Proof of Immortality III

[caveman1917]

It's one of the classic formulations of reincarnation meant to explain the growth of the human race. Today there are billions of humans alive, whereas thousands of years ago there were much fewer humans. The hypothesis is that after death, the soul that inhabited a single body is fractured into a number of child souls that inhabit the number of new bodies that account for the human population growth rates. A corollary theory says that the subdivided souls are in some respect less vigorous than the originals, leading to the maxim that our forebears are less diluted in whatever qualities the reincarnate souls are said to possess. Not that this helps make sense, but it alludes to a concept that others have considered.

I got that part, I just don't know how it fits in with his claim that his soul has existed before his body. Unless he claims that before he had his body that his soul wasn't so much his soul but some sort of shared "group soul", but then that would run into even more contradictions.

Anyway, this reminds me of an argument made regarding immortality in context of the many-worlds interpretation. I can't remember by who though. It was an argument against the notion of "quantum suicide" in that context and used a similar reasoning about a fixed measure of consciousness which gets subdivided among "descendants" - but then "descendants" in the sense of "copies" after a split between worlds.

 

[Jabba]

Why, if you think you have no possibility of existing, do you think it is possible for your body to exist. If you are mortal, your self and your body are the same thing.

jond,
- If I'm mortal, I (very most likely) would not currently exist. In other words, since I do currently exist, I am very likely not mortal...

 

[jond]

Dave,
- To say it more precisely, "If OOFLam is true, there is virtually no likelihood that I would currently exist." And then, if OOFLam is not true, the likelihood that I would currently exist is about .62.

Only because you keep insisting that under OOFLam, your "self" exists as a separate entity. The problem that you refuse to acknowledge is that the scientific perspective is that the "self" does NOT exist as a separate item, but is rather a process, an emergent property of your functioning neurosystem.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- To say it more precisely, "If OOFLam is true, there is virtually no likelihood that I would currently exist." And then, if OOFLam is not true, the likelihood that I would currently exist is about .62.

Still nonsense.

 

[Jabba]

I don't really have a problem with made-up priors. Priors are just an expression of personal belief. There's no hard reason that any two people should agree on them; after all, we each bring different background information to any particular problem.

Furthermore, with a little algebra, we can write Bayes Theorem in terms of the odds of H, like this:

P(H|E) / P(~H|E) = [ P(E|H) / P(E|~H) ] × [ P(H) / P(~H) ] .

This shows that the posterior odds of H can be factored into the likelihood ratio and the prior odds, each factor contributing independently to the posterior odds. Since the data only affects the posterior odds through the likelihood ratio, even people who hold radically different subjective prior odds of a hypothesis should be able to agree on how much their odds should change given new data E. In this sense, Bayesian inference still "works" in the face of disagreements about the priors. But it requires H and ~H to make unambiguous predictions about the data. Thus, lack of consensus on the priors is tolerable, even expected. But lack of consensus on the likelihoods, which implies that the models (hypotheses) have not been adequately specified, is fatal.

jt,
- I don't understand that. Please try again.

 

[caveman1917]

jt,
- I don't understand that. Please try again.

It means that we don't agree that P(E | H) < P(E | ~H) and that this is fatal for your argument.

 

[Jabba]

- Time for my nap.

 

[Monza]

jond,
- If I'm mortal, I (very most likely) would not currently exist. In other words, since I do currently exist, I am very likely not mortal...

This is entirely devoid of logic. If a mortal thing can exist (even if the probability is very low) then it can only contemplate its own existence during the time it exists. This is the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.

 

[Jabba]

It means that we don't agree that P(E | H) < P(E | ~H) and that this is fatal for your argument.

caveman,
- I'll look for myself, but you can speed things up if you point me to your reasoning for why P(E | H) < P(E | ~H) is not true.

 

[Jabba]

jond,
- If I'm mortal, I (very most likely) would not currently exist. In other words, since I do currently exist, I am very likely not mortal...

This is entirely devoid of logic. If a mortal thing can exist (even if the probability is very low) then it can only contemplate its own existence during the time it exists. This is the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.

Monza,
-True -- but, what is the probability that now would be some relatively short time period after 1942 on the Gregorian calendar?

 

[theprestige]

Monza,
-True -- but, what is the probability that now would be some relatively short time period after 1942 on the Gregorian calendar?

"Relatively short" is you being the Texas sharpshooter again.

 

[godless dave]

Monza,
-True -- but, what is the probability that now would be some relatively short time period after 1942 on the Gregorian calendar?

Exactly 1. The probability that now would be now is 1.

 

[JayUtah]

I'll look for myself, but you can speed things up if you point me to your reasoning for why P(E | H) < P(E | ~H) is not true.

Shifting the burden of proof. It is your stubborn contention -- without any evidence whatsoever -- that P(E|H) is, in your words, as close to zero as it can possibly get. It is your further contention -- again without any evidence -- that P(E|~H) is necessarily as high as you think you can get away with. The algebraic effect of this arbitrary dictum is to reject H for all values of H.

Caveman1917 is rejecting your claim made without evidence. To do so, he does not have to offer a competing rationale. You are the one begging the question. He is inviting you to correct that.

 

[JayUtah]

I don't understand that. Please try again.

Quit stalling. It has been discussed ad nauseam. Don't ask for more discussion. Just treat what's already there.

 

[JayUtah]

Unless he claims that before he had his body that his soul wasn't so much his soul but some sort of shared "group soul", but then that would run into even more contradictions.

In the formulation to which I refer, which may or may not be what Jabba intends, that's indeed the characterization of the corporate soul. Your soul and mine may have once previously inhabited a single other body as a combined entity that has now been split. And yes, that would give rise to contradictions.

 

[The Sparrow]

What are the odds that the banana I just peeled was just peeled by me?
They are so unimaginingly small that we should conclude by bayes thingamajingy that in fact the banana was not peeled by me.

I mean, think about it, a universe 44 billion light years across, and how many billions of bananas in history! The odds that this one banana exists here now to be peeled is so low, therefore..........ummmmm..........bananas have souls!

Jabbas bayes thingy proves bananas don't exist.

 

[Jabba]

I don't really have a problem with made-up priors. Priors are just an expression of personal belief. There's no hard reason that any two people should agree on them; after all, we each bring different background information to any particular problem.

Furthermore, with a little algebra, we can write Bayes Theorem in terms of the odds of H, like this:

P(H|E) / P(~H|E) = [ P(E|H) / P(E|~H) ] × [ P(H) / P(~H) ] .

This shows that the posterior odds of H can be factored into the likelihood ratio and the prior odds, each factor contributing independently to the posterior odds. Since the data only affects the posterior odds through the likelihood ratio, even people who hold radically different subjective prior odds of a hypothesis should be able to agree on how much their odds should change given new data E. In this sense, Bayesian inference still "works" in the face of disagreements about the priors. But it requires H and ~H to make unambiguous predictions about the data. Thus, lack of consensus on the priors is tolerable, even expected. But lack of consensus on the likelihoods, which implies that the models (hypotheses) have not been adequately specified, is fatal.

jt,
- I don't understand that. Please try again.

It means that we don't agree that P(E | H) < P(E | ~H) and that this is fatal for your argument.

caveman,
- I'll look for myself, but you can speed things up if you point me to your reasoning for why P(E | H) < P(E | ~H) is not true.

caveman,
- Does the following give your reasoning?

To be honest, I'm not really following the specific debate on your claims all that closely, I'm just here for the probability stuff. But since you asked, I took a look through the past couple of pages, and here's my 2 cents:

Mojo's quest for finding fallacies is counter-productive. When playing that game, at some point you just see what you want to see. The one that I can see to be well-supported is that you are assigning a lower probability to a compound hypothesis including a simple hypothesis to which you, on its own, assign a higher probability (ie body vs body + soul). The other ones seem to be pushing it a little, increasingly so as increasingly more are "discovered".

I find that Texas Sharpshooter/special case/HARKing argument unconvincing. One can certainly make deductions based on one's own existence, even probabilistic, and even after the fact.

For example, suppose I have an electrical wire in front of me. If I touch it and the wire is live then I die, if it isn't live then I survive. I touch it, and I survive. I conclude that the wire wasn't live. Perfectly fine deduction. Making it probabilistic doesn't change this. Suppose that if it's live that I have a 99% chance of dying and 1% chance of surviving and vice versa for it not being live. I conclude that the wire likely wasn't live. Also a perfectly fine deduction. Even coming up with this after the fact doesn't change this. Suppose I remember now that, indeed, 10 years ago I touched such a wire and survived, then I can still reach the same conclusion, based on my current existence, regarding that wire from 10 years ago.

I think that the problem rather is that your conditional likelihoods are in fact equal, contrary to what you claim. Yes, the odds of you existing under the - as you call it - scientific explanation are pretty damn small. Out of the insanely large number of potential people which could have been created under the scientific explanation, it's a very small chance that you would have been among the actual people who got created. But then, the same argument applies for the immortal soul. Out of the insane number of potential immortal souls which could have been created, it's a very small chance (the same small chance) that you would have been among the actual immortal souls which got created.

Hence, I think the error is simply your claim that P(E | H) =/= P(E | ~H) whereas they are, in fact, equal. Given that the relative likelihood is 1, all you're getting out of this exercise is your own prior beliefs getting reflected back at you. As I've said much earlier here:



You can believe in immortality as much as you want, it is not a priori better or worse than to believe in mortality. But you're not doing what you seem to think you're doing, ie providing an argument as to why people should adopt your belief in immortality - and you sure ain't proving it mathematically.

Then on the other hand, people who self-identify as skeptics in this thread have a tendency to claim that science supports their case for mortality, forgetting that just because evidence is consistent with one hypothesis doesn't mean it is necessarily any less consistent with another. If I really had 5$ every time someone made that error I'd be rich now.

All in all, this thread is a huge exercise in futility, but the tangents on probability theory every once in a while are interesting though.

 

[JayUtah]

caveman,
- Does the following give your reasoning?

Asked and answered. He does not have the burden of proof. Quit stalling. Quit trying to orchestrate side debates among your critics.

You claim a specific value comparison between P(E|H) and P(E|~H). You and only you have the burden to prove the relationship you claim.

 

[Jabba]

Asked and answered. He does not have the burden of proof. Quit stalling. Quit trying to orchestrate side debates among your critics.

You claim a specific value comparison between P(E|H) and P(E|~H). You and only you have the burden to prove the relationship you claim.

Jay,
- I've explained my reasoning before.
- I'll try again.
- Here's my reasoning for P(E|~H):

1.1. Re P(E|~H):
1.1.1. The probability (“likelihood”) of E given ~H, involves several specific hypothetical possibilities.
1.1.1.1. That only some of us have but one finite life.
1.1.1.2. That we each have numerous finite lives.
1.1.1.3. That only some of us have numerous finite lives.
1.1.1.4. That we each have an infinity of finite lives.
1.1.1.5. That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives.
1.1.1.6. That we each have an infinite life.
1.1.1.7. That only some of us have an infinite life.
1.1.1.8. That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained).
1.1.1.9. Some other explanation.

1.1.2. Now I must estimate (roughly) the prior probability (rounded off to three decimal places) of each more specific possibility (hypothesis), given ~H.
1.1.2.1. That only some of us have but one finite life: .000
1.1.2.2. That we each have numerous finite lives: .200.
1.1.2.3. That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .000.
1.1.2.4. That we each have an infinity of finite lives; .200
1.1.2.5. That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: 000.
1.1.2.6. That we each have an infinite life: .200.
1.1.2.7. That only some of us have an infinite life: .000
1.1.2.8. That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .200
1.1.2.9. Some other explanation: .200

1.1.3. And now, I must estimate the likelihood of my own current existence given the different specific hypotheses under ~H.
1.1.3.1. That only some of us have but one finite life: .10.
1.1.3.2. That we each have numerous finite lives: .10.
1.1.3.3. That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .25.
1.1.3.4. That we each have an infinity of finite lives; 1.00
1.1.3.5. That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: .50.
1.1.3.6. That we each have an infinite life: 1.00
1.1.3.7. That only some of us have an infinite life: .50
1.1.3.8. That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .50
1.1.3.9. Some other explanation: .50

1.1.4. And now, I must multiply each of the probabilities of ~H above by the likelihoods of my current existence, given each specific hypothesis, and add up their products. And, the total likelihood of my current existence given ~H:
1.1.4.1. P(E|~H) = (0*.5) + (.2*.10) + (0*.25) + (.2*1.0) + (0*.5) + (1*.2) + (0*.5) + (.2*.5) + (.2*.5), or
1.1.4.2. P(E|~H) = 0 + .02 + 0 +.2 + 0 + .2 + 0 + .1 + .1, or
1.1.4.3. P(E|~H) = .62.

- I'll be back with my reasoning for P(E|H).

 

[godless dave]

How did you arrive at those numbers?