proto-consciousness field theory

[Belz...]

The Hard Problem goes further than that. It asks, implicitly, If consciousness is an illusion, who is experiencing that illusion?

If someone is experiencing the illusion then it's not an illusion.

 

[RecoveringYuppy]

It seems to me that the first of those posts revealed considerable knowledge of the matters Myriad was discussing.

But he goes on for many paragraphs without linking anything to consciousness and then tacks on "We perceive it, in part, as consciousness" as the last sentence totally out of the blue. There's not a single clue in there as to why the AI process he describes leads to consciousness. That last sentence is just a total non-sequitur.

 

[baron]

If someone is experiencing the illusion then it's not an illusion.

?

 

[Belz...]

?

Well, we're talking about experience, right? So if consciousness, the experience itself, is an illusion, then no one would experience it, since the experience itself is consciousness. So by asking who is experiencing the illusion, the illusion, which is consicousness, ceases to be an illusion.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

My claims require fewer entities, not more. The claim that the brain creates consciousness involves two entities - brain and consciousness. I claim consciousness exists independently of brains. That's also two entities - brain and consciousnesses. Yet the claim that consciousness is unique to this set of animals over here and not present in this set over here requires another entity - the line. I don't believe that line exists. So my claims require fewer entities.

If emergent properties don't exist then "the line" certainly doesn't. And you're ignoring the fact that if you're positing the brain and consciousness as two independent things then a means for the two to interact also has to exist.

Earlier you gave the example of radio waves, but here you're denying that aerials are necessary for radios to work.

You also didn't answer my question - how does the reasoning you've presented lead to the idea of a consciousness field that interacts with data being processed?

So you're making a distinction between dreamless sleep and your experience in terms of internal conscious awareness. What is that distinction?

The perception of time having passed.

That's RBD. RBD and somnambulism are entirely separate phenomena.

Dreams don't only occur during REM sleep.

And you're side-stepping the point, which is that I've never seen it claimed that sleepwalkers experience nothing while they are sleepwalking. On the contrary, most sleepwalkers can remember at least some of their experiences, even if those experiences are often modified by their dreams.

No, they're an abstract noun, they don't actually exist.

Then what is the computer doing when it is running those calculations? What is it running?

Do computer programmes exist?

Calculations don't share any of the elements we attribute to consciousness.

Which attributes do you believe consciousness has which requires a higher standard for existence than calculations have? What about them requires this?

Or, I suppose, to put it another way - what about consciousness not "existing", as you're apparently choosing to define the word, means that that description of it cannot be accurate?

I don't accept that consciousness is an emergent property because that would mean it doesn't exist. I don't accept that consciousness is a direct product of the brain, and only of the brain, because that would require adoptions of unwarranted assumptions and additional entities to explain.

Neither of these actually answer my question. Rather than explaining what your hypothesis contributes to understanding you're explaining where you think other hypotheses fall down. This is akin to creationism attacking the theory of evolution rather than having any explanatory or predictive power of its own.

My theory also explains certain observations such as group behaviours, where individual creatures behave as one single large one.

Lots of small components behave as a single, larger system. Do they all imply conscious action? Does the fact that a number of water molecules together exhibit behaviours such as liquidity imply that those behaviours are the result of conscious action? Does the orbit of planets around the sun imply that the solar system is organised by conscious action?

 

[JoeMorgue]

And like I said (which apparently was a "get off my lawn" comment for.. reasons) this is where this conversation always goes and always dies.

Someone walks into the room and puts two identical widgets on the table. By every test, observation, or external criteria we can perform the two widgets behave and perform identically, but we're assured one of the two identical widgets has some special inherent specialness we have to account for. And thus the dance begins.

Bill: "Okay so what is special about the second widget that we have to factor in a new process or variable to account for?"
Ted: "Oh you see the special thing is what makes Widget 2 different from Widget 1."
Bill: "Okay. So what makes Widget 2 different from Widget 1?"
Ted: "Easy. The differences is the special quality that Widget 2 has that Widget 1 doesn't."
Bill: "So the difference is the thing that makes them not the same, and they aren't the same because there's a difference."
Ted: "Yep."
Bill: "Care to elaborate on that... like at all?"
Ted: "Nope!"

It's completely self contained and circular. "True philosophical conscious" is what human brains have that a p-zombie or a Turing Complete Artificial Intelligence or (insert any one of a billion other metaphors/thought experiments/philosophical concepts here) doesn't have but the thing that humans have that p-zombies/Turing Complete AI/etc don't have is "true philosophical consciousness." 20 GOTO 10.

Throughout this will be sprinkling meaningless distinctions without difference trying to linguistic bootstrap a difference that doesn't exist into itself. A computer can "feel" pain but it can never "experience" pain. Sure I could lay you down in a MRI machine and literally watch you have thoughts and emotions but that cold, scientific machine can never really show you real essence of the feeling. Science can explain sensory inputs but not... QUALIA *dramatic music sting.* Science understands hamburgers with cheese, but we need philosophy to understand real true cheeseburgers. And at no point will what separates a cheeseburger from a hamburger with cheese be offered outside of some new variation on "It's defined as the difference."

Bill: "So wait, are you saying science doesn't understand how the mind works?"
Ted: "Oh don't be silly Bill. That's a complete strawman. Nobody here is saying that science doesn't understand that brain. Nobody is saying that at all. Nobody here is some Wooster trying to shove a soul or some other woo into the brain. Nobody at all."
Bill: *Wait for for it.*
Bill: *Wait for for it.*
Ted: "But...."
Bill: *There it is.*

People are going to disassemble a grandfather clock down to its tiniest pieces, spread them all out on a table, and demand I show them where the "process of keeping time" is on the table. When I say I can't they'll go "OH so you're saying clocks don't keep time? That's madness!"

 

[jrhowell]

My claims require fewer entities, not more. The claim that the brain creates consciousness involves two entities - brain and consciousness. I claim consciousness exists independently of brains. That's also two entities - brain and consciousnesses. Yet the claim that consciousness is unique to this set of animals over here and not present in this set over here requires another entity - the line. I don't believe that line exists. So my claims require fewer entities.
...
It depends which claims you mean. I don't accept that consciousness is an emergent property because that would mean it doesn't exist. I don't accept that consciousness is a direct product of the brain, and only of the brain, because that would require adoptions of unwarranted assumptions and additional entities to explain. My theory also explains certain observations such as group behaviours, where individual creatures behave as one single large one.

I can apply the same logic to food.

Substances can be edible or inedible. Some may say that edibility is an emergent property based on the specific chemical composition of the substance in question. But that can't be true because emergent properties do not exist and clearly edibility is real since eating the wrong thing can kill you.

Perhaps instead the universe is imbued with an edibility field that various substances interact with. That is more a parsimonious explanation, eliminating all the complexity of chemistry, and so more likely to be true.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Dr. Foreman: Occam's razor. The simplest explanation is always the best.
Dr. House: And you think one is simpler than two?
Dr. Cameron: I'm pretty sure it is, yeah.
Dr. House: Baby shows up. Chase tells you that two people exchange fluids to create this being. I tell you that one stork dropped the little tyke off in a diaper. Are you going to go with the two or the one?
Dr. Foreman: I think your argument is specious.
Dr. House: I think your tie is ugly.

 

[baron]

If emergent properties don't exist then "the line" certainly doesn't.

It exists as an entity as far as Occam's razor goes, which is what I said.

And you're ignoring the fact that if you're positing the brain and consciousness as two independent things then a means for the two to interact also has to exist.

Earlier you gave the example of radio waves, but here you're denying that aerials are necessary for radios to work.

Where have I denied that? I have no idea how the conscious field and matter might interact, which is exactly the same understanding you have of how a brain might produce consciousness directly, i.e. zero.

You also didn't answer my question - how does the reasoning you've presented lead to the idea of a consciousness field that interacts with data being processed?

Because I see it as eminently more logical to postulate the existence of a field rather than saying "We don't know what consciousness is, but the brain creates it, but it doesn't really exist." I say it does exist and if it exists it must be something. If you don't believe consciousness exists then fine, I just don't understand how you can take that position.

The perception of time having passed.

I don't know what you mean. You seem to be be making unfounded and arbitrary guesses. How can you know that you have an experience of time having passed during dreamless sleep? What method do you use to detect dreamless sleep, and how do you separate it from the periods of REM sleep and half-wakefulness that everybody experiences during their sleep cycles?

Dreams don't only occur during REM sleep.

That's irrelevant. You said, "On the contrary, I've seen many stories where somnambulists were dreaming about doing one thing while physically doing something relevant to that (such as punching in their sleep because they believe themselves to be fighting an ogre)."

I pointed out that the bracketed portion is not somnambulism, it is RBD. You are confusing elements of sleeping experience just as you are confusing elements of conscious experience.

And you're side-stepping the point, which is that I've never seen it claimed that sleepwalkers experience nothing while they are sleepwalking. On the contrary, most sleepwalkers can remember at least some of their experiences, even if those experiences are often modified by their dreams.

And what do you conclude from that?

Then what is the computer doing when it is running those calculations?

It's doing a great many things. What's your point?

Which attributes do you believe consciousness has which requires a higher standard for existence than calculations have?

Self awareness. Why can't you understand that abstract nouns are simply convenient ways of referencing a set of more complex elements which, at some point, have their grounding in the physical? I could announce that the act of eating a biscuit whilst wiggling my thumbs and humming Auld Lang Syne is a scuitwigsyne. That doesn't mean that humanity now shares the planet with a new entity known as a scuitwigsyne, it simply means I've decided to use that word to describe those elements.

Neither of these actually answer my question. Rather than explaining what your hypothesis contributes to understanding you're explaining where you think other hypotheses fall down. This is akin to creationism attacking the theory of evolution rather than having any explanatory or predictive power of its own.

Emergent properties don't exist. Consciousness does. Therefore consciousness is not an emergent property. I don't know how I can phrase it more clearly.

Lots of small components behave as a single, larger system. Do they all imply conscious action? Does the fact that a number of water molecules together exhibit behaviours such as liquidity imply that those behaviours are the result of conscious action? Does the orbit of planets around the sun imply that the solar system is organised by conscious action?

No, why would they?

 

[Chanakya]

...who is experiencing that illusion? ... Who, or what, is doing the observing? ...

That was a surprise, you doing a Nisargadatta there! :--)

That answer is easy enough, though. Our 'self' is an illusion too (strictly in the sense that I'd said that consciousness itself is illusory). Which is kind of tautological, given how the two ideas are merely different ways of looking at the same (non-) thing.

Of course, I think of this not as some article of faith, but as a not unlikely speculation, that may one day be 'proved' with greater certitude.

And, speaking of speculation, I've read your ideas here with interest, but I do wonder how you've found your way to making that part of your belief system / worldview (as you've said more than once).

I don't think it's necessarily irrational to hold subjective beliefs like this, provided you're clear that it's no more than that (which too you've said more than once), but I'm curious why you think this is more than simply speculation.

 

[baron]

That was a surprise, you doing a Nisargadatta there! :--)

I've not heard of him but a Google shows he was a Hindu mystic and I have read some summaries and commentaries on relevant Hindu and Buddhist texts.

That answer is easy enough, though. Our 'self' is an illusion too (strictly in the sense that I'd said that consciousness itself is illusory). Which is kind of tautological, given how the two ideas are merely different ways of looking at the same (non-) thing.

OK, but just as you find it impossible to imagine consciousness as a thing I find it impossible to think of the conscious 'self'*, and conscious experience, as an illusion. I am not only more certain that it exists than I am of anything else, I can't understand how somebody could deny it, as they are literally denying the evidence of their own senses.

*Note I'm not referring to the 'self' as a consistent personality here, that's a whole different topic - I don't believe in the self.

Of course, I think of this not as some article of faith, but as a not unlikely speculation, that may one day be 'proved' with greater certitude.

And, speaking of speculation, I've read your ideas here with interest, but I do wonder how you've found your way to making that part of your belief system / worldview (as you've said more than once).

I don't think it's necessarily irrational to hold subjective beliefs like this, provided you're clear that it's no more than that (which too you've said more than once), but I'm curious why you think this is more than simply speculation.

Consciousness, as defined by the Hard Problem, is entirely subjective. I have no evidence for it and neither does anybody else. So we have two options. Disbelieve in consciousness, as you do, or believe in it and try to explain it. I'm forced to choose the latter and have consistently said my theory is only speculation. Just like all other theories, whether originated by scientists, philosophers or some random person on a forum.

 

[Dancing David]

"I would say my toaster is conscious then"
-PixyMisa

 

[Belz...]

"I would say my toaster is conscious then"
-PixyMisa

I miss that guy/gal. He/she didn't tolerate much nonsense on this issue. In fact, most of the consciousness heavy hitters seem gone.

Leaving said nonsense in, unfortunately.

 

[Chanakya]

Google shows he was a Hindu mystic

whose modus operandi for approaching enlightenment was a relentless questioning/exploration of the 'Who am I?' question.

I can't understand how somebody could deny it, as they are literally denying the evidence of their own senses.

So who is it that finds it impossible to understand this? Take a few days off, hike to the top of some nearby hill, change into a loincloth, and contemplate that question. Like Nisargadatta, that impossibility may become easier to comprehend. :--)

I'm not referring to the 'self' as a consistent personality here, that's a whole different topic - I don't believe in the self.

We may be in agreement after all. Junk the loincloth, I guess.

have consistently said my theory is only speculation

Oh, OK then. I was thrown by your repeated use of "I believe", etc, as opposed to "I imagine", etc. No doubt just a figure of speech, then.

 

[baron]

whose modus operandi for approaching enlightenment was a relentless questioning/exploration of the 'Who am I?' question.

That's a good idea, and one that people have entertained for thousands of years. Nothing is going to come to people who don't question their own experience, let alone those who dismiss it outright.

So who is it that finds it impossible to understand this?

Me.

Take a few days off, hike to the top of some nearby hill, change into a loincloth, and contemplate that question. Like Nisargadatta, that impossibility may become easier to comprehend. :--)

We may be in agreement after all. Junk the loincloth, I guess.

I always wear a loincloth whilst posting on ISF.

Oh, OK then. I was thrown by your repeated use of "I believe", etc, as opposed to "I imagine", etc. No doubt just a figure of speech, then.

'I believe' is grammatically more accurate. 'I imagine' is indicative of conclusions based on a cursory examination of the topic, and whether you agree with me or not I can tell you my research has been anything but.

 

[kellyb]

Oh. I'll take your word for it, for now. I was under the impression that both these have been kind of proven, but perhaps I was mistaken. (Haven't read the two articles you've linked, yet, but I will, when I have a bit of time. And it might be good for me to generally read a bit more on this, and, perhaps, after that, start a fresh thread on this?)

Some people claim it's (that consciousness is merely an illusion) been proven, but it just boils down to a handful of people asserting vehemently that it's been proven, AFAIK. The only evidence backing the claim of proof that consciousness is an illusion I can find is the evidence (which is undeniable) that consciousness is deceptive and strange, and that what we're overtly thinking is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to all the data our brains are processing. I just personally don't think that even puts a dent into the fact of the existence of sentience, tho.

If you want to start a spinoff thread, that's cool! I love consciousness discussions.

 

[Chanakya]

I believe' is grammatically more accurate.

Not necessarily literally "I believe", the "etc" part. E.g., right here, where you say you are unable to even imagine how someone may hold the other POV. That seemed stronger on the belief continuum than just speculation.

'I imagine' is indicative of conclusions based on a cursory examination of the topic

Not necessarily, not if you use that phrase colloquially. But let me not nitpick. I take your point, figure of speech, 'believe' as in 'speculation that appears likely'.

, and whether you agree with me or not I can tell you my research has been anything but.

I do not know enough to definitively either agree or disagree. But yeah, consciousness fields, I agree they seem unlikely to me.

 

[Chanakya]

Tbh, the nature of this 'field' of yours isn't clear to me. Is it, like, intrinsic to the universe? Or do we conscious creatures somehow generate it, and then, once it is in place, interact with it?

 

[Darat]

Here you're talking about qualia absent the presence of stimulus, but an absence of stimulus is not required for qualia to exist. If you feel pain then you have qualia, regardless of whether or not you can induce pain simply by thinking about it.

But the without stimulus is the point used to argue that feeling pain, seeing red is different to the "experience" of red. But I'm someone who does not have such qualia absent a clear environmental stimulus. I only see or experience red when my eyes are open and there is a red apple in front of me. There is simply no need for qualia to explain how I am conscious. Even if qualia do exist I would say folk like me demonstrate that they are not required to explain consciousness unless you want to claim I'm a p-zombie.

 

[baron]

Tbh, the nature of this 'field' of yours isn't clear to me. Is it, like, intrinsic to the universe? Or do we conscious creatures somehow generate it, and then, once it is in place, interact with it?

It's fundamental and ubiquitous.

I can maybe explain my thinking in this way:

* Imagine the conscious field as a flat, 2d sheet (of course it's not 2d, but for ease of imagining).

* A complex entity (say an ant) appears on this sheet. The ant processes information in its little ant brain.

* A distortion appears at the point of information processing in the conscious field, and this is the ant's (minuscule) consciousness.

* Add a million more ants. Each ant produces the same distortion in the field representing its own conscious experience.

* But now there is communication between ants, and this communication also produces distortion of the field, but an overarching distortion - group consciousness - overlaid on the individual consciousnesses of the ants.

* When the magnitude of this distortion exceeds that of the individual, the individual behaves under the group influence as opposed to its own.

This is what I believe anyhow, and I have done since long before I heard of IIT (which I first read about three or four years ago).