Resolution of Transporter Problem

[rocketdodger]

Perhaps some day you will be comfortable enough to share it.

$50 on "behaviorist"

Do I win, Merc?

 

[rocketdodger]

'Dodger, my objection was simply that the problem as stated required killing someone. The fact that another person was created did not suddenly mean that the person who is killed, is suddenly not killed.

Ah.

Well, that is the interesting question, right -- does the notion of a "copy" have any meaning when it comes to pure information?

I don't know the answer to this. But I know that, for example, no matter where the number X is used it is still X. Every instance of a number is the same. Perhaps a consciousness is similar?

 

[Mercutio]

Perhaps some day you will be comfortable enough to share it.

Happy to, if anyone asked; as is, people just seemed happy assigning their own categories. Who am I to spoil their fun?

'Dodger, you owe me fifty bucks. (and now that there is incentive...) Although Radical Behaviorism (not simply "Behaviorist" or "Behaviorism", because there are several schools of behaviorism) is indeed a philosophy, and it would indeed be accurate and acceptable to call me that, the broader category I was thinking of was Pragmatist.

But since your answer would be technically half-correct... you still owe me fifty bucks. If we ever meet in person, I'll collect in single malt. Until then, you're off lucky.

 

[RandFan]

$50 on "behaviorist"

Do I win, Merc?

I would have guessed monist but I like pragmatist.

 

[Richard Masters]

I am guessing D2 would be the type of data structure that blurs the distinction between classes and their objects.

Namely, any instances of C (D2) would instantly become their own <whatever> due to modification of the underlying structures. Is there even a name for a class who's instances can change their own metadata? Once a class does so, is it still the same class? Is it a different class that inherits from the first and only exists in a single instance?

If the source code for executable doesn't exist, are the instances of classes in the executable actually the abstract classes themselves? If not, do the abstract classes not even exist? If a class doesn't exist, how can there be an instance of it?

I know people do research on this kind of stuff -- executable code that modifies itself. What do they call such a thing?

Bootstrapping, Adaptation, Evolution, Reflection, Learning

I think it's problematic to apply OO analogies so deeply, but along those lines, I think it's more of case of information structure and function (grammar) vs information context and semantics (reference).

Those are intertwined(entangled), and affect each other by reflection. If teleportation preserves the structure, function, context, then I think you can preserve the self-reference just fine. But having concurrent and conflicting references violates our understanding of identity (and mostly for this reason, magnifies causal deviations to paradox-like levels).

 

[Nick227]

'Dodger, my objection was simply that the problem as stated required killing someone. The fact that another person was created did not suddenly mean that the person who is killed, is suddenly not killed.

I consider this argument manipulative and as usual subtly attempting to avoid the real crux of the thought experiment. You seem to me to constantly resort to emotive manipulation when you don't want to look at the issue.

Merc, you constantly come out with this whole "Someone dies...and I care" routine, like you're standing up for the rights of man or something. I don't believe a word of this BS. You're just scared to look and you don't want to admit it. I have to put it out.

Nick

 

[GreedyAlgorithm]

Indeed - understanding type becomes a lot harder the more mutable your objects are.

My own modest proposal is that:

*) Every unique instance of an object is also a unique class.
*) The strongest class relationships are between objects that have isomorphic functions
*) The weakest class relationships are between objects that be be decomposed into sets of objects which share strong class relationships
*) The more layers of decomposition you have to go through the weaker the relationship is

Does "modest proposal" mean that was a parody? If not, then note that you have defined exactly one type of class relationship - the isomorphism. Decompose two objects into sets which have isomorphisms, and the two objects are isomorphic. Then it's turtles the rest of the way down. Never gets weaker unless there is at least one defined non-isomorphic class relationship.

ETA: Unless there is no isomorphism between the sets of one and the sets of another, in which case saying the objects have a class relationship is a pretty strong claim which would benefit from some explanation!

 

[Mercutio]

I consider this argument manipulative and as usual subtly attempting to avoid the real crux of the thought experiment. You seem to me to constantly resort to emotive manipulation when you don't want to look at the issue.

Merc, you constantly come out with this whole "Someone dies...and I care" routine, like you're standing up for the rights of man or something. I don't believe a word of this BS. You're just scared to look and you don't want to admit it. I have to put it out.

Nick

You may believe what you wish. The fact that it bears no relation to my thinking on it would bother some people, but if you have no trouble with it, more power to you. I had even, in the other thread, given my conditions for entering the machine--they have nothing to do with your allegations of what my objections are, but if you wish for whatever reason to claim cowardice on my part as the reason, and ignore the people on the other thread who either understood, or felt the same way (such as Darat), I really don't much care.

As for the "crux of the thought experiment", I addressed that earlier--it is "resolved" one way or the other based purely on one's initial assumptions. Assume materialism, conclude materialism; assume dualism, conclude dualism. It is a boring thought problem, so I thought I'd actually give my real answer rather than engage in the circular-reasoning-fest.

My reasoning is perfectly reasonable; if you need to reject it in order to claim that you have "resolved" the problem, then you have not resolved the problem.

 

[cyborg]

Decompose two objects into sets which have isomorphisms, and the two objects are isomorphic.

I didn't mean to imply that every object in that set would have an object in the other set it is isomorphic to.

Consider a human as an object. You can decompose that object into limbs, torso, head etc...

A hand with five fingers is similar but clearly not the same as a hand with four. Cut off the tip of a finger and it's different but still very similar. Two four fingered hands of a different size are very similar indeed. And so on.

Compare a ball with a hand and you'd soon have to get pretty basic to find ways of unifying these objects in a class system.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

'Dodger, you owe me fifty bucks. (and now that there is incentive...) Although Radical Behaviorism (not simply "Behaviorist" or "Behaviorism", because there are several schools of behaviorism) is indeed a philosophy, and it would indeed be accurate and acceptable to call me that, the broader category I was thinking of was Pragmatist.

Now hold on just a durn minute here. Pragmatism is really an epistemological stance, not an ontological one. The rules of the game are that you have to declare an ontological stance, or else you ain't playin' fair. Just because you think it may be meaningless to ask what ultimate reality is don't mean you get to say so.

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

The rules of the game are that you have to declare an ontological stance, or else you ain't playin' fair.

I'm a hopeless romantic. A lover not a fighter.

Given that all's fair in love and war I'd say that's about as fair as you can get.

 

[Gagglegnash]

Hi

If you make a copy of an object... any object... which is identical to the original, and I mean down-to-the-quantum-level identical, is it a copy or more like... I dunno... a reinstantiation?

Our language has no framework on which to hang the words to describe two instances of a unique entity.

My solution: Give hims armor and hises's choice of swords and let hims duke it out until... ummm... less than two of him exist (since, in a sword fight, it's quite possible for both instances to be killed). If hes can't bring hims'selves to kill hims'selves, then hes is responsible for working out a way to get along.

 

[Mercutio]

Now hold on just a durn minute here. Pragmatism is really an epistemological stance, not an ontological one. The rules of the game are that you have to declare an ontological stance, or else you ain't playin' fair. Just because you think it may be meaningless to ask what ultimate reality is don't mean you get to say so.

~~ Paul

Pragmatically, the moment there is one iota difference between the monisms, there is reason to choose one. Until then, the question is utterly irrelevant. Or, to quote myself: Ontology is, largely, a pantload.

That, dear boy, is an ontological stance.

 

[Darat]

So what you are saying is that pragmatists go commando!

 

[Nick227]

As for the "crux of the thought experiment", I addressed that earlier--it is "resolved" one way or the other based purely on one's initial assumptions. Assume materialism, conclude materialism; assume dualism, conclude dualism. It is a boring thought problem, so I thought I'd actually give my real answer rather than engage in the circular-reasoning-fest.

My reasoning is perfectly reasonable; if you need to reject it in order to claim that you have "resolved" the problem, then you have not resolved the problem.

Hi Merc,

For me the "crux of the thought experiment" is to gain awareness. This is how I understand Susan Blackmore's interpretation of it. There are many, yourself not included, who consider themselves to be 'materialists', but who's thinking still reveals traces (or often copious quantities) of dualistic belief. Thought experiments like The Teletransporter can reveal this and then the individual has the possibility to look deeper at their belief systems.

Blackmore specifically states that you cannot use 'malfunction' type scenarios to avoid travelling. To me she wants you to make a choice dependent upon your beliefs about yourself and the machine. I imagine she does this because she doesn't want people to 'cop out' of the process.

And, for me, you and Darat do cop out. You don't think it's a good thought experiment, if I recall, but then I don't see either of you actually engage with it. I don't think you even dare to look.

Nick

 

[Mercutio]

Hi Merc,
And, for me, you and Darat do cop out. You don't think it's a good thought experiment, if I recall, but then I don't see either of you actually engage with it. I don't think you even dare to look.

Nick

If I look assuming X, I see Z. If I look assuming Y, I see Y.

I do not assume either X or Y, long before this problem showed up. There is absolutely no reason to assume either X or Y, because (as Paullie the Greek will tell you) both monisms reduce to the same thing. There is no "dare" about it. I could ask you if you stay on the ground because you are afraid of violating gravity--it would be every bit as ludicrous.

I look. I just see something different than you seem to. I could easily give you the answer you were looking for, but I have this thing about circularity. I try to avoid assuming my conclusions whenever possible.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

And, for me, you and Darat do cop out. You don't think it's a good thought experiment, if I recall, but then I don't see either of you actually engage with it. I don't think you even dare to look.

Nick

It is hardly our fault if you do not actually read what we have posted.

 

[RandFan]

FWIW: I think it is a great thought experiment because it is capable of getting people to question what they think of as self. It was a big reason for me to think long and hard on what I thought of as self.

The idea that if I were to be cloned and my oringinal died in the process doesn't cause me any concern in the slightest (at least as far as my "self" goes). Merc's right, in that case a person has died so I wouldn't subject any collection of atoms and molecules that is human to anything life threatining.

But then I'm not really certain what it means to die or to live. The only thing that has any importance to me isn't my biological self (that's been replaced many times over) but my collection of memories and the sense of self.

 

[RandFan]

I wasn't involved in the other thread and I've not read all of the posts in this one so if my posts are redundant please ignore.

I got to thinking of Mercutio's point about killing a person and it got me thinking. In order to perform a heart transplant you have to, sorta, kill someone. We seem to be ok with that so what line is being crossed with the transporter that causes some of us discomfort?

What if person A had a terminal disease that didn't effect the brain and what if person B was in a persistent vegetative state and it were possible to perform a brain transplant from person A to person B? Would that be ok?

Is that a line that we could come to accept? What if the transporter could create a clone free of disease? And if the transporter worked by disassembling every atom and then rebuilding the body from those atoms how is that not killing a person?

Again, sorry if this is old hat.

 

[Darat]

I wasn't involved in the other thread and I've not read all of the posts in this one so if my posts are redundant please ignore.

I got to thinking of Mercutio's point about killing a person and it got me thinking. In order to perform a heart transplant you have to, sorta, kill someone. We seem to be ok with that so what line is being crossed with the transporter that causes some of us discomfort?

...snip...

But I suspect that you wouldn't be OK with the idea of randomly picking a healthy person and killing them to get a heart for transplanting?

What if person A had a terminal disease that didn't effect the brain and what if person B was in a persistent vegetative state and it were possible to perform a brain transplant from person A to person B? Would that be ok?

...snip...

If persistent vegetative state means they are brain dead then I don't see anything wrong with that.

Is that a line that we could come to accept? What if the transporter could create a clone free of disease? And if the transporter worked by disassembling every atom and then rebuilding the body from those atoms how is that not killing a person?

Again, sorry if this is old hat.

Actually it's not so much that it's old hat it's just that when you've spent an lot of effort, as Merc and I did to explain your position, and someone didn't pay attention it is a tad frustrating.

Interesting in that thread I remember making a post in which I said that if such a teleport was made I expect society would adjust to it if the killing was kept behind closed doors because as humans we are rather good at not thinking about stuff like that or simply hand-waving it away (and Merc agreed).

So whilst I (and I assume Merc) would still maintain that a person is being killed I acknowledge that how that would be viewed by society may evolve into something that doesn't consider the "teleport death" the same way as the death that results from stabbing someone in the heart.