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Resolution of Transporter Problem

Like RD says, it comes down to how you view the relationship between a substrate and the information that it processes.

Nick

Indeed. Under materialism, they are one and the same. Information IS the substrate and the process. It's not an immaterial 'something' that is being processed in the physical substrate.

Information, here, is the ghost in the shell.
 
You do understand there is a difference between coming to a rational realisation and living as an emotional being don't you?

Of course I do. Rationally speaking, I realize that death is a permanent end, and therefore do not choose to hasten that death foolishly, from some emotional hope that I will magically teleport to another world.
 
Of course I do. Rationally speaking, I realize that death is a permanent end, and therefore do not choose to hasten that death foolishly, from some emotional hope that I will magically teleport to another world.

And yet the self that wrote that magically hoped it would teleport into the future despite that being impossible.
 
Indeed. Under materialism, they are one and the same. Information IS the substrate and the process. It's not an immaterial 'something' that is being processed in the physical substrate.

Information, here, is the ghost in the shell.

Hmmm...

So you would argue that the phenomenon of addition is somehow different in every instance it is encountered? That is, two apples combining with three apples to make five is somehow fundamentally different, on a phenomenal level, from two oranges combining with three oranges to make five?

Because it seems to me that the whole point of mathematics is to label similar phenomena as similar. I wouldn't expect someone to say "no, that is totally different, because it is oranges instead of apples." I would expect them to say "well, the things being added are different, but the phenomenon is the same."
 
I have a feeling we're having a difficulty of semantics here, rather than a conceptual one.

When I say 'thinking' - and I believe Pixy is in the same canoe as I am - I refer to the processes occuring within the brain, either within 'conscious awareness' or not. As it is, all sensory activity occurs within 'conscious awareness' - not, necessarily, within the focus of that awareness, but definitely within conscious awareness. Without thought process, sensory activity doesn't happen.

Then we are using different terms here. "Thinking" to me is the process of thoughts appearing and disappearing in awareness. Seeing is quite different. I can see this monitor with no thoughts present.

What then do you call what I am calling "thinking," which is incidentally what the dictionary calls "thinking?"

All thought.

Why call it thinking? Why not just call it processing, then there's no confusion?


Or we're having issues with semantics. My guess is that you see 'thought' as an active, intentional process - something commanded by the self, intentional, with definite purpose or something. Ironic, since you also see 'self' as an empty illusion.

I don't see thought in this way. I am using the words "thought" and "thinking" as they are commonly used and defined in dictionaries. They relate to a process of inner reasoning which manifests consciously usually as inner language. I believe you will find that this is the common usage of these words.


Ironically, those who USUALLY cling with such fervor to the alleged 'hard problem' are dualists or idealists, not materialists; USUALLY, the materialists are satisfied in saying, 'it's all in the brain/it's all covered by physics/we may not know it yet, but it's coming soon'.

Well, I would recommend you to actually read the leading writers in the field. Who's actually saying "it's coming soon?" Please quote me direct. For Rama we're just scratching the surface and I recall another leading researcher, I think Baars, saying something like "get back to us in 100 years!"

Pretty black-and-white thinking.

You are definitely seeming less 'materialist' by the moment, Nick. I think RD is having that inkling too, at the moment.

Actually, I'm probably the only real materialist in this village. Though I must admit that Cyborg seems to be pretty on track. Most of you guys seem to be what Dennett terms "Cartesian Materialists" - materialist on the outside but dualist inside. I can't see why any true materialist would baulk at travelling by Teletransporter.

Nick
 
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Indeed. Under materialism, they are one and the same. Information IS the substrate and the process. It's not an immaterial 'something' that is being processed in the physical substrate.

So, will you finally get in the pod then, Z?

Teletransporter Operator to new recruit said:
Now, you won't have any problem with the dualists or the materialists. They get in and travel nice as pie. But those Cartesian materialists. They're a bloody nightmare. They babble on and on about dying or the thing going wrong and make a big drama. There's a stick here to bash them over the head if they give you too much trouble.

Nick
 
Hmmm...

So you would argue that the phenomenon of addition is somehow different in every instance it is encountered? That is, two apples combining with three apples to make five is somehow fundamentally different, on a phenomenal level, from two oranges combining with three oranges to make five?

Because it seems to me that the whole point of mathematics is to label similar phenomena as similar. I wouldn't expect someone to say "no, that is totally different, because it is oranges instead of apples." I would expect them to say "well, the things being added are different, but the phenomenon is the same."

Addition is symbolic language, just as the word 'apple' is not, itself, an apple. The physical addition of apples IS different from the physical addition of oranges, because apples are not oranges; but the pattern arrangement CAN be represented in a symbolic linguistic form that can be applied, as long as we're able and willing to label dissimilar things with an iconic label.

With apples and oranges, it's not as readily apparent; try, for example, adding apples and, say, clouds. If you put two apples and three apples together, you have five apples; but if you put two clouds and three clouds together, you have just one larger cloud. Linguistically, we might say the same thing; but realistically, there can be (and in this case, is) a world of difference.

The reason we can associate addition of apples to addition of oranges is because we can choose to iconically represent both apples and oranges as 'individual objects of a similar type'. Once we do that, we really are no longer adding apples to apples and oranges to oranges; we're adding things to things, whose properties are similar enough to apply a related law of addition.

So, yes, on a fundamental level, any arithmetic process has the capacity to be fundamentally different, based on the properties of the precise things being added. Even in a pure abstract environment, this is true. Is adding two positive integers to three negative integers the same as adding together five negative integers? It can be - or it can be vastly different. What about adding fractions? Imaginary numbers?

One should ALWAYS remember that mathematics is not, fundamentally, a thing in itself (beyond being a shared concept), but more a language for manipulation and description of a concept we share amongst ourselves.
 
But that isn't your dead horse, Nick.

Your dead horse -- and I know this, because you argued with me about it, and I am one of the most outspoken hardcore materialists on these forums -- is about how you define self.

Outspoken hardcore materialist? You? Well, I will grant you that you moving in the right direction by getting in the Teletransporter.

We (and by "we" I mean educated materialists) all understand that whatever is going on in our minds is a physical processes, and we all agree that it is very illusory and not centrally located and blah blah all that Dennet stuff.

What you constantly argue about is what things should be called. Why do you waste your time? If Pixy wants to lable the collection of processes in his head as his "I" then why shouldn't he?

Er, because technically he isn't doing it. And actually we were discussing the correct usage of the term "thinking."

He fully understands the nature of those processes, he doesn't think there is a dualistic homunculus in there.

No, few people do these days. But as Blackmore and Dennett note...a lot of people who like to label themselves "materialist" still create dualistic models. This is an observed phenomenom, RD. People write about it. I know you would love to brush all those bits you don't get under the carpet so you can claim some omnipotent materialism, but unfortunately annoying so-and-so's like me will continue to point out that actually your emperor is still in the altogether.

I repeat...

* we do not yet understand consciousness
* we have not yet overcome the Hard Problem, except on a theoretical level

You can use as much rhetoric as you like, RD. I can only hope you don't succeed in actually convincing yourself.

I mean, this outstanding argument of yours -- that has been going on for over a year -- is tantamount to a mathematician getting after a colleague because they use a different set of variable labels than you. Who cares if Pixy wants to use T and U instead of X and Y? The equation is the same regardless.

No it isn't, RD. As you would know if you actually understood it.

Nick
 
It occurs to me that the disintegration in the sending side of the transporter (assuming it's not essential to the transport process, but added deliberately to prevent accumulation of duplicates, as per many of these scenarios), is a waste of good protein. Why not solve food shortages along with transportation delays?

Please help out by substituting "instantaneously flash frozen, then cut into steaks and delivered to local dining establishments" for "disintegrated" in subsequent discussion. (Especially since the freezing method seems like a better way to facilitate a reliable transmission-scan than disintegration.)

Of course, the system should be thoroughly tested first, preferably on Kobe cows.

And when I go on that Mars vacation, save the sirloin for when I get back.

Respectfully,
Myriad

PS: It occurs to me that the above could be misinterpreted in all sorts of ways. It is not an attempt to be an anti-teleporter argument by squick (would that be argumentum ad nauseam?). I'm must pointing out that there are many parallels between the various attitudes about our brain-embodied minds, and past and present attitudes about the rest of our flesh. I for one would have no problem chowing down on that sirloin, assuming the taste is okay. My body has always been perfectly capable of consuming its own substance (though of course rarely per orem), and has always done so on a regular ongoing basis -- indeed, these days, I rather wish it would do so more.
 
With apples and oranges, it's not as readily apparent; try, for example, adding apples and, say, clouds. If you put two apples and three apples together, you have five apples; but if you put two clouds and three clouds together, you have just one larger cloud. Linguistically, we might say the same thing; but realistically, there can be (and in this case, is) a world of difference.

Yet on a molecular level the two are the same -- the total number of molecules after the addition is the sum of the two sets prior.

The reason we can associate addition of apples to addition of oranges is because we can choose to iconically represent both apples and oranges as 'individual objects of a similar type'. Once we do that, we really are no longer adding apples to apples and oranges to oranges; we're adding things to things, whose properties are similar enough to apply a related law of addition.

Yes, exactly. Note that you say "a law of addition," -- it is the same law. It isn't different each time it is applied.

To put this in context, what if "my consciousness" was the phenomenon of adding two things to three things? Would "my consciousness" not be present every time this law was applied, regardless of whether the subject of application was apples or oranges?

So, yes, on a fundamental level, any arithmetic process has the capacity to be fundamentally different, based on the properties of the precise things being added. Even in a pure abstract environment, this is true. Is adding two positive integers to three negative integers the same as adding together five negative integers? It can be - or it can be vastly different. What about adding fractions? Imaginary numbers?

Bold mine.

I don't disagree.

My point is that, for instance, if a class of things can be discretized, then applying the law of addition to them will always follow the same set of rules -- the law of addition of natural numbers. Regardless of what those things are, if they are in that class, the law is always the same -- no exceptions.

There aren't multiple instances of the law of addition of natural numbers. There is one instance that is simply applied everywhere.

If consciousness is information, then a consciousness can be formulated as a set of rules. Then every case of those rules being obeyed is an application of the same consciousness. It is irrelevant if the cases are in different places, times, universes, whatever.
 
Er, because technically he isn't doing it. And actually we were discussing the correct usage of the term "thinking."

Yes, he is. You don't recognize this because you insist a dog must be called a dog instead of, for instance, Ino.

And you weren't discussing that -- you were bringing out your dead horse of "there is no self."

* we have not yet overcome the Hard Problem, except on a theoretical level

Reading your posts, it seems you argue that the hard problem hasn't been overcome at all. I am quite happy with a theoretical level.

No it isn't, RD. As you would know if you actually understood it.

What I understand is that you can't communicate with someone speaking a different language by simply raising your voice. Pixy, Me, and a slew of others just happen to speak a different language than you on this issue. Yet there are words in both of our languages for the same things... I don't know why you refuse to see this.
 
Yes, he is. You don't recognize this because you insist a dog must be called a dog instead of, for instance, Ino.

And you weren't discussing that -- you were bringing out your dead horse of "there is no self."

I am not so bothered with whether there is a self or not. The way I see it, sometimes yes, sometimes no. I bring up selfhood because, like I said, this is the core issue for most people with the Teletransporter. They have a deep-rooted intuition that something of them dies in the teletransporter, given to them by evolution. Yet, for a materialist, this intuition must be irrational.

Reading your posts, it seems you argue that the hard problem hasn't been overcome at all. I am quite happy with a theoretical level.

Well, you haven't read very many of them! I'm happy to argue either side of the issue. There's a hard problem or there's no hard problem. Recently, I've been pointing out to the hard problem deniers that, as a rule, they're living a bit in cloud cuckoo land. In their zest to forward materialism they overlook serious issues. I can say that it's all information processing. I can say that the mind is what the brain does. It's not a big deal. But I find it more rewarding to really start to look at the issues. I don't care if materialism is right or wrong. I'm actually more interested in what's true. You don't see so much of this on this forum.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, RD, you need to read more of the actual research. This you don't do. You stick Blackmore and Dennett away in a little box somewhere in your head labelled "weird" because you don't want to deal with the issues they raise. And they're actually 2 of the most forthright and outspoken materialists alive. Ramachandran you don't read. Baars you don't read.

For me, you just want to be able to wrap it all up as something you already understand in your own head. You resist the interventions of any annoying researchers or pundits who threaten this illusory state of awareness by sidelining them with a few haphazard categorisations. You then reinforce it all by summoning up the opinions of a few other deluded souls as back-up. This is what I see.

If and when you do open up to the wider body of research and opinion on consciousness about the first thing you will see is the open admission that actually we know very, very little thus far about the subject...get back to us in 100 years.



What I understand is that you can't communicate with someone speaking a different language by simply raising your voice. Pixy, Me, and a slew of others just happen to speak a different language than you on this issue. Yet there are words in both of our languages for the same things... I don't know why you refuse to see this.

Because that is actually not what the issue is. It is not about language, though you repeatedly come back to this "back door" as a way of not looking. The hard problem is not to do with language. The issues with self are not to do with language. You may need to be very clear about language and semantics sometimes when discussing them, but they are not about language.

Nick
 
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Yet on a molecular level the two are the same -- the total number of molecules after the addition is the sum of the two sets prior.

Indeed - and we can say the same at the atomic level, perhaps even lower - assuming there isn't too much mass or energy shed or accrued over time. Of course, when we get down to that level, it's not five. :D

Yes, exactly. Note that you say "a law of addition," -- it is the same law. It isn't different each time it is applied.

To put this in context, what if "my consciousness" was the phenomenon of adding two things to three things? Would "my consciousness" not be present every time this law was applied, regardless of whether the subject of application was apples or oranges?

I might agree if you said 'consciousness' - but the moment you add the qualifier 'my' (whether we're speaking from an ownership point of view, or an associative one), you change it from a general phenomenon to a specific instance of a phenomenon. Now, if you're going to argue that specific instances are irrelevant, you'll likely have to re-write entire sections of our social contract - and I doubt it'll be a very popular re-write.

I don't disagree.

My point is that, for instance, if a class of things can be discretized, then applying the law of addition to them will always follow the same set of rules -- the law of addition of natural numbers. Regardless of what those things are, if they are in that class, the law is always the same -- no exceptions.

Agreed. But the law, again, is a general application - a singular instance of the law, however, even though it may have the same properties as another instance, is not the same instance.

There aren't multiple instances of the law of addition of natural numbers. There is one instance that is simply applied everywhere.

I disagree. Multiple applications make it multiple instances of a general law.

If consciousness is information, then a consciousness can be formulated as a set of rules. Then every case of those rules being obeyed is an application of the same consciousness. It is irrelevant if the cases are in different places, times, universes, whatever.

I disagree. If we are reducing consciousness as information, then a specific instance of consciousness also has to include specific aspects of information that associate it to a particular place, time, universe, whatever. Further, some classes of information can be dynamic in terms of time and, to a limited degree, space, but still remain particular instances, distinguishable from other instances by at least one observer.

However, as I've pointed out before, I'm not actually sure you can reduce consciousness purely to information, since it seems to me that consciousness is the process AND the substrate - and, apparently, the substrate undergoes no fundamental primary structural change throughout life.

Another thing that's starting to slowly percolate through the dense grey matter of my mind is the bit I quoted earlier.

Nick said,
All information transfer relies on direct, continuous interactions between something physical. At a fundamental level there is no such thing as discontinuity.

Direct, continuous interactions. I'm wondering how you have direct, continuous interactions when you are having to disrupt an existing process to get the 'information' out of it. In the case of something as complex as brain activity, the very act of extracting the information might well be the whole reason 'vaporization' occurs. Even as such, is it truly a transfer of direct, continuous interaction - or merely an image-copy? Are we physically transferring thought process, or are we photographing it, in some 4-D sense, and remodelling it elsewhere? And if that's the case - is that truly direct, continuous interaction? In a photograph, there are obvious intermediaries - light, light-reactive substances, etc. And the result is, clearly, a deeply imperfect copy.

In any other form of representation that we currently have, we have intermediary processes - and we have imperfect duplications. It is possible that this 'information transfer-teleportation' may not even be theoretically possible - that you'd have to actually transport the matter itself, or find a way to rapidly, fluidly, and with no disruption of process, replace the matter with simulation - and, even then, given that, in the course of our natural history, our same brain cells remain with us since birth, I'm not sure rapid replacing actually wouldn't result in brain-death for us.

I'm attempting, at the moment, to envision any way to move a direct, continuous process interaction from one substrate to another without introducing a discontinuity at some point. Aside from mobility of the entire system, which is exactly what we're trying to bypass, I'm not sure there's really a way.
 
I might agree if you said 'consciousness' - but the moment you add the qualifier 'my' (whether we're speaking from an ownership point of view, or an associative one), you change it from a general phenomenon to a specific instance of a phenomenon.

Well, that is the point of the assumption in the OP. If D2 completely describes what matters to my consciousness, and is different from D1 and D3, then we have a case of something like this:

D1 = The rules of addition of natural numbers.
D2 = The rules of addition of adding the natural number 2 and the natural number 3.
D3 = The rules of adding two specific apples with three specific apples.

Thus D2 is still general, although not as general as D1. Only D3 is specific (remember D3 is the information needed to completely describe my consciousness to an external observer).

I disagree. If we are reducing consciousness as information, then a specific instance of consciousness also has to include specific aspects of information that associate it to a particular place, time, universe, whatever. Further, some classes of information can be dynamic in terms of time and, to a limited degree, space, but still remain particular instances, distinguishable from other instances by at least one observer.

Yes but the assumption in the OP is that my consciousness doesn't care about all that specificity -- D3 -- it only cares about relative information that could affect its own self awareness -- D2.

Whether or not external observers can tell a difference between instances is irrelevant because the only observer you care about is yourself. And by the definition of the experiment it is impossible for you two tell a difference between instances.

Nick said,

Nick didn't say that, I did. You quoted wrong in your post awhile back.
 
I've said it before and I'll say it again, RD, you need to read more of the actual research. This you don't do. You stick Blackmore and Dennett away in a little box somewhere in your head labelled "weird" because you don't want to deal with the issues they raise. And they're actually 2 of the most forthright and outspoken materialists alive. Ramachandran you don't read. Baars you don't read.

For me, you just want to be able to wrap it all up as something you already understand in your own head. You resist the interventions of any annoying researchers or pundits who threaten this illusory state of awareness by sidelining them with a few haphazard categorisations. You then reinforce it all by summoning up the opinions of a few other deluded souls as back-up. This is what I see.

Yet you are consistently unable to quote me as saying anything in disagreement with the works you champion.

I have called you out on this before. Want to get into it again? Go ahead and quote me saying anything explicitly dualistic or even anything that explicitly disagrees with the work of Dennet or Blackmore.

I don't think you can. I think you will do what you always do and make unsupported generalizations about people.
 
Ugh... I never said it was non-physical. It would have to rely on some physical process for transfer (and everything else). If it sounded otherwise, my mistake.

There, does that make it clear that there is no discontinuity?
No. You take a process; you encode it, destroying the process in the process; you reinstantiate the process elsewhere.

That's a discontinuity.
 
I can only surmise that your experience of life is strikingly different from mine. Thinking to me is a discreet process, the sensation of there being strings of thoughts passing into and out of awareness.
That's not thinking. That's a false interpretation of the experience of thinking.

So, either your experience is radically different
Same experience; more understanding.

and it somehow appears to you that you are thinking the monitor into existence or something
Absolutely not.

or you are conflating data in order to make the issue more simple.
No.

Well, I'll find out when I get that far. Currently I'm with Ramachandran, who's quoted as stating that we are just about ready to start scratching the surface of this issue.
Depends on whether you want a neuroscientific understanding or an operational theory. We know a huge amount - but there is still a lot left to find out.

Because there is experience and the apparent phenomenom of subjectivity.
That's information.

Anyone can say that the brain is a data processor, that the mind is what the brain does. It's no problem. But to get from that down to neuronal modelling is a quite different thing. Your confidence here is not mirrored by any of the major names in consciousness research as far as I'm aware. I read Blackmore's excellent series of interviews with 20 or so of the usual suspects recently and I don't recall anyone having anywhere near the confidence you seem to regularly display in these threads, Pixy.
You're confusing the broad outlook with the fine details. We don't have all the fine details - though we do have some of them. But of the broad outlook, there is no question.

So, either you're the recipient of some near transcendental level of understanding not shared by Dennett, Ramachandran, Baars, Searle, the Churchlands, O'Regan, Crick, Chalmers, and the rest of the gang
Searle and Chalmers are idiots.

or you are misleading yourself as to your level of actual understanding. That's how I see it.
Well, you're wrong.
 
No. You take a process; you encode it, destroying the process in the process; you reinstantiate the process elsewhere.

That's a discontinuity.

That's also good old-fashioned nightmare fuel right there (of course, this whole subject is). I never really thought of it that way, but it does make sense now that you mention it.

I was about to suggest that this could be avoided by transferring your brain into another brain, carrying said brain to the destination, then downloading that into the brain of your new body, but there are just so many wasted steps in there. :p
 
Yeah. ;)

Now, just to explain a bit further, I'm not saying that the teleporter does in fact kill people. That depends on the definition of self. If your definition includes physical continuity of process, then it kills you. If your definition only requires continuity of internal state (internal information, D2 if I recall correctly), then it doesn't kill you.

We lean instinctively toward requiring physical continuity of process because, in the real world, anything that destroys that does indeed kill you. In a universe where teleporters were possible, we'd have to re-examine our definitions.
 
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