Proof of Immortality, VII

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No, I am not confused; and, no, you have not refuted my argument. You have only misunderstood it, which, of course, could by my fault for not communicating it properly. Let me try again.

Jabba observes that he exists, and he believes that his observation that he exists is evidence for the hypothesis he is immortal, H_im, over the hypothesis that he is mortal, H_m. Now, let's assume that H_m is true. What is the probability that Jabba would observe that he exists under H_m? It's 1. Why? Consider the alternative: what is P(Jabba_observes_that_he_doesn't_exist | H_m)? it's 0. Therefore, P(Jabba_observes_that_he_exists| H_m) = 1. And this is true of H_im, as well. Therefore, P(E|H_m) = P(E|H_im) = 1.

The trick Jabba has unconsciously played is misstating E as "Jabba exists," when in fact E is "Jabba observes that Jabba exists." But Jabba could never observe his own nonexistence; therefore, Jabba's observation that he exists is the only outcome that Jabba could ever observe, which is why I've been saying that, for all intents and purposes, Jabba is conditioning his observation on his own existence. To put it another way, Jabba's sample space is E.


Yes, you are confused about this. Let me paraphrase:

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Caveman observes that he exists, and he believes that his observation that he exists is evidence for the hypothesis that the wire wasn't live, ~L, over the hypothesis that it was live, L. Now, let's assume that L is true. What is the probability that Caveman would observe that he exists under L? It's 1. Why? Consider the alternative: what is P(Caveman_observes_that_he_doesn't_exist | L)? It's 0. Therefor, P(Caveman_observes_that_he_exists | L) = 1. and this is true of ~L, as well. Therefor, P(E|L) = P(E|~L) = 1.
And yet I clearly can conclude that the wire likely wasn't live based on my own existence.


No. If you are using your existence after touching the wire as evidence for whether the wire was live or not, then the probability of you existing after touching the wire if it is live had better be less than 1. Otherwise, the mere fact of your existence cannot discrinate between wheter the wire was live or not.

Or for another one:

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Caveman observes that he exists, and he believes that his observation that he exists is evidence for the hypothesis that the universe supports life, S, over the hypothesis that it doesn't support life, ~S. Now, let's assume that S is true. What is the probability that Caveman would observe that he exists under S? It's 1. Why? Consider the alternative: what is P(Caveman_observes_that_he_doesn't_exist | S)? It's 0. Therefor, P(Caveman_observes_that_he_exists | S) = 1. and this is true of ~S, as well. Therefor, P(E|S) = P(E|~S) = 1.


Now you make the same mistake even more blatantly. If the universe could not support life the probability of you observing you exist would be 0, not 1. Therefore P(E|S) / P(E|~S) = Infty.

This is by now the, what, third refutation of your claim or something.


You keep using the word "refutation." I don't think it means what you think it means.
 
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*The gang are discussing the fact that on the show Friends Phoebe was only pregnant for less than 4 months by the show's timeline while Rachel was pregnant for over a year.*

Michael: Everybody knows if a women just holds the baby in and doesn't give birth eventually it's absorbed back into her body. Like when you hold in a poop for too long.
*Dan, Soren, and Katie get really, really confused looks. There's a long silent pause as they look at each other.*
Soren: *Slowly* Michael... where do you think your poop goes? I mean when you don't poop?
Michael: Mine? Usually in an alleyway behind my apartment.
Dan: No when you don't poop. When you "adsorb it back into your body?"
Michael: Where does my poop go when I don't poop? You're not even making sense.
 
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- I'm saying that if time consists of 14 billion years, and I live to be 100, the likelihood of now corresponding with the time of my existence is 1/140,000,000 -- and that likelihood pretty much assures that OOFLam is wrong.

If a lottery issues 140,000,000 tickets, the probability of you having bought the ticket that you actually bought is 1/140,000,000. This result, however, does not disprove the possibility that a lottery exists, any more than your trivial observation disproves materialism.

Dave
 
- No.
- I'm saying that if time consists of 14 billion years, and I live to be 100, the likelihood of now corresponding with the time of my existence is 1/140,000,000 -

How is that "now" defined? I don't mean how long or precise it is, but how was that particular "now" decided upon?

- and that likelihood pretty much assures that OOFLam is wrong.

False.

Hans
 
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You keep using the word "refutation." I don't think it means what you think it means.

:rolleyes: I have applied your argument to valid premises and derived a contradiction, that constitutes a refutation of the validity of your argument. No wonder you keep giving invalid arguments if you don't even understand how refutations of them work.

Jabba you are free to ignore any of these claims that P(E) must be 1. They are unable to defend that claim, unsurprisingly since it's just the latest in the unending litany of bad math.
 
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Isn't it amazing that in five years we've not only not moved forward, but actually moved backwards to explaining basic concepts and words?

That's Jabba's style -- not unique to him, but certainly part of the fringe-argument repertoire. When you get clobbered at one scope of the debate, change the scope. Jabba knows his argument fails at the outline level. He commits several egregious fallacies that he knows he cannot avoid or explain. When a fringe argument gets into this kind of trouble, it often descends down into absurdly reductionist detail until it reaches a scope where discussions can ensue endlessly over starting principles and elementary concepts that are often so abstract as to be susceptible (it would seem) to endless second-guessing. Keep in mind that the goal of a fringe argument is most often just to keep the discussion going and maintain the illusion of relevance.

We've switched from an infinite number of "potential selves" to an infinite number of "potential nows." Materialism has no concept of "potential selves," but "potential nows" isn't a concept that even makes sense. You don't even have to delve into philosophy on this one. "Now" means a certain thing (which Jabba's desperately trying to change), and the thing it means has nothing to do with the uniformly distributed random variable Jabba's treating it as in his latest model. While Jabba can argue that materialism ought to include something like a soul, here he's assuming that things like "now" and the period of his lifetime are represented by mathematical constructs that patently do not model the behavior. He knows he needs the Big Denominator, and he's been casting about for years for a pseudo-mathematical post-justification for it. His latest claim is simply, straightforwardly wrong from the get-go. Which is leading him to say such absurd things such as science having to stay behind the velvet rope while he ruminates solipsistically over his existence.

The other statisticians Jabba consulted accused him of having to reinvent probability theory in order to get his proof to work. He's at it again.
 
Jabba you are free to ignore any of these claims that P(E) must be 1. They are unable to defend that claim, unsurprisingly since it's just the latest in the unending litany of bad math.

Speaking of ignoring, it seems that you've ignored the defenses of that claim, which is how you can now pretend like they don't exist.

It's not that it _must_ be one. It's that it IS one.
 
We've switched from an infinite number of "potential selves" to an infinite number of "potential nows." Materialism has no concept of "potential selves," but "potential nows" isn't a concept that even makes sense. You don't even have to delve into philosophy on this one. "Now" means a certain thing (which Jabba's desperately trying to change), and the thing it means has nothing to do with the uniformly distributed random variable Jabba's treating it as in his latest model. While Jabba can argue that materialism ought to include something like a soul, here he's assuming that things like "now" and the period of his lifetime are represented by mathematical constructs that patently do not model the behavior. He knows he needs the Big Denominator, and he's been casting about for years for a pseudo-mathematical post-justification for it. His latest claim is simply, straightforwardly wrong from the get-go. Which is leading him to say such absurd things such as science having to stay behind the velvet rope while he ruminates solipsistically over his existence.

Yeah, pay no attention to the befuddled old man behind the curtain.
 
Oh, another teacher!

You know what, let's draw Venn diagrams. Venn diagrams always work. Well, nothing is ever going to work with you of course, but they tend to work in general so perhaps for other readers.

All we'll be needing here is the definition of a probability space, so open your textbooks on page 1, or open a tab on your browser here.

1. The universe

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Behold, the universe! As you might have guessed, the term universe here doesn't mean the physical universe, it means the set of all possibilities we choose to consider. You can think of each pixel in that ellipse as representing a possibility. We'll call the universe U.

For example, suppose we are going to toss a coin, then we might consider the possibilities of it either landing heads or tails and some possibilities would include:

- "coin tumbles on the table, hits a glass on the middle of the table and ends up landing tails."

- "coin flips over a couple of times and ends up landing tails on the edge of the table."

- "coin tumbling about on the table with tails up, but then right before it stops someone bumps into the table, the coin flies off, bounces against the wall, and eventually comes to rest on the floor landing heads instead."

... and so on and so forth.

Note that we didn't consider for example "putting the coin back in your pocket without ever tossing it in the first place" but that's totally fine, the universe is freely chosen. Also note that even though, for simplicity and intuition, we're using a coin toss here as an example, the universe can be entirely abstract without any relation to the real world.

Some small notational asides:

- Statements in quotes (like above) define subsets of the universe by being considered as predicates: "Q" = {x in U | Q(x) }.

- In some textbooks (as on the wiki) the term sample space is used instead of universe, as it is usually used in the subfield of statistics. However we're doing the general case here so we'll stick with universe.

- Usually the term here is outcomes rather than possibilities, but we'll switch to that later since the term outcome might lead to a misunderstanding at this stage.

2. Events.

The term events here, as you might expect, doesn't mean physical events. Events are subsets of the universe, ie sets of possibilities.

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Suppose we are considering the possibility that a coin may or may not have a soul. Every possibility that we have earlier now gets split into two possibilities, for every "x" above we now have "x and coins have a soul" and "x and coins do not have a soul". Think of it as the U we had earlier now having become ~S and getting mirrored as S, and the new U being the combination of both of these.

So in this case S is "coins have a soul" and ~S is "coins do not have a soul". For example in S we would have:

- "coin tumbles on the table, hits a glass on the middle of the table and ends up landing tails, and coins have souls"

- and so on...

and in ~S we would have:

- "coin tumbles on the table, hits a glass on the middle of the table and ends up landing tails, and coins do not have souls"

- and so on...

Now we can start using the proper term outcomes instead of possibilities. Remember here that the two examples above would be indistinguishable to us yet they are distinct outcomes. Outcomes here means possibilities we choose to consider, it doesn't necessarily mean singular indistinguishable outcomes in an observational sense.

3. Probability

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Let's first define two more events, H and ~H. H is "the coin landed heads" and ~H is "the coin did not land heads" (ie landed tails). As you might have noticed by now, the notation ~ denotes set complement. Basically for any event X, there is an event ~X which consists of all the outcomes in U but not in X. Or differently, they can be defined by negating the predicate, ie "coin landed heads" vs "coin did not land heads" or "coins have souls" vs "coins do not have a soul". Defining one implicitly defines the other.

Now, for probability. A probability function is a function from events to real numbers between 0 and 1. The probability of the universe is by definition 1: P(U) = 1. In the Venn diagrams the relative area denotes relative probabilities, so P(S) = P(~S) = 0.5 and so on.

Note particularly that the domain of P is a set of events, called a sigma-algebra but ignore that for now. Hypotheses do not have probabilities, data do not have probabilities, models do not have probabilities, only events have probabilities.

However, as per point 2 above we do have a way to "translate" hypotheses or data into events. Consider the hypothesis "coins have a soul" which translates into the event S = {x in U | "coins have a soul"}. The same goes for data such as "the coin landed heads" which translates into the event H = {x in U | "the coin landed heads"}. With this you can see why there's no real distinction between hypotheses and data, because what has probabilities isn't hypotheses/data but sets of outcomes defined by asserting the hypothesis/data as a predicate on the universe.

4. Conditional Probability

Strictly speaking a conditional probability isn't a probability at all, it's a bit of notation abuse. You might wonder, why would mathematicians abuse notation for this? Well, one answer is that the problem goes away in more general measure spaces, but there still should be a really good reason for notation abuse in probability spaces. The reason is that everything that came before is all nice and well, but what we really want to do here is inference, we want to be able to use all this so that we can learn from information we receive.

This is probably going to be best understood in terms of exclusion of possibilities, so here goes:

Suppose we tossed the coin and it landed heads. Remember that H is "the coin landed heads" and ~H is "the coin did not land heads", and given that we now consider "the coin landed heads" to be true we also consider "the coin did not land heads" to be false.

So we take our eraser and start going through U and erasing every possibility that is now not a possibility anymore, after all if we now consider "the coin did not land heads" to be false then for example the following possibility: "coin tumbles on the table, hits a glass on the middle of the table and ends up landing tails" isn't a possibility anymore. After we've done that we end up with this new U:

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We used to consider P(S) = P(~S) = 0.5, but now we'd like to know P(S') and P(~S'). That's the basis of inference, asserting a certain predicate to be true over the universe (or equivalently, excluding/erasing the possibilities for which the predicate is false) and finding the new P(X') for all X we were choosing to consider. Note that the basis for our assertion of said predicate doesn't have to be observation of data, if for example we had access to an oracle and it says "coins have souls" then we'd have erased ~S and ended up with S as the new U.

This is what conditional probabilities are for. That activity of erasing all possibilities that are not in an event is called conditioning on an event. For the case above we would have:

P(S') = P(S|H)
P(~S') = P(~S|H)

and so on. Here you can see the notation abuse, remember that only events have probabilities, yet S|H or ~S|H aren't events. However since this is such a core feature of the entire thing that just gets passed over, but it's important to understand nevertheless. And this is where Bayes' theorem comes in, since it gives us an expression for those conditional probabilities:

P(S') = P(S|H) = P(S) * P(H|S) / P(H)

and so on. In our case above I've put P(H|S) < P(H|~S), basically the assumption that having a soul makes a coin more likely to land tails, and as such when we assert "the coin landed heads" and pick up our eraser that leads us to finally conclude P(~S') > P(S'). We've inferred that coins likely don't have souls by observing one landing heads.

5. Conclusion

Bayesian inference is simple. If you think of having a bunch of possibilities, then start to consider some predicate about them as true, and taking your eraser and erasing all possibilities which have now become impossible and going "This is my new universe now!" with whatever is left, then you understand the gist of it.

What to take home from this:

- The universe is freely chosen. (which by itself debunks that P(E) = 1 stuff)

- The universe does not need to be outcomes of an experiment, that's just one application but the theory is much more general and abstract. For example the universe could be some function space.

- Inference consists of asserting a predicate to be true over the universe, getting a new universe from that and updating all the probabilities of events you're choosing to consider. The basis for considering the predicate to be true does not need to be observational data, again that's just one application but the theory is much more general and abstract. For example the assertion could be a theorem we've proven in said function space.

- Don't let mish-mashed and confused expositions lead you to think that this is difficult or something, the core ideas here are perfectly simple.
 
Utter hogwash. Any statistical inference must properly model the underlying system in order to produce useful results. And the underlying systems we observe in nature do not invariably line up as discrete, uniform probability distributions the way your thinking seems limited to.

In terms of Bayes (as opposed to frequentist thinking), we may certainly incorporate the effects of informal knowledge. But insofar as that knowledge is not based at least in significant part on observation and empirical analysis, it is not useful for inference. It certainly couldn't be used to prove anything. For example, in constructing a Bayesian search plan, we may consult with the local sheriff's deputies for their opinions about how hard it would be to overlook a missing child in some given part of the search area. Such information would be strictly informal as science reckons rigor, and would be subjective in the way Bayesians use the term. But it would still ostensibly be based on relatively unbiased real-world expertise of those deputies and their familiarity with the land. Those are still factors informed by facts, not flights of fancy.

There is absolutely nothing in Bayesian reasoning that says you get to ignore science when the science rightly applies.



The proper formulation of the math and the givens is dictated by the behavior of the system being modeled, which in turn is dictated by the natural laws that pertain to it. But since you don't understand how probability density can vary, you just want to pretend it doesn't exist or doesn't apply. As I said before, you're trying to make the problem fit your understanding rather than expand your understanding to properly accommodate the problem.

The science is part of the givens.

- You're right (in our current case) -- but that is the extent to which science is involved. If a scientific claim is not part of the givens, it has nothing to do with "likelihood" of the Bayesian variety.
- In this case, all the science we're given is that time exists for 14 billion years, and we're asking for the likelihood that now would be within a particular century (100 years).

- "Likelihood" is only part of the Bayesian formula -- science does get involved, but except for the givens, only in the "prior probabilities."

No, that doesn't address anything I said. Probability density affects all parts of the Bayesian model. Can you describe probability density in your own words?
- That would be difficult.
- I don't know the right words, but the density function re the likelihood of now being between 1942 and 2042 is uniform -- it does not vary. If it did, that would be at least implied in the givens.
- Unfortunately, I can see how human population through time could be implied in my givens, and I wasn't able to make sure that it wasn't...

- Fortunately, the question I was trying to stipulate (that doesn't involve the human population factor) does apply to the overall issue, and the answer is, in fact, 1/140,000,000. Forget any human population implication in the word "now," and the resulting likelihood of now being between 1942 and 2042 does apply to the posterior probability of OOFLam -- given my current existence,
 
- That would be difficult.
- I don't know the right words, but the density function re the likelihood of now being between 1942 and 2042 is uniform -- it does not vary. If it did, that would be at least implied in the givens.
- Unfortunately, I can see how human population through time could be implied in my givens, and I wasn't able to make sure that it wasn't...

- Fortunately, the question I was trying to stipulate (that doesn't involve the human population factor) does apply to the overall issue, and the answer is, in fact, 1/140,000,000. Forget any human population implication in the word "now," and the resulting likelihood of now being between 1942 and 2042 does apply to the posterior probability of OOFLam -- given my current existence,

How can we forget any human population implication when you are a human?
 
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