Myriad - thanks for your thoughts. I will reread and study them later. As an initial response I would suggest that your introduction of ideas such as a narrative, will, language and etc. are way way down the road from my initial offering of our most intimate experience which is 'being present, being aware'.
And each of us can locate and establish this 'being present, being aware' without any suppositions, language or narrative, though language and perhaps a narrative is required to communicate it with another.
And yes, my claim that consciousness is fundamental is speculative, but since I can find no other 'substance' than consciousness, I have no choice. Now, I am not claiming I author or create my perceptions, or imagine them - physics totally works. Yet I can not find any matter. So, I must have some kind of a 'condition', or science has a long ways to go in understanding reality.
Apologies for the delayed response. My work schedule is prohibitive of all but the hastiest responses, in the latter half of most weeks.
The obvious question regarding "being present" as a pure state is, if you disavow all sensory input, memory, and thought, then
where (and
when) are you present? Similarly, in the case of "being aware," being aware of what? Phrases such as "pure being" is sometimes used to describe such a mental state without invoking those questions.
The more subtle question is, can pure being actually be an experience? We can ask the same question in a different way: what else does or does not experience pure being? Does a thermostat experience pure being, perhaps if you disconnect its one sensory input (a thermometer)? If so... so what? That is, what's the difference between such "consciousness" and just existing as an object?
And if not... why not? What's the difference between the thermostat and you? Surely having or not having a mere material brain, a vague and perhaps not even real thing so many steps down that road from primary-ness, can't make any important difference, if it's the consciousness that's primary.
The other issue with your particular ideal monism is that it's in competition with so many others that seem to have equal footing. I mentioned Schopenhauer's concept of will (
welt) as primary. Move your finger; what's the one thing you can say with certainty about that experience? Not that your finger exists; it might be mere mental illusion or "representation" ("
vorstellung") that you and I happen to call a finger. Not even that you exist. The one certain thing is that it moved
because you willed it. Such thinking convinced Schopenhauer that will is the monad, the primary thing that really exists. (This is not a solipsism; the monad isn't individual will, it's universal will. You cannot will yourself through a wall because the wall's will resists that result.) Electromagnetism and gravity are manifestations of will, and so forth.
It was studying such ideas that convinced me that all ideal monisms are arbitrary, more or less interchangeable, and ultimately tautological. Will is primary. Change is primary. God is primary. Oneness is primary. Consciousness is primary. Go back far enough, and you can find philosophers arguing about whether air is primary, or if it's water instead. The game is, you claim everything is a duck, and then you classify anything that seems a lot like a duck (such as ducks) as the true reality; things that are somewhat like a duck (swans, geese, clay pigeons, boats, raincoats, down comforters, anything that's in a row, quarks) as partly real but distorted by our imperfect perceptions, but being important clues pointing to the true duck nature of all things; and anything that seems unlike a duck (such as the stars, or medieval agrarian history except for the parts about ducks) as mental illusion.
This is even true of materialism. The difference is that with the latter, the part where you try to describe everything as different varieties of duck seems to be a lot less work.