Resolution of Transporter Problem

[Nick227]

No, I told you that if there was a p-zombie who exhibited all the behaviors that can arise from unconscious processing it would lack the behaviors that arise from consciousness and hence not be a p-zombie.

So, what are those behaviours? What behaviours specifically can only occur with conscious processing and not unconscious?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Ahh... your dualism becomes apparent.

By definition if the function of conscious processing is achieved then the processing is conscious.

That is complete and utter nonsense. Phenomenal consciousness, according to GWT, is just inter-module neuronal broadcasting. Humans evolved one way of doing it. Computers do it another way. That's all it is. There's no reason why we shouldn't do without consciousness altogether.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

By definition if the function of conscious processing is achieved then the processing is conscious.

That is complete and utter nonsense. Phenomenal consciousness, according to GWT, is just inter-module neuronal broadcasting. Humans evolved one way of doing it. Computers do it another way. That's all it is. There's no reason why we shouldn't do without consciousness altogether.

Just to chime in a little bit here. Whether "there's no reason we shouldn't do without consciousness altogether" is somewhat beside the point I think.

We can make a similar attrition when it comes to there being no reason for the fusion between single cell organisms into multicellular, which thorough evolutionary processes then has turned out to operate as functional wholes. They might have just continued as single cell entities. Might not the 'reason for consciousness' then have a pretty solid evolutionary rationale? It seems to be of pretty high survival benefit for the whole organismic functional whole to function as a whole when certain inter-module neuronal broadcasting exhibit that which we call consciousness.

Humans did not evolve one way of doing it, the very fact that it started to happened is what eventually made us distinguishable as humans in the first place. From this perspective, consciousness is a matter of scale in regards to complexity of potential broadcasters, not a phenomenon in it's own right (well, except as a conceptual tool of course).

 

[Nick227]

Just to chime in a little bit here. Whether "there's no reason we shouldn't do without consciousness altogether" is somewhat beside the point I think.

We can make a similar attrition when it comes to there being no reason for the fusion between single cell organisms into multicellular, which thorough evolutionary processes then has turned out to operate as functional wholes. They might have just continued as single cell entities. Might not the 'reason for consciousness' then have a pretty solid evolutionary rationale? It seems to be of pretty high survival benefit for the whole organismic functional whole to function as a whole when certain inter-module neuronal broadcasting exhibit that which we call consciousness.

For sure. But we're discussing whether GWT infers that P zombies can or cannot exist. If consciousness is simply a global access state then I can't see a reason why the same level of communication couldn't be achieved by another means, negating the need for phenomenal consciousness. Can you?

I mean, the human brain doesn't have the equivalent of a cpu. A computer doesn't need global access. Why would it be conscious?

Humans did not evolve one way of doing it, the very fact that it started to happened is what eventually made us distinguishable as humans in the first place. From this perspective, consciousness is a matter of scale in regards to complexity of potential broadcasters, not a phenomenon in it's own right (well, except as a conceptual tool of course).

Well, a human processes vast amounts of data unconsciously. That which gets processed in the "light of day" so to speak, will inevitably appear to be completely different, I think. Don't you consider phenomenal consciousness a phenomenon in its own right?

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

For sure. But we're discussing whether GWT infers that P zombies can or cannot exist. If consciousness is simply a global access state then I can't see a reason why the same level of communication couldn't be achieved by another means, negating the need for phenomenal consciousness. Can you?

I mean, the human brain doesn't have the equivalent of a cpu. A computer doesn't need global access. Why would it be conscious?

I know it's ultimately a P zombie discussion. I really don't know how to form an opinion about that. It seems to me it's entirely dependent on one's conceptual point of departure. I haven't really though about it at great length at all.

I also don't know if a computer is conscious in any meaningful sense because I'm still quite unsure about what a 'meaningful sense' in regards to consciousness would entail in toto. Perhaps the computer still lacks the architecture of a human-like ecosystem. We are, after all, something of an ecosystem where different units don't react in a unilateral way to each other. Or then it is already conscious at some rudimentary level. I simply don't know.

Well, a human processes vast amounts of data unconsciously. That which gets processed in the "light of day" so to speak, will inevitably appear to be completely different, I think. Don't you consider phenomenal consciousness a phenomenon in its own right?

An extreme limitation of actions that become conscious might be the survival advantage the functional whole has. What would become of us if all aspects of the liver function would suddenly become conscious activities? Heh, people might die while being engulfed in watching a good film and thus momentarily "forgetting to manoeuvre" some crucial liver function. It might be that what exactly is "allowed" to broadcast globally has heavily been moulded through evolution and the genetic blueprint.

I really don't know why phenomenal consciousness should ultimately be considered a phenomenon in it's own right, although it certainly feels that way. I often wonder if we're even approaching it from the right direction. We often tend to treat subjectivity as the extra ingredient, as the defining ingredient, and never the other way around. What if the defining ingredient is actually that which is not conscious, i.e. not being available to the global workspace? How would we experience consciousness if everything was broadcast and accessible at all times; would we still think there's something distinct as consciousness or subjectivity in it's own right? Would there be "we" at all in any meaningful sense?

 

[Nick227]

I know it's ultimately a P zombie discussion. I really don't know how to form an opinion about that. It seems to me it's entirely dependent on one's conceptual point of departure. I haven't really though about it at great length at all.

I also don't know if a computer is conscious in any meaningful sense because I'm still quite unsure about what a 'meaningful sense' in regards to consciousness would entail in toto. Perhaps the computer still lacks the architecture of a human-like ecosystem. We are, after all, something of an ecosystem where different units don't react in a unilateral way to each other. Or then it is already conscious at some rudimentary level. I simply don't know.

It's strikes me that consciousness, as in global access, is what evolution came up with to try and make up for the fact that the brain has no cpu.

An extreme limitation of actions that become conscious might be the survival advantage the functional whole has. What would become of us if all aspects of the liver function would suddenly become conscious activities? Heh, people might die while being engulfed in watching a good film and thus momentarily "forgetting to manoeuvre" some crucial liver function. It might be that what exactly is "allowed" to broadcast globally has heavily been moulded through evolution and the genetic blueprint.

I'm sure it has.

I really don't know why phenomenal consciousness should ultimately be considered a phenomenon in it's own right, although it certainly feels that way. I often wonder if we're even approaching it from the right direction. We often tend to treat subjectivity as the extra ingredient, as the defining ingredient, and never the other way around. What if the defining ingredient is actually that which is not conscious, i.e. not being available to the global workspace? How would we experience consciousness if everything was broadcast and accessible at all times; would we still think there's something distinct as consciousness or subjectivity in it's own right? Would there be "we" at all in any meaningful sense?

Well, I imagine global access is single channel. If everything being processed was made globally accessible, life would just be selfless white noise.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

So, what are those behaviours? What behaviours specifically can only occur with conscious processing and not unconscious?

Nick

For starters, how about all the behaviors you think a solution to the HPC needs to explain?

First you argue that the HPC is a valid problem, then you claim there are no exclusively conscious behaviors? Don't you realize that is inconsistent?

No, of course you don't ...

 

[rocketdodger]

That is complete and utter nonsense. Phenomenal consciousness, according to GWT, is just inter-module neuronal broadcasting. Humans evolved one way of doing it. Computers do it another way. That's all it is. There's no reason why we shouldn't do without consciousness altogether.

Nick

...see?

Now you are saying there is no HPC because all the results of consciousness can be achieved without consciousness?

 

[PixyMisa]

You need to read Chalmers more closely.

Well, someone does.

The HPC does not assert that there can be no materialist model for consciousness.

That is precisely what it does assert.

 

[PixyMisa]

I mean, the human brain doesn't have the equivalent of a cpu. A computer doesn't need global access. Why would it be conscious?

Most computers are conscious, Nick.

GWT is a model (not a very interesting one) for human consciousness, for the specific way in which the brain generates the various aspects of human consciousness.

Consciousness in and of itself is really simple and pretty much unavoidable for any complex neural network. Human consciousness is really complex, but that is a completely different issue.

 

[Nick227]

For starters, how about all the behaviors you think a solution to the HPC needs to explain?

First you argue that the HPC is a valid problem, then you claim there are no exclusively conscious behaviors? Don't you realize that is inconsistent?

No, of course you don't ...

I argued that the HPC, as quoted by Chalmers, is potentially valid. Chalmers asserts that there may be other things still to be understood once the easy problems are solved.

Theorists like Block assert that there is Access Consciousness (AC) and that this is distinct from Phenomenal Consciousness (PC). But this is just his interpretation of the situation. I'm completely happy that AC = PC. The HPC as stated by Chalmers does not assert that materialism cannot explain consciousness. Sorry.

Just to remind you, you still haven't come up with any behaviours that can only go on "in the light." Shall I take it that you thus accept that P zombies are possible?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Well, someone does.


That is precisely what it does assert.

No it doesn't. Chalmers clearly states that materialism may not be enough to explain phenomenal consciousness. You can accuse him of hedging his bets, perhaps, or fence-sitting, but he articulated the notion first and this is what he stated.

Other theorists, and also Chalmers it seems at times, have taken the position that there will inevitably still be something left to be explained. And there are people who insist that no matter what materialist science comes up they still won't believe. But the HPC is not defined to reflect this position. It is more loose. It also makes no rational sense to say that the HPC states that consciousness absolutely cannot be understood materialistically, as if this was the case then it wouldn't be a "hard problem," it would be an "impossible problem."

I appreciate that, like qualia, your position here requires that the HPC is defined as procluding consciousness from having a purely material basis. But unfortunately this is not how it is defined in reality.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Most computers are conscious, Nick.

As you define "consciousness" this may be so.

GWT is a model (not a very interesting one) for human consciousness, for the specific way in which the brain generates the various aspects of human consciousness.

Actually, I think the main feature of GWT is that it provides a function for phenomenal consciousness that is non-Cartesian. And, interesting or not, it is currently the dominant model amongst cognitive neuroscientists. GWT does distinguish between unconscious processing and access consciousness. AI does not, presumably because machines have CPUs and don't need AC.

Consciousness in and of itself is really simple and pretty much unavoidable for any complex neural network. Human consciousness is really complex, but that is a completely different issue.

The notion of consciousness that arises in AI is different from that in GWT. Phenomenal (or access) consciousness is merely a means, developed by natural selection, to allow rapid dissemination of information amongst a broad group of decentralised parallel modules. A computer has a CPU. It does not need global access.

Until we know more about how global access actually takes place in the human brain, and it does seem to be the subject of considerable current research, we will not know whether machine consciousness is really analogous to human access consciousness (phenomenality) at all.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

I argued that the HPC, as quoted by Chalmers, is potentially valid. Chalmers asserts that there may be other things still to be understood once the easy problems are solved.

How is it potentially valid if there are no behaviors that can't arise from unconscious processing?

Just to remind you, you still haven't come up with any behaviours that can only go on "in the light." Shall I take it that you thus accept that P zombies are possible?

Just to remind you, I did, in the post you just responded to.

If you think the HPC is valid, then any behavior you think the HPC applies to is automatically outside the realm of a p-zombie. Otherwise the HPC wouldn't apply.

Of course, that illuminates the level of nonsense implicit in the HPC. First, assume there are aspects of behavior that can only arise from conscious processing. Second, assume there are entities that can exhibit this behavior and don't feature conscious processing. Huh? Am I the only one that sees the glaring inconsistency there?

I know what you are saying. You, like all the other HPC proponents, are saying that it might be possible to act like one is conscious without one actually being conscious, in which case one is a p-zombie. But what does "act like X instead of being X" actually mean? You, nor any HPC proponent, has ever explained.

How would you respond if I told you there was such a thing as a p-apple, that behaved exactly like an apple being pulled to the Earth by gravity, forces and all, but it really wasn't an apple being pulled to the Earth by gravity? Oh, and don't forget, there is no way to tell the difference. Would you say "oh, yeah, I see now, there is a 'Hard Problem of Gravity,' because we can't fully explain gravity, we can only explain the behavior of an object being acted on by gravity?"