought expariment"
Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: It can't tell whether it's a BIV or a real person.

That is all I was talking about.
Find fault with my logic.

Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: No meaningful distinction can be made between the "vat" and its supporting equipment, and a real world. Of course the BIV can't tell whether it's a BIV or a "real person," because there's no difference between those two possibilities.

(To make such a distinction, we would have to add to the thought experiment some additional entity, which can observe the 'actual' situation 'objectively' and say e.g. "that's a brain in a vat!" But to posit those capabilities of that entity introduces a contradiction: how can that entity be certain it's observing anything real, if the BIV cannot be?)

 

[Frank Newgent]

Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: No meaningful distinction can be made between the "vat" and its supporting equipment, and a real world. Of course the BIV can't tell whether it's a BIV or a "real person," because there's no difference between those two possibilities.

garbage in, garbage out

 

[Cheetah]

Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.
Conclusion: No meaningful distinction can be made between the "vat" and its supporting equipment, and a real world. Of course the BIV can't tell whether it's a BIV or a "real person," because there's no difference between those two possibilities.

(To make such a distinction, we would have to add to the thought experiment some additional entity, which can observe the 'actual' situation 'objectively' and say e.g. "that's a brain in a vat!" But to posit those capabilities of that entity introduces a contradiction: how can that entity be certain it's observing anything real, if the BIV cannot be?)

 

[David Mo]

But if, as you posit, it cannot, there is no other means of investigation open to us. Metaphysics cannot do it; it has no means of testing the truth of its premises.

It depends of the sense of “to test”. If you adopt the strong concept of the philosophical positivism I am afraid you will need some metaphysical concepts referred to subjective states of mind. If that comforts you, I will tell you that adopting certain "metaphysical" concepts does not imply to accept dualism or idealism.

I repeat, I’m not talking about behaviour, this is the province of psychology and the other social sciences. I’m talking about ‘consciousness’ i.e. the self-awareness of the higher creatures such as the primates...including humans...and certain other animals.

Psychology also studies consciousness.

You continue to posit the ‘mind’, i.e. the process of thinking, feeling and perceiving, as a separate entity from the brain. It is not. This is dualism and dualism poses enormous problems at the level of the supposed nexus between the material brain and the hypothetical mind/soul. .

Your mistake: solipsism is not a dualism, it is a monist idealism. The solipsist doesn’t claim for two different and separate things. He is a monist. Only ideas in my mind exist. Terefore the problems of dualism do not affect him.

 

[IanS]

IansS, that does not seem to have anything to do with what I was explaining, here is my logic:

Think of this as a "thought expariment"
Given: The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person.Conclusion: It can't tell whether it's a BIV or a real person.

That is all I was talking about.
Find fault with my logic.

Would you pleas explain what your post has to do with my point.

Do you mean to say that the article (links posted above) does not have anything to do with what your were saying? Is that what you say?

Well that would of course be wrong. It has everything to do very exactly with what you have assumed/claimed for a BIV … in particular, when you say “The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person”, the article explains how Putnam's “proofs” (these are what philosophy calls “proof”) show that the BIV cannot in fact have the same experience as a human brain functioning in a real body …

… but as I just said to you – you must read the article and understand it for yourself, rather than trying to get me explain it to you. Read the article (enough times until you know why it says that BIV is now widely agreed to be very probably, or at least quite likely, wrong).

 

[Tassman]

It depends of the sense of “to test”. If you adopt the strong concept of the philosophical positivism I am afraid you will need some metaphysical concepts referred to subjective states of mind. If that comforts you, I will tell you that adopting certain "metaphysical" concepts does not imply to accept dualism or idealism.

“To test” in this context refers to being able to show the premise of a metaphysical argument to be true. Axioms, which often act as metaphysical premises, are assumed to be true but they cannot be shown to be true. Hence you cannot show that the conclusion of a metaphysical argument is true.

Psychology also studies consciousness.

Psychology studies the behaviour of conscious entities, not consciousness itself.

Your mistake: solipsism is not a dualism, it is a monist idealism. The solipsist doesn’t claim for two different and separate things. He is a monist. Only ideas in my mind exist. Terefore the problems of dualism do not affect him.

So what’s all this talk about the “problem between mind and brain”? Either the mind is separate from the brain, which is dualism, OR the “mind” is reducible to the neurological function of the brain and nervous system as I’ve argued previously.

 

[Cheetah]

Do you mean to say that the article (links posted above) does not have anything to do with what your were saying? Is that what you say?

Yes IanS, that is what I'm saying, I was quite clear.

In the BIV I was explaining and linked to, the part you highlighted:
"The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person" is indeed a given, it is part of the thought experiment.

What is your problem with that exactly? It is a thought experiment after all?

In any case...

Putnam's argument.
You seem to say that you understand his argument and agree with it.

Here: BIV

it remains far from clear how exactly Putnam’s argument should be taken and what it actually proves

That seems to be the consensus.
You might be one of few people who understand his argument and agree, I don't know.
I certainly don't understand it.*

What do you think it actually means?
I there really an experiment I can do to make sure I'm not a BIV?
How does the experiment work?


* Honestly I didn't really try. I just read enough to confirm that it does not pertain to what I was explaining.

 

[David Mo]

“To test” in this context refers to being able to show the premise of a metaphysical argument to be true. Axioms, which often act as metaphysical premises, are assumed to be true but they cannot be shown to be true. Hence you cannot show that the conclusion of a metaphysical argument is true.

All right. According you if you are unable to prove that impressions are caused by external world you are not saying the truth. You cannot prove it. Therefore you are not saying the truth.

I think it would be better to search for a less drastic criterion of truth. Perhaps your concept of truth is useful in natural sciences but it is not operational in the study of consciousness.

For example:

Psychology studies the behaviour of conscious entities, not consciousness itself.

Truly? And what have to be done with all this?
https://philpapers.org/browse/attention-and-consciousness-in-psychology

So what’s all this talk about the “problem between mind and brain”? Either the mind is separate from the brain, which is dualism, OR the “mind” is reducible to the neurological function of the brain and nervous system as I’ve argued previously.

It is amazing that you have not understand yet that solipsism is not a dualism.
I have not seen any “argument” of yours about the “reducible” mental features. You only announce your particular beliefs.

 

[Belz...]

Ian, you complicate things unnecessarily and it blurs the point.

You seem to agree with me that if (a really, really big IF, I know) you were a brain in a vat, you could not know for sure that you were one, since your experiences would be identical to what you would have experienced as a brain in a scull in a body in the real world.

Just answer yes or no for me, please.

I'd say no, myself. I'd expect any simulation, dream or delusion to contain inconsistencies. If there are no inconsistencies, then it is indistinguishable from an external reality and therefore for all intents and purposes IS an external reality.

 

[David Mo]

Yes IanS, that is what I'm saying, I was quite clear.

In the BIV I was explaining and linked to, the part you highlighted:
"The BIV has the exact same experience as a real person" is indeed a given, it is part of the thought experiment.

What is your problem with that exactly? It is a thought experiment after all?

In any case...

Putnam's argument.
You seem to say that you understand his argument and agree with it.

Here: BIV

That seems to be the consensus.
You might be one of few people who understand his argument and agree, I don't know.
I certainly don't understand it.*

What do you think it actually means?
I there really an experiment I can do to make sure I'm not a BIV?
How does the experiment work?


* Honestly I didn't really try. I just read enough to confirm that it does not pertain to what I was explaining.

Putnam's argument is a petitio principi made by a second-rate philosopher. Don't overstate his contribution.

 

[David Mo]

I'd say no, myself. I'd expect any simulation, dream or delusion to contain inconsistencies. If there are no inconsistencies, then it is indistinguishable from an external reality and therefore for all intents and purposes IS an external reality.

I correct your sentence:
If there are no inconsistencies between ideas and external facts, then external facts are indistinguishable from ideas and therefore for all intents and purposes external reality is an idea.

Do you see the difference? If you claim that an external reality is different from an idea you have to show what that difference is, which is impossible. Therefore external reality is just an idea.

 

[Belz...]

I correct your sentence:
If there are no inconsistencies between ideas and external facts, then external facts are indistinguishable from ideas and therefore for all intents and purposes external reality is an idea.

Do you see the difference? If you claim that an external reality is different from an idea you have to show what that difference is, which is impossible. Therefore external reality is just an idea.

That might fly in a first year philosophy class but you won't get that by me. You added a new element to the first bolded part and then pretended to make a point with it. But there is no point, since to me consistency IS the distinguishing factor. Your version makes no sense under that.

 

[RecoveringYuppy]

But there is no difference in the consistency.

 

[Belz...]

But there is no difference in the consistency.

Not sure what you're saying here but 1) Everything I know for a fact happens within my mind or is unreal is inconsistent, while everything that appears to be real and outside my mind is consistent. I consider that to be a reasonable standard for determining what's real and 2) If the simulation were entirely, 100% consistent, then there's no way to tell the difference anyway and thus it's entirely reasonable to treat it as if it were reality.

We've moved on from solipsism precisely because of this sort of thing.

 

[LarryS]

Not sure what you're saying here but 1) Everything I know for a fact happens within my mind or is unreal is inconsistent, while everything that appears to be real and outside my mind is consistent. I consider that to be a reasonable standard for determining what's real and 2) If the simulation were entirely, 100% consistent, then there's no way to tell the difference anyway and thus it's entirely reasonable to treat it as if it were reality.

We've moved on from solipsism precisely because of this sort of thing.

There is no frame of reference where one can claim this occurred inside the mind, and that occurred outside the mind. Everything we've ever experienced and known has occurred in the mind . . . and even this expression is an artifact of language, who don't know any inside or outside the mind. This is not saying that reality is only in or of our limited mind . . . this would be solipsism.

 

[Belz...]

There is no frame of reference where one can claim this occurred inside the mind, and that occurred outside the mind.

There absolutely is and I just provided it to you.

 

[LarryS]

There absolutely is and I just provided it to you.

Are you saying the mind is the frame of reference for determining what is outside and inside the mind? It's impossible to know or experience anything outside the mind.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Putnam's argument is a petitio principi made by a second-rate philosopher. Don't overstate his contribution.

Curious why you think this begs the question.

If we are brains in a vat, then the statement "we are brains in a vat" refers not to actual physical vats but vat-dream vats. The statement would be false.

Only if we are not brains in a vat would the statement "we are brains in a vat" refer to actual physical vats.

 

[Cheetah]

I'd say no, myself. I'd expect any simulation, dream or delusion to contain inconsistencies. If there are no inconsistencies, then it is indistinguishable from an external reality and therefore for all intents and purposes IS an external reality.

Yes.
I'd say, it depends on the technology sustaining the brain. A real brain in a real vat might well experience "glitches in the matrix."

But that is beside the point. If I said:

"If you hopped on a moonbeam all the way to TRAPPIST-1, spent a day sightseeing and then caught a moonbeam back home, you will only be a way for a day but on earth 80 years and a day will have passed"

What will be the value in pointing out "you can't hop on a moonbeam", "TRAPPIST-1 is 39.6 ly away, not 40" etc.
That is irrelevant to the point I was making (relativity), it's a thought experiment.