Proof of Immortality, VI

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I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.

I think you are agreeing that it was a silly thing to say. An honest and well-educated claimant would agree.
 
- Here, I'm saying that the same consciousness (inherently involving a particular self) would be received by two different receptors (cameras) in different places. So actually, we would be duplicating the physical receiver of the self. The self would then be analogous to the moving pictures received by the two cameras and played by the computer.

Are you still arguing for H or not? You don't seem to be able to focus on a single argument.
 
Dave and others,
- Moving right along -- hopefully, the rest of my premises:

11. To formally re-evaluate OOFLam, we can use the following formula from Bayesian statistics: P(H|E)=P(E|H)*P(H)/(P(E|H)*P(H)+P(E|~H)*P(~H)).
12. There are 3 variables in that formula -- we've already discussed P(E|H), the likelihood of the event occurring, given H (OOFLam).
13. Another variable is the prior probability of H (and ~H).
14. There is a reasonable probability of at least 1% for ~H -- and therefore, no more than 99% for H.
15. The remaining variable is P(E|~H), the likelihood of the event occurring, given ~H. For now, I'll suggest 99%.
16. Inserting the numbers, we get that the posterior probability of H, after adding E to the evidence is: P(H|E)=10-100*.99/(10-100*.99+.99*.01). And rounding off, we get P(H|E)=0/.099, or zero.
17. So, by adding this new info to the evidence for H and rounding off, we get that the probability of H being true is zero.

- That ought to give us some more disagreements to discuss.

How would this look if H was the hypothesis that you have an immortal "self"?
Mojo,
- Good question. I need a nap. I'll be back.
 
Dave,
- As often happens, it took me a while to understand (or think that I understand) at what you are getting...
- But first, it isn't an issue of "possible" -- I don't think that any of this is possible.
- I think that the issue has to do with the way I described the "self" a long time ago. I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.
- Here, I'm saying that the same consciousness (inherently involving a particular self) would be received by two different receptors (cameras) in different places. So actually, we would be duplicating the physical receiver of the self. The self would then be analogous to the moving pictures received by the two cameras and played by the computer.

- Above I had said, "In this analogy, my 'self' is the receiver of the info being gathered by the camera." Here, I'm saying that my self is the motion picture being played by my computer...
- This is confusing stuff (at least for me) -- but so far, I suspect that both versions are correct, but simply represent different perspectives. For now, I'll stick with the latter analogy.

wait...what happened to duplicating the observer?

Now you are in brain is a radio mode?

How is this effectively tackling 1 point at a time?
 
Dave,
- As often happens, it took me a while to understand (or think that I understand) at what you are getting...
- But first, it isn't an issue of "possible" -- I don't think that any of this is possible.
- I think that the issue has to do with the way I described the "self" a long time ago. I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.
- Here, I'm saying that the same consciousness (inherently involving a particular self) would be received by two different receptors (cameras) in different places. So actually, we would be duplicating the physical receiver of the self. The self would then be analogous to the moving pictures received by the two cameras and played by the computer.

- Above I had said, "In this analogy, my 'self' is the receiver of the info being gathered by the camera." Here, I'm saying that my self is the motion picture being played by my computer...
- This is confusing stuff (at least for me) -- but so far, I suspect that both versions are correct, but simply represent different perspectives. For now, I'll stick with the latter analogy.

Not under H.
 
Dave,
- As often happens, it took me a while to understand (or think that I understand) at what you are getting...
- But first, it isn't an issue of "possible" -- I don't think that any of this is possible.
- I think that the issue has to do with the way I described the "self" a long time ago. I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.
- Here, I'm saying that the same consciousness (inherently involving a particular self) would be received by two different receptors (cameras) in different places. So actually, we would be duplicating the physical receiver of the self. The self would then be analogous to the moving pictures received by the two cameras and played by the computer.

- Above I had said, "In this analogy, my 'self' is the receiver of the info being gathered by the camera." Here, I'm saying that my self is the motion picture being played by my computer...
- This is confusing stuff (at least for me) -- but so far, I suspect that both versions are correct, but simply represent different perspectives. For now, I'll stick with the latter analogy.

So that's a model of the the self. But it's not the model of the self that is accepted by the scientific community or materialists. My confusion is because we had a discussion about whether we all had the same experience of a self. Most of us agreed that we experience something like this:

I experience an awareness, a sense of being an observer of what is happening inside and outside of me. Some of these things I remember, some I attach importance to.

Nothing about that experience suggests that duplicating The Sparrow's body would result in one The Sparrow looking out of two sets of eyes.

But you seem to be implying that it does.

I'm asking why.
 
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But first, it isn't an issue of "possible" -- I don't think that any of this is possible.

It is, and has always been, a hypothetical. If memory serves, it was your hypothetical: What would happen to the "self" if we could hypothetically make a perfect copy of the body? You intended this to be problematic for materialism, since it would be a problem for your theory. But it isn't a problem for materialism because materialism doesn't involve incarnation; the self arises from the organism. Duplicate the organism and the duplicate will be self-aware just as the original is or was. Be all that as it may, of course it's impossible. It's a thought experiment. The problem today is that you're trying to manipulate the thought experiment to once again inject the concept of a soul into E, the data, by inventing -- once again -- a new expression that refers to the supposedly ineffable part of E you keep begging.

I think that the issue has to do with the way I described the "self" a long time ago. I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.

Yes, that was an analogy you used before, but it's not the analogy you're using now.

Here, let me help you: Under materialism, self-awareness is an emergent property of the process of neurological cognition that occurs in a functioning human brain. You are working on the part of your proof that estimates P(E|H). Your concept of a soul is not part of E, no matter what weasel-words you invoke to try to get it in there. E simply means we are self-aware, without trying to explain how or why. We have a sense of self. In this part of your proof, you may not invoke concepts here that are not part of H, because this part of your proof assumes arguendo that H has happened or is true. None of the ideas you're trying to express via computer-and-camera or radio-and-signal analogies has the slightest to do with H. They are all straw men. Quibbling over whether the straw man is wearing a fedora or a porkpie hat is not productive. Please stop this and move on.

Here, I'm saying that the same consciousness (inherently involving a particular self)...

No such individualization exists under H. You are self-aware. I am self-aware. Those are not two "particular self-awarenesses." Please disabuse yourself of this chronically broken idea. It has no meaning in materialism, or really any meaning in the known universe. There aren't two "going 60 mph" because the very concept is meaningless.

This is confusing stuff (at least for me)

It really isn't confusing for anyone else. Just because you're confused doesn't mean anyone else has to be. If you find this topic to be too intellectually challenging to understand how you're wrong, then please just admit -- after five years of ongoing failure -- that you aren't competent to debate at this level, concede the debate, and give your critics their due. They have been patient with your Befuddled Old Man character for far longer than you are entitled to.

And by now we all know it's just an act. You're not "confused." You're simply failing in your attempt to foist a straw man onto your critics, and you're trying to place blame for that elsewhere. Your critics, both here and elsewhere, are simply not as dumb as you seem to think they are. They can easily see right through your fairly ham-fisted efforts to hustle important premises to your proof in through the back door by constantly shifting language and disguising your real intent. You avoid the word "soul" only because it too blatantly begs the question; you apparently need more subtle question-begging that might actually stand a chance of fooling someone, hence the "confusing" romp through the thesaurus.

Under materialism, self-awareness is very simple: it is an emergent property of a functioning brain and nervous system. As with any property, it comes and goes exactly as the entity of which it's a property comes and goes; it's meaningless to consider that it would have a separate existence. As with any other property, it isn't particularized, individualized, enumerable, or discrete. It's a property. All your "confusion" arises when you try to depart from that simplicity and tack on a bunch of nonsense you're making up as you go.

...but so far, I suspect that both versions are correct, but simply represent different perspectives. For now, I'll stick with the latter analogy.

Neither version represents H, materialism. They are deeply wrong, if your intent is to accurately represent the thinking that opposes your belief. You seem entirely disinterested in whether or not you're right about this, and it's a very key element to your proof. What is the rational way, under your "Effective Debate," to respond to a claimant who has no interest in fact or truth?
 
It's the return of the befuddled old man routine.

Indeed, I've never figured out how "Sorry, I guess I just don't understand my own argument" translates to "I think a well-educated but neutral audience would understand what I mean." That's either a paradox or an admission of insufficiency.

"I'm confused," however, equates nicely to, "Since I don't seem to understand what's going on in this argument, I can't be held accountable for any rebuttals that I also wouldn't understand." That makes a lot more sense in the context of a debate where one party claims the privilege of ignoring whomever he wants.
 
Indeed, I've never figured out how "Sorry, I guess I just don't understand my own argument" translates to "I think a well-educated but neutral audience would understand what I mean." That's either a paradox or an admission of insufficiency.

"I'm confused," however, equates nicely to, "Since I don't seem to understand what's going on in this argument, I can't be held accountable for any rebuttals that I also wouldn't understand." That makes a lot more sense in the context of a debate where one party claims the privilege of ignoring whomever he wants.

^What he said^
 
- What I'm trying to do now is lay out all the different disagreements so that we can address them one at a time.

____1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17________________________|||____________________

- This is the first set of limbs/highways on my tree/map. There are further branches/roads off the first set of limbs/highways.

[IMGw=500]https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/1b/1b/13/1b1b13935fb9c11fc354d6b4938b7662.jpg[/IMGw]
 
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Dave,
- As often happens, it took me a while to understand (or think that I understand) at what you are getting...
- But first, it isn't an issue of "possible" -- I don't think that any of this is possible.
- I think that the issue has to do with the way I described the "self" a long time ago. I said that maybe the physical brain was just the receiver of the consciousness -- that it didn't actually produce the consciousness.
- Here, I'm saying that the same consciousness (inherently involving a particular self) would be received by two different receptors (cameras) in different places. So actually, we would be duplicating the physical receiver of the self. The self would then be analogous to the moving pictures received by the two cameras and played by the computer.
- Above I had said, "In this analogy, my 'self' is the receiver of the info being gathered by the camera." Here, I'm saying that my self is the motion picture being played by my computer...
- This is confusing stuff (at least for me) -- but so far, I suspect that both versions are correct, but simply represent different perspectives. For now, I'll stick with the latter analogy.
So that's a model of the the self. But it's not the model of the self that is accepted by the scientific community or materialists. My confusion is because we had a discussion about whether we all had the same experience of a self. Most of us agreed that we experience something like this:
...
I experience an awareness, a sense of being an observer of what is happening inside and outside of me. Some of these things I remember, some I attach importance to...
Nothing about that experience suggests that duplicating The Sparrow's body would result in one The Sparrow looking out of two sets of eyes.

But you seem to be implying that it does.

I'm asking why.
- I was trying to make sure that we were talking about the same thing/process as we discussed the "self." First, I said that it's the thing/process that reincarnationists think comes back to life. I'm pretty sure that we all know what that experience is -- we just disagree with each other about its nature.

- From http://www.dictionary.com/browse/self:
Philosophy.
the ego; that which knows, remembers, desires, suffers, etc., as contrasted with that known, remembered, etc.

the uniting principle, as a soul, underlying all subjective experience.
- (Note that the dictionary version doesn't just say "soul" -- it says, "as a soul.")

- Anyway, I then suggested that if we were able to duplicate the brain --
and the self along with it, while the first brain was still living -- the self would be looking out two sets of eyes. I was still trying to make sure that we were all talking about the same experience.
- My conclusion is that the self to which most of us are referring would be occupying -- received by -- two different brains, and be looking out two sets of eyes.
- If we actually duplicated the same self, it would be looking out two sets of eyes -- and, probably be confused.
- This probably won't really clear things up, but it might get us started -- and, we probably don't need to go there anyway...

- After all that, I suspect that the real confusion here is thinking that the "model" and the "experience" refer to the same concept. They are not the same.
- The model is more than the experience -- the model refers to the nature of the experience. And, you're right -- it isn't the model of the self that is accepted by the scientific community or materialists. But H refers to the experience and claims a model. ~H claims that the model claimed by H -- about the self experience -- is wrong.

- I'd better leave it at that -- for now, at least.
 
- I was trying to make sure that we were talking about the same thing/process as we discussed the "self." First, I said that it's the thing/process that reincarnationists think comes back to life. I'm pretty sure that we all know what that experience is -- we just disagree with each other about its nature.

- From http://www.dictionary.com/browse/self:
Philosophy.
the ego; that which knows, remembers, desires, suffers, etc., as contrasted with that known, remembered, etc.

the uniting principle, as a soul, underlying all subjective experience.
- (Note that the dictionary version doesn't just say "soul" -- it says, "as a soul.")

- Anyway, I then suggested that if we were able to duplicate the brain --
and the self along with it, while the first brain was still living -- the self would be looking out two sets of eyes. I was still trying to make sure that we were all talking about the same experience.
- My conclusion is that the self to which most of us are referring would be occupying -- received by -- two different brains, and be looking out two sets of eyes.

My question is: how did you reach that conclusion?
 
- I was trying to make sure that we were talking about the same thing/process...

Stop doing this, Jabba. Don't keep trying to equivocate your soul into E by constantly smudging the language.

First, I said that it's the thing/process that reincarnationists think comes back to life. I'm pretty sure that we all know what that experience is -- we just disagree with each other about its nature.

More equivocation. We all experience self-awareness, both atheists and reincarnationists. Materialism doesn't care one smidgen what reincarnationists believe causes their self-awareness. Don't try to equate one with the other in any way.

I was still trying to make sure that we were all talking about the same experience.

After countless repetitions of the same claim to the same audience, I guarantee your audience is familiar with your claim. The problem is not that your critics do not know what you're claiming. The problem is that your claim is wrong. Not wrong in the sense that your critics believe in materialism while you believe you have a soul. That would be claim best tried according to the evidence. Your claim is wrong in the sense that it flagrantly misrepresents materialism. That is simply an observable fact. There is no point debating whether or not you are getting materialism right; you simply aren't. And you admit it below.

My conclusion is that the self to which most of us are referring would be occupying -- received by -- two different brains, and be looking out two sets of eyes.

Your conclusion is dead wrong, as far as materialism is concerned. Please stop foisting it.

This probably won't really clear things up, but it might get us started...

We already started and finished this part of your proof dozens of times. Please don't just try to start it up again. There is nothing in materialism or the observation of self-awareness that is answered or modeled by "looking out through two sets of eyes." It's meaningless twaddle.

After all that, I suspect that the real confusion here is thinking that the "model" and the "experience" refer to the same concept. They are not the same.

The confusion here is that which you're trying to cause by injecting your notion of a soul into E, as data, where it would then have to be answered by materialism. Once you stop building the same straw man over and over again, you'll see why you're wrong.

The model is more than the experience -- the model refers to the nature of the experience.

Just another word for "soul." Straw man.

And, you're right -- it isn't the model of the self that is accepted by the scientific community or materialists.

Hence it can have no bearing upon P(E|H). If you now agree that what you're postulating is not H, then you have effectively conceded that you are not properly formulating P(E|H). Your proof fails forthwith, without opportunity for rehabilitation.

You're done.

But H refers to the experience and claims a model. ~H claims that the model claimed by H -- about the self experience -- is wrong.

Jabba, in this post I outlined a number of individually fatal flaws in your argument. One of them was your inability to understand the parts of a statistical inference and what role each played in the epistemology of the inference. Your statement above is evidence of that ongoing misunderstanding.

E is the experience of being self-aware. Under H, that would be explained as an emergent property, the result of the process of cognition that occurs in a functioning brain. You haven't given us any sort of codifed ~H, but we can be reasonably sure that, under your theory, that experience would be explained as the operation of a soul that is incarnated in an otherwise self-unaware organism. ~H being "materialism is wrong" doesn't affect your promised proof for immortality or an immortal soul. Please learn how to properly formulate a statistical inference.

I'd better leave it at that -- for now, at least.

You're leaving it in the same place you have every day for the past five years. You simply restated your argument and ignored everything that was said to you.

Pathetic.

No, you had better not leave it at that. You had better show that you're really interested in whether your proof has merit, instead of -- as your critics suspect -- merely a totem for your deconstruct-the-skeptics fantasy. Begin by addressing the individually fatal flaws I have graciously outlined in your proof. If you are able to do that, then we can see whether it's worth it, finally after five years, to begin your debate. Except that you've effectively condceded that you're wrong. You just haven't figured out how yet, or brought yourself to believe it.
 
- And, you're right -- it isn't the model of the self that is accepted by the scientific community or materialists. But H refers to the experience and claims a model. ~H claims that the model claimed by H -- about the self experience -- is wrong.

- I'd better leave it at that -- for now, at least.

- Congratulations, you've finally admitted that your model (H) is NOT the scientific model, and as such your whole Bayesian wrangling does nothing but argue against your own straw man.

- And, now that you've established that, you should also acknowledge that the scientific model is far more likely than your H. As you know by now, the scientific model only requires a functioning brain to generate the experience of self awareness. Whereas your model requires the same functioning brain, plus a separate entity, plus a means by which those two can interact.

- After five years, it's time to accept defeat, don't you agree?
 
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