Proof of Immortality III

[Jabba]

Ah, that's what the "AM" in OOFLAM stands for. I had figured that OOFL stood for "only one finite life" but couldn't figure out what the AM stood for.

Do you agree with the following statements? 1. Every soul (ie the subjective "I"), mortal or immortal, for at least the first part of its life "inhabits" a body. 2. A soul is mortal if it dies when the body it inhabits dies. 3. A soul is immortal if it continues to live after the body it inhabits dies. This ignores a couple of other possibilities, but I presume it captures what you want to argue.
If you agree with these statements, then we can identify each soul with the body it started out with. All potential souls can then be identified with all potential bodies, and all actual souls with all actual bodies. The probability that you, Jabba, would be in the set of actual souls is then the same irrespective of whether your soul is mortal or immortal. It is simply the probability of your body being in the set of actual bodies.



Why? The probability of your existence as an immortal soul is the same as the probability of your existence as a mortal soul. By the identification of souls with bodies, it is the same as the probability of your existence as a body tout court. Ergo P(E | H) = P(E | ~H).

Caveman,
- I almost agree with your statements.
- Re #1, my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.

 

[caveman1917]

Caveman,
- I almost agree with your statements.
- Re #1, my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body

Even so, bodies haven't always existed. So even if the soul exists before the body, there is still a "first body" that it "inhabits" and hence can be identified with. The "prior to" doesn't change the argument here.

- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.

It's not about dependence per se but that we can identify each soul with a body. For each soul we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits" - whether the soul exists prior to the body or only comes into existence simultaneously with this body doesn't change that we can identify it with this body. Unless you're claiming that there exists some sort of reservoir of souls which never "inhabit" any body?

 

[caveman1917]

And if you're claiming that an immortal soul can be identified with multiple bodies (reincarnation or something) then you're less likely to be an immortal soul rather than a mortal one, simply because, given a number of bodies, there would be less souls associated with these when they are immortal than when they are mortal.

 

[Mojo]

- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.

Jabba,
- Do you have a body?

 

[jond]

Caveman,
- I almost agree with your statements.
- Re #1, my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.

Jabba, under H, the self and the body are one and the same. And even if the self/soul exists as a separate entity (~H), you cannot simply dismiss the body. Not only is the body what we are communicating with, we know with absolute certainty that we can dramatically alter the self by physical damage to the brain, or chemical alterations to the brain. The self is absolutely dependent on a specific body, whether or not it is an independent item.

 

[JayUtah]

Jabba's hypothesis H is that we're just bodies, while his hypothesis ~H is that we're bodies + immortal souls.

No. In fact he has specifically denied that corporeality is his H. His H is "Each of us has only one finite lifetime at most," which he refers to as OOFLam. Corporeality is a vagabond in this debate. You can argue, and many of your critics will agree, that corporeality would need to be part of his argument, but he dances around it while his critics assign it a particular role in their formulation. Now if the problem were formulated as you suggest, then your case against conjuctive fallacy on the basis of augmenting an existing corporeality would tend to persuade. But as I'm sure you'll agree, the problem isn't being consistently or correctly formulated on Jabba's side, and perhaps also on his critics' side.

 

[Jabba]

Ah, that's what the "AM" in OOFLAM stands for. I had figured that OOFL stood for "only one finite life" but couldn't figure out what the AM stood for.

Do you agree with the following statements?

1. Every soul (ie the subjective "I"), mortal or immortal, for at least the first part of its life "inhabits" a body.

2. A soul is mortal if it dies when the body it inhabits dies.

3. A soul is immortal if it continues to live after the body it inhabits dies.

This ignores a couple of other possibilities, but I presume it captures what you want to argue.

If you agree with these statements, then we can identify each soul with the body it started out with. All potential souls can then be identified with all potential bodies, and all actual souls with all actual bodies. The probability that you, Jabba, would be in the set of actual souls is then the same irrespective of whether your soul is mortal or immortal. It is simply the probability of your body being in the set of actual bodies.



Why? The probability of your existence as an immortal soul is the same as the probability of your existence as a mortal soul. By the identification of souls with bodies, it is the same as the probability of your existence as a body tout court. Ergo P(E | H) = P(E | ~H).

Caveman,
- I almost agree with your statements.
- Re #1, my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body
- In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body. Take such dependence out of your formula and the likelihood of my current existence (E) is much greater given ~H than it is given H. I think that makes sense.

Even so, bodies haven't always existed. So even if the soul exists before the body, there is still a "first body" that it "inhabits" and hence can be identified with. The "prior to" doesn't change the argument here.



It's not about dependence per se but that we can identify each soul with a body. For each soul we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits" - whether the soul exists prior to the body or only comes into existence simultaneously with this body doesn't change that we can identify it with this body. Unless you're claiming that there exists some sort of reservoir of souls which never "inhabit" any body?

Caveman,
- Unfortunately, I don't understand your logic here.
- I don't see how we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits."
- I guess that I don't understand the implications, or even the meaning, of "identify."

 

[JayUtah]

my (hidden?) assumption is that the self exists prior to any specific body

You only observe E when there is a body involved, so you can't tell us whether the observations you attribute to E are a product of the body or the soul.

Hidden or not, that's not a valid assumption. You want to prove life precedes birth and continues after death. You don't get to assume any of that as part of a pro of for it.

In my argument, the self is not dependent upon a specific body.Take such dependence out of your formula...

No. In your argument E conflates body and soul. Your E requires a body until you prove that the body is moot. You don't get to speculatively attribute the properties of the self to the soul you're trying to prove exists, as part of the proof. That's just begging the question and/or arguing in circles. We can observe that the properties of the self require at least a body, and you've proffered the radio analogy for E so you can't just set that aside. Except that you have moved the goalposts and now you're trying to argue that the body is entirely irrelevant to the self. You've effectively made a perfectly circular argument. You posit that a certain thing exists and is entirely responsible for whatever arbitrary properties you want to assign it, without being able to prove it exists or has any of those properties.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, under H, the self and the body are one and the same. And even if the self/soul exists as a separate entity (~H), you cannot simply dismiss the body. Not only is the body what we are communicating with, we know with absolute certainty that we can dramatically alter the self by physical damage to the brain, or chemical alterations to the brain. The self is absolutely dependent on a specific body, whether or not it is an independent item.

Jond,
- Superficially, at least, we can always blame this on poor reception, caused by damage to the antenna or something.
- I would assume that other animals also have selves -- their receivers are just different than ours.

 

[JayUtah]

I don't see how we can point to a body and say "this is the first body that this soul inhabits."

Do you agree that for each soul in your model that has ever inhabited a body, there would have to be a first such body that that soul inhabited?

 

[JayUtah]

Jond,
- Superficially, at least, we can always blame this on poor reception, caused by damage to the antenna or something.
- I would assume that other animals also have selves -- their receivers are just different than ours.

Entirely supposition. You're piling more speculation on top of your original speculation to patch the holes in it. Stick with facts, please.

 

[jond]

Jond,
- Superficially, at least, we can always blame this on poor reception, caused by damage to the antenna or something.
- I would assume that other animals also have selves -- their receivers are just different than ours.

What JayUtah said, and what's more it's irrelevant. You are still dealing with a specific body. No other body is receiving that signal. Furthermore, the damage is consistent across multiple people. For example: When you damage a specific region in the brain that breaks the connection between visual recognition and emotional connection, people begin to confaublate stories that their loved ones have been replaced by imposters. But when they get a phone call from a loved one they get the emotional connection and tell that loved one "you need to get there right away, there are imposters taking your place!" This is called Capgras Syndrome, and it's real. And repeatable.

Radios do not work like that, at all.

 

[godless dave]

Jond,
- Superficially, at least, we can always blame this on poor reception, caused by damage to the antenna or something.

Which would mean that, in that model, there would have to be a mechanism for pairing a particular soul with a particular body. The details of how that happens would be relevant to the likelihood of a particular soul existing and being paired with a particular body.

 

[Mojo]

Jabba, under H, the self and the body are one and the same. And even if the self/soul exists as a separate entity (~H), you cannot simply dismiss the body. Not only is the body what we are communicating with, we know with absolute certainty that we can dramatically alter the self by physical damage to the brain, or chemical alterations to the brain. The self is absolutely dependent on a specific body, whether or not it is an independent item.

Jabba has claimed that the "immaterial self" has no characteristics specific to itself, and everything that makes an incorporated "self" different from other selves originates with the body it inhabits.

 

[theprestige]

Evidence?

It's the null hypothesis engendered by Jabba's claim. It doesn't need evidence, it just needs refutation.

 

[Jabba]

Do you agree that for each soul in your model that has ever inhabited a body, there would have to be a first such body that that soul inhabited?

Jay,
- I assume so -- though, in the era of singularities and multiverse, it's hard to pin anything down.

 

[Jabba]

Which would mean that, in that model, there would have to be a mechanism for pairing a particular soul with a particular body. The details of how that happens would be relevant to the likelihood of a particular soul existing and being paired with a particular body.

Dave,
- I think I agree -- but so far, I don't see how that's relevant to the probability, or likelihood, of reincarnation.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I think I agree -- but so far, I don't see how that's relevant to the probability, or likelihood, of reincarnation.

Your whole approach is to compare the likelihood of you existing under OOFLam (where "you" is just the physical body) to the likelihood of you existing under some model where "you" is an immaterial soul inhabiting or connecting to a physical body. Calculating the likelihood of the latter is central to your approach.

 

[Jabba]

Entirely supposition. You're piling more speculation on top of your original speculation to patch the holes in it. Stick with facts, please.

Jay,
- It is speculation, but still possibly supportive of the claim. Can someone be responsible for murder when he was 1000 miles away from the victim at the time of the crime?

 

[Jabba]

What JayUtah said, and what's more it's irrelevant. You are still dealing with a specific body. No other body is receiving that signal. Furthermore, the damage is consistent across multiple people. For example: When you damage a specific region in the brain that breaks the connection between visual recognition and emotional connection, people begin to confaublate stories that their loved ones have been replaced by imposters. But when they get a phone call from a loved one they get the emotional connection and tell that loved one "you need to get there right away, there are imposters taking your place!" This is called Capgras Syndrome, and it's real. And repeatable.

Radios do not work like that, at all.

jond,
- I see your point -- there are all sorts of mental illnesses. But, I'm not saying that the brain is the same as a radio, I'm saying that it is just analogous, and is not limited by the same mechanisms. There is a physical reason for Capgras Syndrome, and some kind of damage to the brain is responsible. I assume that a radio doesn't have nearly as many ways that its reception can be altered.
- And, what have you done to the real jond?!