Richard T. Garner and "Beyond Morality"

[Wowbagger]

Could I not be disgusted by corporal punishment even if it did help a student study better?

Well, this may sound strange at first, but, according to theory: *IF* corporal punishment really was great for student productivity and such, THEN: most people would probably NOT be disgusted by it!

The mileage of an individual may vary, but (according to theory) the disgust we currently feel for such a thing largely comes out of the fact that it does a lot of harm, and no real good purpose. If we lived in an alternative universe where the opposite was true: It did a lot of good, and no real harm, then we would not be disgusted by it.

You may be, but it seems to me that ending corporal punishment was not a scientific cause but an ethical cause. Similarly, I think that goes for ending slavery and women's rights to vote were not grounded on beliefs that scientists had discovered no differences in people.

No one can escape empirical reality for long! Not even those who brush of science as a motivating factor.

I contend that *IF* ending slavery or giving women the right to vote ended up actually causing a lot of harm to society, we would eventually go back to either having slaves or taking voting rights away from women.

It happens that, in this universe, ending slavery and granting votes for women did a LOT of good. So, we keep those policies around, and very few argue against them, anymore.
But, maybe that's because we're lucky the Universe worked out that way.

My point is that if you are going to make claims about how science has created normative rules then you have to be able to actually demonstrate that

That is a good point to talk about:

Sometimes it is not formal science that does it, but a "proto-science": A sorta bumbling, stumbling, fumbling around, trying to find what works; that does it.

For my part, I only have to demonstrate that proto-science is good enough.

Errrm... that looks like a problem to me in the sense that you are explicitly drawing attention to the difference in is and ought statements.

My point is that morals ("oughts") become facts ("ises") over time. Because that is what tends to work best, over time.

It is not a naturalistic fallacy to state that the Earth revolves around the Sun.

I contend that once we know the facts about morals, it will no longer be seen as a naturalistic fallacy that we will value certain things, for the same reason. (Such as, according to theory, well being.)

If you go back far enough, before we knew for certain that the Earth revolved around the Sun, I am fairly sure philosophers of the day would try to argue over the question "Should the Earth revolve around the Sun?". Back then, the answer would have a lot of weight on theological notions considered important, at the time.


In a former era, I tried to argue that the distinction between "is" and "ought" is actually a useful fiction: That there really is no such distinction in nature. We humans decided to invent it. So, when it comes to morals, we shouldn't be surprised that the lines get blurred, and one becomes the other.
While I still feel that way, I decided not to defend it so much, anymore, especially when time is of the essence, and there are more important ways to argue these things.


If you still insist that I am making a naturalistic fallacy, then WE ARE ALL making it! All of us! Every time we commit our values to ideas that coincide with facts, we do it! If you think slavery is bad, and/or think women should have the right to vote, then YOU TOO are not distinguishing your "oughts" from your "ises" very well, either!

ETA: In fact it would risk becoming a circular argument: People value that which people value and having what you value is well-being therefore well-being is what we value.

To break such a circle, we need to demonstrate a clear starting point, (and if possible, an ending point).

The starting point I propose is the very process of Natural Selection. It was there BEFORE "people valued that which they valued", by giving us our first "proto" sense of values: Survival and replication of our genes. Everything else that became a value emerged largely from that! (With, perhaps, a few other natural processes tossed in.)

The fact that it currently appears as though we "value what we value" is only a consequence of how all the various aspects later became entangled with each other. But, it is not irreducible: We can still dissect all the pieces, and see how they work, and where they came from, if we study them hard enough.

We can even anticipate that a few circular-looking systems will form within all of that. But, as long as we can reconcile their origins, I don't think there is anything terribly wrong with that; and it's not something we have any control over, at any rate.

 

[angrysoba]

If you go back far enough, before we knew for certain that the Earth revolved around the Sun, I am fairly sure philosophers of the day would try to argue over the question "Should the Earth revolve around the Sun?". Back then, the answer would have a lot of weight on theological notions considered important, at the time.

I think you are just making that up.

I think also that if you start by arguing this in your presentation that you are going to lose the argument big time.

 

[angrysoba]

Well, this may sound strange at first, but, according to theory: *IF* corporal punishment really was great for student productivity and such, THEN: most people would probably NOT be disgusted by it!

The mileage of an individual may vary, but (according to theory) the disgust we currently feel for such a thing largely comes out of the fact that it does a lot of harm, and no real good purpose. If we lived in an alternative universe where the opposite was true: It did a lot of good, and no real harm, then we would not be disgusted by it.

No one can escape empirical reality for long! Not even those who brush of science as a motivating factor.

I contend that *IF* ending slavery or giving women the right to vote ended up actually causing a lot of harm to society, we would eventually go back to either having slaves or taking voting rights away from women.

It happens that, in this universe, ending slavery and granting votes for women did a LOT of good. So, we keep those policies around, and very few argue against them, anymore.
But, maybe that's because we're lucky the Universe worked out that way.

But clearly owning slaves and denying women the right to vote or keeping them in servitude would not be a good thing for the slaves or for women, or would it?

If you could pick the way to have a society and you were told that for the majority of people, the upper caste, life would be absolutely great for everyone except a very small caste of slaves who would live in abject misery which will be necessary for certain occupations. Or you could have a society of people living not so well, lower longevity, poorer health, less to eat, but no slavery at all, then could you say which one was objectively better? Well, for those who would be slaves, the second one obviously. But for the vast majority the former. But can science actually tell us which should be objectively and universally preferred?

Also, if you were behind a Rawlsian-type veil of ignorance and told you could live in either society but did not know in advance which position in society you would end up in, which would you choose to live in?

 

[Wowbagger]

I think you are just making that up..

Right now, this very day, we have people arguing over whether or not humans evolved from "monkeys". They are under the impression that it is morally repugnant if we have done so. If you asked "Should we write that humans evolved from ancestral primates (or 'monkeys', as you call them) in our school textbooks?" They will say "No".

But clearly owning slaves and denying women the right to vote or keeping them in servitude would not be a good thing for the slaves or for women, or would it?

In this universe, it is not.

In the alternative universe, (that exists only in my thought exercise), it would be good for them! Or, at the very least, the best possible option for them.

(Don't ask me how it could possibly be good for them. My imagination hasn't gotten that far, yet.)

...except a very small caste of slaves who would live in abject misery...

My thought exercise assumes that either:

1. They would not be miserable (in that universe)

2. Or: They would still be objectively better off, even if they are miserable. No other alternative (in that universe) would be better for them.

Again, don't ask me how that could possibly work. I don't really live in that alternative Universe.

Also, if you were behind a Rawlsian-type veil of ignorance and told you could live in either society but did not know in advance which position in society you would end up in, which would you choose to live in?

Ah, this is a good question! My own preference would be based on the Universe I happen to live in (where slaves is bad).

But, if I was NOT asked, and transported to the other Universe against my will: I would be forced to adapt my morality to fit with what works, there.

We can, indeed, see microcosms of this between societies on Earth. Though, there are important points to emphasize:
1. These differences are NOT usually about larger issues such as slavery, but about smaller things, such as what to do if you hit someone with your car.
(In most industrial societies, we are morally obligated to stay with the victim and not run off. In traditional societies, one is actually more obligated to run off, to the nearest police station, and NOT stay with the victim.)

2. Even on the small scale, you can't say morality is truly relative. They still have their roots in the same ultimate factors.
(To use Sam Harris terms: The Moral Landscape would actually be very shallow.)

3. And you certainly can NOT claim "anything goes" (Though, I don't think anyone here would argue that.) because we can make predictions about how the answers will play out, based on facts about the society.

 

[angrysoba]

Right now, this very day, we have people arguing over whether or not humans evolved from "monkeys". They are under the impression that it is morally repugnant if we have done so. If you asked "Should we write that humans evolved from ancestral primates (or 'monkeys', as you call them) in our school textbooks?" They will say "No".

I think there is a misunderstanding here.


Saying that it is wrong to believe something is not the same as saying something ought to be true.

ETA: X is a fact or X is not a fact are descriptive statements about the world, not normative statements. However, we may infer some bad intent in someone claiming something to be true.

For example, while you use the example of someone having a wicked belief (i.e that the Earth is not the centre of the universe around which all else revolves), we.they don't say that the Earth is wicked for not revolving around the Sun.

Maybe a better way to put it, we (I will assume you and I think the same way on this) believe the Holocaust took place and we think there is something very fishy indeed being said by Holocaust deniers, but it doesn't mean that we believe the Holocaust ought to have happened, does it?


ETA: We also have another word for affirming statements that are not true and are known to be not true. The word is "lying". In this case we are condemning the person for their lives, not reality for being different to how we demand it is.

 

[phiwum]

Right now, this very day, we have people arguing over whether or not humans evolved from "monkeys". They are under the impression that it is morally repugnant if we have done so. If you asked "Should we write that humans evolved from ancestral primates (or 'monkeys', as you call them) in our school textbooks?" They will say "No".

This is not at all relevant.

You previously claimed that people probably once asked, "Should the earth revolve around the sun?" This is not at all like asking, "Should we write that humans evolved from monkeys?" It is like asking, "Should it be the case that humans evolved from monkeys?"

It is obvious that the latter question is bizarre, just as the question "Should the earth revolve around the sun?" is bizarre. But no matter. You've thought about it and concluded (without looking) that people probably asked that.

 

[phiwum]

There is rather a lot of material here, and I feel that if I respond to every point raised, these posts will become unwieldy. So, I'm going to ignore most of your points, for now. I don't see much to be gained, for instance, in continuing our semantic disagreement over the term "moral preference", so I'm going to drop that bit -- not that I concede the point, but there are more interesting points of contention than that.

If I cut anything that you would really like me to address, just let me know.

I am saying that the building blocks of morality can be objectively ascertained. That is a much more significant claim than saying that you can objectively determine what a person believes about morality.

In fact, no, I don't think you are saying that.

You're claiming that whether a given person has a given "moral preference" can be objectively ascertained. This is a fact about the cognitive states of persons. This claim (which, of course, is far from being clearly demonstrated) is not about "objectively ascertaining the building blocks of morality".

You do see the difference, right?

Ok, yes, fine. To a large extent, moral debates are determined by how a person feels about a certain proposition. i.e. you can shift a moral debate on abortion with phrases like "pro-choice" or "pro-life". I do not believe this is a meaningful way to hold a moral discussion, however. I believe that how a person feels about an issue is only a shortcut to what actually matters, which is the expected outcome of a proposition and the moral desirability of that outcome. The reason that examples like the trolley problem don't work is because people intuitively grasp that allowing people to push other people onto train tracks wouldn't result in a society they want to live in.

This paragraph appears to be a gross misreading of my point.

My point is that I do not grant it as obvious that morality is about the consequences of actions. This claim requires argument.

The answer to whether that person is "responsible" in the loosest sense of the word is "yes, to the extent that any other factor that could have prevented that outcome from happening is responsible". A butterfly flapping his wings might be "responsible". The issue is that when you use a word like "fault", you are slipping in connotations such as "blame". The issue then becomes whether or not we should hold it against that person and be angry at them, which is an entirely different question. (one which can still be answered, but it's obviously much harder to do so.)

Let me refresh your memory. You said, "The consequences of actions, and whether or not they satisfy moral preferences, can be determined objectively." So, I'd like for you to objectively determine whether the NPR interviewee was, given your own personal "moral preferences", morally responsible for this outcome. How do you intend to "objectively determine" that?

Look, I'm willing to overlook many of your unjustified claims. I'm willing to grant, for the sake of argument, that perhaps some day we can objectively determine the "moral preferences" of an individual just by looking at his brain structure. Is that obviously true? Certainly not, but let's grant it.

But now you want to go further. You want to argue that we can take a certain causal chain and determine whether it "fits" the moral judgment criteria we found in a given brain. But it seems to me that we do not have a complete and coherent set of rules ("moral preferences") that unambiguously apply to every situation. It would be great if we did. There would be far fewer moral dilemmas. But that's not how the average human thinks. We are a jumble of conflicting, ambiguous, vague, incoherent moral rules of thumb. And if you really could objectively determine the moral preferences, that is what you would get -- a mess of so-called preferences that sway one this way or that, depending on how we think of the moral hypothetical.

Indeed, this is why moral philosophers aim to find a coherent theory of morality. Our intuitions (yes, yes, "preferences") are not well-developed for the task of determining what ought to be done. We would like, rather, to have an objective set of principles (NOTE: I mean that the principles themselves are objectively true, not that I can objectively determine whether a person accepts those principles) to unambiguously determine what ought to be done.

We can, of course, doubt whether the moral philosophers will be able to do this, but it is what they aim for when they look for an objective basis for morality.

I believe your disagreement here is the result of your misinterpreting what I mean by "preference", which is not the same as "belief", as explained in the first part of this post. What we can do is objectively determine what a person (morally) desires AND how best to obtain it, which means that it can be objectively determined what a person should do GIVEN their desires/preferences.

Again, this presupposes that ones set of moral preferences is coherent. But there is no reason to believe this, without evidence. We have good evidence, for instance, that human systems of belief are an incoherent mess (look at Kahneman and Tversky, for instance). I see no reason to think that our moral preferences are any more consistent than our set of beliefs.

If you agree that we can have a moral system that is the same as a universal and objective morality for all intents and purposes then I think I have proved a whole lot. I think it is worth recognizing the importance of this. Surely you would agree that the average person who hears that "morality is subjective" does not conclude what I just described? If so, surely you must also agree that "subjectivism" is not an adequate description for "Near universal and objective morality".

I won't grant you this point, because you have given no reason to think that (1) there is a significant majority who holds nearly the same moral preferences or (2) this set of nigh-universal moral preferences is constant and does not change over time. (And, as before, I balk at calling this an "objective morality".)

Oh, I know that there are a ton of other suggestions, I just don't think they are sensible.

1) "Morality is what god says is good". Well there is no god, so no.
2) "Morality is what maximising evolutionary fitness". Naturalistic fallacy, so no.
3) "Morality is out there, somewhere". Too vague, so no.

Do you know of any sensible alternative to "human morality comes from human moral preferences/desires"?

I know several serious attempts at providing a rigorous justification for truly objective morality, including Kantianism and Utilitarianism. We may doubt whether these attempts are as successful as one would like, but they are not well-described by any of the three items above. In particular, philosophical theories of morality do not boil down to, "Morality is out there, somewhere."

So far as I understand your claims, you're stuck guessing that (1) individuals have a coherent set of moral preferences and (2) there is a single, coherent set of moral preferences that is unchanging (else it would not count as universal) and used by nearly everyone. There are some other issues (such as the implicit claim that moral preferences are always or almost always consequentialist in nature), but these two are surely enough for now.

 

[Meed]

Well, this may sound strange at first, but, according to theory: *IF* corporal punishment really was great for student productivity and such, THEN: most people would probably NOT be disgusted by it!

The mileage of an individual may vary, but (according to theory) the disgust we currently feel for such a thing largely comes out of the fact that it does a lot of harm, and no real good purpose. If we lived in an alternative universe where the opposite was true: It did a lot of good, and no real harm, then we would not be disgusted by it.

No one can escape empirical reality for long! Not even those who brush of science as a motivating factor.

How do you define "long"?

According to your theory shouldn't acceptance of homosexuality have been the norm for most of human history (not to mention the present)? And how about equal rights between the sexes?

I contend that *IF* ending slavery or giving women the right to vote ended up actually causing a lot of harm to society, we would eventually go back to either having slaves or taking voting rights away from women.

But through most of history, subjugation of women and general sexism has been the norm. So if the theory is "societies establish norms that benefit them" and if we are to take "women's rights benefit society" as an assumption, then the theory does not seem to be supported by the empirical evidence in this respect.

It happens that, in this universe, ending slavery and granting votes for women did a LOT of good. So, we keep those policies around, and very few argue against them, anymore.
But, maybe that's because we're lucky the Universe worked out that way.

I contend that once we know the facts about morals, it will no longer be seen as a naturalistic fallacy that we will value certain things, for the same reason. (Such as, according to theory, well being.)

The problem with "well being" as a basis of morality is that it raises the question "whose well being"? If I'm competing with someone for resources, then our well beings are in direct conflict. Is a moral action an action that increases one's own well being? An action that increases the well being of sentient creatures on average? Or something else? Neither of the two metrics just mentioned seem to line up very well with the ways in which most people judge morality.

In a former era, I tried to argue that the distinction between "is" and "ought" is actually a useful fiction: That there really is no such distinction in nature. We humans decided to invent it. So, when it comes to morals, we shouldn't be surprised that the lines get blurred, and one becomes the other.
While I still feel that way, I decided not to defend it so much, anymore, especially when time is of the essence, and there are more important ways to argue these things.

I disagree, but since you do not wish to argue it, I won't.

If you still insist that I am making a naturalistic fallacy, then WE ARE ALL making it! All of us! Every time we commit our values to ideas that coincide with facts, we do it! If you think slavery is bad, and/or think women should have the right to vote, then YOU TOO are not distinguishing your "oughts" from your "ises" very well, either!

I don't see how this follows.

To break such a circle, we need to demonstrate a clear starting point, (and if possible, an ending point).

The starting point I propose is the very process of Natural Selection. It was there BEFORE "people valued that which they valued", by giving us our first "proto" sense of values: Survival and replication of our genes. Everything else that became a value emerged largely from that! (With, perhaps, a few other natural processes tossed in.)

I disagree. In the past we did not know what genes were so 'replication of genes' could not have been a value, moral or otherwise. I'm not sure what you mean by "proto" or "before 'people valued that which they valued'". Are you saying that at some people in evolutionary history people did not value that which they valued?

I do agree with you in the sense that human morality was naturally selected for and thus the capacity for morality/sense-of-morality is something that is or was generally beneficial to survival and reproduction. But not in the sense that survival and reproduction must be foundational moral values themselves.

 

[Soapy Sam]

The highlighted part is a question that Wowbagger needs to answer given that he is the one arguing the proposition that there are objective moral norms. It is not necessary for me to demonstrate that "right" means anything, but rather is part of the definition of normative ethics:

Fair enough. But out of curiosity do you think it has any actual meaning? I'm interested in your POV, not a wiki definition.

Wowbagger is going to engage in a debate with someone who is a moral skeptic, that is Wowbagger's opponent will be asking Wowbagger to demonstrate the meaning of right in the context of ethics.

What's strange to me is that your own moral relativism is so clearly at odds with Wowbagger's claims to objective moral norms and yet you two are high-fiving each other and engaged in furious agreement.

It suggests to me that neither of you properly understand what is being debated.

I already said you can't argue something till you define it. I define morality as behaviour. If you think it's anything other than that, go ahead and explain.

Wowbagger and I share the view that moral behaviour is behaviour and that behaviour is based in genetics. I'm sure we can find lots of room for disagreement on particulars.

The question of interest (to you I suspect, I already have an answer) is whether morality actually exists , independent of human behaviour. My answer to that is a simple "no", for the same reasons I'd say humour , sarcasm and football don't exist independent of human behaviour. They are aspects of behaviour and that's absolutely all they are.

(It's arguable that ants , dogs, and other creatures can display what we see as aspects of morality. I grant that as a possibility, but it simply asks another instance of the same question- has morality any objective reality outside behaviour?)

Where (I think) wowbagger and I would agree is that behaviour which is not survival oriented is not likely to survive long, and that behaviour which improves survival is selected for both genetically and culturally, with the latter being vastly faster.
The most important part of the human environment is other humans. You are far more likely to be hurt, helped, saved or killed by another person than by any other organism except bacteria. We are subject to the tolerance, approval or disapproval of other humans from cradle to grave. They have biases , bigotries, rules, laws, religions, political systems, all of which we must accommodate to some extent. Those systems define "public opinion" and the "right" way to behave. Spit in their eye if you wish. You will pay for it.
Morality is self-interest writ large. Most laws protect property rather than people. Free speech is fine until you say what your family, your peer group or your government does not want said. Consider Mr. Snowden. Dying for your country is dandy until the people on top are required to do so- which is why it's OK to carpet bomb entire cities, but not to assassinate political leaders, as that might just come back at you.
The people with the gold make the rules. That's human morality.
Gather allies.
Don't challenge the leaders till you are in a position of strength.
Help people who are in a position to help you.
Remember favours.
These are moral behaviour in a communicative, tribal ape.

You may see this as cynical. It's not. It's reality and it works! A surprisingly decent civilisation can develop by simply following similar, simple rules.
That's because we are well adapted to those rules.

But rules and people are all there are.

"Morality" is an abstract concept emergent from the behaviour of large numbers of people and that behaviour ultimately stems from individual genetics.
So is "humour".

I honestly feel philosophers keep chasing this simple notion looking for something complex which really isn't there.

Nobody goes looking for humour in a non human, non behavioural context. Why hunt for morality?

 

[phiwum]

that behaviour is based in genetics. [...][/HILITE]

The question of interest (to you I suspect, I already have an answer) is whether morality actually exists , independent of human behaviour. My answer to that is a simple "no", for the same reasons I'd say humour , sarcasm and football don't exist independent of human behaviour. They are aspects of behaviour and that's absolutely all they are.

So, if I'm not misreading you, it seems that sarcasm and football (!) are also based in genetics. You good with that? I could conceivably accept that sarcasm had some genetic basis, but surely football serves as a reductio.

 

[Wowbagger]

I think there is a misunderstanding here.

This is not at all relevant.

You previously claimed that people probably once asked, "Should the earth revolve around the sun?" This is not at all like asking, "Should we write that humans evolved from monkeys?" It is like asking, "Should it be the case that humans evolved from monkeys?"

Assuming your intention is to write what is true, there is no practical difference between the two. Though, the later does sound more bizarre.

One of my points is that moral questions will, eventually, sound equally bizarre.

How do you define "long"?

There is no single, set definition. (How long does it take for a movie production to be completed after it is initially greenlit?) But, we should be able to make predictions on how long things take, based on various parameters.

According to your theory shouldn't acceptance of homosexuality have been the norm for most of human history (not to mention the present)? And how about equal rights between the sexes?

I predict that, historically, we will find trends towards both happening through most of history, in the form of inclined saw-tooth graphs.
For example: Homosexuality gets a little more accepted, then much of that gets retracted. Then it gets a little MORE accepted, which then gets partly retracted, etc. The trend line marches upward, toward greater acceptability, though often very slowly, with the occasional setback thrown in, for various reasons.

We can expect the incline to be very gradual, but still detectable, for much of history, because they would be working within the realm of proto-science: Stumbling and fumbling their way around trying to find what works.

Once formal science enters the picture, and systematically makes relevant discoveries at a faster rate, the chart will move upwards a LOT faster.

The problem with "well being" as a basis of morality is that it raises the question "whose well being"?

Everyone's!

There are very few things in life, any more, that are actually zero-sum games. There are creative ways to turn every competition for limited resources into NON-zero-sum games, where everyone wins! It is often NOT EASY to develop these solutions. Sometimes they are hard to negotiate, because they may require a short-term sacrifice by one or more parties. But, once these strategies are figured out by someone, they have the opportunity to spread to everyone.

In our early history, we had stronger in-group/out-group biases, where we would act in the best interests of everyone in our group. If we were paranoid, and suspect the out-group might try to kill us, we would be tempted to go off on a pre-emptive strike, and kill them off first.

Today, our "in-group" has become a LOT more inclusive, and even includes almost every stranger we meet on a daily basis. So, we are more inclined to develop non-zero-sum strategies with more people. (And, perhaps, even other animals!)

I don't see how this follows.

I can also add this:

If God existed, and declared "X is a good thing, and Y is a bad thing!" Those would, no doubt, become facts, because this God is omnipotent, and his word IS reality.
If someone then says "I should support X, and not Y", you could say they are making a naturalistic fallacy.

Replace "God" with "science", and the case is not much different. (Though, science would be provisional and not "law".)

If science declared "X is a good thing, and Y is a bad thing!", it would only be natural for most people to say " I should support X, and not Y", even though that might also be a naturalistic fallacy.

If I am accused of conflating "Is" and "Ought", it is only because everyone naturally does that, anyway! Don't shoot the messenger!

My important contribution would be to demonstrate that there is no other stable manner in which morality can exist. Any attempt to defy facts would not last forever. (According to theory.)

In the past we did not know what genes were so 'replication of genes' could not have been a value, moral or otherwise.

We do NOT need to be aware of it happening, for it to be an influence on us! Much of what we do is guided by hidden influences we are not aware of. It took science centuries to work out the various biases in our brains. There could still be more of them to discover!

Are you saying that at some people in evolutionary history people did not value that which they valued?

Perhaps this line of reasoning should start from scratch:

I think we can (hopefully) accept the fact that a conscious brain is a prerequisite for most accepted definitions of morality. (If not, we can debate that in another thread!)
But, what happened BEFORE we had such a consciousness? Morality did not just suddenly appear out of nowhere! It was built on top of biological systems that were already in place. Those systems (in hindsight) could be said to be a "proto-morality".

Is that clearer?

But not in the sense that survival and reproduction must be foundational moral values themselves.

See my "layers" comment, next:

So, if I'm not misreading you, it seems that sarcasm and football (!) are also based in genetics.

You good with that? I could conceivably accept that sarcasm had some genetic basis, but surely football serves as a reductio.

This is a fair point. Perhaps it would be best to explain it in terms of Layers: Systems are built on top of systems, but the workings of higher systems might not necessarily be reduced to the workings of the lower ones. Though, we can still predict aspects of one based on the other.

This line of thinking was inspired by how Antonio Damasio explains how consciousness works, in his book "Self Comes to Mind". He defines layers of consciousness this way: A proto-self, in the form of basic survival systems; a core self, where a 'narrator' forms from maps of the proto-self; and an autobiographical self on top of that, where memories and language contribute to a sustained sense of "being aware". Each one is built on top of the other. But, the autobiographical self cannot, necessarily, be reduced to merely the behavior of the proto-self.
Though, having said that, we can still make some types of predictions about one layer, based on findings of another.

I am still researching and developing this line of argument, so I cannot tell you where good places to draw the lines between layers would be, for morality yet. But, if such layers are found to be practical, that could better explain what I mean.

Natural selection would be a proto-morality. But, thanks to the workings of various layers between that and our current, actual morality, we can NOT reduce our morality to just natural selection. However, that does NOT imply we can't make predictions about morality based on our understanding of natural selection, and vice-versa.

 

[phiwum]

Assuming your intention is to write what is true, there is no practical difference between the two. Though, the later does sound more bizarre.

Nonsense! There is a very clear difference between the two!

An affirmative answer to the first ("We should write that humans evolved from monkeys") is an assertion about what we should do. It is an expression of a norm binding the potential authors.

An affirmative answer to the second ("It should be the case that humans evolved from monkeys") is simply incoherent. Who or what should ensure that it is the case?

The second sounds bizarre because it is bizarre.

One of my points is that moral questions will, eventually, sound equally bizarre.

You haven't proved that point, and you can't do so by pretending as if it is plausible that "Should the earth revolve around the sun?" was once a serious question. Maybe you should present evidence that anyone ever asked such an odd question?

 

[phiwum]

So, if I'm not misreading you, it seems that sarcasm and football (!) are also based in genetics.

You good with that? I could conceivably accept that sarcasm had some genetic basis, but surely football serves as a reductio.

I bungled my quotation. I intended to highlight the following two statements:

"Wowbagger and I share the view that moral behaviour is behaviour and that behaviour is based in genetics."

"My answer to that is a simple "no", for the same reasons I'd say humour , sarcasm and football don't exist independent of human behaviour. They are aspects of behaviour and that's absolutely all they are."

From which it seems to follow that football is also based in genetics.

 

[Soapy Sam]

So, if I'm not misreading you, it seems that sarcasm and football (!) are also based in genetics.

You good with that? I could conceivably accept that sarcasm had some genetic basis, but surely football serves as a reductio.

At a generic level, yes they are.

Sarcasm is an aspect of language use, which is certainly under genetic control.
Football is a game played by creatures with legs and hands. The whole point is to restrict the use of the hands for controlling the ball.* Spider football is very different, the offside rule in particular - and as for handling the ball, well , referees have nervous breakdowns.

Yes, of course both have a genetic basis. You don't hear much sarcasm from rabbits and there are few trees playing football.

*I mean the game 99% of the world call "football". American football seems to be based on advertising.

 

[phiwum]

At a generic level, yes they are.

Sarcasm is an aspect of language use, which is certainly under genetic control.
Football is a game played by creatures with legs and hands. The whole point is to restrict the use of the hands for controlling the ball.* Spider football is very different. The offside rule in particular 0 and as for handling the ball, well referees have nervous breakdowns.

Yes, of course both have a genetic basis. You don't hear much sarcasm from rabbits and there are few trees playing football.

*I mean the game 99% of the world call "football". American football seems to be based on advertising.

Well, if you call that a genetic basis, then of course everything a human can possibly do (mathematics, ballet, sitcoms, sneezing, suicide, ditch-digging, and so on) has a genetic basis. That's a pretty trivial claim. We won't get much mileage from that, I think.

But, in context, the claim about morality was supposed to mean something more -- namely, that we can make non-trivial discoveries about morality using what we know about natural selection (if I understood correctly). I don't see that this fact (humans are capable of moral reasoning, and humans are the product of natural selection) leads to a great payoff.

What corresponding deep facts will we learn about ballet?

ETA: I should note as well that your description of football didn't have anything much to do with natural selection. A creationist could also see that humans have hands and feet and come to the same conclusions. This is reasoning based on the form of humans (which, yes, comes from natural selection), but uses nothing about natural selection per se.

 

[Wowbagger]

You haven't proved that point,

I theorize that it will happen. It follows from the theory that objective moral truths exist.

One part of that is to demonstrate that morality stabilizes around certain values. Meaning: Deviation from those values won't last forever.

The value I suspect most accurately reflects stable morals is "well being". But, if I am wrong about that, then there would be some other value or values that take its place, and morality will be found to stabilize around that, instead. So, I will stick with "well being" for now, to keep things simple.

If we accept that "well being" is the only stable manner in which morality can exist, then the question "Should we value well being?" starts to look weird. It can't exist in any other form, for very long. And, we have no control over that, even if we didn't like it that way.

It would be like confirming that the Earth has a stable orbit around the Sun, then asking "Should the Earth revolve around the Sun?". It won't likely change for a few billion years. And, we have no control over that, even if we didn't like it that way.

 

[Cavemonster]

Well, if you call that a genetic basis, then of course everything a human can possibly do (mathematics, ballet, sitcoms, sneezing, suicide, ditch-digging, and so on) has a genetic basis. That's a pretty trivial claim. We won't get much mileage from that, I think.

But, in context, the claim about morality was supposed to mean something more -- namely, that we can make non-trivial discoveries about morality using what we know about natural selection (if I understood correctly). I don't see that this fact (humans are capable of moral reasoning, and humans are the product of natural selection) leads to a great payoff.

What corresponding deep facts will we learn about ballet?

ETA: I should note as well that your description of football didn't have anything much to do with natural selection. A creationist could also see that humans have hands and feet and come to the same conclusions. This is reasoning based on the form of humans (which, yes, comes from natural selection), but uses nothing about natural selection per se.

Right and going further, genetics is only a particular subset of biology, which is really just a subset of chemistry, which is described in full by physics. So really physics should answer all our moral, football and ballet questions... right?

 

[angrysoba]

Right and going further, genetics is only a particular subset of biology, which is really just a subset of chemistry, which is described in full by physics. So really physics should answer all our moral, football and ballet questions... right?

Exactly.

You may as well say the answer to the question, "Should I give money to charity or spend it on an expensive toy for my child?" is "The Big Bang!"

 

[angrysoba]

Fair enough. But out of curiosity do you think it has any actual meaning? I'm interested in your POV, not a wiki definition.

Well, the wiki definition is the meaning of normative ethics.

Most of what you are talking about is descriptive ethics. It will be pointless having any discussion if you fail to see the difference.

I already said you can't argue something till you define it. I define morality as behaviour. If you think it's anything other than that, go ahead and explain.

I already gave a defintion of normative ethics and you told me you weren't interested in a wiki definition.

Wowbagger and I share the view that moral behaviour is behaviour and that behaviour is based in genetics. I'm sure we can find lots of room for disagreement on particulars.

The question of interest (to you I suspect, I already have an answer) is whether morality actually exists , independent of human behaviour. My answer to that is a simple "no", for the same reasons I'd say humour , sarcasm and football don't exist independent of human behaviour. They are aspects of behaviour and that's absolutely all they are.

(It's arguable that ants , dogs, and other creatures can display what we see as aspects of morality. I grant that as a possibility, but it simply asks another instance of the same question- has morality any objective reality outside behaviour?)

Where (I think) wowbagger and I would agree is that behaviour which is not survival oriented is not likely to survive long, and that behaviour which improves survival is selected for both genetically and culturally, with the latter being vastly faster.
The most important part of the human environment is other humans. You are far more likely to be hurt, helped, saved or killed by another person than by any other organism except bacteria. We are subject to the tolerance, approval or disapproval of other humans from cradle to grave. They have biases , bigotries, rules, laws, religions, political systems, all of which we must accommodate to some extent. Those systems define "public opinion" and the "right" way to behave. Spit in their eye if you wish. You will pay for it.
Morality is self-interest writ large. Most laws protect property rather than people. Free speech is fine until you say what your family, your peer group or your government does not want said. Consider Mr. Snowden. Dying for your country is dandy until the people on top are required to do so- which is why it's OK to carpet bomb entire cities, but not to assassinate political leaders, as that might just come back at you.
The people with the gold make the rules. That's human morality.
Gather allies.
Don't challenge the leaders till you are in a position of strength.
Help people who are in a position to help you.
Remember favours.
These are moral behaviour in a communicative, tribal ape.

You may see this as cynical. It's not. It's reality and it works! A surprisingly decent civilisation can develop by simply following similar, simple rules.
That's because we are well adapted to those rules.

But rules and people are all there are.

"Morality" is an abstract concept emergent from the behaviour of large numbers of people and that behaviour ultimately stems from individual genetics.
So is "humour".

I honestly feel philosophers keep chasing this simple notion looking for something complex which really isn't there.

Nobody goes looking for humour in a non human, non behavioural context. Why hunt for morality?

What you have written just shows a complete confusion about the issue.

 

[phiwum]

I theorize that it will happen. It follows from the theory that objective moral truths exist.

One part of that is to demonstrate that morality stabilizes around certain values. Meaning: Deviation from those values won't last forever.

The value I suspect most accurately reflects stable morals is "well being". But, if I am wrong about that, then there would be some other value or values that take its place, and morality will be found to stabilize around that, instead. So, I will stick with "well being" for now, to keep things simple.

If we accept that "well being" is the only stable manner in which morality can exist, then the question "Should we value well being?" starts to look weird. It can't exist in any other form, for very long. And, we have no control over that, even if we didn't like it that way.

Perhaps we should wait for the evidence that "well-being" is the limit of all moral evolution. Or, at least, some definition of "well-being", so that the question "Should we value well-being?" is meaningful.