Split Thread Science cannot explain consciousness, therefore....

[Tassman]

Could you highlight the specific premises that are not true?

There is no actual brain in an actual vat being fed actual electrical impulses. It is imaginary, i.e. a thought-experiment..

 

[David Mo]

There is no actual brain in an actual vat being fed actual electrical impulses. It is imaginary, i.e. a thought-experiment..

Of course. This "thought-experiment" shows that sense data are subjective. May you answer a simple question? This one: How can the brain in a vat know that he is a brain in a vat and not the emperor Charlemagne?

 

[Cheetah]

We have made progress, I think.

I don't think it helps any solipsist-type argument of unreality to introduce ideas about a so-called “brain in a vat”.

I'll show you how it does.

Well that second Wiki quote (directly above) actually specifically does say exactly what I just pointed out as an “unspoken demand for proof” in the previous Wiki quote! That is – look at the highlighted sentence above where is says right from the start “one cannot know" … but how many times do we have to explain to you (and to David Mo and Larry) that neither science nor anyone here is claiming to have a literal “proof” that what we detect is indeed certain to be “reality”.

Yes!!!
You CANNOT KNOW, that was my point all along. That is what ties it to solipsism, because of course it works both ways.

You cannot know that you are a brain in a vat, just like you cannot know that you are not, see? The same for solipsism. The same for materialism.

 

[Cheetah]

There is no actual brain in an actual vat being fed actual electrical impulses. It is imaginary, i.e. a thought-experiment..

Of course not, I was not talking about the example, I thought you would understand.
I'm talking about the argument the example illustrates.
Please highlight the specific premises in the argument that are not true.

 

[Cheetah]

Indeed ... any suggestion at all of a "brain in a vat", immediately invokes external reality. So that cannot be any support at all for claims of non-reality.

I'll say it again, don't attack the example used to illustrate the point, attack the point itself if you disagree. See post #1208.

 

[Tassman]

Of course. This "thought-experiment" shows that sense data are subjective. May you answer a simple question? This one: How can the brain in a vat know that he is a brain in a vat and not the emperor Charlemagne?

One cannot know whether one is a brain in a vat, consequently one cannot know whether all one's beliefs might be false, since, in principle, it is impossible to rule out oneself being a 'brain in a vat'. Nor is there good reason to think we are a ‘brain in a vat’, the concept remains a thought-experiment not an empirically verifiable fact.

 

[Tassman]

Of course not, I was not talking about the example, I thought you would understand.
I'm talking about the argument the example illustrates.
Please highlight the specific premises in the argument that are not true.

The argument may well be a valid argument, but unless it can be shown to have a verifiable true premise, it is not a sound argument. An argument is sound if and only if it is valid and all its premises are true.

 

[The Norseman]

The argument may well be a valid argument, but unless it can be shown to have a verifiable true premise, it is not a sound argument. An argument is sound if and only if it is valid and all its premises are true.

Does the ability to be falsified have any input on valid arguments? Would it affect the validity in other words?

I ask because you're saying that that argument may be valid; but what if it isn't falsifiable? Does that matter in this case?

 

[Tassman]

Does the ability to be falsified have any input on valid arguments? Would it affect the validity in other words?

I ask because you're saying that that argument may be valid; but what if it isn't falsifiable? Does that matter in this case?

As I understand it, a valid argument is concerned with the logical form of the argument, not necessarily the truth of the argument...although the truth value of the argument is implied. OTOH an argument is 'sound' only if it is both valid, and all of its premises can be shown to be actually true.

 

[Cheetah]

As I understand it, a valid argument is concerned with the logical form of the argument, not necessarily the truth of the argument...although the truth value of the argument is implied. OTOH an argument is 'sound' only if it is both valid, and all of its premises can be shown to be actually true .

I agree with everything you say.
OTOH I think that in this case all the premises are true.
That is why I'm asking you to specify which are false in your opinion.

 

[ynot]

Science can explain consciousness better than philosophy, fantasy, religion and other paranormal beliefs . . . therefore

 

[Tassman]

I agree with everything you say.
OTOH I think that in this case all the premises are true.
That is why I'm asking you to specify which are false in your opinion.

The premises may be true, the problem is that you can't show them to be true. The 'brain in a vat' is merely a thought experiment and as such is a device of the imagination used to investigate ideas.

 

[Tassman]

Science can explain consciousness better than philosophy, fantasy, religion and other paranormal beliefs . . . therefore

I couldn't agree more. As Dan Dennett superbly opines: "Over the centuries, every other phenomenon of initially "supernatural" mysteriousness has succumbed to an uncontroversial explanation within the commodious folds of physical science... The "miracles" of life itself, and of reproduction, are now analyzed into the well-known intricacies of molecular biology. Why should consciousness be any exception? Why should the brain be the only complex physical object in the universe to have an interface with another realm of being? Besides, the notorious problems with the supposed transactions at that dualistic interface are as good as a reductio ad absurdum of the view. The phenomena of consciousness are an admittedly dazzling lot, but I suspect that dualism would never be seriously considered if there weren't such a strong undercurrent of desire to protect the mind from science, by supposing it composed of a stuff that is in principle uninvestigatable by the methods of the physical sciences. - "Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds,"

 

[Cheetah]

The premises may be true, the problem is that you can't show them to be true. The 'brain in a vat' is merely a thought experiment and as such is a device of the imagination used to investigate ideas.

You keep dodging my question, let me rephrase, again.

Please highlight any premises in the argument, illustrated by the thought experiment, that only "may be true" and are not "undeniably true".

You keep claiming there are.
I honestly cannot see any.
That's why I am asking, please point it/them out to me.

 

[David Mo]

One cannot know whether one is a brain in a vat, consequently one cannot know whether all one's beliefs might be false, since, in principle, it is impossible to rule out oneself being a 'brain in a vat'. Nor is there good reason to think we are a ‘brain in a vat’, the concept remains a thought-experiment not an empirically verifiable fact.

The brain in a vat posses the nature of sense data. The issue is not whether this imagined situation is possible or not. However, you have done the correct answer: the brain in a vat never would be able to know that he is not the emperor Charlemagne, but a brain in a vat. He would have impressions without any objective link. He would experiment horses, shrines, battles and crowns where no horse, no shrine, no battle and no crown would exist.

Conclusion: the mere existence of impressions doesn't justify the belief that the external world exists. The solipsist gives a further step: How do you know that you have a brain? By means of impressions. Draw your own conclusion, please.

Note that the solpsist problem forces us to change our concept of truth. We can define the truth as the correspondence between ideas and things, but the things can be no more the thing-in-itself of Aristotelian metaphysics. There is not any way to compare thoughts with external things, even if we believe in the existence of an external world.

 

[David Mo]

I couldn't agree more. As Dan Dennett superbly opines: "Over the centuries, every other phenomenon of initially "supernatural" mysteriousness has succumbed to an uncontroversial explanation within the commodious folds of physical science... The "miracles" of life itself, and of reproduction, are now analyzed into the well-known intricacies of molecular biology. Why should consciousness be any exception? Why should the brain be the only complex physical object in the universe to have an interface with another realm of being? Besides, the notorious problems with the supposed transactions at that dualistic interface are as good as a reductio ad absurdum of the view. The phenomena of consciousness are an admittedly dazzling lot, but I suspect that dualism would never be seriously considered if there weren't such a strong undercurrent of desire to protect the mind from science, by supposing it composed of a stuff that is in principle uninvestigatable by the methods of the physical sciences. - "Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds,"

Beautiful sentence but not too clear.

In reality this is a statement of intentions. Many problems are solved by science that aroused new problems. Science is a way to solve old problems by means of new unsolved problems about the same things that we thought solved. Nobody knows if this chain will never end. I am not so optimistic as Dennet is because nobody knows if this chain has some unknowable links. The origin of Universe seems to be one of them. Maybe human consciousness is another unsolvable problem. Some of these problems are metaphysics. Analysis can discard them. Other are unavoidable and we have to look for extra-scientific provisional solutions.

However, speculations about the future are not scientific in themselves. What a rational sceptic has to do is to manage himself with the current state of positive knowledge. And current science is not able to explain every feature of what we call mind. We ought to cope with limitations of the scientific knowledge of brain and behaviour and use mental concepts when we have not other choice.

 

[David Mo]

Science can explain consciousness better than philosophy, fantasy, religion and other paranormal beliefs . . . therefore

Amen.

 

[Tassman]

You keep dodging my question, let me rephrase, again.

Please highlight any premises in the argument, illustrated by the thought experiment, that only "may be true" and are not "undeniably true".

You keep claiming there are.
I honestly cannot see any.
That's why I am asking, please point it/them out to me.

I would have thought it obvious, but perhaps I’m missing something. How do you argue that the imagined premises of a thought experiment can compare with the actual things of the external world? Certainly, one can make a valid argument by way of imagined premises. But, but one cannot provide true premises to a deductive argument from one’s imagination, hence one cannot make a ‘sound argument’. Where am I wrong?

 

[IanS]

We have made progress, I think.



I'll show you how it does.



Yes!!! You CANNOT KNOW, that was my point all along. That is what ties it to solipsism, because of course it works both ways.

You cannot know that you are a brain in a vat, just like you cannot know that you are not, see? The same for solipsism. The same for materialism.

Well that answer just shows how monumentally wrong you have been all along & right from the very beginning!

You say we "CANNOT KNOW". But it was pointed out to you long, long ago, why that is a completely meaningless and utterly worthless statement. You cannot accurately claim to truly "know" anything!

All your opponents here have said long ago that of course "we cannot know", i.e. it's impossible to produce the absolute certainty of a "proof" for anything at all (even in pure maths you have to make certain starting assumptions). That's been explained to you here countless times.

We cannot accurately claim to be "certain" that the world we detect around us is real, we cannot produce an absolute proof of that. So its like everything else (inc. evolution, QM, GR or anything at all), and there is no exception possible for philosophers claims either - you cannot show a literal "proof", instead you have to produce credible genuine evidence for whatever you claim.

If you (any philosopher) claim that the world might be an illusion, then you have to show genuine credible evidence for how that could be the case. So what is your evidence for how the world might be an unreal illusion?

Look - all that you have is a hypothesis (actually just an idea) from philosophers who have claimed that the world might be an unreal illusion. If you claim any hypothesis or idea like that, then the mere claim/idea/hypothesis is 100% worthless unless and until you support it with genuine credible evidence ... so what do you produce as the evidence of an unreal world?

Science disagrees with that philosophical hypothesis/idea of an unreal world. Science says that world around us is indeed real, and real in more-or-less almost exactly the form that we detect it. And to support that hypothesis of science, science produces a vast mountain of completely unarguable evidence (if you claim that it's not unarguable, then you will have to produce genuine research papers from the scientific journals that claim to show how & why science is wrong to think that it's detecting a real world ... if you cannot find any papers doing that, then you have no valid objection to what science produces as the evidence).

But that's not a "proof". Science is not claiming that "WE CAN KNOW" (to use your own words). It's a hypothesis which says that world around us appears to be real as we detect it, and here is all of the evidence for why we think that is true.

Against that you have what you have been producing as an alternative hypothesis from philosophers who say the world may be an unreal illusion. OK, so if you say that, then you have to do what science has done, and you must produce all your evidence of an unreal universe .... where is the evidence which shows the universe to be an illusion.

And by the way, it makes no difference at all if you try to rule out the use of "evidence" by claiming that if your hypothesis of unreality is correct, then all detected evidence would also only be an illusion in one disembodied "mind". You still end up needing to explain what evidence your disembodied mind has used to claim that you are indeed just a single disembodied mind ... and I have already explained that in detail in previous posts.

So ... if you make that hypothesis of unreality, then what is your evidence to support that hypothesis?

 

[Cheetah]

I would have thought it obvious, but perhaps I’m missing something. How do you argue that the imagined premises of a thought experiment can compare with the actual things of the external world? Certainly, one can make a valid argument by way of imagined premises. But, but one cannot provide true premises to a deductive argument from one’s imagination, hence one cannot make a ‘sound argument’. Where am I wrong?

I'm saying that the "imagined premises" of the thought experiment are "undeniably true", not only in the context of the thought experiment, but also in the "real world" that we live in.