Richard T. Garner and "Beyond Morality"

[phiwum]

I disagree. You will get all the mileage possible, because that is exactly right. Everything we do is a result of human genetics and that includes both moral and immoral behaviour and that's all there is to it.
There are no moral universals. A spider society would have some rules that are very like ours and some that would horrify us- but they would be fine by spider standards.
It doesn't, because there is no great payoff. This is why I think the whole question is a bit silly. People do what they do because they are people. There are no grounds whatever for claiming that what constitutes good behaviour for humans is universally good in some way other than good for human survival in a human environment. I think seeking moral universals is hunting for unicorns.
Look at any athletes- dancers, divers, sprinters, long distance runners. Look at the difference in body shape. If you can't see gene selection at work, I don't think you are looking hard enough. If all human society consisted of ballet dancers, divers and runners, we would be speciating like crazy. We're not of course, because in a gene pool of 7 billion, any variation is slight.
Remember that among humans, "natural" selection is often exaggerated by conscious selection. The people who play pro sport are both self selected (they have the ability and the desire) and extraneously selected by scouts and trainers who know what to look for in a good exemplar of a specific sport.
Team sports are in fact a microcosm of society. Behave anti-socially (eg not trying hard enough, not passing the ball, not "being a team player") will get you kicked out fast. That's selection at the sharp end. The same sort of behaviour in the wider realm of life can have similar, if slower and less obvious, results.

Sorry, I'm unconvinced that any of this teaches me much about ballet, aside from basic structural facts about human beings -- and these facts are observable even if we don't appeal to natural selection at all.

But, if you think that one gains deep insight into ballet, football, moral reasoning and cheesemaking by appear to genetic inheritance, well, I guess have at it. Frankly, the whole thing seems pretty obscure to me.

The fact is that much of moral judgments (such as altruistic sacrifice) are in conflict with what one expects from natural selection. Someone interested in a descriptive account of morality in humans has to explain that conflict (though, of course, the right explanation may simply be that natural selection is a crude mechanism that rarely settles on the optimal solution).

It is not enough to say, "Well, we're all evolved, so our morals come from that, innit?"

 

[phiwum]

Right, so would you agree that the act of measuring someone's opinions and feelings is objective, even though the answer does technically depend on someone's opinions and feelings?

And would you therefore also agree that the ability to measure people's moral values, and then analyse which course of action optimizes/satisfies them, would yield an entirely objective way of determining how to satisfy human moral values?

Assuming it could be done, I'd call this an objective way of determining how to satisfy (an individual) human's moral values.

Which is not the same as an "objective moral theory", which is what you were calling it before. What we'd be talking about here is simple practical reasoning constrained by moral rules. You start with the morality as given (that is, as read from the brain of the given individual).

Mind you, I'm still dubious that our brains actually have anything corresponding to moral rules, clearly and unambiguously stated, much less that these rules can be read from the brain structure and then coherently applied to the great bulk of moral dilemmas, thereby settling once and for all the really hard questions.

But, if you could do that, I'd agree that the process is objective in the sense stated above. It's just not an objective moral theory in any clear sense of the terms.

ETA: You have used the terms "objective moral truths" and "objective morality". I'm not sure that you used the term "objective moral theory" previously, contrary to what I wrote above, but surely "objective morality" is similar enough for my point.

 

[Meed]

It is not enough to say, "Well, we're all evolved, so our morals come from that, innit?"

Right. It makes little sense to me to attempt to study human sociology, psychology or even health by somehow utilizing evolutionary principles to draw conclusions. Evolutionary principles can hint at why certain things might have been selected for, but if we want to simply know what and how things are (e.g. what is human morality and how does it work psychologically/sociologically) then it makes a great deal more sense to study what we can actually observe rather than speculating about evolutionary history. And of course if we're interested in how things should be rather than how things are then evolution becomes even less relevant.

 

[angrysoba]

I disagree. You will get all the mileage possible, because that is exactly right. Everything we do is a result of human genetics and that includes both moral and immoral behaviour and that's all there is to it.

Okay, but then what is the difference between moral and immoral behaviour.

Anyway, I disagree that everything we do is the result of "human genetics". I think the environment has a big impact on things we do as well. And then there are those laws of physics, of course. And the laws of logic. They both throw spanners in the works as well.

 

[Correa Neto]

Football and ballet are group activities (yes, there are those solo numbers and also player who seem to think they are or should be playing alone). Since we are a social species, shaped by evolution to cooperate, part of these activities could be said to be related to evolution and genetics. But what about the rules within each of them? What are the parameters controlling the actions of each individual within a team? A blend of biology and non-biologic (environmental and contingency) factors. Football from 2013 is different from the 60’s. Ballet choreographies from the XIX Century are different from nowadays’, not to mention the plays tend to reflect somehow aspects of the culture of the time and place they were created. So, following the KISS principle (or maybe reductio ad absurdum, if you prefer), we have

Human behavior = biology + environment + contingency

Each variable will display several values and relative weights. I guess few would disagree. Few would also, I hope and believe will disagree understanding how these factors interact to build human behavior is an extremely difficult task.

Let’s suppose we could track brain activity during moral choices. Suppose we can see which areas are being activated and different patterns of neurons being fired for moral and immoral decisions(*). Suppose we can even track gland activity, taking notes of hormone production or even change several hormone levels along the experiments. The researcher now even knows how hormone levels affect decision-making, for example. Note all this data will not completely explain why this or that decision was taken. The why has huge subjective context- and culture related aspects. These aspects will feed a neuron network (actually a body, for other physical aspects will have influences on the decision) shaped by evolution and by the individual’s experiences, his/hers unique personal background (OK, parts of it are shared by many others of the same culture). In the end, we may have a probabilistic model indicating the odds of a given decision being taken under different sets of parameters, even if we don’t know the exact role and weight of each variable.

We already have statistic models for human behavior. They are used in marketing, for example. You don’t need to know exactly how the factors interact. You just need to know that a given color and a given placement at the store’s shelves will give your product an edge when a potential customer considers buying something. I believe analogies can be draw regarding moral decisions. Sure, this or that customer will not be affected by your strategy, with a few it may even backfire. Same with morals and we can blend them with decisions about buying or not something.

We can choose not to buy this or that product, even if its color, design and placement appeals somehow to our brains. I will not buy it because I know company A is not following, say, norms regarding environment, respect to its employees, taxes, whatever, even if it is cheaper than another similar product. Yes, I could be said to be taking such a decision because I was shaped to cooperate, contribute for group welfare. But what if I want that product just to impress people, to somehow increase my status? Screw the community. Screw ethics. The perspective of personal gains won over sharing and caring. We see both attitudes every single day. Which factors will control such decisions in individual level? Which decision will be the dominant, the most common one? Which attitude will provide an evolutionary edge?

Whatever are the answers, they will not be “just genetics”. Maybe not even "mostly genetics". Context, environment, contingency will, I believe (or hope), have roles and these roles may, to a certain point, be more important than our hardwires. The routines, the behaviors, the standards stored at our brains, which were developed based on our experiences have a huge influence. Sure, since you can’t run Skyrim or GTAV on a PC XT, depending on how you reduce the problem you can say its just genetics…

(*) I bet 10 quatloos someone somewhere already did similar experiments.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

All these atheist moral realists are looking for a certain kind of word which might conjure up a sense of the value that they place on human life and conscious experience, which separates us from rocks and dust. I think that word is 'sacred'.

Good luck cooking up some kind of 'sciency' version of that one. It's better to just admit that you have a faith belief that consciousness or life has some kind of axiomatic value, from which you can construct some kind of 'system'. Better than kidding yourself that your moral beliefs are solely based on methodological naturalism, like Dennett, Harris and Dawkins seem to have done.

 

[punshhh]

All these atheist moral realists are looking for a certain kind of word which might conjure up a sense of the value that they place on human life and conscious experience, which separates us from rocks and dust. I think that word is 'sacred'.

Yes, while they also deny the existence of a mind and assume that conscious experience is a given at a certain complexity of computation.

Good luck cooking up some kind of 'sciency' version of that one. It's better to just admit that you have a faith belief that consciousness or life has some kind of axiomatic value, from which you can construct some kind of 'system'. Better than kidding yourself that your moral beliefs are solely based on methodological naturalism, like Dennett, Harris and Dawkins seem to have done.

It all looks like an argument for the existence of philosophical zombies to me. Zombies who are sentient, conscious and have experience.

 

[Arcade22]

For example: Corporal punishment used to be a lot more prevalent in schools, often under the "spare the rod and spoil the child" Biblical claim. Once the word from science got out, that such punishment is actually antithetical to student productivity, the practice almost entirely stopped (except for a few small schools, but they are considered disgusting to most other people). In that way, a descriptive claim: "corporal punishment has a negative impact on student productivity", transformed into a normative one: "corporal punishment is bad."

I highlighted to problematic part. In this case we apparently already have a normative premises: schools ought to be productive. As such we can use this normative statement with scientific evidence to determine what we ought to do to make sure that schools are productive.

This is not controversial at all. The problem is when people begin with a descriptive claim such: "corporal punishment has a negative impact on student productivity" and then turn it into a normative statement such as "corporal punishment is bad" without mentioning or justifying the original normative statement.

I know that one is a trivial claim. I only brought it up to explain why I was not making an appeal to popularity.

Sounds about right, if a little bit too wordy.

For some reason i don't think going from two unconvincing fallacious arguments to two statements which are so vague and ambiguous is much of an improvement...

"desirable consequences" could be taken as a synonym for "good for our well-being". I get tired of using the same words all the time.

Now you just have to define "good", "our" and "well-being". You know, this is the kind of problems you get into when you already got a conclusion and work backwards to prove it...

It is interesting how those who claim to get their morals from gods tend to converge on ideas you don't really need to get from gods.

Sure, you can just get it from some other sacred notion. Common sense, laws of nature, human rights, justice, equality... pick your poison.

Reason is not bullet-proof, and can be misguided. But, it is more likely to lead to the right answers faster than almost anything else. The only type of justification that does it better is Science, but even that one is not always perfect.

The thing is that you are assuming that there is a "right answer" to these questions. You still have not shown that is the case.

As a side note: I think that those who (claim to) get their morals from gods will probably end up matching closely to those who get them from reason, after a while. But, it will take them longer.

Got any evidence?

Which is what all the others you listed will end up boiling down to!

I see that phiwum already responded to this so i won't.

That might be true for most people, now. But, does not necessarily need to stay the case. I suspect morality will, eventually, be accepted as a realm of science, and not something based on faith.

Yeah, but so far the only people I've seen that have supported that belief has been crackpots and philosophers. Not a good sign!

Oh, and before you ask: No, science is NOT, itself, a form of faith. It is grounded in objective reality, that can be independently and reliably verified by disinterested parties.

What is the highlighted part but a statement of faith?

Interesting you should say that!

The example I was going to use in my opening remarks was to ask "SHOULD the earth revolve around the Sun?" It does seem like an absurd question. But, I would go on to demonstrate that moral questions, such as "Should I value well-being?" would eventually reach that level of absurdity, because the answer is going to be more obvious: "Duh, of course!! What else are ya gonna do?!"

Ah yes, Reductio ad absurdum. Wonderful.

 

[Wowbagger]

The meeting I had Wednesday was quite interesting.

The good news is that there is a tremendous amount of experimental data that is consistent with the idea that values converge on consequentialist ideas, over time. And, even though there might NOT be anything that directly tests the idea, we can introduce a variable or two into existing experimental protocols to do so. So, at the very least: There CAN be an empirical basis upon which the theory of moral truths rests, that I am promoting.

For example, we can set up a variation of Muzafer Sherif's Robbers Cave Experiment ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robbers_Cave_Experiment#Robbers_cave_study ), where a few people are persuaded to dissent from the best interests of their fellow in-group members, in various ways.

The bad news is that no one wanted to commit to the final step, and say that science is telling us what our values ought to be.

To that end, I would first ask this: IF God existed, and God made decrees about what we should and should not do, would that (hypothetically) count as an Objective Morality? Most people, including error theorists, would seem to say yes. If not, then the word would have no meaning, and it would be pointless to continue on those grounds.

Once that is accepted, I would claim that: All I am doing is substituting God for natural processes. If natural processes tend to have us converge on certain values, and if we have no control over what those values are going to be: That societies will always be running back, or crawling back, to them whenever we veer off of them for too long, it would be not be philosophically different from God making a decree. Except, in this case, there is no God entity. Just a virtual "decree" about what our values ought to be, from nature.

However, even that was dismissed as just being philosophy and not science. We will have to work on that, I suppose.

Though, for the purposes of my debate: I think I can, at the very least, make a convincing case that: By investigating moral truths, we have a better opportunity to learn more about our values. If we dismiss them as non-existent, (and were merely efforts to control people in the past, as error theory is prone to do), then we would be less inclined to be able to do that.

There is no guarantee we would find objective truths, nor am I claiming error-theory is non-progressive. I am claiming that the hunt for objective truths will make us a lot more progressive than error-theory would.

If you'd like to drop the unlikely claim that every moral reason is fundamentally selfish, then we can move on.

Why would I do that?

It has already been well established in accepted science that selfish systems can become altruistic, once it is recognize that acting altruistic is in the best interest of the selfish entity. That has been a standard part of evolutionary biology since about the 70's, and has not fundamentally changed since.

Perhaps you should read up on the subject.

But, (to stay relevant to the intended topic of the thread), even if I was wrong, that does not mean objective moral truths don't exist. Whatever takes the place of this idea would then be upgraded to an aspect of moral truth.

Even if God doesn't exist, the presumption that those who invoke God really believe in God and fear eternal justice is enough to explain their behavior.

But, the values they have don't come from nowhere!

They might oppose X behavior, claiming God opposes it. But, a researcher figures out that, historically: X behavior decreased the power and wealth of religious leaders; then the REAL reason X is opposed is because those religious leaders conspired against it!
What is weird, here, is that no one needs to know what the true reasons were! The faithful would not. Perhaps not even the current generation of leaders! (Assuming the conspiracy was hatched in past generations.)
Only through careful study of the history of X behavior was that true motive revealed!

Imagine if the same thing is happening to YOU! You might assume, for example, that you think "it's wrong to break deathbed promises", on altruistic grounds that it harms others. But, what if the true, hidden reason is because, historically: Societies that broke deathbed promises were worse off, than those that largely kept to them. Perhaps it was because it reduced trust among people to be sufficiently problematic in other situations. And, your physiology is tapping into that historic lesson, without even realizing it.

This is pure magic. The thought that, if I don't do it even in situations where my action is undetectable then others won't either is simple magical thinking.

I said it was a statistical connection, not a casual one. This is not a roulette wheel, where each spin is an independent action from any other. (Assuming it was a fair game.)

Stealing in moments where you think your actions will be undetectable DOES tell us something about whether or not such thefts will occur, in the future, under similar circumstances. Though, we would need a good sample size to demonstrate that, effectively.

I'm speaking of those rare situations when I indeed won't be caught.

Then your thinking is fine, but trivial, and irrelevant to my point.

In the real world, the worry about getting caught is a real one, and an increasingly worrisome one for potential thieves. And, THAT changes the game strategy, and how we approach the morality of the subject.

It is important for me to emphasize that, because if such things can be demonstrated, it becomes an example of a manner in which morality converges on certain values. Your plain point is not part of that mixing bowl.

You are assuming a utopian situation: a land of milk and honey. This is not the actual human condition based on the limit of consumable goods.

If we approach economics with the goal of building something that can, objectively, be called a "utopia", (that is: Not merely the delusions of mad men, but a society that really IS objectively best for all citizens!); we are more likely going to hone in on strategies to find one, or something close to one. If we all assume it can never be done, we are forever deprived of our potential.

That our altruism is expanding, so that more and more people are in our "in-group", and the very idea of there even being a true "out-group" is declining, is a sign that this could happen.

I was also recently reminded of John Rawls' Theory of Justice: That the rules of society work out best for everyone, if you don't know what role you will be playing in that society, before you make the rules. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice) I think more people are innately realizing this, and that could be part of a natural path towards "objective utopia".

The real danger is declaring to have the right strategy too early. It might be in the best interests of building a Utopia that we never assume we actually found it, yet, and always leave our assumptions of such things open to skeptical investigation. Utopias would always and forever be Provisional Utopias.

Perhaps we don't speak of the same "Nature". Can you scientifically define "Nature", please?

Nature is natural processes. Perhaps you really take issue with the word "decides"? If so, perhaps you will accept this non-anthropomorphic variation:

Natural forces converge on what objective truths will be. We can try to tap into that, or not. People can accept them, or not. If not, then it's to their own peril.

Here you are objectively wrong. Not only Hume, Camus and Dostoevsky practised the alternative moralities which I had spoken above, but they were celebrated people and died without any peril derived of their beliefs.

If their beliefs were truly bad for society, then society would have eventually figured that out! Those three happened to be either right, or at least benign, towards well-being.

Another example, Karl Marx, turned out to be largely wrong: Although many with power followed his ideals for a long time, they eventually crumbled.

There are others who are hybrids: Ayn Rand, for example, was right about individual rights being important (it keeps the despots at bay); but she was wrong about laissez-faire capitalism being the way to do it (since there are certain types of exploits only a governmental system can squash).

The idea that Nature punishes the bad guys is illusory and derives of the religious belief in a Justice God. It is a consolation belief. No. Nature is morally indifferent, cold, frozen I would say. Let Nature quiet and let us search for morality elsewhere.

My idea is not nearly as naïve as that:

People punish the bad guys. But, we can also make predictions on what sorts of actions people will want to punish, based on studying the nature of moral systems.

If you accept that, then: What you really object to is my use of anthropomorphic language for nature, not the ideas I am trying to promote, themselves. And, I suppose that is a bad habit I am going to have to try to lose.

I highlighted to problematic part. In this case we apparently already have a normative premises: schools ought to be productive. As such we can use this normative statement with scientific evidence to determine what we ought to do to make sure that schools are productive.

What if I told you that natural forces will tend to converge on "productivity of schools" to be something we should value, as that contributes to societal well-being?

This is not controversial at all. The problem is when people begin with a descriptive claim such: "corporal punishment has a negative impact on student productivity" and then turn it into a normative statement such as "corporal punishment is bad" without mentioning or justifying the original normative statement.

Pardon my use of abbreviations. Is this better?:

Corporal punishment is bad because it has a negative impact on student productivity, and student productivity is important for the overall well-being of the society.

I assume that is not going to be terribly controversial. Where the REAL controversy is introduced, I think, is my claim that science can tell us this is something to value. To demonstrate why, I would append even more words to the end:

Corporal punishment is bad because it has a negative impact on student productivity, and student productivity is important for the overall well-being of the society, and well-being is a value we will always tend to converge on from inescapable natural processes acting upon us.

Now you just have to define "good", "our" and "well-being".

I have already done this a dozen times. Here is the summary:

Well-Being: The overall health, wealth and happiness.
Our: All of the people in the society we live in.
Good: Improves upon, or at the very least: Does not detract from.

"Good for our well-being" = Something that improves upon, (or at the least, does not detract from), the overall health, wealth, and happiness of everyone living within our society.

Got any evidence?

Is Pope Francis good enough to demonstrate the general trend?

Yeah, but so far the only people I've seen that have supported that belief has been crackpots and philosophers. Not a good sign!

And, if I am wrong about that, then objective moral truths will be discovered through proto-science instead of formal science. The incline of well-being might look different, but will still trend in the same direction, towards improvement.

What is the highlighted part but a statement of faith?

See this highlighted part:

No, science is NOT, itself, a form of faith. It is grounded in objective reality, that can be independently and reliably verified by disinterested parties.

Ah yes, Reductio ad absurdum. Wonderful.

Like I said: Don't shoot the messenger.

If it becomes increasingly persuasive for people to accept scientific facts for the foundations of their morals, even if it takes a few generations to do so, then the Naturalistic Fallacy is something everyone ends up doing. Complaining to me about that, won't change it.

 

[Arcade22]

What if I told you that natural forces will tend to converge on "productivity of schools" to be something we should value, as that contributes to societal well-being?

You know, the main problem you seem to have is that you don't understand the difference between normative and descriptive statements.

Your statement: "natural forces will tend to converge on "productivity of schools" to be something we should value" is totally incoherent to me. Can you explain how i should understand it? How do these "natural forces" "converge" on something and turn it into something i should value? Can you justify this at all? Explain how they do this logically without any obscurantism, or else i wont even bother to respond since this the central issue.

Pardon my use of abbreviations. Is this better?:

Corporal punishment is bad because it has a negative impact on student productivity, and student productivity is important for the overall well-being of the society.

I assume that is not going to be terribly controversial. Where the REAL controversy is introduced, I think, is my claim that science can tell us this is something to value. To demonstrate why, I would append even more words to the end:

Corporal punishment is bad because it has a negative impact on student productivity, and student productivity is important for the overall well-being of the society, and well-being is a value we will always tend to converge on from inescapable natural processes acting upon us.

No you arguments still smell bad. Even if "well-being is a value we will always tend to converge on" is true it does not follow that i or anyone else ought to "value our well being", no matter how much you mention your "inescapable natural processes".

I have already done this a dozen times. Here is the summary:

Well-Being: The overall health, wealth and happiness.
Our: All of the people in the society we live in.
Good: Improves upon, or at the very least: Does not detract from.

"Good for our well-being" = Something that improves upon, (or at the least, does not detract from), the overall health, wealth, and happiness of everyone living within our society.

So you are implicitly assuming without any justification that morality is equal to utilitarianism. Why not start with justifying that instead of begging the question?

Is Pope Francis good enough to demonstrate the general trend?

No, it's not really convincing. If this is the kind of stuff you are going to bring to a real-time debate you are going to get destroyed unless you happen to be a master of obscurantism.

And, if I am wrong about that, then objective moral truths will be discovered through proto-science instead of formal science. The incline of well-being might look different, but will still trend in the same direction, towards improvement.

So by a "proto-science" i am supposed to assume you mean a group of psedoscientists pretending to science and thusly proving that moral truths are real and what they are?

I guess such a group would not be all to different from the "proto-scientists" that are, right now as I'm writing this, trying to discovering the facts that demonstrate that God intelligently designed us. Who knows, maybe they will be just as successful as those guy too!

 

[phiwum]

To that end, I would first ask this: IF God existed, and God made decrees about what we should and should not do, would that (hypothetically) count as an Objective Morality? Most people, including error theorists, would seem to say yes. If not, then the word would have no meaning, and it would be pointless to continue on those grounds.

Most philosophers that I know would think that God's decrees don't create an objective morality in the usual sense of the term. As Kant says, when we say that God is good, we rely on a prior (indeed, a priori) definition of good when making that judgment.

Why would I do that?

It has already been well established in accepted science that selfish systems can become altruistic, once it is recognize that acting altruistic is in the best interest of the selfish entity. That has been a standard part of evolutionary biology since about the 70's, and has not fundamentally changed since.

Perhaps you should read up on the subject.

Well, no kidding. Sometimes acting altruistically can be in one's self-interest? Who knew?

But, of course, I never once said otherwise. My point is that your attempts to make every altruistic act come down to self-interest are not effective. They are sadly ad hoc and filled with magical thinking: I better not do X, or else others will do it to me!

Yes, of course, I agree that there are good, prudential reasons for some altruistic acts. But when everything comes down to the pretense that a selfish act is always bad, because others will do the same to me, it's clear that your reasoning has gone awry.

But, (to stay relevant to the intended topic of the thread), even if I was wrong, that does not mean objective moral truths don't exist. Whatever takes the place of this idea would then be upgraded to an aspect of moral truth.

I don't suppose I've argued here that objective moral truths don't exist, so I can't imagine this is relevant to anything I've said.

But, the values they have don't come from nowhere!

They might oppose X behavior, claiming God opposes it. But, a researcher figures out that, historically: X behavior decreased the power and wealth of religious leaders; then the REAL reason X is opposed is because those religious leaders conspired against it!
What is weird, here, is that no one needs to know what the true reasons were! The faithful would not. Perhaps not even the current generation of leaders! (Assuming the conspiracy was hatched in past generations.)
Only through careful study of the history of X behavior was that true motive revealed!

Imagine if the same thing is happening to YOU! You might assume, for example, that you think "it's wrong to break deathbed promises", on altruistic grounds that it harms others. But, what if the true, hidden reason is because, historically: Societies that broke deathbed promises were worse off, than those that largely kept to them. Perhaps it was because it reduced trust among people to be sufficiently problematic in other situations. And, your physiology is tapping into that historic lesson, without even realizing it.

I think this is utterly fanciful. I do not think that there's a strong evolutionary drive to keep deathbed promises because it helps the society. In fact, this is pure and silly speculation, as far as I can tell.

I said it was a statistical connection, not a casual one. This is not a roulette wheel, where each spin is an independent action from any other. (Assuming it was a fair game.)

Stealing in moments where you think your actions will be undetectable DOES tell us something about whether or not such thefts will occur, in the future, under similar circumstances. Though, we would need a good sample size to demonstrate that, effectively.

No, this makes no sense. My act does not increase the likelihood that others would do the same thing, because there's no causal connection between my undetectable act and their behavior.

This is a perfect example of what I mean by magical thinking.

Then your thinking is fine, but trivial, and irrelevant to my point.

Really? Because you just claimed that even when the theft will not be discovered, I will raise the probability that others will do the same thing.

In any case, if my thinking is "fine", then it follows that we sometimes make moral judgments that are independent of self-interest.

In the real world, the worry about getting caught is a real one, and an increasingly worrisome one for potential thieves. And, THAT changes the game strategy, and how we approach the morality of the subject.

It is important for me to emphasize that, because if such things can be demonstrated, it becomes an example of a manner in which morality converges on certain values. Your plain point is not part of that mixing bowl.

Great. So, it is your contention that smaller percentages of persons steal, or cheat on exams, or do other dishonest things, because it is no longer advantageous to do so. Well, that might be true. Or it might not. We could check that statistically.

Of course, I happen to agree that persons sometimes decide whether to do something based on likely outcomes. In fact, I think this is utterly obvious.
We call that practical reasoning (of the prudential sort).

But I don't find it plausible in the least that all moral reasoning is just prudential reasoning posing as selflessness.

 

[Wowbagger]

You know, the main problem you seem to have is that you don't understand the difference between normative and descriptive statements.

I covered a lot of this, already. Perhaps you should read more of this thread.

The claim is that objective moral truths exist. Truths that, according to theory, are inescapable and binding in some manner. You can always try to defy them. But, your motivation for not doing so, is that your efforts will more likely be undone, and you might get punished. If you are willing to see your efforts undone, and potentially punished, then that is up to you.

The more specific claim is that well-being is the key moral value that is inescapable and binding by natural forces acting upon the members of a society. You can defy that, if you want to, but if so: You will find yourself on the wrong side of history. Everyone else is more likely to do what is in their collective best-interest towards better well-being.

If we chart various ways well-being has improved over the years, we find that they tend to do so in an inclined saw-tooth like fashion. The general trend is towards better well-being, but there are setbacks along the way.

If you are willing to be one of those setbacks, on the otherwise upwards chart, then that is up to you.

Most people will eventually make the leap from the descriptive statements to normative ones in that manner. In other words: Most people would choose the path towards well-being.

Once we unravel what moral truths probably are, society collectively makes the naturalistic fallacy. If you don't like it, don't complain to me, about it.

No, it's not really convincing. If this is the kind of stuff you are going to bring to a real-time debate you are going to get destroyed unless you happen to be a master of obscurantism.

In order for a Pope, who is supposed to be a conduit of God's messages, to remain a "moral authority", he or she cannot go by the supposed word of God, alone. Even Popes have to bend their moral views towards what is objectively better for their flock.

The Popes will, generally, take a lot longer to reach the same conclusions as non-religious rational people. But, they get there, eventually.

So by a "proto-science" i am supposed to assume you mean a group of psedoscientists pretending to science and thusly proving that moral truths are real and what they are?

I covered this already in the thread.

Proto-science is a type of informal discovery process: A stumbling, bumbling, fumbling around, to discover what works in the Universe. Before there was Hume, before there was a formal scientific process, before there was a systematic disciple for acquiring new, empirical knowledge... There was proto-science!

Psedoscience is just a bunch of people claiming to be doing formal science, but doing it wrongly. They will often even get worse results than proto-science, and at a faster rate.

Most philosophers that I know would think that God's decrees don't create an objective morality in the usual sense of the term. As Kant says, when we say that God is good, we rely on a prior (indeed, a priori) definition of good when making that judgment.

Your motivation for believing God is good (assuming He exists), is that you will be punished by God, if you don't. If YOU want to be punished by (the hypothetical) God, go right ahead!

In the case of objective morality: Your motivation is punishment by society: Either to you, or to future generations of people following your orders. If YOU want to risk taking that kind of punishment, go right ahead!

If it takes a naturalistic fallacy to leap from there, for you to decide that you SHOULD do something, then don't complain to me. You would be the one doing it!

My point is that your attempts to make every altruistic act come down to self-interest are not effective.

If you want to debate this, I suggest doing it in another thread. Because, it just sounds like you have not read up on the established science on this point.

No, this makes no sense. My act does not increase the likelihood that others would do the same thing, because there's no causal connection between my undetectable act and their behavior.

Perhaps this would be a good thing to debate in a separate thread, because it is related to the previous one. As are most of your other comments.

 

[Arcade22]

I covered a lot of this, already. Perhaps you should read more of this thread.

Perhaps you should respond to my question, which i explicitly asked you to answer, rather than continuously making assumptions which you are unwilling or unable to justify let alone prove logically or otherwise?

 

[phiwum]

Your motivation for believing God is good (assuming He exists), is that you will be punished by God, if you don't. If YOU want to be punished by (the hypothetical) God, go right ahead!

Nonsense.

Listen, you don't really get to just make stuff up as it suits you. The fact is that philosophers say that our notion of morality must precede our judgment that God is good. You don't get to just pretend they're saying this because they're scared.

That's not how argument works.

In the case of objective morality: Your motivation is punishment by society: Either to you, or to future generations of people following your orders. If YOU want to risk taking that kind of punishment, go right ahead!

You are confused between the claim that morality is objective and the question of what motivates moral behavior. The two issues are distinct.

If it takes a naturalistic fallacy to leap from there, for you to decide that you SHOULD do something, then don't complain to me. You would be the one doing it!

If you want to debate this, I suggest doing it in another thread. Because, it just sounds like you have not read up on the established science on this point.

Kind sir, I needn't look at "established science" to know that your argument is specious. You've provided no scientific evidence at all, but rather claimed without argument that stealing is (almost?) always bad for the thief and this is why people don't steal. Surely, we should discuss odds of being caught, the punishment likely given, the degree to which one man's actions have a statistically measurable impact on theft and hence increase the likelihood that he will later be victimized, and so on.

Or we could just take your word for it.

What I think is funny is that highlighted bit. That's the bit you stressed. From where I sit, it is ridiculous to worry that my thievery would lead to a measurable increase in the probability I will be burgled. But, you said it, and so I'm sure science will confirm that there is a non-negligible statistical correlation and also that this is a large part of the reason people don't steal.

Because, you have science on your side.

Perhaps this would be a good thing to debate in a separate thread, because it is related to the previous one. As are most of your other comments.

Or you could just ignore my point and forget that you've relied on such dubious causal relationships. Either way, man.

 

[Wowbagger]

Listen, you don't really get to just make stuff up as it suits you. The fact is that philosophers say that our notion of morality must precede our judgment that God is good. You don't get to just pretend they're saying this because they're scared.

That's not how argument works.

Perhaps you misunderstood because I personalized the argument. Perhaps I will replace the word "your", and see how you respond:


The motivation, for a typical person who believes God is good (assuming He exists), is that they will be punished by God, if they don't. If THEY want to be punished by (the hypothetical) God, then they could go right ahead!

The more important point is this: What I am suggesting is that science effectively does the same thing, to a typical person who values science, without God existing.

You are confused between the claim that morality is objective and the question of what motivates moral behavior. The two issues are distinct.

In philosophy they are highly distinct, sure.

In the real word, one blends into the other.

If someone believes science is right about some moral subject, that person will follow what science is saying. They would be making a naturalistic fallacy, sure. But, that's not the fault of my argument: I'm just pointing out that this happens... in the real world.

 

[phiwum]

Perhaps you misunderstood because I personalized the argument. Perhaps I will replace the word "your", and see how you respond:


The motivation, for a typical person who believes God is good (assuming He exists), is that they will be punished by God, if they don't. If THEY want to be punished by (the hypothetical) God, then they could go right ahead!

The more important point is this: What I am suggesting is that science effectively does the same thing, to a typical person who values science, without God existing.

This argument does not actually do anything to show that, were God to dictate certain rules of behavior, those rules would be an "Objective Morality".

All you've shown is that, if God exists and says you ought to do something on pain of eternal damnation, then it is in your prudential interest to do what he says. That's not really what one means by "Objective Morality".

In philosophy they are highly distinct, sure.

In the real word, one blends into the other.

If someone believes science is right about some moral subject, that person will follow what science is saying. They would be making a naturalistic fallacy, sure. But, that's not the fault of my argument: I'm just pointing out that this happens... in the real world.

So, your point is that sometimes people engage in fallacious reasoning?

Well, yeah, okay. Now, can you tell me how that's relevant to the claim that there is an objective morality and that this is the limit point of all human moral progress? Because I'm having trouble seeing the relevance now.

I guess I can't quite figure out where you're going here. Let me summarize what I think you've said, and you tell me if I'm misinterpreting.

(1) For religious folks, the reason that they claim God is good and do what he says is because they don't want to suffer. So, if God actually did dictate some norms, those would be an objective morality.

(2) In the real world, the reason people do what society wants them to do is also fear of punishment. So, that's an objective morality.

I hope you can see that neither of those two conclusions follow from the premises.

 

[Correa Neto]

There's that experiment with two kids and a cake. Adult says "thou shall not eat the cake". Adult leaves the room and... Cake disappears, kids claim to be innocent.

Even the people who believe in omigods which sooner or later deliver punishment will every now and then go against morality. They may fear punishment, they may believe god is watching and knows-it-all but they will break the codes. Driven by necessity, perhaps in some cases. Somehow believing it can be justified, forgiven or being a minor sin can perhaps be a more important cause. Now, non-objective, contex-depended, flexible morality rules could also be the reasons. When the perceived personal gains are seen as worthy the risk of breaking the codes, we'll break them. They are objective, context-dependent.

 

[David Mo]

Nature is natural processes.

Sorry, but this is not a very good definition. Natural is natural is a tautology.

My definition is: “Nature” is all human behaviour that is not socially learned.

I distinguish natural behaviour genetically pre-determinate from learned cultural or artificial behaviour. Artefacts, tools, rites, institutions, sports, 3D films, inheritances and so on are cultural. Sexual attraction, mothers’ love, aggressive or cooperative impulses and so on are natural. Almost all natural impulses are culturally shaped and that’s way is so difficult find the “natural” in men.

If we approach economics with the goal of building something that can, objectively, be called a "utopia", (that is: Not merely the delusions of mad men, but a society that really IS objectively best for all citizens!); we are more likely going to hone in on strategies to find one, or something close to one.

Fine! But we didn’t talk about having a goal. We talked about the actual situation, in which there is an obvious competition between those who want more at the expense of the greater number and those who want more at the expense of the smaller number. And you have to choose between the lesser good of the greatest number (egalitarianism) or the greater good of the smaller number (elitism). And the moral decision has to be taken now, not wait to Utopia. It's a classic utilitarianism moral distinction that also is at the origin of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and his opposition between freedom and equality.

That our altruism is expanding, so that more and more people are in our "in-group", and the very idea of there even being a true "out-group" is declining, is a sign that this could happen.

"Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn", might say the conservative dandy of Notes from Underground.

Or I can continue as Nietzsche: Altruism is a weapon in the arms of the weak people against the strong ones. It is an invention of the sacerdotal class and fruit of his resentment against the nobleman of spirit..

To think that everything the society has done is well done is conformist. I think conformism is a bad moral belief only valuable for lambs. I think that some dissidents are as the eagles over the lambs. I’m denying that social approbation or the interest of society is the main criterion to know if someone is morally wrong or not. I think that my affections, my will or my freedom are higher goods than the law of the herd.

If you think that moral values are objective (natural or ideal) you have only two ways to demostrate it:
a. Show me any contradiction in my Nietzschean speech.
b. Show me an experience (observation or experiment) that concludes I am wrong.

I think you are not able to do it.

 

[Wowbagger]

This argument does not actually do anything to show that, were God to dictate certain rules of behavior, those rules would be an "Objective Morality".

Most of the people I have argued with, including many philosophers, accept that an omnipotent god WOULD be a form of Objective Morality, if he actually existed.

Instead of that: We can show, empirically and objectively, that morals tend to stabilize on particular core values.

If you don't think that constitutes an objective morality, then all you are doing tossing objective values into some other category of values. And, ironically, you will likely be following them, anyway.

So, your point is that sometimes people engage in fallacious reasoning?

Even my opponent will be doing that, at some point. I guarantee it!

Let me summarize what I think you've said, and you tell me if I'm misinterpreting.

You are focusing on the wrong things. I only brought up religious folks to demonstrate one particular avenue many people take to acquire their values, for comparison purposes.

The most important point, for the sake of my live debate, is this: Objective morality lends itself better to understanding our values than error theory does.

The SECOND most important point is the theoretical nature by which objective morality exists: "Well-being" is the only stable value upon which morality CAN exist. (According to theory.) Any deviation from it usually doesn’t last very long, and certainly cannot last forever.

The third point is how that stability emerges: It began, long ago, with our evolutionary inheritance. It continues in the form of emergent behavioral properties that exist within the collective society. But, strangely, the society really can’t control them: They work independently of individual minds, even though individual minds make up their building blocks.

Although it is possible for an error theorist to accept these things, once they are found (usually by objective moralists); the negative aspect they place on morality's existence prevents them from being as innovative as they could be, in discovering them.
And, ironically, error theorists end up (almost always) following the same values as those the objective moralist would claim to be objective.

Most of the things you were picking on are tangents and side tracks and stuff.

Sorry, but this is not a very good definition. Natural is natural is a tautology.

I was offering a synonym. You do know what a synonym is, right?

My definition is: “Nature” is all human behaviour that is not socially learned.

That is pretty good. But, that is limited to Human Nature.

Actual Nature goes a few layers deeper than that: Into the realm of natural forces. Everything about our morality begins with those, historically. Though, one cannot really reduce morality to such physical forces, we can still make certain kinds of predictions based on our understanding of them.

If you think that is controversial, we should start another thread about it.

Fine! But we didn’t talk about having a goal. We talked about the actual situation, in which there is an obvious competition between those who want more at the expense of the greater number and those who want more at the expense of the smaller number. And you have to choose between the lesser good of the greatest number (egalitarianism) or the greater good of the smaller number (elitism). And the moral decision has to be taken now, not wait to Utopia. It's a classic utilitarianism moral distinction that also is at the origin of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and his opposition between freedom and equality.

When forced to choose between the two, it appears as though egalitarianism is more stable than elitism. If you must know.

If you think that moral values are objective (natural or ideal) you have only two ways to demostrate it:
a. Show me any contradiction in my Nietzschean speech.
b. Show me an experience (observation or experiment) that concludes I am wrong.

I think you are not able to do it.

I think it is a sign of great misinterpretation when you ask me to find contradictions in statements that do not contradict what I am saying very much (except in one spot). Almost as if you completely misunderstood my points, and have not read much of this thread. But, at any rate:

Altruism is a weapon in the arms of the weak people against the strong ones.

This could be true. Though, I would add that it is a "weapon" we can expect to naturally emerge from evolutionary forces.

It is an invention of the sacerdotal class and fruit of his resentment against the nobleman of spirit.

I would call it more of a "discovery", than an "invention". But, that is a minor point.

To think that everything the society has done is well done is conformist. I think conformism is a bad moral belief only valuable for lambs.

I do NOT claim that everything society has done, is done well. I introduced the concept of the saw-tooth graph to reflect that. We can predict setbacks will always tend to happen.

And, I agree that conformism could be a bad thing. Though, convergence on moral values that work well is not necessarily "conformist": It would be no more "conformist" than living on a planet that revolves around the sun.

Those points have nothing to do with this:

I’m denying that social approbation or the interest of society is the main criterion to know if someone is morally wrong or not.

It does not matter what Nietzsche denies. I do not know everything about his life, but I am willing to bet that even his sense of moral values tended to converge on what is in the best interest of society, anyway.

And, I might add, he does not need to know it is happening! He would not need to be a "conformist" or consciously altruistic, etc. All he needs is this:

I think that my affections, my will or my freedom are higher goods than the law of the herd.

Right! And, those affections, freedoms, will, etc. do not come from nowhere!

And, such things usually seem to act for the good of society, in most people, in the long run, anyway. So, all that ranting and raving against it got him nowhere out of it!

(ETA: And, sometimes, the "Law of the Herd" could be wrong about what is in their own best interests.)

 

[phiwum]

Most of the people I have argued with, including many philosophers, accept that an omnipotent god WOULD be a form of Objective Morality, if he actually existed.

Well, whoever you have spoken with is simply wrong, near as I can figger.

If you'll look at Kant, or Plato's Euthyphro, for instance, you will see that this is not at all the traditional philosophical view. I see no reason to concede to your anonymous philosophers.

Instead of that: We can show, empirically and objectively, that morals tend to stabilize on particular core values.

You say we can show that, but of course, you haven't really shown that.

But, let's suppose you do. That would not show that these core values ought to be selected, merely because they are the limit point. Rather, one requires an argument that they actually are what we should value, independently of what we do value -- or worse, what we value "in the limit".

If you don't think that constitutes an objective morality, then all you are doing tossing objective values into some other category of values. And, ironically, you will likely be following them, anyway.

I don't dispute that every morality worth discussing will, for instance, value liberty, equality of opportunity, fairness, beneficence, non-maleficence, and so on. It does not follow that, simply by observing the disparate moralities value these in various disparate ways, these are therefore the basis of objective morality.

Importantly, what we need to know is what to do in the many, many cases where these values are in conflict, and when two distinct moral theories clash on what to do. Do you think that, for instance, your limit point morality will solve all moral dilemmas? That, over time, we will all come to agree when, for instance, a fetus is a morally relevant being, when the rights of the minority ought to outweighs the interests of the majority, when the desire for equal opportunity supercedes the right to association?

I agree that many of our moral values are more or less universal, in the sense that they are valued. It doesn't follow that, simply because these things are viewed as good that we have thereby found a coherent and complete moral theory.

Even my opponent will be doing that, at some point. I guarantee it!

Oh goody! Another claim we ought to accept on your authority!

You are focusing on the wrong things. I only brought up religious folks to demonstrate one particular avenue many people take to acquire their values, for comparison purposes.

The most important point, for the sake of my live debate, is this: Objective morality lends itself better to understanding our values than error theory does.

I'm not defending error theory, since I'm not familiar with it.

I'm pointing out that your so-called "objective morality" is thus far based on your pronouncements and wishes, and you haven't given any argument that indeed there is a single, coherent, complete moral theory which is the unique limit point of moral progress.

So, all you have really is a guess. You hope that this is how things are, and that in the end, moral dilemmas will be solved uniquely. I just don't count this as a discovery, but a wish.

The SECOND most important point is the theoretical nature by which objective morality exists: "Well-being" is the only stable value upon which morality CAN exist. (According to theory.) Any deviation from it usually doesn’t last very long, and certainly cannot last forever.

Add this to the list of unproved claims.

The third point is how that stability emerges: It began, long ago, with our evolutionary inheritance. It continues in the form of emergent behavioral properties that exist within the collective society. But, strangely, the society really can’t control them: They work independently of individual minds, even though individual minds make up their building blocks.

Morality is, apparently, like magic! It really is quite comforting, isn't it? Don't fret your pretty little head, it will all work out in the end. Because, apparently, natural evolution of moral values tends towards utopia.

Although it is possible for an error theorist to accept these things, once they are found (usually by objective moralists); the negative aspect they place on morality's existence prevents them from being as innovative as they could be, in discovering them.
And, ironically, error theorists end up (almost always) following the same values as those the objective moralist would claim to be objective.

Most of the things you were picking on are tangents and side tracks and stuff.

Okay, let's focus on the important stuff.

Let's start with the first claim. Prove to me that moral values tend towards a single, well-defined limit over time. Show me how we arrive at this conclusion.

That's not a tangent, is it?