Science and free will

[UndercoverElephant]

UE: Why don't you just stop there? Stop with the nonsensical philosophy and sad attempts at logic?

a) there's nothing wrong with my logic.
b) this has more to do with religion than philosophy. I'm only using philosophy to crank the door open wide enough to allow religious language into the debate.

What you have basically constructed is a rather blatant apologetic for something you are well aware is so unique as to be unreal, so out there that no one(unless they already believe) would believe you and can never be proven and yet has some major foundation to your beliefs.

It isn't a foundation, but it is certainly an important component. I'm not sure it is as unique as you suggest. Many people have previously spoken about such things. If there's a difference in my case it is that I came from a fiercely skeptical/atheist/scientific background and I have enough of a philosophical education to know how the two worldviews intersect. Most people who experience stuff like what I have experienced lack either the scientific knowledge and/or the philosophical knowledge to be able to come to a board like this and last more than five minutes before being blasted off the board by angry materialistic skeptics calling them deluded anti-scientific fools.

You can quote philosophers all day long but in the end, you believe because you believe. End of story. Your rationalization is dishonest to yourself and to others.

On the contrary, it would be dishonest to myself to deny my experiences really happened. It would be the zenith of dishonesty.

 

[Belz...]

"Determined" means that something has been caused by something else.

Good. So we could drop it and use "caused" instead.

"Random" has two meanings. One is the compatiblist sort of randomness that Lord Emsworth refered to: fair dice throws.

Yes. We use the term "random" to refer to this in everyday life. But this is not true randomness, and I don't usually mean that when I use the word "random".

I'm no more interested in that than I am in compatibilist free will.

That's fine. I'm not interested in free will at all. I don't have knowledge of the future so it's all the same to me.

The second meaning of "random" is metaphysical and it refers to quantum events - or at least it would refer to quantum events if those events really are determined by absolutely nothing at all, as some people believe.

It isn't a matter of belief. They do seem completely random. If that's the case, then there are random events. If not, then EVERYTHING is deterministic. I also have issue with "metaphysical". I think it's quite physical.

NOTE: "will" is NOT an event. It is a cause, but not an event.

It's not an event because it was itself uncaused, is that what you mean ? That's fine. But I'm still trying to understand how the fact that it was uncaused anything but random.

A non-physical cause.[/b]

But it's still a CAUSE.

I mean exactly what is happening when the suicidal jumper finally jumps.

That doesn't help me.

You, being a determinist, believe that this moment is determined by previous physical states (or possibly by quantum randomness if you are an indeterminist who doesn't believe in free will.)

This is annoying. Why do you keep trying to label me ? I'm not a "determinist" or anything. As far as our current knowledge is concerned that's the way it works. Of course there's also the small issue of "P or NOT P".

I don't accept this.

And yet I still don't have a working definition of something that is both uncaused and not random.

I am saying that the moment is (or at least can be) determined by the free will of the jumper - by the intent of the agent of free will.

Yes, I know. But the problem is you have A) No reason to believe that this isn't either deterministic or random and B) You can't explain it in any other way, for good reasons.

Why doesn't that make sense to you? The only reason it could not make sense to you is that you are a materialist

No, no, no, no, no, no, no and no. Perhaps that's enough noes for you to get that this isn't the case ? I'll try and repeat myself for a last time, hoping it'll stick, this time: Materialism has nothing to do with it. Were I an idealist or a dualist it still wouldn't make sense.

It doesn't make sense because it is illogical. Now, if you want to argue that free will violates the laws of logic, that's a different matter.

- that you don't have any concept of an agent of free will which is capable of intent. You can't define "intent" or "will" in terms of anything else. It can't be reduced, either linguistically or metaphysically, to anything else.

Listen, this is very, very simple.

You seem to agree that "caused and not caused" are polar opposites. There is no third possibility. I'll wager that you agree that if something has NO CAUSE, that is, it happened without any reference to any factors, then whatever result this event will have will be either random or indistinguishable from randomness, which for all intents and purposes makes it random. And you seem to agree that "caused" and "determined" are synonyms.

So, here we are. You say that free will is neither random nor caused. How, exactly, am I supposed to make any sense of this, considering my previous paragraph ?

I don't refer to anything except intent/will.

In order for me to understand what you mean by that, we have to be able to define what causes will and how it causes anything. And that's what I said. In both cases you use words which, to me and others it seems, use measures of BOTH determinism and randomness, and nothing else. Of course, there's a good reason for that.

I do NOT try to define it in terms of either caused or uncaused previous events.

I didn't say you tried to. I said you DID.

I have repeatedly explained this to you. It is you who need to define it in terms of caused or uncaused events, not me. Why? Because you are a materialist.

I submit that you have no idea what materialism is.

 

[yy2bggggs]

"Determined" means that something has been caused by something else.
...
The second meaning of "random" is metaphysical and it refers to quantum events - or at least it would refer to quantum events if those events really are determined by absolutely nothing at all, as some people believe. ... You, being a deterministcompatibilist,

This is a critical fix. I, for example, am a compatibilist, but not a determinist. I'm not by any means rare in this regard.

believe that this moment is determined by previous physical states ...

Another fix. It's not crucial that they be ordered a certain way.

I don't accept this. I am saying that the moment is ... determined by the free will of the jumper - by the intent of the agent of free will.

No! You can't disagree while agreeing at the same time. Fix it. Either agree, or disagree.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You believe that retrocausality explains something about free will. For the sake of "Bob", could you please tell me what it is?

OK. I hope you understand that I'm trying to have several different discussions at the same time with all sorts of different people with different backgrounds and different levels of ability to understand the various things I am talking about.

I understand why you are saying I'm not being coherent, and it is my fault. Let me try again.

Once upon a time I was a materialistic skeptic. I didn't believe in any sorts of "woo" at all. Woo was just woo. I then went through a period of nihilism, followed by a deep involvement in mysticism and philosophy and a series of events which according to my previous belief system have to count as paranormal. As a result, I had a great deal of re-organising to do. That is the reason why I took three years off work to study philosophy. I wanted to try to sort out the apparent inconsistencies.

Now I believe that what I previously called "woo" breaks down into various sub-classes. Some of it is still unbelievable, either because it contradicts science or because it just doesn't make any philosophical sense. But some of it neither contradicts science nor involves any great philosophical mistakes. It just isn't supported by science. This second class of woo includes things a bit like free will and karma. So I use words like those to indicate to people roughly what I am talking about. However, if you take a normal dictionary definition or normal "woo understanding" of what is meant by free will and karma then actually neither of them correctly describe what happened to me. They are in the right ball park, but that is all. The same does not apply to synchronicity and retrocausality. These are the most basic form of "woo". They are what all the other (existent) forms of woo are actually based on or can be reduced to. So I am saying that what people call free will and karma are actually manifestations of retrocausal effects, and that the most basic sort of retrocausal "woo" is synchronicity. The connection with free will is rather obscure - or at least it is rather difficult for me to explain it to you because I would need to go into far too many details about the experiences themselves. Maybe I have an atypical concept of free will.

Free will would occur when the agent (the "I", which is also the observer in quantum mechanics according my interpretation) interacts with the physical system. The nature of this interaction is retrocausal. In effect, as you will something, the agent retrocausally influences quantum events that, as in the case of schroedinger's cat, we would normally think of as having already happened. These events can be neural events (which is simpler) but can also be other events which have no obvious connection with the individual concerned.

Does that help?

 

[lightfire22000]

Ever since Wohler's groundbreaking experiments largely debunked the "vital force" myth and founded Organic Chemistry with, I want to say William Brand, it's been difficult to say that we have "free" will since everything has a cause and we're made out of the same stuff as inorganic compounds ultimately. However, liberal application of Godelian incompleteness among other things show that we have to act as though we have free will since we can never know what our destiny is. The act of trying to find our destiny changes it.

So we don't have free will in substance in terms of being able to do whatever we want, but we have it in practice. It's confusing, but it comes down to having to admit that we're always going to be wrong.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is a critical fix. I, for example, am a compatibilist, but not a determinist.

So you think that free will is compatible with determinism, but not a determinist?

If you think free will is compatible with determinism then we are talking past each other. I have no interest in compatiblist free will. It's not what I'm talking about.

Another fix. It's not crucial that they be ordered a certain way.No! You can't disagree while agreeing at the same time. Fix it. Either agree, or disagree.

I don't see the problem. I am saying that the free will of the jumper determines when he jumps, not that the free will of the jumper is determined by something.

You do understand the difference between "determines" and "is determined by", right?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It isn't a matter of belief. They do seem completely random.

Err...don't you see a problem here?

If it wasn't a matter of belief then you wouldn't have said "they SEEM....", you'd have said "they ARE...."

If that's the case, then there are random events. If not, then EVERYTHING is deterministic.

No. If that is the case then everything in physical reality is caused by something, but not all causes have to be physical, and non-physical causes don't have to be caused by anything at all.

It's not an event because it was itself uncaused, is that what you mean ?

No. I mean it's not an event at all. It's ONLY a cause.

Listen, this is very, very simple.

You seem to agree that "caused and not caused" are polar opposites. There is no third possibility. I'll wager that you agree that if something has NO CAUSE, that is, it happened without any reference to any factors, then whatever result this event will have will be either random or indistinguishable from randomness, which for all intents and purposes makes it random.

No, I don't agree with that, not least because it is riddled with weasel words like "either random or indistinguishable from randomness" (which confuses epistemology, ontology and pragmatism) and "for all intents and purposes" (which only applies to your own intents and purposes, not mine.)

It is not random, because it is an intentional act of will. You can't understand this or reduce this to anything else. The act of will is a metaphysically foundational component of the system. Which is why you can't get your head around it, because you are a frickin' materialist.

You keep saying that it doesn't matter whether you are a materialist or not. If so, why can't you accept "intentional will" as a component part of the system? Answer: because you can't make sense of how something can be intended unless it was caused by something else. Why can't you make sense of this? Because you can't make sense of the "intended" part. My response to you is this: consult your own subjective experiences. Do you understand the difference between thinking and willing? Do you understand what it would be like to be the suicidal jumper at the moment he jumps? Because that is the only way you are ever going to understand how something which hasn't been determined is nevertheless intentional.

In order for me to understand what you mean by that, we have to be able to define what causes will and how it causes anything.

***NOTHING**** causes will.

 

[yy2bggggs]

So you think that free will is compatible with determinism, but not a determinist?

Pretty much, only I go further and reject the term "free will" (for pragmatic reasons). But what is called "compatibilist free will" is something I believe exists.

There are many, many compatibilists who are not determinists... as I said, I'm by no means rare. The key issue is that compatibilists believe that choice in itself must be determined by something, but determinists believe everything is determined. Compatibilists who are not determinists, therefore, believe that choice must be determined by something, but not that everything is determined.

See compatibilism^WP.

It's not what I'm talking about.

I'm not interested in what you're not talking about.

I don't see the problem. I am saying that the free will of the jumper determines when he jumps, not that the free will of the jumper is determined by something.

And I'm not interested in what you're not saying. The modality here is critical. There is something that you are saying--it is that that I want you to clarify. You are saying that it's not determined.

You do understand the difference between "determines" and "is determined by", right?

Sure. Do you understand the difference between not saying something is the case and saying something is not the case? The point in things being determined is that nothing you have shown so far must be non-determined. Ergo, there's nothing here that supports that there should be something non-determined. Ergo, there's no problem being solved.

That's what I was saying earlier. If A causes B, T(A)<T(B) versus T(B)<T(A) has nothing to do with whether or not there is a C such that C causes A. Any of the following four things could be true:

• There is no C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(A)<T(B)
• There is no C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(B)<T(A)
• There is a C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(A)<T(B)
• There is a C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(B)<T(A)

So retrocausality (that is, the fact that T(B)<T(A)) doesn't in any way have to do with indeterminism of A.

Got it?

ETA: The critical question here is bound by the fact that you believe A is undetermined. You believe this for some reason. What is this reason? What do you gain in explanatory power by A being undetermined?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The modality here is critical. There is something that you are saying--it is that that I want you to clarify. You are saying that it's not determined.

Yes. I'm saying that free will is not determined. If it was determined then it wouldn't be free.

Sure. Do you understand the difference between not saying something is the case and saying something is not the case? The point in things being determined is that nothing you have shown so far must be non-determined.

The modality is also critical here too. You're right, I have not shown so far that something must be non-determined. If I could do that then I'd have an argument as to why determinism is necessarily false. I'm not saying that determinism is necessarily false.

Ergo, there's nothing here that supports that there should be something non-determined. Ergo, there's no problem being solved.

I've already answered that and you said it was an irrelevant post. There's no problem for you to solve, but there is a problem for me to solve.

That's what I was saying earlier. If A causes B, T(A)<T(B) versus T(B)<T(A) has nothing to do with whether or not there is a C such that C causes A.

Let me try to translate into English....

If [act of will] causes [physical effect], it makes no difference whether [act of will] comes temporally before or after [physical effect]....

No, the translation broke down. Please write it in words. I don't know what A, B and C are supposed to represent.

ETA: The critical question here is bound by the fact that you believe A is undetermined. You believe this for some reason. What is this reason? What do you gain in explanatory power by A being undetermined?

It means that the will is free rather than unfree.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Pretty much, only I go further and reject the term "free will" (for pragmatic reasons). But what is called "compatibilist free will" is something I believe exists.

There are many, many compatibilists who are not determinists... as I said, I'm by no means rare. The key issue is that compatibilists believe that choice in itself must be determined by something, but determinists believe everything is determined. Compatibilists who are not determinists, therefore, believe that choice must be determined by something, but not that everything is determined.

See compatibilism^WP.
I'm not interested in what you're not talking about.
And I'm not interested in what you're not saying. The modality here is critical. There is something that you are saying--it is that that I want you to clarify. You are saying that it's not determined.

Sure. Do you understand the difference between not saying something is the case and saying something is not the case? The point in things being determined is that nothing you have shown so far must be non-determined. Ergo, there's nothing here that supports that there should be something non-determined. Ergo, there's no problem being solved.

That's what I was saying earlier. If A causes B, T(A)<T(B) versus T(B)<T(A) has nothing to do with whether or not there is a C such that C causes A. Any of the following four things could be true:

• There is no C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(A)<T(B)
• There is no C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(B)<T(A)
• There is a C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(A)<T(B)
• There is a C that causes A, and A causes B, and T(B)<T(A)

So retrocausality (that is, the fact that T(B)<T(A)) doesn't in any way have to do with indeterminism of A.

Got it?

OK, I am guessing that you are saying that it doesn't make any difference whether the act of will comes before or after the effect, because we are still left with the same questions about whether or not the act of will is itself determined, yes?

If so, I agree. The retrocausal nature of it is just there to make it consistent with QM, it doesn't directly affect the question about what, if anything, caused the act of will.

If so, then I have to answer: "nothing causes the act of will". If something is causing the act then it isn't an act of will at all, its just some physical event which is being determined by previous physical events.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

ETA: The critical question here is bound by the fact that you believe A is undetermined. You believe this for some reason. What is this reason? What do you gain in explanatory power by A being undetermined?

What am I trying to explain?

Two things:

(1) how it is possible that the will can both be free and non-random.
(2) my own personal experiences.

(1) is of interest to anyone who thinks there is an a-priori argument against the existence of libertarian free will, because I am challenging their position. QM is only indirectly related to this, because it provides the possibility of a mechanism which doesn't contradict the laws of physics. From what you've said to me it seems that to make it more than a possibility we would need a new variant of the hidden variable interpretation of QM. [eta: even a new variant of HVT wouldn't make it more than a possibility, it would just clarify the connection between quantum mechanical and metaphysical versions of the idea]
(2) is of little or no interest/relevance to anyone who has a skeptical/materialist agenda and they are free to ignore it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

deleted

 

[Lord Emsworth]

The purpose is to lead people to distinguish between the ever-changing content of their mind and the ever-present, never-changing "I" which observes that content. When you ask "how is this intentional act mine?" then the difference is crucial. Free will is owned by you, not your mind. That is why it is free. If it was owned by your mind then it would not be free - it would be the prisoner of your thought processes. Many spiritual practices are deliberately designed to help people become more aware of these distinctions.

You didn't even answer the question that you brought up: "How is this free intentional act mine?" Well, how is it?

That's a different sort of randomness. It's a compatibilist version of randomness because it is compatible with determinism.

No, absolutely not compatible with determism. By definition. Just like the witchcraft of a Discworld novel is not compatible with a world where there is no witchcraft.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No, it isn't. "Not determined" and "random" are not synonyms. If for you they are synonyms then you are begging the question.

What question am I begging? The technical definition of random is "not determined."

"Random" is a subset of "Not Determined".

What's another subset of "not determined"?

Magic, miracles, gods and perhaps the Magic 8 Ball ie. things that break known laws of physics and causality which so far is...nothing?

I love it when my question is answered before I even post it.

Libertarian free will would not look out of place into the above category of phenomena.

Good, then I can dismiss it until someone provides some evidence. I will stipulate that evidence trumps the logic of the excluded middle.

I am saying that the moment is (or at least can be) determined by the free will of the jumper - by the intent of the agent of free will.

Sure, I'll agree with this. Now how was the agent's intention "determined/decided/calculated/invented/arrived at/come up with"?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What question am I begging? The technical definition of random is "not determined."

I'm afraid we aren't going to be able to rely on other people's definitions of "random", of which there are many. You can't get rid of free will by defining it out of existence any more than you can get rid of the mind-body problem by defining it out of existence.

Now how was the agent's intention "determined/decided/calculated/invented/arrived at/come up with"?

It wasn't "determined/decided/calculated/invented/arrived at/come up with" at all. It just was.

Maybe this is an essential missing piece of information: the agent is aware of everything that anything, anywhere is aware of. Remember the analogy of the picture on the reel of film (brain processes), the picture on the movie screen (mind) and the missing part of the explanation in the mind-body problem (the lamp in the projector)? That lamp is also the agent of free will. There is only one of these lamps, not many. So the agent is aware of everything that anything, anywhere is aware of. It doesn't have its own brain (that would be another sort of deterministic, cognitive process). But it does have access to slightly less than seven billion human brains and everything that all of them are aware of, including all of their knowledge and all of their emotional states. So the question is: "how do we get from effective omniscience (knowledge of everything which is known at the present moment) and effective omnipotence with respect to control over apparently random physical events, to some actual coherent effect via free will?"

Before I go on, I'd like to hear your response to that.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You didn't even answer the question that you brought up: "How is this free intentional act mine?" Well, how is it?

That depends what "mine" means. You, or your mind? Your soul or your brain???

 

[Lord Emsworth]

That depends what "mine" means. You, or your mind? Your soul or your brain???

The question was: "How is this free intentional act mine?" The use of italics, I assume, means that it is about that never-changing I.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The question was: "How is this free intentional act mine?" The use of italics, I assume, means that it is about that never-changing I.

In that case the answer is "Everything is yours."

 

[Lord Emsworth]

In that case the answer is "Everything is yours."

Leaving aside for a min that this sounds a little megalomanic for what you several pages ago called a simple entity, the question was:
"How is this free intentional act mine?"
And don't look at me like that, you introduced it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Leaving aside for a min that this sounds a little megalomanic for what you several pages ago called a simple entity, the question was:
"How is this free intentional act mine?"
And don't look at me like that, you introduced it.

How could it not be yours?