• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Robot consciousness

Oh, I do allow non-humans to have awareness.

My point was only that the description of the physical action was abstract and metaphorical.

If a dog is aware, then when a tree limb falls on a rock, if the dog observes the event, it perceives that this action has occurred, just as a human would.

But if a dog observes a person asking another person or a computer to perform a multiplication and subsequently receiving an answer, it cannot perceive this action in the way I just described, because that action is entirely symbolic, not physical.

So we need to be very careful here to consistently distinguish between physical reality, on the one hand, and symbolic representation on the other.
I don't see how you can say that the multiplication action is entirely symbolic if the dog is able to observe it. What you mean is that the dog doesn't understand multiplication, which may well be the case. That certainly can't be used to show that a dog (or robot) can't understand anything. There are other cases where a trained dog does demonstrate understanding, say of a command to sit. You say "sit", the dog hears this, and sits. I could give you the same command and expect the same result. The symbol here is the (100% physical) sound pattern, as distinguished from other sound pattern symbols or silence.

What you may have in mind here is a higher understanding: understanding that the word "sit" is a symbol, for instance. A dog is unlikely to have that, but there's no theoretical reason a robot couldn't be taught it.
 
Last edited:
I don't see how you can say that the multiplication action is entirely symbolic if the dog is able to observe it. What you mean is that the dog doesn't understand multiplication, which may well be the case.

Same thing. The branch falling on the tree is not symbolic. The dog perceives it, same as we do.

The multiplication is entirely symbolic. Nothing has actually been multiplied, and only beings who understand the symbols can perceive that a symbolic transaction has taken place.

That certainly can't be used to show that a dog (or robot) can't understand anything.

But that's not what I'm saying.

I don't understand your point here.

Nothing in this discussion is relevant to whether or not a dog has any sort of understanding.

It was only an example to demonstrate that your scenario regarding multiplication is a purely symbolic transaction.
 
Same thing. The branch falling on the tree is not symbolic. The dog perceives it, same as we do.

The multiplication is entirely symbolic. Nothing has actually been multiplied, and only beings who understand the symbols can perceive that a symbolic transaction has taken place.
Symbolic doesn't imply not physical.

Only beings who understand the meaning of "symbol" and "symbolic transaction" can understand it in those terms, yes. But that doesn't mean that they can't understand the symbols themselves without knowing that they are symbols. If that were true we'd never be able to learn the meaning of the word "symbol" in the first place, since it itself is a symbol.

Do you not see the "sit" command as a symbol the dog can understand? Understanding multiplication is a more complex case, but we could probably train a dog to understand a simple multiplication table, say with just the numbers "two" and "three", where the dog has been trained to fetch the correct number-shaped biscuit upon hearing a particular combination of those words. The results would be the same for what a human trained in this task would do. The major difference is that the human has a ton of additional understanding and associations with those words, including recognizing and associating the whole task with the sound pattern "multiplication".
 
Pardon me, but the hell we have.

Any physical system that changes can be classified as an information processor if you like.

So it seems that when you say "information processor", you are referring specifically to TMs.

In that case, we need to see some convincing argument that the human brain is -- and is only -- a TM.

lol

drkitten doesn't mean "we" as in "here in this thread," he/she means "we" as in "the sum of humanity's mathematicians."

The convincing argument that the brain is no stronger than TM equivalent is that the brain is made of the same stuff as other physical systems. That is, quite simply, all there is to it.
 
Well, that's all well and good.

Doesn't address the question, tho.

Now mind you, I'm not saying that the brain is not a TM. It may well be. Would be interesting to know.

But if you say it is, then we need to outline the necessary components of such a device and describe which components of such a device correspond to analogous components of the brain, with nothing left over.

I'm not simply going to accept such a claim on faith, especially given the enormous ramifications.

double lol

I told you once before piggy that you simply are not going to be able to understand this without the requisite background in computer science. You refused to accept that.

I don't know who was correct, but I observe that you are in approximately the same position of understanding this issue that you were in over a year ago.

Perhaps you should start educating yourself in the requisite fields?
 
Symbolic doesn't imply not physical.

Only beings who understand the meaning of "symbol" and "symbolic transaction" can understand it in those terms, yes. But that doesn't mean that they can't understand the symbols themselves without knowing that they are symbols. If that were true we'd never be able to learn the meaning of the word "symbol" in the first place, since it itself is a symbol.

Do you not see the "sit" command as a symbol the dog can understand? Understanding multiplication is a more complex case, but we could probably train a dog to understand a simple multiplication table, say with just the numbers "two" and "three", where the dog has been trained to fetch the correct number-shaped biscuit upon hearing a particular combination of those words. The results would be the same for what a human trained in this task would do. The major difference is that the human has a ton of additional understanding and associations with those words, including recognizing and associating the whole task with the sound pattern "multiplication".

Ok. But that's consistent with my point.
 
double lol

I told you once before piggy that you simply are not going to be able to understand this without the requisite background in computer science. You refused to accept that.

I don't know who was correct, but I observe that you are in approximately the same position of understanding this issue that you were in over a year ago.

Perhaps you should start educating yourself in the requisite fields?

Perhaps it would help if you educated me, which is one of the functions of these forums, if properly used.

(And I hope that you're not referring to that thread where folks were pondering why thermostats couldn't be conscious.)
 
lol

drkitten doesn't mean "we" as in "here in this thread," he/she means "we" as in "the sum of humanity's mathematicians."

The convincing argument that the brain is no stronger than TM equivalent is that the brain is made of the same stuff as other physical systems. That is, quite simply, all there is to it.

Apparently not. This is not a question that can be resolved entirely with reference to mathematics.

We also have to consider the actual organ which produces consciousness, which is not a mathematical abstraction, but rather a physical organ like the heart or liver.

Whenever we make models, we are dealing with a level of abstraction which flattens certain aspects of the system being modeled. If we then attempt to draw conclusions without compensating for that fact, we're liable to error.

So let's take the notion that no function of the brain -- a physical system -- can possibly be time-dependent because certain informational models of brain activity are not time-dependent.

Add to this the fact that the models being proposed do not specifically describe the particular function of the system -- producing consciousness -- which is under scrutiny.

It would be unwise to conclude from such models that no function of the brain has any temporal limitation.

Tell me, would these mathematical models of the brain correctly assert that consciousness has a subliminal threshold as well as a simultaneity threshold?

If so, how can we categorically deny that a function whose mechanism is unknown -- conscious experience -- is not time-dependent in any way?

If not, then how can we assert that these models are complete?
 
The convincing argument that the brain is no stronger than TM equivalent is that the brain is made of the same stuff as other physical systems. That is, quite simply, all there is to it.

Then here you appear to be conflating simulation with replication.

My car is made of the same stuff as other physical systems.

That does not mean that a TM can drive down the road.
 
Apparently not. This is not a question that can be resolved entirely with reference to mathematics.

We also have to consider the actual organ which produces consciousness, which is not a mathematical abstraction, but rather a physical organ like the heart or liver.

Doesn't matter. The assumption fundamental to all science is that the physical world can be fully described by mathematics to an arbitrary level of precision.

Whenever we make models, we are dealing with a level of abstraction which flattens certain aspects of the system being modeled. If we then attempt to draw conclusions without compensating for that fact, we're liable to error.

Unless what you are modeling is a model to begin with.

So let's take the notion that no function of the brain -- a physical system -- can possibly be time-dependent because certain informational models of brain activity are not time-dependent.

It isn't just "certain informational models," it is all possible models. Relativity? Time diliation? All physical processes are not time-dependent. What they are dependent upon is the relative rates of time in their local enviroment. Which we already admitted -- if you want to slow a brain and not blow it up, you also need to slow the environment of the brain and all the input to the brain.

Add to this the fact that the models being proposed do not specifically describe the particular function of the system -- producing consciousness -- which is under scrutiny.

That wholely depends upon your reception to the models. The fact is, the existing models do just fine at describing how the behavior exhibited by conscious entities most likely comes about. That is to say, we are just waiting for technology to catch up with theory and we should have conscious machines all over the place. This is good enough for most researchers who know what they are talking about, because those types of researchers don't make up things they have no evidence of.

What the existing models are not very good at is describing how the magical core nugget of spirituality that some people insist is present in a human being -- yet cannot be observed or measured objectively -- come about. Except, what does that have to do with consciousness?

It would be unwise to conclude from such models that no function of the brain has any temporal limitation.

Except -- all the data suggests the only temporal limitation of the brain would be related to the ability of the components -- neurons, etc -- to exhibit the desired behavior at different timescales. If the components hold up, then so does the emergent behavior that results.

Tell me, would these mathematical models of the brain correctly assert that consciousness has a subliminal threshold as well as a simultaneity threshold?

I don't know what that means.

If so, how can we categorically deny that a function whose mechanism is unknown -- conscious experience -- is not time-dependent in any way??

It is called induction.

Mathematically, if the behavior of every component of a system is time independent, then there should be a configuration of the sum of those components that is also time independent.

If not, then how can we assert that these models are complete?

The models are complete in the same sense that a TM is "complete" -- we are pretty sure whatever is going on is constrained by the limits of physical computation. We know a ton about how neurons work, and the brain is made of neurons. All the rest is just details.

That doesn't mean we know exactly how every behavior or emotion of a human is produced -- but that isn't the issue.

I know exactly how transistors work, and how to make logic gates from transistors, and how to make a microprocessor from logic gates, yet I am not aware of every detail in the computer I am using right now. Does that mean I should always include the disclaimer "I know how computers work, but not really, since I don't know every little detail?"
 
Then here you appear to be conflating simulation with replication.

My car is made of the same stuff as other physical systems.

That does not mean that a TM can drive down the road.

Since when is consciousness something that can drive down the road?

Consciousness is information processing. That is all it can possibly be. Why? Because if you take every neuron in your brain and put them in a random pile, there will be no consciousness. If you take every neuron in your brain and leave them connected, and simply mess up their firing patterns, there will be no consciousness.

And here is the kicker: Your brain is vastly different from mine, and everyone elses. There is absolutely no low level identity between two human brains. There are only correlations and similarities, and even those run the gamut. Remember those people who are born with only half a brain and still function normally?

The only thing in common between human brains is the fact that their neurons seem to process information.
 
Consciousness is information processing. That is all it can possibly be. Why? Because if you take every neuron in your brain and put them in a random pile, there will be no consciousness. If you take every neuron in your brain and leave them connected, and simply mess up their firing patterns, there will be no consciousness.
I don't mean to be picky, but I don't think you quite show that consciousness IS information processing here. You show that information processing is neccessary for consciousness, not that it is sufficient. Whether it is sufficient seems to be the key claim that people who disagree disagree with.
 
I don't mean to be picky, but I don't think you quite show that consciousness IS information processing here. You show that information processing is neccessary for consciousness, not that it is sufficient. Whether it is sufficient seems to be the key claim that people who disagree disagree with.

I think I have shown that consciousness is a type of information processing.
 
That is to say, we are just waiting for technology to catch up with theory and we should have conscious machines all over the place.

But I don't disagree with that. I have no idea why you think I would.
 
But I don't disagree with that. I have no idea why you think I would.

Because you come off as being excessively skeptical.

It feels like you are demanding a fully detailed model before you will agree to the validity of the model to begin with. But that isn't how things work -- if a model is mathematically valid, it is mathematically valid, regardless of the level of detail.

We can be sure that the computational model is valid because there is no rational way it couldn't be valid. We don't need to wait for a fully fledged conscious A.I. to come around in order to prove it.
 
Consciousness is information processing. That is all it can possibly be.

In fact, it cannot be that at all.

Now bear with me, here. I'm not saying that it's not useful to describe the operation of the brain in terms of IP. Clearly, it is. In fact, I don't see any other way, as a practical matter, to talk about what the brain does on a high level. I've done this myself on this thread, speaking of coordinating sets of data and using highly processed information and the like.

But we should be careful to always keep in mind that IP is an abstraction for what happens in pysical reality. It makes sense only to us (to humans) because it's our metaphor.

In objective physical reality, there's no IP going on, just chemical reactions, electric conduction, and other purely physical sorts of stuff.

Btw, as a reminder, the reason this is important for this discussion is because of the assertion that the brain can produce consciousness at any operating speed (if we could slow it down) on the grounds that a TM can produce its outputs at any operating speed.

The brain, of course, is a physical organ just like every other organ of the body, and it operates purely by the laws of physics, just like every other organ of the body.

We don't yet know what causes consciousness, although we do know some of what the brain is doing when it generates conscious experience, and we can make some deductions from what we know. But as of now, there simply are no viable hypotheses for how this organ actually achieves this feat.

Nevertheless, we can be sure that when we figure it out, it will turn out to be the result of the physical activity of the brain. After all, what else is there for it to be?

Similarly, when we look at what computers actually do, again, all we see is physics. A computer doesn't work because "information" makes it work. It works because of how it's built as a physical object.

Now, to human beings using computers, there's a layer of IP that we can discern that's useful to us. But that's entirely symbolic, and it's not what makes computers work.

A sufficiently intelligent alien observer with enough access to the physical details of the system -- or a hypothetical omniscient observer -- could describe everything a computer does (such as causing pixels to light up on screens or causing printers to spray ink on paper or causing speakers to generate sound waves or causing trays to extend and retract or making discs spin and lasers lase) in terms of the materials and electricity. (If you believe that the behavior of a computer does not make sense entirely when viewed objectively in this manner, I'd like to hear why.)

Ditto for the brain. If you could know everything about the physical state of the system, everything it did would add up. From birth to death, there would never be a moment when you'd stop and say, "Whoa, why did THAT happen?! That goes against the laws of physics!"

And you know what... in both cases, you wouldn't need to know a single thing about the "information" that we humans talk about when we talk about brains and computers.

Let's get real simple. Take a man adding on an abacus. We can talk about that in terms of IP. But that only makes sense to the human mind. In objective reality, everything that's going on is consistent with the laws of physics, and explainable in those terms. Not just the movement of the beads, but also the movement of the man's body.

As far as we know, everything in this universe is just a physical-energetic chain reaction, and that includes our brains.

So it is not possible that IP is what generates consciousness. IP is purely symbolic. It is our system of understanding and talking about certain things.

But there is no way in which our symbolic abstractions can cause phenomena in the real physical world.

Therefore, we can be certain that it is the physics of the brain, and not IP, which generates consciousness, however it's done.
 
Because you come off as being excessively skeptical.

It feels like you are demanding a fully detailed model before you will agree to the validity of the model to begin with. But that isn't how things work -- if a model is mathematically valid, it is mathematically valid, regardless of the level of detail.

We can be sure that the computational model is valid because there is no rational way it couldn't be valid. We don't need to wait for a fully fledged conscious A.I. to come around in order to prove it.

Can you tell me, in a nutshell, what you mean by the computational model?

I don't want to misunderstand you.
 
In objective physical reality, there's no IP going on, just chemical reactions, electric conduction, and other purely physical sorts of stuff.
Would you happen to be pl3bs over on the Dawkins forum?
 

Back
Top Bottom