Resolution of Transporter Problem

[Nick227]

Okay, stop right there. Go directly to the bookstore. Purchase Douglas Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Read it.

The entire book is about the role of self-reference in consciousness, and is far and away the best thing ever written on the subject.

And yes, it is a problem with definitions. You have completely misunderstood my (and rocketdoger's, and everyone else's) point. As computer programmers, the concept of self-reference is natural to us. But part of the reason why it's natural to us is that we've all read Godel, Escher, Bach.

I'm happy to read Hofstadter, but I won't do so with much hope that he answers the questions I'm putting. From what I've listened to Wolfe so far, it's nothing new. He takes a position and proceeds with the "easy problems." I don't have a problem with it, but it doesn't deal with the issues that myself and people like Susan Blackmore raise.

eta: BTW, are you now happy to get in the teletransporter, Pixy? It does seem to me a bit incongruous that you have this good hard materialist viewpoint yet won't travel. Makes me wonder whether deep inside you really believe it.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, I recall SHRDLU from Dennett. I don't recall it being demonstrated that SHRDLU experienced actual visual consciousness. That you can program a machine to say "Yes, I experience vision" does not really cut it for me.

That is obviously not the case here, so your argument doesn't cut it for me.

Like I say, you skip over this piece by taking one of the popular materialist perspectives, which is simply that the mind is what the brain does.

This is not "one of the popular materialist perspectives", Nick. This is the single most thoroughly tested scientific hypotheses our species has ever formulated. We cannot prove scientific theories; even observations can be mistaken. This comes closer to being proven true than any other statement of fact it is possible to make.

This I'm ok with, but I think it's also important to be aware that this is stating a position, not providing empiric evidence.

We are drowning in empirical evidence for this, Nick.

Your buddy Wolfe does the same at the beginning of his lecture series.

And then spends the next twenty hours covering just a small part of the evidence.

He states his position, but it is important to make the distinction.

No, it's not. Not this time. There is no other rational, no other sane position you can take.

Of course, it's fair to say that it is currently impossible to empirically demonstrate visual consciousness, and may remain so.

Wrong. Not only is it possible. Not only is it straightforward. It's been done.

I'll ask you, Nick: What aspect of visual consciousness is it you claim that SHRDLU does not demonstrate? Prove that humans have this, and that SHRDLU does not.

But I think it's good to be aware of the distinction here.

It's good to determine that there is a distinction before you claim to be aware of it.

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm happy to read Hofstadter, but I won't do so with much hope that he answers the questions I'm putting. From what I've listened to Wolfe so far, it's nothing new. He takes a position and proceeds with the "easy problems." I don't have a problem with it, but it doesn't deal with the issues that myself and people like Susan Blackmore raise.

There is no "Hard Problem". It's a myth created to make dualists feel good about themselves, while materialists solve the real problems.

I don't remember if Hofstadter tackles Chalmers specifically, but he certainly deals with Searle, and they are suffering from exactly the same misconception.

Read Godel, Escher, Bach. My mother gave it to me for Christmas just after it came out, and I looked at it blankly and thanked her politely... And then she had to pry me loose from it when we sat down to dinner a couple of hours later. Dennet covers SHRDLU and the Chinese Room and self-reference and all the other things people like rocketdodger and I talk about when the topic turns to consciousness. And it does it with enormous wit and elegance.

And I just learned that there's a sequel, released in 2007, called I Am a Strange Loop. I'll have to find a copy of that myself.

 

[Nick227]

Ever seen a magic show, Nick?

For sure, but I don't think the researchers were trying to trick people deliberately. It doesn't seem like that to me.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

For sure, but I don't think the researchers were trying to trick people deliberately. It doesn't seem like that to me.

My point was more general - even when you think you are paying attention to something, you still fail to see things. Magicians merely take advantage of this.

 

[Nick227]

That is obviously not the case here, so your argument doesn't cut it for me.


This is not "one of the popular materialist perspectives", Nick. This is the single most thoroughly tested scientific hypotheses our species has ever formulated. We cannot prove scientific theories; even observations can be mistaken. This comes closer to being proven true than any other statement of fact it is possible to make.

Then why do so many scientific professionals not share your confidence, Pixy. I mean, did you do a lot of NLP or something? I have to ask because to me your confidence is simply not mirrored by the general body of researchers in this field.

I tell you what, I'll read Hofstadter if you read Blackmore's series of interviews "Conversations of Consciousness." What do you think?

We are drowning in empirical evidence for this, Nick.

Well, I've heard it said you can drown in a inch of water.

And then spends the next twenty hours covering just a small part of the evidence.

He shows a chunk of how the brain processes information, yes. This may or may not be the same as what I'm asking. This to me is the point.

No, it's not. Not this time. There is no other rational, no other sane position you can take.

Now you're getting fundamentalist again, Pixy. I'm vaguely familiar with DSMIV and I don't recall subscribing to dualism being in it. Dualism is misguided, I agree, but you just go charging off to the extremes in a manner which to me suggests that actually, underneath it all, you aren't so confident. Especially when you still refuse to get in the teletransporter.

I'll ask you, Nick: What aspect of visual consciousness is it you claim that SHRDLU does not demonstrate? Prove that humans have this, and that SHRDLU does not.

As I mentioned in my reply to RD, I'm happy to concede that you cannot currently demonstrate empirically that visual consciousness exists in humans (there is subjective reporting only). But, given materialism and natural selection and the colossal lack of evidence to the contrary it is reasonable in the extreme to say that it exists.

Your point, which somehow you seem to believe I fail to grasp, is of course that all data processing is consciousness. This is a position, not a demonstrated reality and there is opposing evidence, see the Blackmore piece I quoted earlier which summarises it a little. Humans process consciously but mostly unconsciously. You believe apparently that the difference relates to the presence of self-referencing feedback loops, a position of which I'm skeptical because I already know that awareness of self is not necessary for visual consciousness (actual phenomenology) to be present. This is why I'm skeptical.

Dennett was accused, in the wake of his magnum opus, of not explaining consciousness, but of explaining it away. From what I've read of you, and believe me when I say that your frequent one word ripostes actually don't make it easy for me to determine just what you do believe, I don't think you're following his Multiple Drafts theory but I think the same accusation would be highly valid.

I'm not saying you're necessarily wrong, rather that for me you don't present enough of what you do believe and, when we do get something, you don't pay enough attention to contradictory evidence. This is what I feel.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

My point was more general - even when you think you are paying attention to something, you still fail to see things. Magicians merely take advantage of this.

Well, I didn't read thoroughly the study I quoted, but I did pick up the impression that, in the latter part, they asked subjects to actually look for changes.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Then why do so many scientific professionals not share your confidence, Pixy. I mean, did you do a lot of NLP or something? I have to ask because to me your confidence is simply not mirrored by the general body of researchers in this field.

Name one.

I tell you what, I'll read Hofstadter if you read Blackmore's series of interviews "Conversations of Consciousness." What do you think?

Happy to. Susan Blackmore is pretty good.

Well, I've heard it said you can drown in a inch of water.

He shows a chunk of how the brain processes information, yes. This may or may not be the same as what I'm asking. This to me is the point.

What evidence do you have that these are not the same thing?

Now you're getting fundamentalist again, Pixy. I'm vaguely familiar with DSMIV and I don't recall subscribing to dualism being in it.

Look in the index under delusional belief systems.

Dualism is misguided, I agree, but you just go charging off to the extremes in a manner which to me suggests that actually, underneath it all, you aren't so confident.

What extremes?

Especially when you still refuse to get in the teletransporter.

Then you have understood nothing. Nothing at all. My objection to the transporter is based on strict materialism. Not behaviourism, which is my usual, pragmatic approach to such issues, but metaphysical materialism.

As I mentioned in my reply to RD, I'm happy to concede that you cannot currently demonstrate empirically that visual consciousness exists in humans (there is subjective reporting only).

Sorry, this is wrong. You can demonstrate it empirically and we do so constantly.

But, given materialism and natural selection and the colossal lack of evidence to the contrary it is reasonable in the extreme to say that it exists.

What do you think visual consciousness is, Nick? I keep asking you this and you keep not answering. You insist on not defining your terms at all, which is why you remain stuck in the dualist trap with Chalmers and Searle and the like.

Your point, which somehow you seem to believe I fail to grasp, is of course that all data processing is consciousness.

NO.

I never said that, I never said anything like it, I never said anything that could possibly suggest that I had ever even thought that.

This is a position, not a demonstrated reality and there is opposing evidence, see the Blackmore piece I quoted earlier which summarises it a little. Humans process consciously but mostly unconsciously. You believe apparently that the difference relates to the presence of self-referencing feedback loops, a position of which I'm skeptical because I already know that awareness of self is not necessary for visual consciousness (actual phenomenology) to be present. This is why I'm skeptical.

None of that is in any way relevant.

Read Hofstadter. Then come back and we can talk.

Dennett was accused, in the wake of his magnum opus, of not explaining consciousness, but of explaining it away.

Which is entirely correct. That is, yes, he explained it away, but yes, that is the correct thing to do.

Consciousness is not complicated. Human consciousness is complicated, not be cause consciousness is, but because humans are.

That's what you are misunderstanding. When Dennett explained consciousness, he explained the fundamental principles that allow a system to be conscious.

When Ramachnandran or Baars say we won't fully understand the mind for a hundred years, they are talking about fully map of the human mind from the neuron level to the sociological.

From what I've read of you, and believe me when I say that your frequent one word ripostes actually don't make it easy for me to determine just what you do believe, I don't think you're following his Multiple Drafts theory but I think the same accusation would be highly valid.

I've run into his Multiple Drafts theory. I'm not that impressed.

I'm not saying you're necessarily wrong, rather that for me you don't present enough of what you do believe and, when we do get something, you don't pay enough attention to contradictory evidence. This is what I feel.

I have presented it all. You have failed to understand, because you don't have the basic concepts necessary. Which is not your fault; I picked them up because I spent years studying computer science. I could try to explain them here, but you will -as I've said - be far better off with Hofstadter.

 

[PixyMisa]

Happy to. Susan Blackmore is pretty good.

Having seen a list of interviewees from this book, I have to say, though, that it will not convince me that Penrose and Hameroff are anything less than completely wrong, or that Chalmers and Searle are anything more than idiots.

Unless, that is, they refute their previous work.

 

[Nick227]

Name one.

Baars and Ramachandran. That's two.

Here's Blackmore and Baars discussing...

Blackmore: But there still seems to be a mystery here to me, that what you're saying is that the difference between a perception that's unconscious and one that's conscious is a matter of which bit of the brain the processing is going on in. How can one bit of the brain with neurons firing in it be conscious, where another bit of the brain with very similar neurons firing in a very similar way is not? Don't we still have this explanatory gap?

Baars:There are a lot of explanatory gaps. We are in the study of consciousness where Benjamin Franklin was in the study of electricity around 1800: he knew of a number of basic phenomena, and he might have known about the flow of electricity, and the usefulness of the stream metaphor - that things go from one place to the other, a little like the flow of water; that you can put resistors into the circuit, which are a little bit like dams. You have a useful analogy at that point in understanding electricity, which actually turns out to be not bad; but you have to improve it. So we're at a very primitive stage, but there are a few things that we can say. (Blackmore 2005)

For me, Blackmore is asking Baars pretty much identically the same question I have been asking you, and Baars basically replies that we don't know and there's a lot of other stuff about consciousness we don't yet know. She's asking him a direct "hard problem" related question and he's saying we don't know.

I did have somewhere a recent Rama quote where he's saying, as I recall, that we're just starting to make the first inroads into investigating selfhood. Would love to stick it up here, but can't find it online now! Che sera.

Happy to. Susan Blackmore is pretty good.

Okay!

Then you have understood nothing. Nothing at all. My objection to the transporter is based on strict materialism. Not behaviourism, which is my usual, pragmatic approach to such issues, but metaphysical materialism.

As I recall you said you were scared to get in.

Sorry, this is wrong. You can demonstrate it empirically and we do so constantly.

How can you objectively demonstrate the presense of visual perception (phenomenology)? Tell me.

What do you think visual consciousness is, Nick? I keep asking you this and you keep not answering. You insist on not defining your terms at all, which is why you remain stuck in the dualist trap with Chalmers and Searle and the like.

Actual visual perception, seeing. Conscious seeing. Do you experience a room around you visually? If so, that's it.

I never said that, I never said anything like it, I never said anything that could possibly suggest that I had ever even thought that.

Then what do you actually believe here, Pixy? Is consciousness data processing or not? Is the thermostat conscious or not? If you say what you truly believe clearly I'm confident I can understand.

Read Hofstadter. Then come back and we can talk.

OK!

Which is entirely correct. That is, yes, he explained it away, but yes, that is the correct thing to do.

Aha, the truth emerges! The correct thing to do is to explain it away?! You mean fiddle around with words and definitions until whatever annoying phenomena that don't fit in with your pet theory are somehow obliterated?

That's what you are misunderstanding. When Dennett explained consciousness, he explained the fundamental principles that allow a system to be conscious.

I'm not a Dennett expert, but my understanding is that he figured consciousness basically is data processing. Happy to be corrected if wrong.

When Ramachnandran or Baars say we won't fully understand the mind for a hundred years, they are talking about fully map of the human mind from the neuron level to the sociological.

I don't think so, Pixy. Look at the Baars quote above. I think you're trying to explain it away again. Baars is saying that we're at a very primitive level of awareness regarding consciousness.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

For me, Blackmore is asking Baars pretty much identically the same question I have been asking you, and Baars basically replies that we don't know and there's a lot of other stuff about consciousness we don't yet know. She's asking him a direct "hard problem" related question and he's saying we don't know.

He's not talking about the "hard problem" at all. He's talking about very specific questions of brain structure and function.

As I recall you said you were scared to get in.

Yes. In strictly materialist terms, it's a murder machine.

How can you objectively demonstrate the presense of visual perception (phenomenology)? Tell me.

SHRDLU.

Actual visual perception, seeing.

Meaning what?

Conscious seeing.

Meaning what?

Do you experience a room around you visually? If so, that's it.

Meaning what?

What do you mean by "perception", by "conscious", "seeing", "experience"? You have to define those terms operationally to ask meaningful questions based on them. Rocketdodger and I are working from the same set of operational definitions. You don't seem to have any.

Then what do you actually believe here, Pixy? Is consciousness data processing or not?

Yes.

Is the thermostat conscious or not?

No.

If you say what you truly believe clearly I'm confident I can understand.

I have explained it dozens of times.

Consciousness is a synthesis of information, memory, reference, and self-reference. I mean all those terms in their precise definitions in computer science, not any common dictionary definition.

Again, this is exactly what Hofstadter describes (and gives very extensive examples for) in Godel, Escher, Bach. It is precisely what Dennett is talking about with his thermostat example (and is why a thermostat is not conscious).

Aha, the truth emerges! The correct thing to do is to explain it away?! You mean fiddle around with words and definitions until whatever annoying phenomena that don't fit in with your pet theory are somehow obliterated?

No. I mean that - as I said - consciousness is not a problem, not a secret, not a great mystery, not even complicated. It's a feedback loop.

And that's all.

Everyone who is focusing on the great mysteries of consciousness - as opposed to specific functional details of the human brain - has missed the point. That's what Dennett's talking about.

I'm not a Dennett expert, but my understanding is that he figured consciousness basically is data processing. Happy to be corrected if wrong.

Consciousness is data processing. Data processing is not consciousness.

I don't think so, Pixy. Look at the Baars quote above. I think you're trying to explain it away again. Baars is saying that we're at a very primitive level of awareness regarding consciousness.

No, he's not. And we're not.

The human brain, yes. Well, certainly not primitive, but incomplete. But consciousness, no.

 

[Nick227]

He's not talking about the "hard problem" at all. He's talking about very specific questions of brain structure and function.

Read the question Blackmore puts, Pixy. Read it slowly if you need to. That's a clear "hard problem" question and his answer is to accept that there are a lot of explanatory gaps. If you read Baars' book, In the Theatre of Consciousness, he starts off by pointing out that it's a perennial explanatory gap. Neither Blackmore nor Baars here dispute that there is a problem here. This does not mean that there aren't theories, but when it comes to human consciousness it's not yet clear what the answers are.

Here's Ramachandran, summing up an academic article on selfhood written in 2007...

Have we solved the problem of self? Obviously not — we have barely scratched the surface. But hopefully we have paved the way for future models and empirical studies on the nature of self, a problem that philosophers have made essentially no headway in solving. (And not for want of effort — they have been at it for three thousand years). Hence our grounds for optimism about the future of brain research — especially for solving what is arguably Science's greatest riddle.

I submit that your assertion that consciousness is well understood is simply not shared by many who research it professionally.

I could look up more quotes if you want. They don't seem to be so hard to find. Would you like another from Susan Greenfield?

Meaning what?


Meaning what?


Meaning what?

What do you mean by "perception", by "conscious", "seeing", "experience"? You have to define those terms operationally to ask meaningful questions based on them. Rocketdodger and I are working from the same set of operational definitions. You don't seem to have any.

I'm using regular human definitions which I will now accept are not the same as those used by those engaged in AI as a profession. If I ask you "Do you see the monitor?" to me (and I submit the greater bulk of humanity) that's a straight "yes" or "no" question. To you it's clear that it is not. Fair enough.

No. I mean that - as I said - consciousness is not a problem, not a secret, not a great mystery, not even complicated. It's a feedback loop.

And that's all.

Everyone who is focusing on the great mysteries of consciousness - as opposed to specific functional details of the human brain - has missed the point. That's what Dennett's talking about.

Yes, there is a theory that says this. I am familiar with it. I'm sure many other list members are.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, I didn't read thoroughly the study I quoted, but I did pick up the impression that, in the latter part, they asked subjects to actually look for changes.

Nick

Which leads to a subject paying more attention to some things than they would otherwise, misleading them.

I had a bunch of coworkers look at some change blindness gifs, and it is clear from just a few trials that the people who are told "look for a difference between the flickering images" have a harder time spotting the difference.

Again -- all of this is known by magicians and the like. You don't need to rely on my secondhand evidence because anyone educated on the issue will tell you.

 

[rocketdodger]

I submit that your assertion that consciousness is well understood is simply not shared by many who research it professionally.

I submit that since you are not educated in this field you are likely misinterpreting their words. Namely, I submit that when those "who research it professionally" say anything to the effect of consciousness not being well understood they implicitly mean human consciousness.

Which, I see, is exactly what Pixy has already told you. Consciousness is fundamentally simple, humans are not.

 

[rocketdodger]

For me, Blackmore is asking Baars pretty much identically the same question I have been asking you, and Baars basically replies that we don't know and there's a lot of other stuff about consciousness we don't yet know. She's asking him a direct "hard problem" related question and he's saying we don't know.

And I am telling you I know, and the answer is reasoning -- in particular, if we are speaking about self consciousness, reasoning about self and the relationship between self and the "stream" in question.

Pixy is right. I am right. The only conceivable difference between a "conscious stream" and an "unconscious stream" is reasoning. The only conceivable difference between being unaware of self and being aware of self is self reference. The only conceivable explanation of self consciousness is reasoning about self.

You have no evidence that self isn't required for anything because you don't have any experience without self reference. You have no evidence that reasoning isn't sufficient to produce consciousness because you cannot describe any aspect of consciousness that can't attributed to reasoning.

Or do you? I honestly don't know, because so far all we have heard is that those who "research professionally" apparently do but you can't be specific about it.

Are you going to tell me I must be wrong because your (likely incorrect) interpretation of a conversation between Blackmore and Baars disagrees, or are you going to provide a logical counter-argument? You can even cite an argument of theirs, I don't care. Just provide an argument for God's sake!

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm using regular human definitions which I will now accept are not the same as those used by those engaged in AI as a profession. If I ask you "Do you see the monitor?" to me (and I submit the greater bulk of humanity) that's a straight "yes" or "no" question. To you it's clear that it is not. Fair enough.

This is complete B.S. Nick and I think it shows just how dishonest you can be when it comes to trying to win an argument.

It is a straight yes or no question and answer when the context is agreed upon to be a straight yes or no question and answer. You know darn well that the context we are currently in is definitely not such a context.

Honestly, you pretend to be "interested" in the mechanisms underlying consciousness and you think using "regular human definitions" is going to get you there? Weren't you the one that threw a hissy fit because of how "dualistic" and inaccurate all these words are, even when we explicitly said we were not using such definitions?

And now, after we -- again, explicitly -- tell you that you need to define your terms you are playing the part of the fool who didn't know what he was doing? Do you expect us to buy that this whole thing has been a misunderstanding because you were using "regular human definitions?" and you thought they would be sufficient?

It isn't a misunderstanding, Nick, it is a charade. It is a charade because you are merely pretending to care when in reality you are using these threads as a cheap stepford-wives book club audience where you can blab on about subjects discussed in books you really don't understand.

So unless you can show us that you really are here to learn -- by providing arguments that address the issues -- I am going to say that you aren't what you claim you are. I am going to say that you aren't "interested" in anything besides trying to validate your own lack of knowledge by somehow delusionally showing yourself that nobody else knows either.

 

[Nick227]

Yes. In strictly materialist terms, it's a murder machine.

I find that a bit evasive. The question was whether you personally would travel. Are you saying you believe you would die in the teletransporter?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Which leads to a subject paying more attention to some things than they would otherwise, misleading them.

I had a bunch of coworkers look at some change blindness gifs, and it is clear from just a few trials that the people who are told "look for a difference between the flickering images" have a harder time spotting the difference.

Again -- all of this is known by magicians and the like. You don't need to rely on my secondhand evidence because anyone educated on the issue will tell you.

Well, change blindness for me seems to weaken theories of there being a "stream of consciousness." So, thinking about it a bit more, I think it might be hard to draw good conclusions regarding attention. Dennett used the phenomenom of change blindness to reinforce his Multiple Drafts theory, proposing, as I understand it, that we could never actually know what was "in consciousness."

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I submit that since you are not educated in this field you are likely misinterpreting their words. Namely, I submit that when those "who research it professionally" say anything to the effect of consciousness not being well understood they implicitly mean human consciousness.

Which, I see, is exactly what Pixy has already told you. Consciousness is fundamentally simple, humans are not.

Well, it's clear for me that you're not going to believe me any which way. I think I can only urge you to widen your reading. Like I said, Blackmore's series of interviews is excellent because you get great dialogue between one established authority, known for her relatively unbiased perspective, and a host of others.

Frankly, if you read the Blackmore - Baars exchange I quoted earlier and don't believe she's asking him a "hard problem" question then I think you need to revisit the hard problem.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Pixy is right. I am right. The only conceivable difference between a "conscious stream" and an "unconscious stream" is reasoning.

If this is so why, when Blackmore ask of Baars precisely this question, does he agree that it's an explanatory gap?

Nick