Resolution of Transporter Problem

[Malerin]

The fact that there are 3 of them, all identical when they step out of the machine, disproves that they are unique. Unique means that there is only one, and now there are three.

The point is not that they are unique or not. The point is they are three seperate people who happen to have the same physical characteristics and memories as each other, but they each have their own consciouness, POV, and occupy different points in space (so I guess they're unique anyway). Are you claiming that the three people who step out of the transporter are one person?

The whole problem is, if personal identity can survive teleportation, and a teleportation results in three copies being made (each of which qualifies as a person), which copy is me?

 

[rocketdodger]

The point is not that they are unique or not. The point is they are three seperate people who happen to have the same physical characteristics and memories as each other, but they each have their own consciouness, POV, and occupy different points in space (so I guess they're unique anyway). Are you claiming that the three people who step out of the transporter are one person?

The whole problem is, if personal identity can survive teleportation, and a teleportation results in three copies being made (each of which qualifies as a person), which copy is me?

If you copy the number 1234, and three copies are made instead of one, which one is the desired copy?

This question is meaningless because a number is the same regardless of how (or where) it is expressed.

The assumption in the OP is that consciousness is information and thus can be expressed as a number. Hence, in the instant of teletransport, all the copies are you because they can all be expressed as the same number.

EDIT: Note that the very instant after transport they would likely not be expressable as the same number and thus would be different consciousnesses at that point.

 

[Malerin]

If you copy the number 1234, and three copies are made instead of one, which one is the desired copy?

1. They're all copies, just as the three people who step out of the transporter would all be copies of me. The original me was destroyed.
2. It's a false analogy anyway. People are not numbers.

This question is meaningless because a number is the same regardless of how (or where) it is expressed.

It has plenty of meaning: one person steps into the teleporter, three identical people step out. If personal identity can survive teleportation, you should be able to confidentaly say (without guessing) which of the copies is me.

The assumption in the OP is that consciousness is information and thus can be expressed as a number.

That assumption is wrong. If consciousness were just information, how can you explain subjective experience and self-awareness? Self-aware toasters again? If you could write down all the information that you think makes up your consciousness on a piece of paper (or book), is that you? Would you then have no fear of death because you've made a book of yourself?

Hence, in the instant of teletransport, all the copies are you because they can all be expressed as the same number.

Then you violate the axiom that there can only be one me. The three people who step out are not all me. That is a ridiculous conclusion.

EDIT: Note that the very instant after transport they would likely not be expressable as the same number and thus would be different consciousnesses at that point.

[/quote]

Not at all. Instead of scanning a neuron and expressing it 100101010, the machine expresses it 100101010 100101010 100101010. The machine on the other end then assembles three people based on the three sets of information.

 

[Nick227]

The whole problem is, if personal identity can survive teleportation, and a teleportation results in three copies being made (each of which qualifies as a person), which copy is me?

It seems to me that you are assuming that consciousness has personal identity, when really the thought experiment challenges you to grasp that personal identity is merely an aspect of consciousness.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

It has plenty of meaning: one person steps into the teleporter, three identical people step out. If personal identity can survive teleportation, you should be able to confidentaly say (without guessing) which of the copies is me.

Each would have its own sense of personal identity. If materialism is correct then personal identity is just an aspect of consciousness, it is not an innate property of consciousness.

That assumption is wrong. If consciousness were just information, how can you explain subjective experience and self-awareness? Self-aware toasters again?

The "hard problem" still applies, for sure.

If you could write down all the information that you think makes up your consciousness on a piece of paper (or book), is that you? Would you then have no fear of death because you've made a book of yourself?

Nope. If you made a copy of yourself with a teletransporter then both copies would fear death the same.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Nothing tangible may be lost to everyone one else in the universe. But my biggest (and really only) concern is that I don't want to have a my own personal life end. That doesn't serve me any purpose.

Everyone else would still have "me". The universe will still have "me". But as far as I'm concerned, the onus is on people to explain how I will magically change perspective to the new "host" from my own personal point of view. There is no logical reason to assume this will happen. The most logical thing is that I end up going to sleep and never waking up, lights out, while a new copy of me continues it's merry existence. Convinced that it is the real me, from the start.

Yes, this is how I figure it would be too.

I haven't seen anything to change the rather obvious logic that there would be two seperate individuals, and I would continue to experience life through my original set of eyes.

If there is reconition that it's "lights out" but the copy of you still serves others.. then great, if you are willing to make that sacrafice, more power to you.

Instinctually, you would not make the sacrifice. Several billion years of evolutionary history dictate that you will resist death (assuming you don't suffer from some psychiatric condition that causes you to seek to die). Rationally, however, it can be appreciated that selfhood is anyway transitory and that it is "not the same you" that wakes up who went to sleep.

So, to me, it depends on whether you are ruled by instinct or rationality. This thought experiment is a good way to find out. Whilst many materialists clearly consider themselves to be highly rational individuals still plenty of them refuse to get in the teletransporter, or otherwise constantly present side issues to avoid taking a decision.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

1. They're all copies, just as the three people who step out of the transporter would all be copies of me. The original me was destroyed.

So a copy of a number is somehow different from the "original" number? What on Earth is an "original" number anyway?

2. It's a false analogy anyway. People are not numbers.

Perhaps, but it is an assumption the OP is predicated upon. If you don't like that assumption then fine by me but it doesn't change the validity of the argument. An argument's validity has nothing to do with the truth of its premises.

It has plenty of meaning: one person steps into the teleporter, three identical people step out. If personal identity can survive teleportation, you should be able to confidentaly say (without guessing) which of the copies is me.

I did -- all the copies are you.

That assumption is wrong. If consciousness were just information, how can you explain subjective experience and self-awareness? Self-aware toasters again?

After trying to explain such things to you (and others like you) for months -- and failing -- my only recourse is to say "spend a chunk of your life learning about cognitive science, neuroscience, mathematics, computer science, and A.I., and then maybe you will understand."

If you could write down all the information that you think makes up your consciousness on a piece of paper (or book), is that you? Would you then have no fear of death because you've made a book of yourself?

No, because by the time the book was completed I would already be a different consciousness than what the book contains. You seem to be missing a very important point that if consciousness can be expressed as a number the number is constantly changing.

Then you violate the axiom that there can only be one me. The three people who step out are not all me. That is a ridiculous conclusion.

Lol what axiom is that? Where did you pull that from?

Not at all. Instead of scanning a neuron and expressing it 100101010, the machine expresses it 100101010 100101010 100101010. The machine on the other end then assembles three people based on the three sets of information.

The information is the same. 100101010 is the same as 100101010 is the same as 100101010.

 

[Nick227]

I mourn the cyborg of the last post. And now this one too.

Will no one mourn with me?

Alas poor Cyborg4403035. I knew him, Mercutio.

 

[Malerin]

Perhaps, but it is an assumption the OP is predicated upon. If you don't like that assumption then fine by me but it doesn't change the validity of the argument. An argument's validity has nothing to do with the truth of its premises.

I'm not saying your argument's invalid, I'm saying it's wrong. It's based on a ridiculous premise. Personhood is obviously not in the same category as numbers, and it's got you claiming that personal identity can extend across more than one person.

I did -- all the copies are you.

Which would mean I would have three bodies, three sets of memory, three consciousnesses, exist in three different locations, and have three points of view. If all the copies "are me" and one of the duplicates dies, would I die? A part of me die? Your claim that "all the copies are me" is absurd.

After trying to explain such things to you (and others like you) for months -- and failing -- my only recourse is to say "spend a chunk of your life learning about cognitive science, neuroscience, mathematics, computer science, and A.I., and then maybe you will understand."

We're too busy laughing at the idea of conscious toasters (the extra fancy model having self-awareness, as PixyMisa claims).

No, because by the time the book was completed I would already be a different consciousness than what the book contains. You seem to be missing a very important point that if consciousness can be expressed as a number the number is constantly changing.

Not if you are in a state of suspended animation and someone records all the information about you in a book. Your claim is that you and the book would be the same thing. Clearly, they're not. As much as materialists would like, consciousness cannot be reduced to an equation.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm not saying your argument's invalid, I'm saying it's wrong. It's based on a ridiculous premise. Personhood is obviously not in the same category as numbers, and it's got you claiming that personal identity can extend across more than one person.

Can you give me a mathematical reason why that premise is ridiculous?

Which would mean I would have three bodies, three sets of memory, three consciousnesses, exist in three different locations, and have three points of view. If all the copies "are me" and one of the duplicates dies, would I die? A part of me die? Your claim that "all the copies are me" is absurd.

Can you give me a mathematical reason why that claim is absurd?

We're too busy laughing at the idea of conscious toasters (the extra fancy model having self-awareness, as PixyMisa claims).

Can you give me a mathematical reason why toasters are not conscious?

Not if you are in a state of suspended animation and someone records all the information about you in a book. Your claim is that you and the book would be the same thing. Clearly, they're not.

Can you give me a mathematical reason why the book and I would not be the same thing?

As much as materialists would like, consciousness cannot be reduced to an equation.

Can you give me a mathematical reason why consciousness cannot be reduced to an equation?

 

[Malerin]

So now you're hiding behind non sequiters? Have you stopped beating your wife yet? Can you give me a mathematical reason why there are no non-green green things? Anyway, here's a mathematical reason:

The transporter malfunctions and sends your information to three stations: China, the U.S., and France. If

all the copies are you

, then you (ONE person) would simultaneously exist in THREE different countries.
1 /= 3

 

[cyborg]

Cardinals.

Ordinals.

They are different.

 

[Z]

Cardinals.

Ordinals.

They are different.

Yep - cardinals are little red birdies.

Not sure what color an ordinal is... Hmm: Or - gold? Little gold birdies?

I like little gold birdies. 'Specially 24K gold birdies.

 

[Nick227]

I'm not saying your argument's invalid, I'm saying it's wrong. It's based on a ridiculous premise. Personhood is obviously not in the same category as numbers, and it's got you claiming that personal identity can extend across more than one person.

I think history has shown that discounting an argument on the grounds that "it's ridiculous" generally doesn't bode well. It's better imo to find some more concrete means to object.

Which would mean I would have three bodies, three sets of memory, three consciousnesses, exist in three different locations, and have three points of view. If all the copies "are me" and one of the duplicates dies, would I die? A part of me die? Your claim that "all the copies are me" is absurd.

What's clear is that your perspective is utterly dualistic. You are completely enmeshed in duality as only a diehard idealist could be. Not that there's anything wrong with this, but then why not just come out and say that you can't duplicate yourself because it would confuse the soul, or whatever. I mean, be honest.

We're too busy laughing at the idea of conscious toasters (the extra fancy model having self-awareness, as PixyMisa claims).

Well, there are complexities here for sure. Still, your recourse to laughing again suggests to me that actually you can't follow the argument. Maybe try laughing about it as hard as you possibly can for 10 minutes and then sit down and see if you can follow now. Would be nice to have a meaningful discussion with you. Otherwise it feels like arguing with a philosopher transported here from the early 1900s. Not that that isn't quaint!

Nick

 

[Malerin]

I think history has shown that discounting an argument on the grounds that "it's ridiculous" generally doesn't bode well. It's better imo to find some more concrete means to object.

I don't know what to say, other than people aren't numbers, and this is true in the same way 2+2 doesn't = 5. It seems pretty clear to me. If I copied all your information down in a book and destroyed the book, I should be prosecuted for murder? That is the logic of such a position.

What's clear is that your perspective is utterly dualistic. You are completely enmeshed in duality as only a diehard idealist could be. Not that there's anything wrong with this, but then why not just come out and say that you can't duplicate yourself because it would confuse the soul, or whatever. I mean, be honest.

No. Not dualistic at all. I'm assuming materialism is true. Under materialism, one person CANNOT be in China, the U.S. and France simultaneously. That is what RD is claiming when he says "all copies are me". Are you really saying one person can be in 100 different countries at the same time (if the transporter made 100 copies)?

Well, there are complexities here for sure.

Of conscious toasters? How about a happy calculator? A sad thermostat?

Still, your recourse to laughing again suggests to me that actually you can't follow the argument.

No, conscious toasters, thermostats, ovens, etc. is actually pretty stupid and worthy of scorn. Is an abacus concious as well? A doorbell?

 

[Nick227]

I don't know what to say, other than people aren't numbers, and this is true in the same way 2+2 doesn't = 5. It seems pretty clear to me. If I copied all your information down in a book and destroyed the book, I should be prosecuted for murder? That is the logic of such a position.

People aren't numbers, for sure. But information can be represented numerically and for me materialism indicates that consciousness is information. I don't know that the book analogy is so good as for me the book is constantly changing.

Generally, I don't think that many of the moral or other evolutionary-derived positions we take on murder and death are so useful when considering the Teletransporter thought experiment. As soon as the notion or possibility of duplicating humans comes up so a lot of these positions will inevitably be challenged. I don't think they can be relied on to give useful information.

No. Not dualistic at all. I'm assuming materialism is true. Under materialism, one person CANNOT be in China, the U.S. and France simultaneously. That is what RD is claiming when he says "all copies are me". Are you really saying one person can be in 100 different countries at the same time (if the transporter made 100 copies)?

For me this is a language and terminology thing. One person is one instance of one person until the possibility of duplication comes about. With duplication so there can be multiple instances of the same person. Of course we now need to agree just what "person" means. But I hold to the same point I made above. You can't always use the same terms or logical positions.

Of conscious toasters? How about a happy calculator? A sad thermostat?

Not really. For me personally the complexity comes about when one considers just what the relationship between consciousness and a conscious entity really is. There is not a "place in the brain where things become conscious" so when we assert that a thermostat "is conscious" there are complexities here in considering just what this statement truly means.

According to materialism there is no "you" that is reading this statement - such a position is merely constructed by brain processing. It is not a priori valid. Thus if we say a toaster is conscious just what does this really mean?

No, conscious toasters, thermostats, ovens, etc. is actually pretty stupid and worthy of scorn. Is an abacus concious as well? A doorbell?

Like I say, it is complex. But I doubt scorn is going to help anyone along much. Why do you believe such notions are worthy of scorn? I'd like to ask you to really examine your thought processes here. What processing in you leads to this conclusion?

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

So now you're hiding behind non sequiters? Have you stopped beating your wife yet? Can you give me a mathematical reason why there are no non-green green things? Anyway, here's a mathematical reason:

The transporter malfunctions and sends your information to three stations: China, the U.S., and France. If , then you (ONE person) would simultaneously exist in THREE different countries.
1 /= 3

Oh, I see. One person does not equal three countries. Brilliant!

If you are going to try your hand at anything resembling a formal argument, you might want to include proper definitions for things like "person." Just a suggestion.

 

[Myriad]

I can't help but imagine the Star Trek universe, where everyone is really "them" copy number XXX.. People's original consciousness being destroyed long ago, and the copies running around. Great for everyone else, but a heinous crime against the original life. I would find this kind of lifestyle even worse than abortion! People experiencing death, every day, over and over, and new copies taking up the next cause.

It occurs to me that evolution has made such a decision before, back around the time the opithsocont protista emerged. The critters that stumbled upon the discontinuous lifestyle, involving reproduction and death, outpaced the immortal self-copiers (at least, in the development of more complex forms) and the rest is natural history.

Every consciousness ends exactly once. That wouldn't change in your Star Trek universe. What would change is that each consciousness would perish much sooner, in return for having inherited a great treasure of memory and identity at the time of its forming.

Unless, of course, that's already the way it actually works.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Earthborn]

then you (ONE person) would simultaneously exist in THREE different countries.

I've done that. It wasn't all that special.

Though in this hypothetical situation it would be 3 person's existing in 3 different countries, and all 3 person's would have an equally valid claim at being "you".

1 /= 3

1 does not equal 3, but 1 times 3 does equal 3. In the situation you describe the teletransporter has become a multiplier.

 

[cyborg]

Yep - cardinals are little red birdies.

Not sure what color an ordinal is... Hmm: Or - gold? Little gold birdies?

I like little gold birdies. 'Specially 24K gold birdies.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinal_number

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number

For those still having difficulty with the idea that quantity and identity are different things.