Proof of Immortality III

[JayUtah]

Clever.

Thanks, it's about time someone noticed.

 

[carlitos]

Thanks, it's about time someone noticed.

I resisted commenting, but I did chuckle.

 

[jt512]

Thanks, it's about time someone noticed.

I noticed...which kinda' made me worry about myself.

 

[abaddon]

Thanks, it's about time someone noticed.

Everyone noticed. We simply don't like to encourage you.

 

[Loss Leader]

Thanks, it's about time someone noticed.

I printed out your post and threw it at Mt
Rainier changing its shape slightly. . But don't worry, that was completely predestined to happen.

I was going to bring some sodium to dump there, but I thought, "Na."

 

[John Jones]

More chemistry humor!

 

[JayUtah]

Everyone noticed. We simply don't like to encourage you.

Yeah, that's probably a good idea.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Jabba steps into a Clone-a-tron 5000. Out walk two identical entities. Which is the real Jabba and which is the copy? Not only is it impossible to tell, the question has no meaning.

Would be fun watching them debate each other, tho'

Hans

 

[Jabba]

1653

Dave,
- You're too fast...
- I think this takes us back to Mt Rainier, and why I think I'm different.
- I'm assuming that science would not accept that reproducing the same brain would reproduce the same self.
- If, for instance, they reproduced my brain, I would not be conscious of what that second brain would be experiencing...

1655

Right, because they're not physically connected.

Dave,
- So, while science could (theoretically) predict the "characteristics," of this new self, this new self would not be ME. IOW, there is something about this new self that would not be predictable.
- That's what I'm talking about. That's why the likelihood of my current existence -- given the natural laws of modern science (not just OOFLam) -- is virtually zero. And why, the likelihood of Mt Rainier -- given the natural laws of modern science -- is virtually one.

- There is nothing about a new Mt Rainier that would not be (theoretically) predictable. We can (theoretically) predict all the characteristics of a new Mt Rainier, and Mt Rainier does not have a self (at least, not the unpredictable kind of self that I have).

 

[jsfisher]

1653

1655Dave,
- So, while science could (theoretically) predict the "characteristics," of this new self, this new self would not be ME.

Why wouldn't it be you? How could anyone (including you) tell which is which?

IOW, there is something about this new self that would not be predictable.

In what way is predictability important? Probability of existence is something entirely different.

 

[JayUtah]

So, while science could (theoretically) predict the "characteristics," of this new self, this new self would not be ME.

Asked and answered. The duplicate is no more or less predictable than the original. Neither is predictable from first principles. Predictability and complexity are not the same thing. Chaos theory covers this.

IOW, there is something about this new self that would not be predictable.

What wouldn't be predictable and why?

That's why the likelihood of my current existence -- given the natural laws of modern science (not just OOFLam) -- is virtually zero. And why, the likelihood of Mt Rainier -- given the natural laws of modern science -- is virtually one.

Same mistake you made yesterday.

There is nothing about a new Mt Rainier that would not be (theoretically) predictable.

There is nothing about either you (new or old) or Mt Ranier (new or old) that is not theoretically predictable. However, neither one is practically predictable because both are the product of ongoing processes governed by a complex interplay of laws.

We can (theoretically) predict all the characteristics of a new Mt Rainier, and Mt Rainier does not have a self (at least, not the unpredictable kind of self that I have).

Begging the question. Again. In fact, begging the same question you've been begging for at least a month, every single day.

 

[Mojo]

- So, while science could (theoretically) predict the "characteristics," of this new self, this new self would not be ME. IOW, there is something about this new self that would not be predictable.

Nope. If we could perfectly reproduce your brain, we would also perfectly reproduce your consciousness, because your consciousness is a property of your brain. Like all the other properties of your brain it is the result of the physical processes that have produced your current brain state.

ETA: Seriously, do we yet again have to tell you that if you have two identical things there are two of them, not one?

 

[Mojo]

- That's what I'm talking about. That's why the likelihood of my current existence -- given the natural laws of modern science (not just OOFLam) -- is virtually zero. And why, the likelihood of Mt Rainier -- given the natural laws of modern science -- is virtually one.

- There is nothing about a new Mt Rainier that would not be (theoretically) predictable. We can (theoretically) predict all the characteristics of a new Mt Rainier, and Mt Rainier does not have a self (at least, not the unpredictable kind of self that I have).

You consciousness is the result of physical processes, albeit complicated and chaotic processes. Mount Rainier is the result of physical processes, albeit complicated and chaotic processes. You have no justification for saying that one is "theoretically" predictable while the other is not.

 

[Loss Leader]

1653

1655Dave,
- So, while science could (theoretically) predict the "characteristics," of this new self, this new self would not be ME. IOW, there is something about this new self that would not be predictable.
- That's what I'm talking about. That's why the likelihood of my current existence -- given the natural laws of modern science (not just OOFLam) -- is virtually zero. And why, the likelihood of Mt Rainier -- given the natural laws of modern science -- is virtually one.

- There is nothing about a new Mt Rainier that would not be (theoretically) predictable. We can (theoretically) predict all the characteristics of a new Mt Rainier, and Mt Rainier does not have a self (at least, not the unpredictable kind of self that I have).

What exactly are the characteristics of this soul that makes it distinguishable from your physical brain?

And why have you not answered my questions about the mountain?

 

[zooterkin]

ETA: Seriously, do we yet again have to tell you that if you have two identical things there are two of them, not one?

Just the same as we have to again go through explaining why it's completely unnecessary to type in the post numbers being quoted, when there's a little arrow that takes you back to the quoted post (and which still works if earlier posts are removed for some reason).

 

[JayUtah]

Just the same as we have to again go through explaining why it's completely unnecessary to type in the post numbers...

Jabba has discovered that it gives people something to talk about besides refuting his repetitious, logic-challenged argument.

 

[Mojo]

(at least, not the unpredictable kind of self that I have).

What makes you think your self is unpredictable? Very little in life is predictable, but on the evidence of your posts on this forum your behaviour is right up there with the sun rising tomorrow.

 

[godless dave]

1653

1655Dave,
- So, while science could (theoretically) predict the "characteristics," of this new self, this new self would not be ME. IOW, there is something about this new self that would not be predictable.

I don't see what wouldn't be predictable. The reason it wouldn't be you is because two is more than one. Two things cannot occupy the same space simultaneously. All the characteristics, including the characteristics of whatever parts of the brains have subjective experiences, would be identical.

 

[Pooneil]

Everyone noticed. We simply don't like to encourage you.

I hadn't noticed. But now... well I wish it hadn't been pointed out.

 

[Jabba]

1639

Dave,
- OOFLam does not specifically exclude immaterial selves; it leads to an inductive (probabilistic) conclusion of no immaterial selves.
- Again, if OOFLam did explicitly limit itself to material selves, the likelihood of ME -- given OOFLam -- would have been virtually one. Without such limitation, the likelihood of ME is virtually zero.

1640

This is not true. The so-called scientific model is completely silent of the existence of souls...

js,
- Right now, my primary aim is to effectively express my secondary aim. My secondary aim is something about understanding each other's position, and 'nailing down' our specific disagreements.
- That's why I ask so many questions, why I prefer to verbalize one question at a time and why I urge you (and the others) to simply answer the specific question. This is why attorneys keep urging the witness to, "just answer the question" -- we're trying to carefully localize the specific disagreement. We'll try to evaluate the explanation later.
- So here, I want to make sure that you do not accept that OOFLam strongly suggests the non-existence of immaterial selves. It seems to me that if there is such a thing as immaterial selves, there is little reason to accept OOFLam.