No, What you're "trying" to do is foist on us yet another fringe reset.
It's the next logical step after punting with the Bukowski and Russell quotes. Whenever he gets painted into a corner he throws those out there to imply that anyone who has drawn a conclusion is a fool. Every Jabba thread involves him declaring that the debate is incurably muddy -- through his equivocal obfuscations, obviously -- and then insisting we go back to first principles to "correct" his mud-stirring.
I'll bet he told you just what Jay has told you, that your inputs can't be numbers plucked from a nether orifice.
I'm sure that's what he did, if in fact there was any such meeting. One of the guiding principles of Bayesian analysis is that the priors are facts, not estimates. Sure, you can put estimates in there and run Bayesian models to see what would happen. But as you can imagine, the results only hold insofar as the estimate holds. You most certainly can't shove whatever you want in there and pretend anything comes out of it that reflects the real world.
The notion of "H given E" and "E given H" as operators in the Bayesian world simply do not work backwards as Jabba proposes to use them. He wants to start with posteriors and work backwards to determine what the prior "must" be. This has been explained to him countless times. "Itemizing" it or "organizing" it again does nothing to address that fatal flaw. But if he uses those weasel words, he can pretend that he's engaging in the debate without actually having to address the lack of merit in his argument.
Bayesian analysis is inherently an iterative process. Which is to say, its strength in generating knowledge lies in its ability to adjust parametric distributions of probability based on new data, in ways that classical statistics can only model with random variables. The iteration is the key. Here, in this invocation, there is no iteration. There is simply the proposition. Jabba has grossly co-opted the language and intent of Bayesian methodology to propose what he insists divides the prior and posterior conditions in this case. But his proposition is not an informational event; it's just more of his numerical proctology.
So on the one hand Jabba simply invents numbers that, in Bayesian analysis,
must be measured. And on the other hand, Jabba tries to shoehorn his static proof into the dynamic nature of Bayesian methods by cobbling up the semblance of an event. There is no "event" in Jabba's proof; just two sets of made-up numbers.
I cannot stress enough that when I say Jabba's misunderstanding of Bayes is fundamental, it is
fundamental. His notion of its foundational principles isn't even in the right county, let alone the right ballpark.