Listen, you CAN know sometimes that if you eat yoghurt, you have a stomach ache. Right? Or, that if you go to forests, you feel happy. You cannot know that from a single occasion of eating, or going to the forests, but you have enough experience with yourself to rule other factors after several "expiriments".
Agreed so far?
No. No matter how many times the second event follows the first you cannot
strictly logically conclude that the implication is valid. Within real life you can reasonably assume that the implication holds, in fact you can hold that assumption strongly enough that the alternative never really crosses your mind, but that does not prove anything about the logical status of the implication.
So, the indian can 'run' a control group on himself - not meditating, meditating on different things, eating mushrooms - so he can know what exactly causes the meditation.
The only thing we have to assume is that he is not lying.
Thanks for the explanation.
A "control" group would have to consist of many people from many different backgrounds at many different stages of life with different neurochemical balances and, preferably, with different assumptions about the nature of reality going into the experiment. It would then need some verifiable and repeatable method of inducing a meditative state and of measuring an individual's happiness. All of these things could (in principal) be done in reality, but none of this affects the
strictly logical status of the implication in question.
Additionally, even if every single one of the people, after having meditation reliably induced, attained a measurably high level of happiness in a reasonable and pre-defined length of time thereafter, you could only
scientifically conclude that meditation in that specific manner probably induces happiness.
Even if meditation induces happiness that says nothing about whether or not "atman is brahmin" - just because that was the reason to try meditating doesn't mean it is even supported by the hypothetical result.
I agree that you can't deduce cause from effect, just because it follows. But, what you need to do, is run a few "tests". For example
I eat yoghurt and my stomach hurts.
Did it hurt before?
Is there anything else I ate?
Ok, lets try again on another day. Does it happen again?
Now lets try it in another room. Does it happen again.
THEN you can conclude it without a fallacy. Otherwise you are saying that it is impossible to understand cause-effect relationship.
Were you sitting down every time you ate yoghurt? If so, sit down to read a book - does your stomach hurt again?
Were you always eating the same flavour of yoghurt?
Were you always eating the same brand of yoghurt?
Were you always eating yoghurt on an empty stomach?
Were you always in the same emotional state when eating yoghurt?
Were you always eating yoghurt at the same time of day?
Were you always eating yoghurt at the same altitude above sea level?
Were you always eating yoghurt in the same manner (i.e. slowly, one spoonful at a time or were you freezing it and swallowing it in a single chunk)?
Were you always standing up in the same way after eating the yoghurt?
Are you an idiot (i.e. did you punch yourself in the stomach soon after each time you ate yoghurt)?
How long was the yoghurt sitting in the fridge before you ate it?
Was the yoghurt sitting in the fridge before you ate it?
Eat an apple - does your stomach hurt?
Drink some milk - does your stomach hurt?
Eat some chicken - does your stomach hurt?
Filter the yoghurt for 3-inch long iron screws - did you find any?
Try yoghurt packaged in a different substance - does your stomach hurt again?
Get a friend to randomly line up 100 containers, 50 of which contain yoghurt and 50 of which contain an inert substance which is indistinguishable from yoghurt through sight, sound, touch, taste or smell - can you reliably tell which ones are yoghurt based on whether or not your stomach hurts?
After all that, I would say you can scientifically conclude that yoghurt makes your stomach hurt with very high likelihood. However, that does not prove anything about the logical status of the implication.