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Science and free will

I think the actor loads the quantum dice. That's why I suggested free will has to involve retrocausality.
That sounds needlessly complex. It's also causal (retrocausality is causal).

It also seems to simply sweep the problem under the hood of complexity, and to me at least, it's not complicated enough to make it go away. Essentially, if I could initiate retrocausal processes, what it would look like is that some time would pass, then I would make a decision (which you allege is a causal thing), and then afterwards I would make that decision be the thing that I did. I cannot change what I did in the past, however... I can only possibly sit and regret decisions that I have made, so I at least have no powers of revision.

However, we don't live in an instant, but more of a "smear" of time--the very short term time it takes to perceive things, assemble them in our minds, etc. That does legitimately provide some opportunity for your retrocausal processes to occur, given certain... liberties (no pun intended) taken with the mechanics. So that could allow me to retrocausally commit actions. The problem with this, however, is that the retrocausality of the situation solves no problem. It's just ordinary causality, extended in space-time a tad. It's still A resulting B... the only difference is T(B)<T(A). There's nothing particularly significant about that--no new capabilities are added when compared to T(A)<T(B). So there's nothing that retrocausality would actually do in that smear that ordinary forwards in time causality can't.

Finally, there's a strange physical limitation to quantum mechanics. For all of the tunneling you get to do, for all of the faster-than-c stuff that is fundamentally happening, there's one suspiciously consistent law that seems to never, ever be violated... information cannot travel backwards in time. The implication of this is that there seems to be no retrocausality to be found in quantum mechanics. So even if you want to appeal to QM, and slip retrocausality in, you need to invent the mechanism within QM. It's just not there.
 
That sounds needlessly complex. It's also causal (retrocausality is causal).

Retrocausality is causal in the sense that something in the present is causing something in the past. It's acausal (at least in the case of free will) in the sense that the thing in the present which is causing something in the past is not itself being determined by anything else. The actor is an uncaused cause.
 
The third way that LWF needs, has to be a 'blend' of indeterminsm and determism. Why that is so is fairly easy to see. To me at least.

On one hand there has to be an actually open future, means that you could have done several different things. And no, counterfactuals as in compatibilism don't cut it. It has to be that the same situation has to have several possible outcomes each with a p < 0.

On the other hand, that what you eventually do, needs to be connected to back to the situation that it arose from. In particular, you need to connect what you do back to what you are. You have control over what happens, after all.

But this control stands in direct contradiction to what was said in the second paragraph. You cannot have an outcome be controlled by you, and have it open - IOW uncontrolled - at the same time. You cannot be the cause of your action and not cause your actions at the same time.


Of course you can equivocate on you and gloss over the disctinction between counterfactually and actually possible, or even just retreat to complexity or appeal to stuff beyond our understanding but ...
 
Finally, there's a strange physical limitation to quantum mechanics. For all of the tunneling you get to do, for all of the faster-than-c stuff that is fundamentally happening, there's one suspiciously consistent law that seems to never, ever be violated... information cannot travel backwards in time. The implication of this is that there seems to be no retrocausality to be found in quantum mechanics. So even if you want to appeal to QM, and slip retrocausality in, you need to invent the mechanism within QM. It's just not there.

"Seems" is a "weasel word".
 
The claim that the laws of physics always act in a consistent way is itself a metaphysical claim,

Why? How?


Nobody makes this claim. Nobody thinks cats can hover in mid-air. If anyone did claim this then it would be an incorrect empirical/scientific claim.

So according to you, it wouldn't be a Metaphysical claim?
If so, why not?
 
Why? How?

Because there is no scientific answer to questions like:

Why are the laws of physics the way they are and not different?
Where did the laws of physics come from?
Do the laws of physics actually govern reality, or do they merely describe regularities?

So according to you, it wouldn't be a Metaphysical claim?
If so, why not?

Because cats can't hover in mid-air without behaving in a way which is inconsistent with the known laws of physics.
 
Because there is no scientific answer to questions like:

Why are the laws of physics the way they are and not different?
Where did the laws of physics come from?
Do the laws of physics actually govern reality, or do they merely describe regularities?

But it is not up to science to answer those questions. Those are philosophical questions. Science only deals with the phenomena that it can understand and measure, within which it can make accurate predictions about behaviors

Because cats can't hover in mid-air without behaving in a way which is inconsistent with the known laws of physics.

But you've just explained precisely why it is a metaphysical claim!

That's exactly what makes a claim metaphysical: Something that is inconsistent with the known laws of physics
 
You've just contradicted yourself in two sentences. First you claim you're not starting with this as an assumption, then you declare that the reason you believe it is because "it's simply obvious."

It's only a contradiction because you still don't get it. It's not an axiom. It simply is the nature of the thing.

It's not obvious to me.

Well, I suggest you read a textbook about logic and propositions, and then one about causes and causality.

On the contrary, it's obvious to me that I do have free will. NOT random will.

I never claimed things were all random. Your arguments are jumping all over the place.

How do you know that an act has to be either determined or random or a combination of both?

Because if it isn't determined by previous states there is NO way to determine its future states and therefore is it indistinguishable from true randomness, which makes it random by any definition of the word.
 

Are those three dots really that hard to spot ?

What is going on at the moment the suicidal jumper actually jumps? What caused him to jump? Well, it was partly caused by all that thinking he did in the previous hours, because if he'd concluded he didn't want to die yet then he wouldn't have jumped at all. But that can't be the whole story, or he'd have jumped the instant he'd made his mind up that he was actually going to jump.

So that's your reason ? Because he hesitated ? But the hesitation itself is ALSO caused by other factors, ad infinitum. Plus, cats hesitate, too.

You come to the conclusion that it must either be because of some other deterministic cognitive processes (maybe subconscius ones) or that there is a combination of deterministic cognitive processes and pure randomness, presumably coming from quantum effects, but that's because you're a materialist.

No, that's because I understand logic.

The difference between you and me as that I don't believe those quantum effects are actually purely random.

If they're not random then they're deterministic and we simply don't have enough information to determine their causes. If this is true then there is only ONE logical possibility instead of two and you're even in deeper trouble than I thought you were.

Instead, I think they are being influenced by the "I", "the soul", or whatever else you want to call the agent of free will. Your next question will be something like "but how does the agent decide whether/when to act?"

Actually my next question would be: "evidence ?"

The answer is that it doesn't "decide", it just acts. It's a simple entity. It can't "decide" things because it doesn't have it's own brain.

And how is that "action" not arbitrary, since it isn't a decision ?

It does, on the other hand, have access to brains, because it is the observer of minds.

Since it interacts with physical reality it must be detectable in principle. So, again, evidence ?
 
It's only a contradiction because you still don't get it. It's not an axiom. It simply is the nature of the thing.

You're still just asserting it.

Well, I suggest you read a textbook about logic and propositions, and then one about causes and causality.

Actually, I suggest you (try to) read the most important textbook about logic, propositions and causality which has been written in the past 100 years. It is called "The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and it was written by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

If you don't understand the relevance of that book, then you are in no position to lecture anybody else on logic, propositions and causality. That's what the book is about, and it is has been a primary influence on everything written on that subject since it was published.

Please stop trying to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs.

Because if it isn't determined by previous states there is NO way to determine its future states which makes it random by any definition of the word.

Why not? Answer: no reason, you're just assuming that this is the case because "it's obvious."
 
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But it is not up to science to answer those questions. Those are philosophical questions. Science only deals with the phenomena that it can understand and measure, within which it can make accurate predictions about behaviors

You mean like what happens to a cat when it is thrown out of a window?

But you've just explained precisely why it is a metaphysical claim!

That's exactly what makes a claim metaphysical: Something that is inconsistent with the known laws of physics

No, that's exactly what makes it scientific rather than metaphysical. "Metaphysics" has a common meaning and a technical philosophical meaning. The common meaning is indistinguishable from the word "woo." Some woo is inconsistent with physics, some is merely unsupported by it. The technical meaning refers to a branch of philosophy which has nothing to say about what does or does not breach the laws of physics. That's what physics is for.
 
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If they're not random then they're deterministic...

So you keep asserting, but not justifying.

Actually my next question would be: "evidence ?"

You want scientific evidence for a metaphysical claim? Metaphysical claims can't be supported or falsified by scientific evidence. That's why they are metaphysical.

And how is that "action" not arbitrary, since it isn't a decision ?

Because it is an act of will.

Since it interacts with physical reality it must be detectable in principle.

Why?
 
Well, I suggest you read a textbook about logic and propositions, and then one about causes and causality.

http://www.bambooweb.com/articles/T/r/Tractatus_Logico-Philosophicus.html

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length work published by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his lifetime. Originally published in German in 1921 as Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, when its author was just 32, it is now widely considered one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century. There are seven "main" propositions.

The slim volume (less than eighty pages) sets forth a complete philosophical system that may be construed as the completion of Bertrand Russell's early philosophy of "logical atomism." The book comprises a system of short, vatic utterances, numbered 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.12, etc., so that 1.1 is a comment on or elaboration of 1, 1.11 and 1.12 comment on 1.1, and so forth, to demonstrate their nested interrelations.

There are seven main propositions:

1. The world is everything that is the case.
2. What is the case (a fact) is the existence of atomic states of affairs.
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4. A thought is a proposition with sense.
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
6. The general form of a proposition is the general form of a truth function, which is [p, ξ, N(ξ)]. This is the general form of a proposition.
7. What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence.

I suggest you type: "logic propositions causality +tractatus" into google.
 
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But it is not up to science to answer those questions. Those are philosophical questions

You mean like what happens to a cat when it is thrown out of a window?


No, I mean like:

Why are the laws of physics the way they are and not different?
Where did the laws of physics come from?
Do the laws of physics actually govern reality, or do they merely describe regularities?





No, that's exactly what makes it scientific rather than metaphysical. "Metaphysics" has a common meaning and a technical philosophical meaning. The common meaning is indistinguishable from the word "woo." Some woo is inconsistent with physics, some is merely unsupported by it. The technical meaning refers to a branch of philosophy which has nothing to say about what does or does not breach the laws of physics. That's what physics is for.


Ok. Let me see if I get this straight, cause sometimes one looses the trail of the conversation

To summarize:

Why isn't a metaphysical claim "A cat will hover in the air" instead?

Nobody makes this claim. Nobody thinks cats can hover in mid-air.

So according to you, it wouldn't be a Metaphysical claim?
If so, why not?

Because cats can't hover in mid-air without behaving in a way which is inconsistent with the known laws of physics.

But you've just explained precisely why it is a metaphysical claim!

That's exactly what makes a claim metaphysical: Something that is inconsistent with the known laws of physics

No, that's exactly what makes it scientific rather than metaphysical.


What you're saying in this conversation is: The statement "A cat will hover in the air" is a scientific claim because "cats can't hover in mid-air without behaving in a way which is inconsistent with the known laws of physics"

Does this make any sense to you?
 
What you're saying in this conversation is: The statement "A cat will hover in the air" is a scientific claim because "cats can't hover in mid-air without behaving in a way which is inconsistent with the known laws of physics"

Does this make any sense to you?

No, but it's not quite what I am saying. I am saying that it is up to science to determine whether or not cats thrown out of windows can hover in mid-air. In other words, the correct statement "Cats thrown out of windows do not hover in mid-air" is a scientifically-justified statement and "cats thrown out of windows can hover in mid-air" is a statement which can be scientifically falsified. Metaphysical statements can be neither supported nor falsified by science. They have nothing to do with science.
 
You might want to check the definition of 'interact'.

It's not "interact" that is causing the problem. It's the claim that any interaction must necessarily be detectable by science. There's all sorts of reasons why this is not true. What if the interaction is non-repeatable? What if it is inconsistent? What if it manifests via quantum randomness? What if it only happens to certain people? What if the interaction is partly determined by people's belief systems?

I genuinely do not know why so many people believe that any interaction with physical reality is necessarily detectable by science. Many people do believe it, but there is no good reason why.
 
Instead, I think they are being influenced by the "I", "the soul", or whatever else you want to call the agent of free will. Your next question will be something like "but how does the agent decide whether/when to act?" The answer is that it doesn't "decide", it just acts. It's a simple entity. It can't "decide" things because it doesn't have it's own brain. It does, on the other hand, have access to brains, because it is the observer of minds. Does that get any closer to answering your question? The agent of free will can act in a way which is neither determined nor random because it has access to the contents of mind but is not constrained by those contents.


It is random. The probability to jump or not may be biased toward either of the two possible outcomes, but no matter how you twist it or turn it, they are both greater than zero (p(j) > 0 and p(~j) > 0). Only when either of the two probabilites equals zero and the other one equals one this randomness is gone (p(j) = 1 and p(~j) = 0 for example). What you have then, is either fate (where one thing will happen no matter what) or strict causality where one thing will happen as a result, consequence, or whatever of prior states.

With your construction you don't have the luxury of being in a position to cast the act as a consequence of prior states any more. "[T]he "I", "the soul", or whatever else you want to call the agent of free will" is a completely featureless entity with the exception that it introduces said randomness, or better yet is randomness - in person, and in your decision making process. Screwing with it, messing it up.

Fate's twin sister Etaf so to speak. And if "the contents of the mind" beg and plead enough then - maybe - Etaf follows that begging and pleading. Or - maybe - even if the begging and pleading is yet so loud, she doesn't, just esuaceb.
 
It's not "interact" that is causing the problem. It's the claim that any interaction must necessarily be detectable by science. There's all sorts of reasons why this is not true. What if the interaction is non-repeatable? What if it is inconsistent? What if it manifests via quantum randomness? What if it only happens to certain people? What if the interaction is partly determined by people's belief systems?

I genuinely do not know why so many people believe that any interaction with physical reality is necessarily detectable by science. Many people do believe it, but there is no good reason why.

The highlighted words are where you trip up and create a (presumably) inadvertant strawman. Any interaction with physical reality is detectable in principle, not necessarily by current science.

ETA: All of the "what ifs" that you mention are real possibilities which real science deals with on a daily basis through proper research methodology and statistics.
 
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