Resolution of Transporter Problem

[PixyMisa]

(1) fails too. Determinism means there's no self, in the sense of a self which takes decisions independent of pre-conditions.

You mean naturalism, not determinism. Or maybe you mean determinism, but it's more broadly true for naturalism anyway. (Our Universe is, after all, not deterministic.)

But so what? Who believes that they make decisions independent of preconditions anyway?

But, as I keep saying to you, how do you know this sense of self has any materialistic reality.

Easy.

There's a sense of self. Everyone has it. It's generated by the brain. No brain, no sense of self. The brain is a material thing. Therefore, the sense of self is a material thing of some description.

So where then is this seat of conscious experience that you appear to allude to?

It's the brain, which is found in the same place it's always been.

Scientists have been seeking it since before Descartes and haven't got very far.

You're not seriously comparing our understanding of cognitive science with Descartes?

It's the same again. You seem to me to take it as read that it exists, yet no one can find it.

Right there, in your head.

Materialism denies its existence too.

Whatever gave you that idea?

 

[PixyMisa]

If you agree that this seemingly persisting self is but continuity of processing and short-term memory then, as I see it, you shouldn't object to the Teletransporter as these things will be replicated.

There you go - replicated. Which means that there is no continuity of process. So by my definition of self, the Teletransporter is a murder machine.

Yes, you would have to let go of control and we're conditioned not to do this. I am the same. There are instinctual responses that are hard to overcome rationally, I agree.

Yes. As I said, by my definition, the Telestransporter would kill me. But the very existence of the Teletransporter means I need to re-examine my definition.

 

[Nick227]

There's a sense of self. Everyone has it. It's generated by the brain. No brain, no sense of self. The brain is a material thing. Therefore, the sense of self is a material thing of some description.

Well, there are material processes that combine to create the notion that it exists. In this sense it's material, for sure. There are thoughts that allude to it. There is behaviour which assumes it.

eta: None of this seems to me to affect the Teletransporter. It will all be replicated.

It's the brain, which is found in the same place it's always been.


You're not seriously comparing our understanding of cognitive science with Descartes?


Right there, in your head.

Care to be more specific? Where precisely in the head? Given our advances in cognitive science where specifically in the brain would you say events become conscious? How about we adjust the "grain size" of the investigation down a little?

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, there are material processes that combine to create the notion that it exists. In this sense it's material, for sure. There are thoughts that allude to it. There is behaviour which assumes it.

Exactly. The sense of self is a thought process. No more, no less.

Care to be more specific? Where precisely in the head? Given our advances in cognitive science where specifically in the brain would you say events become conscious?

Why do you think there's a specific place in the brain where this happens?

When we trace the activity involved in conscious awareness of visual stimuli, a whole string of different brain locations light up, one after another. Damaging any of these areas results in varying visual pathologies: You can't see anything, but you still respond to visual stimuli; you can see things, but not name them; and so on. Consciousness is a synthesis.

 

[Rairun]

PixyMisa, I don't actually have any major disagreements with you. I agree the sense of a continuous self normally exists--I was just saying that the continuous self itself doesn't exist.

I think that the best piece of evidence to support the idea that our sense of continuity is an illusion is that we lose it when our memory doesn't work. For example, we may be conscious for a whole night, dreaming, but since we forget most of it, it feels like we've blacked out and woken up in the future.

That's why I disagree that people are afraid of discontinuity. I don't think they are, not really. They are perhaps afraid of discontinuity in circumstances they are not used to, or that they can't understand. It's rare for a person to be as afraid of anesthesia as they are of death. They know they are going to cease to exist as a conscious being for a while, but they also know they are coming back.

 

[PixyMisa]

PixyMisa, I don't actually have any major disagreements with you. I agree the sense of a continuous self normally exists--I was just saying that the continuous self itself doesn't exist.

Depends on how you want to define it; I'd say that continuity of self is far more robust than the continuity of sense of self.

I think that the best piece of evidence to support the idea that our sense of continuity is an illusion is that we lose it when our memory doesn't work.

Well, of course. What would you expect? Yes, it's an illusion. But it's an illusion of something real.

For example, we may be conscious for a whole night, dreaming, but since we forget most of it, it feels like we've blacked out and woken up in the future.

Actually, I feel like I've gone to sleep and then woken up again. Mind you, I'm atypical - many of my dreams are at least partly lucid, so I'm often aware of being asleep.

Even more striking is that you can lose the continuity of self-awareness while you are awake. People driving long distances often experience this: You are awake, alert, and responsive, and yet you have no memory of driving the last five miles.

That's why I disagree that people are afraid of discontinuity. I don't think they are, not really.

Scares the hell out of me.

 

[Rairun]

Z, here's a little thought experiment for you:

You enter the transporter and lie on a bed. You are anesthetized, and five minutes later the machine makes a copy of you. Then someone comes in, moves the original body to another location and puts the copy on the bed. One hour later, both bodies wake up.

Since there was no continuity of experience, are "you" (whatever you think "you" means) still the original body?

 

[Nick227]

There you go - replicated. Which means that there is no continuity of process. So by my definition of self, the Teletransporter is a murder machine.


Yes. As I said, by my definition, the Telestransporter would kill me. But the very existence of the Teletransporter means I need to re-examine my definition.

Yes. I agree entirely. The teletransporter can be considered a "murder machine" but the idea of its existence tends to cause one to re-examine one's notions of what killing really means.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Exactly. The sense of self is a thought process. No more, no less.

I agree, though it is not purely thought. There are bodily sensations and emotions associated also.

Why do you think there's a specific place in the brain where this happens?

When we trace the activity involved in conscious awareness of visual stimuli, a whole string of different brain locations light up, one after another. Damaging any of these areas results in varying visual pathologies: You can't see anything, but you still respond to visual stimuli; you can see things, but not name them; and so on. Consciousness is a synthesis.

I agree, though I would say that consciousness appears to be a synthesis, or an effect associated with certain types of system complexity. However, the issue of where it happens still exists, if you ask me. In asking, I was more noting that you don't take the "grain size" down below the level of the whole brain. Does consciousness really happen in the brain, do you think? I would agree that it's associated with the brain, but in the brain, or as you put it, in the head?

Nick

 

[gentlehorse]

I agree, though I would say that consciousness appears to be a synthesis, or an effect associated with certain types of system complexity. However, the issue of where it happens still exists, if you ask me. In asking, I was more noting that you don't take the "grain size" down below the level of the whole brain. Does consciousness really happen in the brain, do you think? I would agree that it's associated with the brain, but in the brain, or as you put it, in the head?

Nick

I'll go out on a limb and answer for Pixy. Yes.

Or maybe the elbow...

 

[Rairun]

Depends on how you want to define it; I'd say that continuity of self is far more robust than the continuity of sense of self.

I suppose it is, but only in the sense that my computer has a self to me (i.e. I identify it as being persistent) but is not self-aware.

Well, of course. What would you expect? Yes, it's an illusion. But it's an illusion of something real.

This is kind of tricky. I think it's an illusion, but I define "illusion" as an impression of something false. That is, the illusion has real existence, it's a thought process, but it depicts something that doesn't exist. The falsehood is the idea that there is some sort of intrinsic connection between our past thoughts and our present thoughts, as if they were experienced by the same metaphysical Self (whose existence I reject).

Actually, I should be more rigorous with my definitions. I don't think the sense of self is necessarily an illusion. It is only an illusion when a metaphysical self is assumed to exist. When it's just about different thoughts admittedly playing self-referential games, it's not really an illusion at all. I suppose this does lead to a more flexible sense of self, but it still works in all pragmatical situations we might find ourselves in.

Actually, I feel like I've gone to sleep and then woken up again. Mind you, I'm atypical - many of my dreams are at least partly lucid, so I'm often aware of being asleep.

That's cool. It has happened to me a couple of times, but not very often at all.

Even more striking is that you can lose the continuity of self-awareness while you are awake. People driving long distances often experience this: You are awake, alert, and responsive, and yet you have no memory of driving the last five miles.

This is also true.

Scares the hell out of me.

Oh well. Honest question: are you afraid of anesthesia? I know I am a little, but that's because I'm afraid that I will die, not because I will cease to exist for a couple of hours.

 

[Nick227]

I'll go out on a limb and answer for Pixy. Yes.

Or maybe the elbow...

I have a few issues with this. I think the environment is the real long-term memory for visual perception and so for me it's hard to say where consciousness is really taking place. Generally, I doubt that the notion of a "stream of consciousness" is valid. I suspect that it's more "spread out" than this though clearly highly associated with brain activity.

Nick

 

[Malerin]

Z, here's a little thought experiment for you:

You enter the transporter and lie on a bed. You are anesthetized, and five minutes later the machine makes a copy of you. Then someone comes in, moves the original body you to another location and puts the copy on the bed. One hour later, both bodies you and the copy wake up.

Since there was no continuity of experience, are "you" (whatever you think "you" means) still the original body you?

Yes, I am still me and my duplicate is a seperate person.

 

[Nick227]

Oh well. Honest question: are you afraid of anesthesia? I know I am a little, but that's because I'm afraid that I will die, not because I will cease to exist for a couple of hours.

I think being afraid of the teletransporter is pretty normal really. I mean, you're going to walk into this pod and, by pretty much every definition you're likely to have, you're then going to die. A replica of you will live on at some remote location. With anaesthesia the same body wakes up.

Nick

 

[Z]

Z, here's a little thought experiment for you:

You enter the transporter and lie on a bed. You are anesthetized, and five minutes later the machine makes a copy of you. Then someone comes in, moves the original body to another location and puts the copy on the bed. One hour later, both bodies wake up.

Since there was no continuity of experience, are "you" (whatever you think "you" means) still the original body?

Yep. I'm wherever the original body was moved to. I would not wake up and experience the bed on which the copy is located.

Nick, here's a series of situations for you to consider:

a) Man walks up with a gun and intends to shoot you in the head, no explanation offered. Do you defend yourself?
b) Man walks up with a gun and intends to shoot you in the head. He explains you have a perfect duplicate nearby, and only one of you can be legally allowed to exist at a time. Do you defend yourself?
c) Man walks up with an instantaneous disintegrator ray, and intends to vaporize you, no explanation offered. Do you defend yourself?
d) Man walks up with an instantaneous disintegrator ray, and intends to vaporize you. He explains you have a perfect duplicate nearby, and only one of you can be legally allowed to exist at a time. Do you defend yourself?
e) You walk into a booth marked 'transporter'. In front of you is a red button marked 'Start'. Around you are serrated blades, blender-style, that are clearly set to start grinding the moment you push the button. Death is likely to be rather messy and painful. Do you push the button?
f) You walk into a booth marked 'transporter'. Around you are several ballistic weapon muzzles, tracking your head and heart. In front of you is a red button marked 'Start', which is clearly going to cause the weapons to fire at you. Do you push the button?
g) You walk into a booth marked 'transporter'. Half of a pamphlet is in front of you, on a shelf next to the 'Start' button, which details how advanced laser scanning apparati will dissect you, atom by atom, over the course of 0.03 seconds, totally vaporising your body. Do you push the button?
h) You walk into a booth marked 'transporter'. There is a pamphlet in front of you, on a shelf next to the 'Start' button, which details how advanced laser scanning apparati will dissect you, atom by atom, over the course of 0.03 seconds, totally vaporising your body; while on Mars a similar apparatus assembles a perfect duplicate of you atom by atom from stock matter, creating a perfect duplicate and programming that duplicate with all your consciousness. Do you push the button?

In each case, I would answer either to defend myself, or not to push the button, because in either case, I'm about to wind up dead if I don't defend myself/do push the button. To me, each and every one of these examples is equivalent. Yet you've already said that you would defend your life in A, but push the button in H. What I'm wondering is, at what points do you value your life over this illusion of transport, and at what points the illusion overcomes your survival instinct.

 

[Z]

I have a few issues with this. I think the environment is the real long-term memory for visual perception and so for me it's hard to say where consciousness is really taking place. Generally, I doubt that the notion of a "stream of consciousness" is valid. I suspect that it's more "spread out" than this though clearly highly associated with brain activity.

Nick

...????

WHOA WHOA WHOA...

You're saying that consciousness is not entirely a result of brain processes? Um... Nick, bro, that's completely against materialism, there, buddy. Environment doesn't have jack squat to do with memory, short or long term. It's all, every single bit, in the brain.

I think I see where the dualism is actually occuring...

No wonder you can't grasp this. No offense - it just shocks me, rather nastily, that someone arguing as if they are such a staunch materialist/determinist would hold the idea that consciousness is not seated firmly in the brain...

 

[Z]

I think being afraid of the teletransporter is pretty normal really. I mean, you're going to walk into this pod and, by pretty much every definition you're likely to have, you're then going to die. A replica of you will live on at some remote location.

And that's the end of the story. Sorry, just because a convincing simulation of me lives on, doesn't mean I'm happy to die.

Now, if I knew death were inevitable - for example, if I was succumbing to old age, and was certain the end was near, yes. I'd gladly have my brain activity patterns and structure transferred to some other body or computer medium. Not for personal survival, but to make sure that my thought patterns could continue to contribute to future knowledge. Like writing the ultimate book, that could still learn and adjust its ideas as times changed.

But I'd still be just as dead.

 

[rocketdodger]

Pixy, what is your opinion of the argument in the OP?

Unfortunately this thread has kind of derailed into an argument whether there is a continuous self to begin with, and my OP has nothing to do with that.

My OP is about whether there is a discontinuity of information when information is transferred from one substrate to another. I say no, there isn't a discontinuity, because if there was then the information must be lost instead of transferred, and we know it isn't lost by definition -- we are told it is transferred.

What say you?

 

[cyborg]

Sorry, just because a convincing simulation of me lives on, doesn't mean I'm happy to die.

Your happiness is irrelevant. This self I am communicating with has already died. It is lost forever. In its place is a impression of it - it is not the same self. It is a different person.

You don't mourn its passing however.

Why?

 

[Gate2501]

(Our Universe is, after all, not deterministic.)

Not on a quantum scale.

Do you think that somehow bubbles up to larger scales?

I always figured that everything was deterministic on macro scales, including our behavior/choices/ect.