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Resolution of Transporter Problem

Well, lets make this interesting then.

Suppose that, by magic and in an instant, there are a number of exact copies of you created somewhere that looks exactly like your current environment. And suppose that, by magic, the brain state of all those copies is kept completely in sync I.E. D2 is the same between all of them.

Is there a single consciousness or multiple ones?

I would say that there is a single one, since there is a single instance of D2 between all of them.

And if that is correct, then killing any number of them (instantaneously of course) would not change anything. D2 would continue in a single instance just like it always has.

Do you disagree with any of that, Darat/Mercutio?
 
But I suspect that you wouldn't be OK with the idea of randomly picking a healthy person and killing them to get a heart for transplanting?
No but then it occurs to me that I'm not clear. It's not the person providing the heart that I was referring to. The person receiving the heart has to die. I think our evolution has left us with a strong sense of survival and self and have a tendency to cling to this thing we see as self (the body) when that is but a means to an end. Oh, and again, I should hasten to add that I don't mean this in any dualistic sense.

If persistent vegetative state means they are brain dead then I don't see anything wrong with that.
Cool.

Actually it's not so much that it's old hat it's just that when you've spent an lot of effort, as Merc and I did to explain your position, and someone didn't pay attention it is a tad frustrating.

Interesting in that thread I remember making a post in which I said that if such a teleport was made I expect society would adjust to it if the killing was kept behind closed doors because as humans we are rather good at not thinking about stuff like that or simply hand-waving it away (and Merc agreed).

So whilst I (and I assume Merc) would still maintain that a person is being killed I acknowledge that how that would be viewed by society may evolve into something that doesn't consider the "teleport death" the same way as the death that results from stabbing someone in the heart.
Cool, I suspect we are very close in our sentiments about this issue. However in my mind I seem to care more about the persistence of the memories and collective sense of self than the technical aspects of being alive. The thought of killing a person bothers me but I'm not absolutely sure that as for me that I've not been killed or that I haven't died thousands of times in some respect. I could personally step into the transporter whatever the requirements so long as there was a better chance of what I consider the self surviving than my driving in a car.
 
Well, lets make this interesting then.

Suppose that, by magic and in an instant, there are a number of exact copies of you created somewhere that looks exactly like your current environment. And suppose that, by magic, the brain state of all those copies is kept completely in sync I.E. D2 is the same between all of them.

Is there a single consciousness or multiple ones?
Still a bit hazy, as scenarios go. When you say "looks exactly like your current environment", that is not enough. It must function exactly like your current environment (or rather, to be consistent, like your current environment will be at time 2 and on). If there is a distinguishable difference, your magic scenario is tainted. So... your scenario here turns out to be the multiverse theory, essentially. In that case, of course, it is logically impossible for anyone to know that they are in universe A or universe B, since their universe is described by everything detectable. If there is an observer, there are not two universes, but one, and a displacement in some dimension or other in order to tell the differences among the multiple "uni"verses (which are not at all separate, but part of a single multiverse).

The other option I can see arrives at the same place--that is, you simply assert from the beginning that it is not exactly the same, but straightforwardly differs, even if only in time-space coordinates and not in any manner we can detect other than coordinates.

Either way (and if there are other options, please share them--I can only think of these two at present), it would appear that you have several separate individuals relative to your magical observer. To the extent that "consciousness" is a meaningful term, there would be one consciousness per person. Each, after all, is aware of his/her surroundings, can think, can remember, can do all the things anyone else can. If you interacted with any of them, you would say each was conscious, without having to reference any of the others. If you have no access to the others (as my first interpretation), you would not have access to the others to have reference to them anyway.
I would say that there is a single one, since there is a single instance of D2 between all of them.
One copy of a book is the same book as another copy of that book? I can burn my own flag, but can be jailed if I burn the one flying over the White House. Why? They only differ in location. And, frankly, differing in time-space coordinates is plenty difference to differentiate among individuals meaningfully.
And if that is correct, then killing any number of them (instantaneously of course) would not change anything. D2 would continue in a single instance just like it always has.
So you think the words are important, but not the book. Once I have it backed up digitally, I can burn the first folio Shakespeare at the Huntington? Oh, I am sure it is just sentimentality--there is no logical reason not to. And the guy you are going to instantaneously kill is only sentimentally attached to his consciousness.
Do you disagree with any of that, Darat/Mercutio?
Only the words. I don't have much problem with the spaces.

Remember, in the first interpretation, no one can tell that there are multiverses. That may, of course, be our current situation. You could kill yourself now (note to mods--I am actively advocating suicide) and in some other part of our multiverse, your exact copy carries on. Of course, that doesn't do much for the friends and family of your copy here, but that is mere sentimentality, and is illogical and we shouldn't consider it.
 
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And, frankly, differing in time-space coordinates is plenty difference to differentiate among individuals meaningfully.

Really? That's meaningful? Seems arbitrary to me.
 
Really? That's meaningful? Seems arbitrary to me.
How so? Do you consider one 1$ coin to be the same as 100 of them? The information on each is the same; they only differ by coordinates. I knew a pair of twins once--remarkably similar, but oddly enough, when they were both there, I could tell that there were in fact two of them. They did not overlap in time-space coordinates. Two books are not one book seen twice, in that they have different... wait for it... time-space coordinates. Bookstores have found that it is useful to sell several different copies rather than the same one several times.

But I guess that was just an arbitrary decision on their part.
 
(and if there are other options, please share them--I can only think of these two at present)

The other option is that our consciousness can be described by a finite amount of information in a relative reference frame and thus reproducing the entire universe isn't necessary, we only need to reproduce a finite subset of it.

For example if I am in a shower, someone could copy me and the shower and put them somewhere with very similar gravitational conditions and all the copies wouldn't be the wiser. No need to copy the whole universe!

If you interacted with any of them, you would say each was conscious, without having to reference any of the others.

I don't need to reference the others, but what I am asking is what would happen if I did reference the others.

Then I would also have to say that all the others are conscious as well and in the same way, because interacting with any of them implies interacting with all of them. I would be able to, for instance, ask number 57 a question and jump to number 135 for the answer since they are all kept in sync. Or, to satisfy the more animal side of me, I could be making love with number 57, pause the world, and continue with number 135.

And so the question becomes "can identical sets of information be different?"

One copy of a book is the same book as another copy of that book?

No. But one copy of a book has the same story as another copy of that book. The question is, are we a book or are we the story?

Of course, that doesn't do much for the friends and family of your copy here, but that is mere sentimentality, and is illogical and we shouldn't consider it.

Unless they knew that the other copies were still me and that I would return in a little while. Which is what we are talking about in the context of a teletransporter, right?
 
How so? Do you consider one 1$ coin to be the same as 100 of them?

Only if I were to mistake the difference between type and quantity.

But I guess that was just an arbitrary decision on their part.

If the value of a book were in its physical presence then a book without any funny squiggles in it should be just as valuable.
 
Mercutio said:
Pragmatically, the moment there is one iota difference between the monisms, there is reason to choose one. Until then, the question is utterly irrelevant. Or, to quote myself: Ontology is, largely, a pantload.

That, dear boy, is an ontological stance.
It's really a meta-ontological stance. And you're not allowed to have those, either, in spite of the fact that pantloadism has an awful lot going in it.

~~ Paul
 
rocketdodger said:
No. But one copy of a book has the same story as another copy of that book. The question is, are we a book or are we the story?
I'd go with being a book, unless you want to get into the hairy mess that results when you consider that people have portions of their stories in common.


~~ Paul
 
The other option is that our consciousness can be described by a finite amount of information in a relative reference frame and thus reproducing the entire universe isn't necessary, we only need to reproduce a finite subset of it.

For example if I am in a shower, someone could copy me and the shower and put them somewhere with very similar gravitational conditions and all the copies wouldn't be the wiser. No need to copy the whole universe!
That was the second option.
I don't need to reference the others, but what I am asking is what would happen if I did reference the others.

Then I would also have to say that all the others are conscious as well and in the same way, because interacting with any of them implies interacting with all of them. I would be able to, for instance, ask number 57 a question and jump to number 135 for the answer since they are all kept in sync. Or, to satisfy the more animal side of me, I could be making love with number 57, pause the world, and continue with number 135.
Are you Interesting Ian? Why on earth would interacting with 57 (and only 57, if I understand what you are saying here) magically make 137 hear you, from his/her shower at a completely different set of time-space coordinates? If you are talking to all of the duplicates at once, there need be many duplicates of you as well, and you are engaging in sloppy seconds with number 135.
And so the question becomes "can identical sets of information be different?"
Only if the information is substrate-free. Which is why the assumptions you bring to the problem determine your logical conclusion.
No. But one copy of a book has the same story as another copy of that book. The question is, are we a book or are we the story?
I would be happy to trade my Norton Shakespeare for the Huntington's first folio. They should be happy with the trade, as they get more plays, and commentary too!

Yes, again, you are assuming substrate-free information, and you are not following your example through.
Unless they knew that the other copies were still me and that I would return in a little while. Which is what we are talking about in the context of a teletransporter, right?
I agree completely--if they assume your conclusions, they will conclude the same thing you do.
 
Only if I were to mistake the difference between type and quantity.
So two coins are two coins, but two Mercutios are one Mercutio. Because you say so.
If the value of a book were in its physical presence then a book without any funny squiggles in it should be just as valuable.
Except that it is no longer identical. In the scenario, the items are identical, and coordinates are sufficient to tell them apart. If each clone pops out with a different serial number, then we have at least two ways of telling them apart. A blank book (I actually just bought a blank book yesterday) is very easily distinguishable from a full book, by looking at its pages. A blank book is easily distinguishable from another blank book, by noting their locations.
 
The other option is that our consciousness can be described by a finite amount of information in a relative reference frame and thus reproducing the entire universe isn't necessary, we only need to reproduce a finite subset of it.

...snip...

Merc's objection is not that you can't create duplicates of someone just that every-time you do by how we usually define a person you are creating a new person. Sure they will all say that they are Darat, they may in fact be completely indistinguishable from the first Darat, but what there are is a group of distinct and separate Darats, they will be no more connected to one another than you and me.. (Albeit it is very likely that given a similar input into their environment they will all respond in a very similar manner.)

However to kill anyone of those is killing a person no matter that there will still be Darats left in the universe.
 
So two coins are two coins, but two Mercutios are one Mercutio. Because you say so.

Nope, never said that.

Two coins are two coins, and two Mercutios are two Mercutios.

Counting is counting.

Except that it is no longer identical.

Didn't say it was identical to anything - just pointing out that the value is clearly not in the physical object by itself.
 
Really? That's meaningful? Seems arbitrary to me.

It's a fairly fundamental principle of physics. Pauli exclusion principle

That's how we tell that two things are actually different objects - we can see 'em at the same time in different places.

If we suspect Bruce Wayne is the Batman, the best way to refute it is to see them at the same time in different places. I don't think it's a arbitrary to regard that as disproving identity.


If those 17 people in a single environment are actually one person (which of course begs numerous questions to which we don't have answers) then suppose we kill 15 of them, instantly. Is anything lost? Not if they are all a single person. Then we open the doors and let them back into the world, where 17 sisters are waiting to marry them. 15 of the sisters complain that we've murdered their future husbands. We say, no, there was only ever one person, having one set of thoughts, and he survived to the end. Right up until the moment the door opened, there was only one consciousness. Is that a credible defence?
 
I'd go with being a book, unless you want to get into the hairy mess that results when you consider that people have portions of their stories in common.


~~ Paul

Perhaps human beings are really pure information, but nobody has managed to extract it from the meat and bone so far.
 
Nope, never said that.

Two coins are two coins, and two Mercutios are two Mercutios.

Counting is counting.
My apologies, then; I mistook your point.
Didn't say it was identical to anything - just pointing out that the value is clearly not in the physical object by itself.
By giving an example in which the physical properties of the object had changed.
 
By giving an example in which the physical properties of the object had changed.

Then you misunderstood - clearly simply being an old book doesn't guarantee that it is a valuable book. An old empty book isn't as important as an old copy of a Shakespearian play. So we recognise that the funny squiggles are more valuable than the ink they are made from or the paper they are embedded in.

Similarly I am arguing that the value of a person doesn't come from their fleshy cages. I don't necessarially expect you to agree - this is a value judgement after all - but this is quite simply why I don't see it as morally problematic if one fleshy cage is replaced with another.
 
Try this idea.

Right now I put you (cyborg) into suspended animation, I then duplicate you and create new-cyborg. I wake you up (cyborg) and show you videos of new-cyborg playing with your children, having a meal with your wife and so on.

You'll just shrug your shoulders and say "Fair enough, might as well top myself since 'I'm' still playing with my kids and enjoying life with my wife?"
 
It would certainly feel weird for the first time to step through the teleporter. Knowing you'd be killed in the process. But I think I would do it. After the first try it probably wouldn't feel as weird though.

Let's say I have a brain tumor. It's operable with 100% succes rate (same as the teleporter). Should I just spend my money on booze and loose women since it's not me that's coming out from the operation room? Should I even bother with the surgery?

If you would choose surgery, why not the teleporter? (not directed at anyone particularly)
 
I have been over this before - in the strictest sense 'I' am not the 'I' of a second ago and I'm not the 'I' of a second to come. The 'I' is constantly 'dying'. Clearly we are not the 'same' person - but then I'm clearly not the same person I was a second ago.

So accepting that to talk about 'I' meaningfully you have to talk about 'paths' - we share paths but not identical ones and they're continually diverging. I doubt I'd kill myself but then I wouldn't be so bothered by the concept of the existence of one of my potential paths continuing inspite of my demise.

When it comes to the sort of infintessimal difference we're talking about in the transporter scenario I'd hardly be bothered at all.
 

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