proto-consciousness field theory

[Robin]

To put is another way, suppose these were a race of aliens who don't experience pain, or run. They don't have "good" or "bad" sensations. They always move at the same speed.

They could observe someone running and immediately know what running is.

They could observe a brain in pain in any detail they liked but could never know what it is to be in pain.

 

[Robin]

I see no reason to suppose there is such a thing as a consciousness field, I am not even clear on what it is supposed to be.

However it is wrong to say that a "field" requires there to be something extra. A field is only descriptive of a pattern in matter/energy.

If I have a battery attached to a switch and a coil and I turn the switch on I have a field that wasn't there before, but nothing was added.

 

[JoeMorgue]

I see no reason to suppose there is such a thing as a consciousness field, I am not even clear on what it is supposed to be.

Soul. It's a soul. A soul. It's a souly soul soul souling along with it's old soul self.

That's what every "Normal functioning neurological bio-chemical process.... but then add on this" is. Every time.

 

[baron]

Baron, since you haven't addressed my posts 423 and 424, let me summarize with my post above:

Do you understand and agree with the running analogy, namely that legs are physical objects, but that they can also produce motion, for instance? And why is the brain and consciousness different?

Let me admit that it's a difficult question, but not in the sense you believe. You're outlining two completely different concepts and asking how they differ. Where do I start? If you believe consciousness exists, which you admit you do, then how can you compare it with running? Running doesn't go around wondering how it is self aware and pondering the mysteries of self-referential experience. Running doesn't exist.

Neurons and chemical interactions.

What does that even mean? How big is a chemical interaction and why do you believe nothing smaller is of relevance?

You've gone from saying you have no idea about the mechanism by which a consciousness field could work to invoking quantum woo.

What's woo about using the word 'quantum' as it's intended? You're making what you think are the right sounds without any understanding of what you're saying.

Another example; I describe the level at which I suggest consciousness could interact with the brain and you think I'm describing a mechanism. Since when does scale = mechanism?

False dichotomy, predicated on your own unique definition of "exist".

Now you're trying to redefine the English language to wriggle out of the hole you dug.

In this analogy, the consciousness field gives rise to consciousness, which is still contained within the brain. I thought your belief was that the field itself was conscious, and that that consciousness resided outside of the brain?

Your analogy was pool balls (or perhaps more accurately just balls). By definition it doesn't involve consciousness, otherwise it wouldn't be an analogy. You maintained that the motions of pool balls are fully described by Newton and there is no room for forces at any other scale to have an effect. I said this is incorrect because you could rig up a device that can literally chuck a pool ball through a window on the basis of a single quantum event. So your theory of interactions based on scale has been proved false.

 

[baron]

Soul. It's a soul. A soul. It's a souly soul soul souling along with it's old soul self.

Yes, because something dependent on a physical event and therefore, by definition, transient, is exactly the same as something that is immortal.

You carry on with your inventions and meta analysis, I'll deal with the actual debate.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Well this is just going to be the Reader's Digest Condensed Version of the Jabba thread.

 

[baron]

Ooh look, I've called something 'woo' - give me an internet point! I've said, "That's the same as a soul," so you must accept me into your skeptcial group! See here, I've compared one poster with another who has a poor reputation for critical thought, surely that's enough to rubber-stamp my skeptic's credentials! OK, I know nothing about the topic and have no desire to educate myself but I'm saying all the right stuff aren't I? Aren't I? Please validate me!!!!

 

[Dancing David]

I know. Because if you look at a red thing you'll have a conscious experience of red, there's no need to base p-zombieness on a failure to imagine.

Well as far as I know I am a p-zombie.

One of the behaviors of consciousness is 'the experience of consciousness' or 'conscious experience of red'.
So under the definition of a p-zombie as an entity which has all the behaviors of consciousness yet is not conscious, I can have a 'conscious experience of red' yet be a p-zombie.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Ooh look, I've called something 'woo' - give me an internet point! I've said, "That's the same as a soul," so you must accept me into your skeptcial group! See here, I've compared one poster with another who has a poor reputation for critical thought, surely that's enough to rubber-stamp my skeptic's credentials! OK, I know nothing about the topic and have no desire to educate myself but I'm saying all the right stuff aren't I? Aren't I? Please validate me!!!!

Adorable. Just adorable. I'll never stop wanting to pinch the cheeks of the "No True Skeptics" card.

Again until you either explain what unknown functioning of the brain you are invoking "X" to explain or define "X" in a way that actually gives us something to test for, it doesn't matter if you call it "Dancing the Charleston While Wearing a Kilt and Clogs." It's functionally a soul.

We've already been through 5 years, a dozen threads, two separate message boards, and thousands of posts of "The difference is that they aren't the same, the reason they aren't the same is there is a difference" stated a dozen different ways.

What question are we trying to answer here?

1. What part of the human condition cannot be explained via the normal operation of a functioning human neurosystem?

2. What X factor exists in the human condition that needs explaining?

And you can't use 1 to answer 2 and then 2 to answer one in an infinite loop.

 

[W.D.Clinger]

Where do I start? If you believe consciousness exists, which you admit you do, then how can you compare it with running? Running doesn't go around wondering how it is self aware and pondering the mysteries of self-referential experience.

The highlighted sentence is probably true (and I say "probably" only because running might have some degree of self-referential self-awareness of which my own limited consciousness, such as it may or may not be, is unaware—after all, a running field sounds just as plausible as a consciousness field), and would distinguish running from consciousness if consciousness were self-aware and running were not, but that would mean only that consciousness and running are not the same thing.

It would be illogical to think such a difference implies the existence of one of those things would imply non-existence of the other, but that appears to be the essence of baron's argument here. (For the sake of communication, I assume baron is making an argument, but I remain open to the idea that his argument does not exist any more than running exists.)

Running doesn't exist.

I still have a few medals and ribbons that were awarded for running. No one has ever given me a medal or ribbon for consciousness.

Thus I possess more tangible evidence for the existence of running than for the existence of consciousness.

That is a weak argument, of course. It is conceivable that someone else has earned a ribbon for consciousness but not for running.

I am confident, however, that the arguments advanced in this post have done little to degrade whatever field of consciousness might exist in the proximity of this thread.

In my experience, running often exists as an epiphenomenon associated with tracks and fields. Your weekly mileage may vary.

 

[baron]

The highlighted sentence is probably true (and I say "probably" only because running might have some degree of self-referential self-awareness of which my own limited consciousness, such as it may or may not be, is unaware—after all, a running field sounds just as plausible as a consciousness field), and would distinguish running from consciousness if consciousness were self-aware and running were not, but that would mean only that consciousness and running are not the same thing.

It would be illogical to think such a difference implies the existence of one of those things would imply non-existence of the other, but that appears to be the essence of baron's argument here. (For the sake of communication, I assume baron is making an argument, but I remain open to the idea that his argument does not exist any more than running exists.)

Actually your facetious suggestion is the correct one. I'm not making an argument. Some people suggest that running is the same thing, or operates on the same principles, as consciousness. I don't know what they're talking about. However, even if I were making an argument it wouldn't be anything close to what you described prior to the aforementioned suggestion, which is unrelated to anything I've said in this thread or indeed in my life.

I still have a few medals and ribbons that were awarded for running. No one has ever given me a medal or ribbon for consciousness.

I'm sorry to hear that.

Thus I possess more tangible evidence for the existence of running than for the existence of consciousness.

You have a strange definition of evidence. I could give you a medal for flying to Alpha Centauri on the back of a magic dragon but I don't suggest you adjust your worldview on that basis.

That is a weak argument, of course. It is conceivable that someone else has earned a ribbon for consciousness but not for running.

I am confident, however, that the arguments advanced in this post have done little to degrade whatever field of consciousness might exist in the proximity of this thread.

You got that right.

 

[baron]

Well as far as I know I am a p-zombie.

One of the behaviors of consciousness is 'the experience of consciousness' or 'conscious experience of red'.
So under the definition of a p-zombie as an entity which has all the behaviors of consciousness yet is not conscious, I can have a 'conscious experience of red' yet be a p-zombie.

Others might judge you on your behaviour but only you really know.

 

[W.D.Clinger]

I'm not making an argument.

Agreed.

 

[baron]

Agreed.

I'm glad you admit you were wrong. Not everybody is that honest.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Again I knew that this was gonna end with someone spreading all the parts of a grandfather clock out on the table and asking us to point to where "the ticking" is.

It's not there because it's not a thing, it's a process. This is not a difficult concept anywhere but the human mind because people want to think they are some special, distinct, unchanging "thing" that exists independent of... well themselves.

If you blow a candle out you don't have a crisis of faith over where the fire went. When you park your car you don't have an existential crisis over where "the driving" went.

"You" are not different. You are a process, a thing that is happening not a thing that exists.

A billion different versions of "Nuh-uh, it's different" where the difference is never explained won't change that.

 

[Dancing David]

Others might judge you on your behaviour but only you really know.

Know what, internal events are behaviors...

 

[Chanakya]

I was just saying that mirages aren't a good example, because viewing a mirage is effectively the same as viewing any other object or scene. I suspect you are thinking more of hallucinations or illusions? Mirages are as easily photographed and recorded as are normal landscapes.

No, I did mean illusion, as opposed to hallucination. Mirages, for instance.

But this exchange gives me an idea of your answer. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you're content not to have mirages/illusions filtered out by our definition. Because while they're not what they appear at first, nevertheless they're definitely something (as opposed to nothing), objectively speaking.

If I'm correct in so describing you position, then I agree, your definition holds.

 

[baron]

No, I did mean illusion, as opposed to hallucination. Mirages, for instance.

But this exchange gives me an idea of your answer. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you're content not to have mirages/illusions filtered out by our definition. Because while they're not what they appear at first, nevertheless they're definitely something (as opposed to nothing), objectively speaking.

If I'm correct in so describing you position, then I agree, your definition holds.

You could be correct, I'm not sure what you mean though, you'll need to explain a bit more.

 

[Chanakya]

This is part of the issue, as demonstrated by certain posters in this thread. ...

I'm afraid I tend to agree with the others on this, although, unlike some of them, I don't know enough about this to insist that my view must necessarily be right.

It seems clear that consciousness-as-process is an apt description. Might consciousness-as-field also be a correct description, another aspect as it were? My short question here was, even if consciousness-as-field were a thing, how do we know that, although we're using this word 'consciousness', we're actually speaking of the same thing as consciousness-as-process (as opposed to something entirely different)?

Hence my nitpick about mirages. Even if there is 'something' -- a big "if" -- how do we know that something is, indeed, consciousness-as-process?

 

[baron]

I'm afraid I tend to agree with the others on this, although, unlike some of them, I don't know enough about this to insist that my view must necessarily be right.

It seems clear that consciousness-as-process is an apt description. Might consciousness-as-field also be a correct description, another aspect as it were? My short question here was, even if consciousness-as-field were a thing, how do we know that, although we're using this word 'consciousness', we're actually speaking of the same thing as consciousness-as-process (as opposed to something entirely different)?

Hence my nitpick about mirages. Even if there is 'something' -- a big "if" -- how do we know that something is, indeed, consciousness-as-process?

But processes don't actually exist. If I roll a ball down a hill I can calculate all sorts of things regarding its energy, motion, modulus of elasticity, temperature, stresses and even its quantum state if I were clever enough, and this is all that's needed to describe the ball in terms of what we can empirically measure.

In addition I could say the ball is rolling. Note I say 'in addition', because 'rolling' tells us nothing beyond what we have already calculated. Rolling does not exist, it's just a linguistic construct to summarise a behaviour which makes communication between humans easier.

If you believe the hard problem of consciousness is a process then you don't believe in consciousness. It's that simple from my perspective. And if you don't believe in it that's fine, but I can't debate with someone who takes this stance because they are literally denying experience and I can't understand a word they say, and vice-versa.