Proof of Immortality, VI

[Jabba]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

 

[RoboTimbo]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy.

A process isn't alive to be brought back to life. Do you mean "soul"?

The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.

What would the difference be? Why do you continue to not answer that question?

- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

Do you disagree with what everyone has told you in every post?

 

[Dave Rogers]

He's supposed to be asking them [...]

There's your problem, right there. I think the only question he knows how to ask is "Do you understand my position well enough to agree with it yet?"

Dave

 

[theprestige]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

Agree that this is what you're talking about and trying to prove?

Or agree that you're correct?

This signature is intended to irradiate people.

 

[jsfisher]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

- Yes, they still disagree.
- No, sense of self is still not a thing.
- Both the original and the copy would still have exactly the same sense of "me".
- No, life is not a thing so it still is not something that can be brought back.

 

[Pixel42]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

These questions have been answered dozens of times, and you have ignored every single answer. What is the point of anyone answering them again?

 

[abaddon]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness --

That is your claim, sure. Nobody has denied that it is your claim.

I would not be brought back to life by the copy.

Correct.

The new self would not be me.

Correct.

That would be a big difference between the two.

Fail. The copy is thus not a copy.

- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.

No. You are claiming the even more unlikely scenario that both yourself exists and has an accompanying soul making it more unlikely.

- Do you still disagree?

Sure.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

WHAT IS THAT DIFFERENCE!?

STOP JUST SAYING "THERE'S A DIFFERENCE" OVER AND OVER.

 

[The Sparrow]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness

Yes, we heard you the first 100 times you said this.

-- I would not be brought back to life by the copy.

Why do you keep saying this. Is the original Jabba dead? 'back to life' implies you were dead.

The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.

I know what you are getting at. Because there would be a discontinuity of your awareness moving to the second copy you think that means your soul would not be in the second copy.
The second copy though would have a continuity of awareness back to the original Jabba. So by your thinking, the copy would now be the real Jabba and the original would be somehow lacking???

- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

Yes


Read the short story 'Fat Farm' by Orsen Scott Card. It has this EXACT scenario happen.

 

[The Sparrow]

Think of it this way Jabba.
Every time you fall asleep, the continuity of your experience of awareness (self) is broken for a time.
When you wake up, you use your memories combined with your awareness to gain your bearings and realize you are you.
If you were copied during the night, what would be different for the copy when it wakes up in the morning?

 

[jond]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

The duplicate self would think it's you. How would anyone tell the difference?

 

[Belz...]

- So, I'm claiming that

Stop. Telling. Us. What. You. Are. Claiming!

my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.

What do you mean "that would be a difference"? What would be a difference? You had the opportunity to tell us right there, and you didn't. You agree that the copy would be identical, so what's different?

It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.

We know.

- Do you still disagree?

Nothing's changed about your claim. Why would we suddenly agree to it?

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- As often happens, it took me a while to understand (or think that I understand) at what you are getting...
- But first, it isn't an issue of "possible" -- I don't think that any of this is possible.
- I think that the issue has to do with the way I described the "self" a long time ago. I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.

The highlighted text obviously refers to a possible nature of the experience of self, not to the experience of self. At the time you seemed to understand that there's nothing about the experience that suggests that duplicating it would result in one thing looking out of two sets of eyes. Your idea of the physical brain as the receiver of consciousness is a model of the nature of the self, a model of what underlies that experience. It's obviously not the model in H.

So you understood this at one point in the discussion. I don't understand why you're backtracking now.

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about). By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life. By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...
- What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness." I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.

 

[JoeMorgue]

STOP TELLING US WHAT YOU ARE CLAIMING AND TELL US WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WOULD BE!

 

[jond]

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about). By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life. By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...
- What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness." I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.

- The duplicate would think it is you. How, specifically, would you differentiate between that and you being brought back to life?

 

[Mojo]

These questions have been answered dozens of times, and you have ignored every single answer. What is the point of anyone answering them again?

When the only tool you have is a hammer...

 

[Hokulele]

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about). By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life. By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...
- What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness." I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.

Then you clearly aren't talking about H.

 

[Jabba]

- The duplicate would think it is you. How, specifically, would you differentiate between that and you being brought back to life?

jond,
- We couldn't.

 

[Hokulele]

jond,
- We couldn't.

Yep, definitely not talking about H.

So what do you think you are accomplishing by comparing two hypotheses that you have made up?

 

[JayUtah]

That would be a big difference between the two.

It would not be, under materialism. Therefore you can't use it in P(E|H).

It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.

The argument you've used to estimate the probability under H is wrong. It's wrong because, by your own admission and continued practice, it continues to incorporate your notion of a soul.

Do you still disagree?

Why shouldn't they continue to disagree? All you've done to answer them is restate your mistreatment of H.