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Proof of Immortality II

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- Back to #3:
3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.

Sure. But that wouldn't mean that the likelihood of any particular experiencer existing is 1/infinity. If that were the case, then the likelihood of anything existing would be 1/infinity.
 
Sure. But that wouldn't mean that the likelihood of any particular experiencer existing is 1/infinity...
- Given the above condition, would the likelihood of any particular experiencer existing now be 7,000,000,000/infinity?
 
- Given the above condition, would the likelihood of any particular experiencer existing now be 7,000,000,000/infinity?

No. Possible experiencers in the future are irrelevant to experiencers existing now. All that matters for the likelihood of an experiencer existing now are the events that led to its existence. These came from a finite number of possibilities.
 
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No. Possible experiencers in the future are irrelevant to experiencers existing now. All that matters for the likelihood of an experiencer existing now are the events that led to its existence.
- Unfortunatrly, I'll need to go back and remind myself of how we ended our previous discussion re the use of such information in Bayesian statistics...
- Seeya later.
 
Alright we need a term for a troll that trolls not because they think it is funny but because they think it makes them sound deep.
 
- Unfortunatrly, I'll need to go back and remind myself of how we ended our previous discussion re the use of such information in Bayesian statistics...
- Seeya later.

Translation: Jabba will be back with a counterfeit consensus composed of equivocation, quote mining, and dishonesty.
 
Although in defense this topic does "seem" like its been going on forever, so I guess I do feel immortal at this point.
 
- Unfortunatrly, I'll need to go back and remind myself of how we ended our previous discussion re the use of such information in Bayesian statistics...

So basically we've gotten nowhere.

I'm no expert on statistics, but I can't imagine any kind of calculation of likelihood that includes future events in a calculation for current or past events - especially when those future events would depend on past events.

For example, I was not a possible "experiencer" in 200 BC, because my parents weren't alive to create me.

Cleopatra was not a possible experiencer in 1970, because her parents were long dead.

Some human who will be born 3000 years from now is not a possible experiencer now.
 
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[ . . . ]
3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.
4) In such a universe, the number of distinct experiencers would be infinite.

Jabba, are you trying out ideas for a sci-fi novel?




So basically we've gotten nowhere.

I'm no expert on statistics, but I can't imagine any kind of calculation of likelihood that includes future events in a calculation for current or past events - especially when those future events would depend on past events.

Not only past events but whatever impossible events that may possibly be imagined.
 
If the ability to make identical copies meant there were an infinite number of potential copies, then that would mean there are an infinite number of potential Volkswagen Beetles. Does that mean the scientific model for how Volkswagen Beetles are created is wrong?

Considered in an informational vacuum? Of course not. However, it would mean the expected value of a particular potential volkswagen beetle is 1/infinity.

But Jabba's Bayes equation doesn't depend on an expected value, it depends on a likelihood of it existing.

That's just a special case of the same principle.

0 = x not observed

1 = x observed

n = number of trials

(0+0+0+0+0+1)/n=1/6=0.166...

expectation of observing x = 0.166...
Dave,
- You didn't respond to Toon's response.
 
- Unfortunatrly, I'll need to go back and remind myself of how we ended our previous discussion re the use of such information in Bayesian statistics...
- Seeya later.

Off topic but when the forum changeover occurs will there be a policy regarding blatant piss taking?
 
Dave,
- You didn't respond to Toon's response.

The number of trials, n, is not infinity (because we're calculating a posterior likelihood), and I don't think his formula applies here anyway.
 
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The interesting thing is that if an infinitely of different "senses of self" truly existed (impossible, of course), then every possible "sense of self", including Jabba's, would have to exist (I've read the science fiction on alternative universes before). So infinity would disprove his theory, not make it better.

I repeat my prior suggestion, because I think Jabba has gotten much closer with his recent postings. Why not just ask: "If we were, somehow, immortal, wouldn't you agree that we were immortal?" It would save a lot of your time, you would have the affirmation you desperately seek, and it would avoid this endless prolongation of us getting nowhere.
 
- Back to #3:
3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.


And if we could, somehow, repeatedly throw a six-sided dice forever, we could produce new, distinct, numbers forever. But they would all be either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.
 
It it amazing how many of these discussions do basically boil down to:

1. I want Woo to exist.
2. What would the world be like if my Woo did exist?
3. I will now assume the world is like that, therefore my Woo exists.
 
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