Robot consciousness

[steenkh]

Can I ask what your thoughts are on consciousness? Is it just a case of the right atoms, in the right place, doing the right thing, or more than that?

Given the questions on duality, I think we can safely assume that he thinks it is more than that.

 

[shuttlt]

Are rocks placed on an endless plane in a manner which encodes human consciousness equivalent and/or identical to human consciousness? Is the "pencil brain" encoding of human consciousness actual human consciousness? Well, if a paramecium or a rock or an atom or a quantum particle can be said to be part of a universal consciousness field (which would actually be your own mind, a solipsist would say), then my answer is "yes," no matter how counterintuitive it may seem.

Where's all this stuff about consciousness fields coming from?

 

[Philosaur]

Duality presented in this thread is not the mathematical or physical concept but the philosophical concept of dualism of the mind.

Just to keep the duality talk from going waaay off track:

This sort of dualism was espoused by (and named after) Renee Descartes. He posited two sorts of "substances" (a loaded word already): mental substance (res cogitans) and physical substance (res extensa). Mental substance has no mass, no dimension, and no physical form. Physical substance is the everyday stuff we see that has mass and has "extension" in space (i.e. dimensions like height and width).

The thing that kills dualistic theories is that there is no way for a non-physical substance to affect a physical substance, or vice versa. Being non-physical, it can't push, pull, attract, repel, leverage, squeeze, or apply any kind of force at all.

Keep in mind (ha ha) that mental substance is not just "energy"--since energy is still physical in nature. Mental substance can't even generate energy--that's still a physical process.

When pressed, Descartes claimed that the mind interacted with the body through the pineal gland. How? He couldn't say.

Where's all this stuff about consciousness fields coming from?

Consciousness fields sound sort of like the panprotopsychism espoused by David Chalmers, a sort of well-known philosopher of mind. The basic idea is that all physical entities, down to subatomic particles, presumably, have a protopsyche or protomind. Get enough of this stuff together in the right configuration and you get a mind.

 

[shuttlt]

Consciousness fields sound sort of like the panprotopsychism espoused by David Chalmers, a sort of well-known philosopher of mind. The basic idea is that all physical entities, down to subatomic particles, presumably, have a protopsyche or protomind. Get enough of this stuff together in the right configuration and you get a mind.

Might this be described as speculative?

 

[Philosaur]

Might this be described as speculative?

Highly so.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

I agree; highly speculative ... as is much or most of this thread.

For the record: no, I don't think human consciousness is more than a case of the right atoms in the right place doing the right thing (which is what I explicitly asserted by accepting that the pencil brain would be a form of human-like consciousness). Instead, my questions relate to what exactly defines consciousness (i.e., consciousness in general)? Again: is a cat conscious? Is a worm? A paramecium? A rock? All are "a case of the right atoms in the right place doing the right thing."

This thread isn't only about defining human consciousness. Because it considers the potential of robot consciousness in the opening post, it's also about defining consciousness in general, without which effort the more specific questions about robot and human consciousnesses can't be sensibly answered.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

As I meant it, the term "consciousness field" isn't a scientific concept but a purely philosophical one, and as such it's not falsifiable in any *scientific* sense. Instead, the unity of consciousness with its objects of consciousness (which is what I meant by referring to all of existence as a "consciousness field") is a fundamental logical/definitional reality for consciousness. It's a fundamental truth, but it doesn't predict anything. It's as true as "existence exists," which also doesn't predict anything.

It's relevant to this thread because, although any particular predictive qualities of consciousness are subject to science, the ULTIMATE nature of consciousness is like an infinite regress and as such is not perfectly computable.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's relevant to this thread because, although any particular predictive qualities of consciousness are subject to science, the ULTIMATE nature of consciousness is like an infinite regress and as such is not perfectly computable.

It isn't an infinite regress, it is the identity axiom.

Although that isn't computable either -- nor does it need to be.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

I consider it to be both an axiom and an infinite regress. It's an axiom because one can't point to, think of, conceive, or perceive anything that isn't a part of one's consciousness. It's an infinite regress because the axiom points directly at the fact that anything newly learned immediately becomes an object in one's consciousness. The relationship of consciousness to the objects of consciousness functions like two mirrors facing each other, in constant reflection.

However, I'll admit that the regress isn't necessarily literally infinite, and we could never prove that it is. But then again, we could never prove that it isn't, either; it's not falsifiable (as I expressed in my last email).

True axioms aren't falsifiable, right? By definition? If anyone will show me that I'm wrong on that point, I'll happily stand corrected.

 

[drkitten]

True axioms aren't falsifiable, right? By definition?

I'm not sure what you mean by "true" axioms, and I fear that "true" axioms are going to end up being the sort of thing studied in geometry class by "true" Scotsmen (who don't put sugar in their porridge).

But axioms more generally are of course falsifiable. Axioms are simple propositions accepted as true without proof. If you have a different set of axioms, you get different consequences, that's all. If the consequences turn out not to match the system, you've falsified the axioms.

For example, a key axiom of geometry is the Parallel Postulate, which states that there is one parallel line through any given point. If you make this assumption, you get Euclidean geometry. If you make a slightly different assumption (i.e. assume the falsity of the Parallel Postulate), you get hyperbolic or Riemann geometry.

All of them are inappropriate under some conditions. Euclidean geometry can't be used, for example, to describe the (curved) surface of the Earth, but Riemann geometry works just fine. I can't use Euclid to calculate the area of North America.

Does this make the parallel postulate a "false" axiom? Does it put sugar on its porridge?

 

[drkitten]

I consider it to be both an axiom and an infinite regress. It's an axiom because one can't point to, think of, conceive, or perceive anything that isn't a part of one's consciousness.

Er,.... wrong.

I can easily demonstrate something that's not part of YOUR consciousness, and in fact, it's routinely done experimentally on babies to study the development of "theory of the mind." All I need to do is put something in a sealed box and then ask you what's in the box.

You don't know. It's literally outside of your consciousness, even though it's within the consciousness of me and my lab assistants.

But in the very process of describing this experiment to you, I've allowed you to conceive of an objet outside your consciousness. It's an object unknown to you in a sealed box.

And I can equally conceive of an object outside of my consciousness by reversing the roles -- or by having an impish lab assistant swap objects while my back is turned and without my knowledge.

Again, methodological realism trumps newage claptrap. The object in the box is real even if you're unaware of it.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

lol

I'm afraid we're experiencing a semantic misunderstanding here, drkitten. I'm not intending to advance any New Age claptrap. I'm merely pointing out that anything one does, thinks, says, feels, conceives, perceives, etc., immediately, by definition, becomes and is part of one's conciousness. Your above examples supposedly "disproving" this only illustrate it.

The existential unity of consciousness with the objects of consciousness is not a scientific principle; it's a recognition of our fundamental existential situation. It's not any more falsifiable than is the truth "existence exists." It could be considered a philosophical or definitional axiom, but it's not a scientifically falsifiable theory.

So how is it relevant here on this thread, then? As I've indicated, we can conceive of human consciousness modeled in many other substrates, but the question remains whether those models are or should be called *actual human consciousness.*

This is semantic distinction, I admit (which I've already made clear), and yet it's a semantics which properly acknowledges the unknown rather than implying unobtainable, absolutely certain and exhaustive knowledge.

 

[drkitten]

I'm afraid we're experiencing a semantic misunderstanding here, drkitten. I'm not intending to advance any New Age claptrap.

Then I suggest you stop making posts that (try to) advance it.

I'm merely pointing out that anything one does, thinks, says, feels, conceives, perceives, etc., immediately, by definition, becomes and is part of one's conciousness.

Well, you'd be wrong, at several levels.

First, of all, things that you "conceive" are not necessarily part of your consciousness, because they don't exist. I can certainly conceive of a new 2010 Camaro in my garage, but I'm not conscious of it. For the very simple reason that it doesn't exist -- there's no such car in my garage.


But there's similarly no reason why I should be "conscious" of anything and everything that is in my garage. If there's a new spiderweb in the northwest corner, I'm not conscious of it. And even if you go look, and find there's a spiderweb stretched across where I wish I had a new Camaro, I'm still not conscious of it.

And, indeed, I can be tricked into "seeing things" that aren't really there; as far as I can tell, there are therefore "objects" in my consciousness that do not correspond to physical objects. How much, for example, does the kilometer-wide Mothership at the end of Close Encounters of the Third Kind weigh?

The object in my consciousness, if it weighed anything, would weigh on the order of thousands of tons. The actual model used, I believe, is a meter across and weighs less than fifty pounds.

The existential unity of consciousness with the objects of consciousness is not a scientific principle;

No, it's not. It's newage claptrap, and it's demonstrably wrong.

There demonstrably exist objects of which I am not conscious. There are also objects of which I am conscious that have no real existence. Therefore, there is no such unity.

It's not any more falsifiable than is the truth "existence exists."

Then how did I just falsify it?

It could be considered a philosophical or definitional axiom, but it's not a scientifically falsifiable theory.

No. It's a falsified theory.

E.g. claptrap.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

Apparently you could benefit from a course in philosophy.

Sorry that I can't respond in depth; work duty calls. For now I'll just say that I stand by my words, and I claim that you're mistaking my semantics as asserting something they definitely are not asserting.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

No, drkitten, the unity of consciousness with the objects of consciousness as I meant it is not a falsified theory. As I wrote, it's not even a theory at all, because it's NOT falsifiable. What I've been pointing out is not theory but a general recognition of the role that subjectivity (a fundamental quality of consciousness, just as is objectivity) plays in consciousness, by definition.

What is indeed falsifiable (as you point out, drkitten) is any particular belief or theory about any specific item in our subjective/objective consciousness. But that's NOT what I'm referring to when I refer to the unqualified, fundamental role that subjectivity necessarily plays in consciousness, and which makes any final or absolute assumptions about the nature of consciousness just that: assumptions.

You continue to misunderstand me by apparently assuming I'm referring to science when I'm instead referring to philosophical meaning. In Heideggerian terms, you keep accusing me of erroneous ontic specifics when I'm instead referring to ontological generality, and no matter how I try to clearly make that distinction, you refuse to acknowledge it.

If you can't see the difference between the two modes, your understanding of philosophy is limited.

 

[drkitten]

No, drkitten, the unity of consciousness with the objects of consciousness as I meant it is not a falsified theory.

Ah, good. We've now progressed past the newage claptrap stage of your gibberish to the humpty dumpty stage, where the words no longer mean anything except whatever stream of consciousness nonsense you feel like attributing to them this week.

If you can't see the difference between the two modes, your understanding of philosophy is limited.

Or alternatively my understanding of philosophy is too good to let your gibberish pass unchallenged.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What is indeed falsifiable (as you point out, drkitten) is any particular belief or theory about any specific item in our subjective/objective consciousness. But that's NOT what I'm referring to when I refer to the unqualified, fundamental role that subjectivity necessarily plays in consciousness, and which makes any final or absolute assumptions about the nature of consciousness just that: assumptions.

Why does the subjective nature of consciousness force all conclusions about consciousness to be nothing more than assumptions?

~~ Paul

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

Or alternatively my understanding of philosophy is too good to let your gibberish pass unchallenged."

- drkitten

------------

The evidence is in our above posts.

I won't claim to be flawless in my expositions, but I do see in your posts constant attempts to misrepresent what I'm expressing, after which you refer to your own misrepresentations as gibberish. Yes, I agree that what you *think* I'm expressing is gibberish.

Do you make any distinction between the ontic and the ontological? If you don't, can't, or won't, then I understand the difficulty you're having with me.

 

[Norm Breyfogle]

"Why does the subjective nature of consciousness force all conclusions about consciousness to be nothing more than assumptions?"

- Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

---------------

"All" conclusions? I don't believe it does. What our inevitable subjectivity does indicate is that we can never have exhaustive certainty re the ontological nature of consciousness. This is why I've expressed that, although human consciousness is computable and even a pencil brain could model it as well as could any other version, we could never call it truly human. After all, such a model's fidelity could always be compared, witheringly, to an actual living human brain.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

"All" conclusions? I don't believe it does.

Then why did you say "... which makes any final or absolute assumptions about the nature of consciousness just that: assumptions."?

What our inevitable subjectivity does indicate is that we can never have exhaustive certainty re the ontological nature of consciousness. This is why I've expressed that, although human consciousness is computable and even a pencil brain could model it as well as could any other version, we could never call it truly human. After all, such a model's fidelity could always be compared, witheringly, to an actual living human brain.

I agree that we can't have certainty about the ontological nature of consciousness. That is because ontology is largely nonsense. I have no idea what your last sentence means.

~~ Paul