True.False.
True.False. The old body is the old body. The new body is the new body. Whether anyone knows which one is which or not.
I don't care which side you're on. We're not responsible for his floundering and pathetic repetition.Don't worry. I'm not on Jabba's side.
I'm not on your side either.
If that 'you' of now has a history that extends into yesterday, then that 'you' of now is that 'you' of yesterday. Whether 'you' were that 'you' yesterday or not. Because you're that 'you' now.
Both have two premises (in the sense of conditions on the probability space).
H:
- we have a body
- we do not have a soul
~H:
- we have a body
- we have a soul
So then on the second one we *also* need to figure out how likely it is he'd have the same soul (or as he calls it, [INSERT RANDOM WORD]) which isn't going to be 100% according to Jabba. Therefore the odds of #1 under H will always be better than under ~H.
We've been round and round this so many times. Jabba can't grasp that a copy is a second thing. The first thing is the first thing and the copy is never actually the first thing. That is the definition of copy. If you copy a banana or a VW, there is still the first banana and the first VW. Yet, when the copy is of a person, Jabba thinks the first person has some magical property that the first banana and the first VW don't have, even though the scenario is the same.
Saying that the copy of a person isn't youuuuu is the same as saying the copy of a banana isn't the fiiiiirst banana.
I don't care which side you're on. We're not responsible for his floundering and pathetic repetition.
And he still can't figure out how he's misrepresenting materialism.
If that 'you' of now has a history that extends into yesterday, then that 'you' of now is that 'you' of yesterday. Whether 'you' were that 'you' yesterday or not. Because you're that 'you' now.
That is totally dependent upon the definition of 'you'.
The body changes constantly... so that 'you' changes constantly
The neurological structure changes constantly ... so that 'you' changes constantly
The psychological substrate of alertness and awareness changes constantly ... so that 'you' changes constantly
What 'you' would you say is persistent?
We've been round and round this so many times. Jabba can't grasp that a copy is a second thing. The first thing is the first thing and the copy is never actually the first thing. That is the definition of copy. If you copy a banana or a VW, there is still the first banana and the first VW. Yet, when the copy is of a person, Jabba thinks the first person has some magical property that the first banana and the first VW don't have, even though the scenario is the same.
Saying that the copy of a person isn't youuuuu is the same as saying the copy of a banana isn't the fiiiiirst banana.
That's because they hypothetical we are discussing is copying the body and brain. Jabba insists that humans are MORE than just the body and brain, that they are receiving a "soul transmission".
Yeah he still hasn't figured out, or is ignoring, that under H that isn't true.
I think in some weird way he is trying to show that H is impossible.
If you presuppose soul transmission/reception as part of what makes a human, then you presuppose materialism is false.
Rather than E being an observation or dispassionate data, such as "Jabba exists and has a sense of self," he wants E to incorporate his theories for how that sense of self arises, such that materialism would have to explain those theories too, not just the observation.
I know I'm late in replying to this, but honestly we all know it doesn't matter because this whole thread is just a "no exit" style looping torture machine.
May or may not have a body, and there's no such thing as a soul. So we have two possibilities based on Jabba's terrible formula:
1. This specific body exists.
2. This specific body doesn't exist.
Souls don't factor into it because under materialism they don't exist. They have no bearing on the possibilities. If you really want we could put (and we don't have a soul) after both of those or something but obviously that's pointless.
Again, we're talking about the specific combination of things that Jabba thinks makes him. So for this one it's:
1. This specific body exists and this specific soul exists and they're linked.
2. This specific body exists and this specific soul exists but they aren't linked.
3. This specific body doesn't exist, but this specific soul does.
4. This specific body does exist, but this specific soul doesn't.
For either of these Jabba would be looking at the likelihood of option #1, and for either of those we need to figure out how likely the existence of this specific body is (setting aside the fact that we're talking about someone we already know to exist and so obviously the answer is 100%). This is going to be the same regardless of the existence of a soul.
So then on the second one we *also* need to figure out how likely it is he'd have the same soul (or as he calls it, [INSERT RANDOM WORD]) which isn't going to be 100% according to Jabba. Therefore the odds of #1 under H will always be better than under ~H.
that substituting "have only a torso" and "have torso and legs" for "have only a body" and "have a body and a soul" in your claims doesn't instantly make you look like a lunatic.
I think in some weird way he is trying to show that H is impossible. If you presuppose soul transmission/reception as part of what makes a human, then you presuppose materialism is false.
Sentience is persistent.