Proof of Immortality II

[Jabba]

He's saying that when you set the prior probability of A, you are doing so in a skewed way to force the result you want.

LL,
- Maybe I need a nap, but how is my setting skewed?

 

[Humots]

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

It is not that the prior probability is zero, or that you have chosen the worng number for the prior probability of A.

It is, instead, that you assign any numerical value to the probability of A at all, given your utter lack of any evidence.

TSF, again, and still.

Thank you Slowvehicle. That's it exactly.

 

[George]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?
- Any problems with that?

No. The key question is immortality, remember?

 

[Jabba]

We don't have problems with the question. We have problems with you not answering the question.

- Good. I've been trying to do that. I'll try harder.

 

[jsfisher]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?
- Any problems with that?

Any problems other than, say, the Texas Sharp-shooter one?

 

[Porpoise of Life]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?
- Any problems with that?

Kind of reads like word salad to me, but that might be my grasp of English.
To answer the quastion I think you're asking: nothing, if the probability is the same. Someone will win the lottery, but that doesnt mean the winner was always destined to win.
(unless we invoke a degree of determinism that makes calculations of probability completely useless anyway)

 

[Pixel42]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?
- Any problems with that?

You're the only one who has a problem with it. Your problem is that you keep refusing to accept the answer, which is: nothing.

Here's a post where I spelt it out for you in nice easy steps:

Q: What set the side of the die that came up apart from the other sides of the die before the die was thrown?

A: Nothing

Q: What sets the side of the die that came up apart from the other sides of the die after the die is thrown?

A: Only the fact that it was the side that happened to come up

Q: What set the combination of sperm and egg that would produce me apart from all the other possible combinations of sperm and egg immediately before I was conceived?

A: Nothing

Q: What sets the combination of sperm and egg that would produce me apart from all those other possible combinations of sperm and egg now?

A: Only the fact that it was the one that happened to occur

Q: What set my consciousness apart from all the possible consciousnesses that might arise when the universe began?

A: Nothing

Q: What sets my consciousness apart from all those other possible consciousnesses now?

A: Only the fact that mine is one of the ones that happened to arise.

If you dispute any part of the above please specify exactly which part and why.

 

[Giordano]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?
- Any problems with that?

Okay with that, as you stated it, but avoid the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy this time please. The advance probability of a given person in particular by the SM (or by your own theory) is small; the advance probability of someone, anyone is high in the SM. Anyone thus created then can look back and declare: oh I'm so special, the chance that I would be conceived is very small. Texas Sharpshooter all the way! The bullet can make a hole anywhere on the side of the barn, then a circle is draw around the bullet hole and it is declared an amazing hit.

Has this been explained to you before? (I somehow remember...)
Anyway, you were going to explain why you were special in advance so as to make your conception very unlikely by the SM (by not by your model and not retroactively using the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy). So please do...

 

[Giordano]

- Good. I've been trying to do that. I'll try harder.

Very incorrectly, when you posted to this point at all.

 

[carlitos]

- Good. I've been trying to do that. I'll try harder.

Liar.

 

[Akhenaten]

- OK. And actually, I'm happy to just call it the CMA of this forum.

You can call it Bambi for all the difference it makes.

It's evidence that determines the truth, not consensus.

And especially not your puerile opinion of where the consensus actually lies.

 

[Loss Leader]

LL,
- Maybe I need a nap, but how is my setting skewed?

You made up a bunch of numbers to support your conclusion.

What if A were, "I own exactly one bicycle"? What would your numbers tell you about that?

What if A were, "I am immortal"? How would your numbers treat that?

You've made it so A always loses. And you've been hoping that A was only ever thought of as the scientific model of the universe. But A could be anything because your numbers are meaningless.

 

[Akhenaten]

- Yeah.
- And, I've probably said this before -- but, for some reason, the poem you allude to above has become my all-time favorite... How do you figure?

I figure that you're flailing about in vain hope that everyone will forget the topic.

 

[Akhenaten]

- You're saying that the prior probability of the new A is zero?

No, that's just what you (and you alone) are reading.

Please invest in a new Babel fish.

 

[Akhenaten]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?

Nothing.

- Any problems with that?

What if there were? You won't acknowledge them.

 

[Akhenaten]

LL,
- Maybe I need a nap, but how is my setting skewed?

Probably by religious belief.

There are other, equally distasteful possibilities.

 

[Akhenaten]

We don't have problems with the question. We have problems with you not answering the question.

- Good. I've been trying to do that.

No, you have not.

I'll try harder.

No, you will not.

 

[Akhenaten]

Kind of reads like word salad to me, but that might be my grasp of English.

It's not you and it's not English - it's Jabbanese.

To answer the question I think you're asking: nothing, if the probability is the same. Someone will win the lottery, but that doesnt mean the winner was always destined to win.
(unless we invoke a degree of determinism that makes calculations of probability completely useless anyway)

Have you tried re-working the calculations using such values as "unimaginably large" and "teensy-weensy"?

It can make all the difference.

 

[godless dave]

- Good. I've been trying to do that. I'll try harder.

Will you? Or will you just rephrase the question, then promise to address it at a later date?

 

[Jabba]

- Back to the key question: what sets a particular example of an oft-occurring event apart from its fellows, so that we are justified (in the Bayes formula) in according the example the likelihood of it specifically occurring, versus according it the general likelihood of any one of the oft-occurring events occurring?
- Any problems with that?

We don't have problems with the question. We have problems with you not answering the question.

- Good. I've been trying to do that. I'll try harder.

- At this point, I’m pretty much in line with Toon, and what sets my particular current existence apart is its "significance."
- Its significance is that my current existence suggests another possible model than, “Each potential self has one, finite, existence at most.” My current existence suggests, to a large extent, that I cannot not exist. At the very least, it suggests that I must exist for multiple lifetimes.
- And, it suggests these things in much the same way that the physical constants of our universe suggest something “paranormal”(?) about our universe…
- In this case – I, in one form or another -- am the only thing, process or illusion that I know exists -- and did I never exist, there might as well be nothing ... forever. It would be as if there was nothing forever. It turns out that my existence is QUITE a coincident.
- If each potential self has only one, finite, existence at most, the likelihood that I would ever exist is something like 1/10⁸⁰!, at most. And, the likelihood that I would currently exist is even smaller -- MUCH smaller.
- And then, there’s the Anthropic Principle…