Proof of Immortality III

[godless dave]

Dave,
- H is the scientific model of mortality for individual human consciousness -- i.e., we each have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most).
- H allows for no immaterial selves. It allows for consciousness to be strictly material.

That contradicts what you said before.

 

[I Am The Scum]

But why is it an H?

 

[Jabba]

That contradicts what you said before.

- Sorry, Dave. You'll need to explain.

 

[JayUtah]

Dave,
- H is the scientific model of mortality for individual human consciousness -- i.e., we each have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most).
- H allows for no immaterial selves. It allows for consciousness to be strictly material. ~H does also; it just implies immaterial selves in that if some of us do not have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most), something must survive the material body.

How is this not just stacking the deck and reversing the burden of proof?

I've twice now posted your original claim. You said you could prove mathematically, immortality. You've very carefully avoided explaining why your argument is now so very different. You get to define immortality however you want. You now get to foist H onto your critics.

Several people have asked you to reconcile your ever-shifting goalposts. Since we're all quite accustomed to your playing dumb when you don't want to answer questions, let's dispense with the charade and hear your explanation.

 

[godless dave]

- Sorry, Dave. You'll need to explain.

Here you go:

So in H, the self is material, and produced by the brain?

- No. The self appears to be an immaterial emergent property produced by the material brain.
- My claim is that by inserting the fact of my current existence into the math of Bayesian statistics, the conclusion is reached that my particular self is (somehow) not limited to the one, finite, lifetime implied by modern science. (One problem here is that what I mean by "one, finite, lifetime" is maybe impossible to fully express -- like saying what things were like "before time.")

I think we're using two different definitions of "material" but that's OK. Would you agree that since, in H, the self is produced by the brain, the likelihood of someone's self existing is exactly the same as the likelihood of their physical body existing?

Dave,
- Sorry. I used the wrong word. The self appears to be an immaterial emergent property somehow connected to the material brain. William James argued that the brain doesn't produce the mind; it transmits the mind. (Just a thought, but I wonder if that could be how emergent properties work in general...)
- Anyway, I shouldn't have restricted the connection to producing the mind. The brain could be transmitting something non-physical into the physical world.
- And as strange as such might seem, it seems to pale in comparison to recent discoveries in physics.
- And then if the self is not restricted to one, finite, life at most (as the math seems to require), the basic self must be what we would call "non-physical."

But then:

Dave,
- H is the scientific model of mortality for individual human consciousness -- i.e., we each have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most).
- H allows for no immaterial selves.

 

[jsfisher]

There is also the problem that Jabba is using ~H as if it were a single alternative to H. It is, instead, the set of all the possible alternatives.

 

[JayUtah]

There is also the problem that Jabba is using ~H as if it were a single alternative to H. It is, instead, the set of all the possible alternatives.

You mean his standard false dilemma?

As has been explained to him ad nauseam, ~H would necessarily include alternatives that are mutually exclusive, just as in all his other highly misguided attempts. Want to prove X "mathematically?" Just cast speculative aspersions on Y, where ~Y includes (but is not equivalent to) X. It's the same pseudo-statistical shell game he's been playing for months. It has no validity whatsoever.

 

[JayUtah]

And most of those possible outcomes that never happened and never will were more likely to happen than your particular brain.

How were you able to determine that the multitude of outcomes would not have included my brain?

Why are we talking about individuals' "brains" as they are now presently constituted in all their particulars, and not the undifferentiated notion of finitely existing entities?

In case you still haven't gotten it yet, it's because, for every outcome that did happen, there was a giganogargantuan number of possible outcomes that didn't happen.

And if they didn't happen, won't happen, and -- I daresay -- cannot ever happen, then how are you able to determine that those outcomes do not have properties that affect your computation? You're begging the question that all those hypothetical multitudes of unknowable alternatives have properties mutually exclusive to our present reality, for the properties pertinent to your claim.

I'm not big on the possibility of you making heads or tails out of the above either, but someone might.

Consider that people object to your arguments not because they are stupid, but because the argument is not defensible.

 

[Toontown]

How were you able to determine that the multitude of outcomes would not have included my brain?

Because I was talking to Mojo about the multitudes of possible outcomes other than his brain. Because I was obviously pointing out the fact that nearly everything that could have happened, did not and never will. Because that's what I actually said. Which sinks Mojo's meaningless observation like a Polish submarine.

Why do you ask? Are you yet another 19th century determinist, popping up like a whack-a-mole?

You appear to have conveniently overlooked the part about the indeterminate quantum stew at 10 ^-43 seconds after the BB, which was in another post not addressed to you. That was when the main shuffle happened. Everything that came off the deck thereafter is a random outcome.

Why are we talking about individuals' "brains" as they are now presently constituted in all their particulars, and not the undifferentiated notion of finitely existing entities?

We are not actually talking about individual brains, in part because you are irreversibly opposed to my use of my subjective conditional perspective as a clue. And, as is the thread norm, you seem to have either forgotten or never actually understood repeated explanations of how that perspective can be used.

And the longer we argue, the more hardwired and dug in your undifferentiated notion of finitely existing entities will become.

Which, BTW, encapsulates why I declined your rather nazi-esque and somewhat browbeating invitation to reveal and discuss with you my personal hypothesis in detail. It's not so much a case of being opposed to discussing my ideas, though I do have reservations. It's mostly a case of not wanting to discuss them with you.

And if they didn't happen, won't happen, and -- I daresay -- cannot ever happen, then how are you able to determine that those outcomes do not have properties that affect your computation? You're begging the question that all those hypothetical multitudes of unknowable alternatives have properties mutually exclusive to our present reality, for the properties pertinent to your claim.

You don't need to worry about any of that, and you can dispense with the precise computation. Common sense will suffice if you simply acknowledge the indeterminate quantum stew at 10 ^-43 seconds, and acknowledge the following:

My specific brain is one specific organization of an immense number of atoms occurring at specific x,y,z,t spacetime coordinates, in one specific spacetime continuum, ultimately resulting from a universe-sized quantum shuffle beginning at 10 ^-43 seconds after the big bang.

All that other irrelevance you're talking about is nothing but a word salad smokescreen.

Consider that people object to your arguments not because they are stupid, but because the argument is not defensible.

You certainly haven't put any dents in any of my arguments. You would have to actually grasp the essence of the arguments first, which you haven't demonstrated.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- H is the scientific model of mortality for individual human consciousness -- i.e., we each have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most).
- H allows for no immaterial selves. It allows for consciousness to be strictly material. ~H does also; it just implies immaterial selves in that if some of us do not have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most), something must survive the material body.

Here you go:





But then:

Dave,
- Specifically, what two claims contradict each other?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Specifically, what two claims contradict each other?

These two:

Dave,
- Sorry. I used the wrong word. The self appears to be an immaterial emergent property somehow connected to the material brain. William James argued that the brain doesn't produce the mind; it transmits the mind. (Just a thought, but I wonder if that could be how emergent properties work in general...)
- Anyway, I shouldn't have restricted the connection to producing the mind. The brain could be transmitting something non-physical into the physical world.

Dave,
- H is the scientific model of mortality for individual human consciousness -- i.e., we each have but one, finite, time of consciousness (at most).
- H allows for no immaterial selves. It allows for consciousness to be strictly material.

 

[Monza]

#YOLO [/endthread]

 

[zooterkin]

You certainly haven't put any dents in any of my arguments. You would have to actually grasp the essence of the arguments first, which you haven't demonstrated.

Would that not require to put your arguments forward first? I believe that's the conventional order. If you have, and I missed them, perhaps you could give a pointer to the post where you did, if you're not prepared to present them again.

 

[I Am The Scum]

He won't.

 

[Rincewind]

Still waiting for proof of immorality...

 

[Garrette]

Still waiting for proof of immorality...

One does not need this thread for that.

 

[Mojo]

Roflmau!

And, at 10 ^-43 seconds after the big bang, an infinity of particular outcomes were possible. And nearly all of them never happened and never will.

But one of them had to.

Seriously? You dredged that up?

It is to roflmau. Stoopid analogy is stoopid.

No. You should not be surprised that your brain has a name.

And once again you have failed to answer the question.

 

[Dancing David]

- We haven't worked out the specific day and time, but the statistics professor with whom I've been corresponding has agreed to meet me for lunch to discuss my claim about one, finite, life (at most). I'll ask him to write down his opinion.

Ah, appeal to a future authority or appeal to authority in the future, is that plu perfect?

 

[Toontown]

But one of them had to.

That's an often-cited rationale for blowing money on the lottery, and that 'reasoning' is as bogus as a 3 dollar bill.

But since you have so totally bought into that 'reasoning', you should put your money where your mouth is and just go ahead and expend your life savings on lottery tickets. Assuming that, given your complete disregard for any odds stacked against you, you haven't already squandered your last dime.

And once again you have failed to answer the question.

Oh yes, I remember now. You wanted to force me to say the probability that the person who beat the odds did in fact beat the odds is 1.

As you now see, I actually have no problem with saying a tautology is tautologous.

Where I run into a problem is when I try to get across to you what my actual conditional perspective actually is. I've explained that several times. I even concocted an analogy which, unlike your false analogy, actually reflects my actual perspective, is amenable to precise calculation, and has the side effect of demonstrating how a single data point can indeed rule out a hypothesis.

All of which was studiously ignored, and is now buried under mountains of detritus, if that incarnation of the thread still exists. And various individuals, yourself among them, continued to concoct false analogies, apparently believing their false analogies defeat a perspective they do not even address.

If you want to see what a real analogy looks like, and if you have the guts to actually address it, go dredge mine up, since you seem to have the time and patience for digging through tons of detritus. Then, if you have that much patience, perhaps you also have enough patience to study the analogy until you understand what my conditional perspective actually is.

But if you did all that you'd be ethically obliged to stop concocting false analogies which don't even address my perspective.

So forget about what a real, gutbusting analogy looks like. You really don't want to go there, do you.

Perhaps I can interest you in what a real, gutbusting rock song sounds like:

 

[Mojo]

That's an often-cited rationale for blowing money on the lottery, and that 'reasoning' is as bogus as a 3 dollar bill.

But since you have so totally bought into that 'reasoning' you should put your money where your mouth is and just go ahead and expend your life savings on lottery tickets. Assuming that, given your complete disregard for any odds stacked against you, you haven't already squandered your last dime.

No, it has been used, here at least, to argue that while the odds of a particular ticket winning the lottery is something like 1 in 13,000,000 (for six numbers drawn from 49) it is possible for there to be a winning ticket almost every week, because millions of tickets are sold. If you buy a ticket it is highly unlikely that it will be a winning ticket.

Once again, your application if this sort of reasoning to Jabba's argument relies on him being a predetermined target. He isn't.

Now, let's get back to your battle of wits with Stanley. Stanley has realised that your superior knowledge of statistics has rendered his bluff ineffective, so offers you a different bet. His bet is that he exists. According to you the odds against this are one to 10^80!. He's offering you 10:1.

Do you accept his bet?