Proof of Immortality II

[Giordano]

Neither of you is anywhere near addressing the implications of the conditional probability expressed in Jabba's formula, the kernel of which did not originate with Jabba. I first saw the essential idea expressed in print in a book on pragmatism published @1933.

The overall formula construction is mathematically correct. It is the values that Jabba uses to replace the variables that we have objected to. Was it the overall construction of the formula you saw in a book published in 1993? Or Jabba's values?

In any case, this is only curiosity. I saw in a book published just last year (a Bible) that Jesus worked on water. I would need more facts and evidence to judge this type of vaguely quoted writing.

 

[Toontown]

I don't know what you mean when you say that "the spacetime pattern they form is unique to each individual."

If you could visualize in 4 dimensions, and if you could map the spacetime paths of each and every atom ever involved in the Giordano Project, the resulting pattern you would see is what I'm talking about.

I think you are saying the same thing we are: that these duplicate "selves" are not the "same" self because there are two, not one, selves and their spatial location and history differ. But do you agree that the two will think the same thoughts at time zero, and that both will believe themselves to be the same person if not convinced otherwise?

I think what they would think, remember, and believe is beside the point. The point is that there would be two of them, both thinking, remembering, and believing.

 

[Giordano]

1/infinity does not equal zero. Rather, zero is the limit of x as x approaches infinity. But that limit can never be reached, because x can never reach infinity.

I believe that is one of the very points already brought up: 1/infinity is, by your own logic, not a legitimate number that one can include in an equation. We all accept that zero is the limit of 1/x as x goes to infinity, but that is not Jabba's equation. Jabba is using 1/infinity. I and others have pointed out to Jabba that x=any very large number would at least make his equation correct mathematically and would still argue his "point" (I think your point too) better than x=infinity would. But he refuses to change even this small part of his theory.

Of course, I disagree that x=is indeed a very large number. Instead, the likelihood that a heathy human brain has a sense of self of some kind is very close to 1 but that there is no reason to suppose in advance that this sense of self (constrained by the biology of course: the particular sperm and egg, and the in utero environment) would be Jabba, or me, or someone else in particular. If you want more details, read the rest of this thread (good luck)!

 

[Giordano]

I think what they would think, remember, and believe is beside the point. The point is that there would be two of them, both thinking, remembering, and believing.

I suspect that what they would think, remember, and believe is very much related to the point that Jabba is making. Everyone here understands there would be two of them, both thinking, remembering, and believing.

But I fear that this thread is way too stuck on this very hypothetical point. To move on, I suggest that Jabba better define the non-physical "self" to which he is referring to, and what exactly he envisions will be reincarnated that will still be Jabba.

 

[Toontown]

The overall formula construction is mathematically correct. It is the values that Jabba uses to replace the variables that we have objected to. Was it the overall construction of the formula you saw in a book published in 1993? Or Jabba's values?

The book presented only the kernel of the idea Jabba's formula was based on. It wasn't formalized mathematically.

It isn't that important. I'm just pointing out the idea has been around for a while. I doubt this author was the originator either. I had been thinking along similar lines when I found the idea in print. That's why I took notice of it.

 

[jond]

I suspect that what they would think, remember, and believe is very much related to the point that Jabba is making. Everyone here understands there would be two of them, both thinking, remembering, and believing.

But I fear that this thread is way too stuck on this very hypothetical point. To move on, I suggest that Jabba better define the non-physical "self" to which he is referring to, and what exactly he envisions will be reincarnated that will still be Jabba.

Not only define that non-physical "self" but he needs to explain how it could conceivably interact with our physical brains.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Not only define that non-physical "self" but he needs to explain how it could conceivably interact with our physical brains.

...and how sequential, discrete, unrelated incidences of "reincarnation" are a comforting vision of "immortality"...

 

[godless dave]

Identity is not determined by brain chemistry. Identical chemistries, occurring at different spacetime coordinates, or different branches of a multiverse, would result in different "selves".

Yes, that's what we've been trying to tell Jabba for the last several months.

Neither of you is anywhere near addressing the implications of the conditional probability expressed in Jabba's formula,

What implications? That in a very large, complex, interconnected universe, the probability of any one event taken in isolation is extremely low?

 

[Monza]

1/infinity does not equal zero. Rather, zero is the limit of x as x approaches infinity. But that limit can never be reached, because x can never reach infinity.

Therefore, 1/infinity cannot be equal to 0, but can be approximated to 0 for some practical purposes. The proof is 1/infinity, which is essentially a division of 1 into infinitely many parts. That infinity of parts, when summed, must equal 1, not 0. You can't make the 1 simply disappear by dividing it into any number of parts. Division is not subtraction. 1/infinity is not 1-1.

Yes, this is well understood. I was restating Jabba's presentation of his theory where he repeatedly states that 1/inf is zero. His mathematical errors have been pointed out many times yet he persists. I'm just wondering what he is getting at if everyone suddenly agreed with his premise. I don't think it would help him. Giordano's summation is probably correct.

 

[xtifr]

Dave,
- I never should have used the term, “self-awareness.” Apparently, "self-awareness" means something to me that it doesn’t mean to anyone else...
- The following is Wikipedia’s definition of what I’m calling the “SELF.”
…In phenomenology, it is conceived as what experiences, and there isn't any experiencing without an experiencer, the self. The self is therefore an "immediate given", an intrinsic dimension of the fact of experiencing phenomena…

That's exactly what I, and I suspect pretty much everyone else, thought you meant. The experiencer is an emergent property of the brain. Anything else you want to call it? Still an emergent property of the brain. Because, in the scientific model, there is nothing about an individual that isn't a property of the body or brain.

- I’m saying that there seems to be no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

And I've pointed out why that's irrelevant several times. A separate brain is a separate entity, formed of a different set of atoms, even if the arrangement is identical. You can't untie the mind from the body, because the mind is an emergent property of the body. The moment you propose a part of the mind that's separate from the body, you're outside the scientific model, and lose the ability to use that proposal to disprove the scientific model.

You can go 'round and 'round with this all you want, Jabba, looking for new names, but the bottom line is: in the scientific model, everything about the mind is an emergent property of the brain and body. Everything!

You're free to believe in a soul if you want. Many people do. You're not free to inject the soul into the scientific model, and then claim that the resulting contradiction disproves the scientific model!

- In that regard, Mojo seems to agree with me.

Nobody here agrees that the scientific model includes any part of the mind being separable from the body.* Mojo said that consciousness is not "pre-existing", and that there are no "pools" where they live when they're not attached to a body. Which is fully consistent with the idea that consciousness emerges from the brain, and is a process of that brain, and cannot exist when the brain is not present and operating, any more than running can exist when legs are not present and operating. How you managed to interpret that any other way is truly beyond me.

* Even the hypothetical, science-fictional concept of "uploading" the self into a computer requires a body-analogue (a computer) to host the process we call the self or consciousness or the experiencer.

 

[Giordano]

Jabba,

I again noticed your tendency to quote your own, prior posts. I think that is one reason we are in such a rut in this thread. You can assume that we all have read your original prior posts. Quoting them again doesn't get us anywhere new, and unduly emphasizes that you believe that we are not understanding what you say rather than the truth, which is that we simply don't agree with you. If you are quoting your prior posts, with no real additional evidence, it simply wastes your precious time.

 

[AdMan]

Jabba,

I again noticed your tendency to quote your own, prior posts. I think that is one reason we are in such a rut in this thread. You can assume that we all have read your original prior posts. Quoting them again doesn't get us anywhere new, and unduly emphasizes that you believe that we are not understanding what you say rather than the truth, which is that we simply don't agree with you. If you are quoting your prior posts, with no real additional evidence, it simply wastes your precious time.

In addition, quoting himself may be giving him the false impression that someone is agreeing with him.

 

[Toontown]

What implications? That in a very large, complex, interconnected universe, the probability of any one event taken in isolation is extremely low?

I could probably explain well enough that someone who already understands the implication would be able to follow the explanation. However, doing so would only give rise to false Texas sharpshooter charges. So I'll pass on the wonderful opportunity.

However, if at any time I should think of an empirical experiment which would demonstrate the principle using something simple like dice, I'll be sure to describe the experiment. But I'm not going to give myself a headache trying to design one.

 

[Giordano]

I could probably explain well enough that someone who already understands the implication would be able to follow the explanation. However, doing so would only give rise to false Texas sharpshooter charges. So I'll pass on the wonderful opportunity.

However, if at any time I should think of an empirical experiment which would demonstrate the principle using something simple like dice, I'll be sure to describe the experiment. But I'm not going to give myself a headache trying to design one.

You're right, I probably couldn't follow your explanation. So no point in hurting yourself thinking of an actual experiment.

 

[John Jones]

In addition, quoting himself may be giving him the false impression that someone is agreeing with him.

You may be on to something there.

Dear Jabba,

Do you think anyone on this thread agrees with anything you have postulated?

Yes or no will do for now.

.

 

[John Jones]

I could probably explain well enough that someone who already understands the implication would be able to follow the explanation. However, doing so would only give rise to false Texas sharpshooter charges. So I'll pass on the wonderful opportunity.

However, if at any time I should think of an empirical experiment which would demonstrate the principle using something simple like dice, I'll be sure to describe the experiment. But I'm not going to give myself a headache trying to design one.

So you've got nothing but a verbose excuse for having nothing. I'm not surprised to see that nothing has changed. Try using concise prose.

You're welcome!

 

[Mojo]

Identity is not determined by brain chemistry. Identical chemistries, occurring at different spacetime coordinates, or different branches of a multiverse, would result in different "selves".

If everything about two brains was identical, what would cause the results to be different?

Identity is recognizable by the specific spacetime paths of the atoms involved in the chemistry in question. The atoms themselves are identical, therefore interchangeable. The spacetime pattern they form is unique to each individual.

If the patterns they form are not identical, the brains are not identical.

Which helps neither your nor Jabba's position. Neither of you is anywhere near addressing the implications of the conditional probability expressed in Jabba's formula, the kernel of which did not originate with Jabba.

Jabba is nowhere near establishing that the assumptions used in his formula are valid.

I first saw the essential idea expressed in print in a book on pragmatism published @1933.

[citation needed]

 

[Aepervius]

Identity is not determined by brain chemistry. Identical chemistries, occurring at different spacetime coordinates, or different branches of a multiverse, would result in different "selves".

No Actually we might be in agreeement. I rad that too quick. As our knowledge of the brain is, a person is solely dictated by the brain chemistry and neuron pattern & connection at a point in time. Take the same neuron patter and connection & chemistry somewhere else and you would still have an identical person at that point in time. Those two person may evolve differently afterward due to different exposure to the environment, but at that point, they are identical. They are not the SAME person though.

Identity is recognizable by the specific spacetime paths of the atoms involved in the chemistry in question. The atoms themselves are identical, therefore interchangeable. The spacetime pattern they form is unique to each individual.

Yes and no. An identical brain + chemistry would lead to an identical person (tough not the same - pinching one would NOT give pain to the otehr). In practice that does not happen because even twins get to see different events/ chemistry/ random events. But that is not the core of the problem. The core of the problem is that there is a finite number of ways neuron can connect and the chemistry can happen. The core of the problem is not whatever hapenned to the atoms before hand, in fact they could have come from raw materials used in a machine to duplicate a brain chemistry and pattern 1:1, whatever happened to them before is irrelevant.

Which helps neither your nor Jabba's position. Neither of you is anywhere near addressing the implications of the conditional probability expressed in Jabba's formula, the kernel of which did not originate with Jabba. I first saw the essential idea expressed in print in a book on pragmatism published @1933.

There is no implication to be said, as long as the validty of each elemnts is checked first. I could make a bayesian formula implicating something with the existence of fairy using spurious prior probability. So what ? As long as the priors are not checked the conclusion is irrelevant. GIGO principle. That's why before using Bayes you have to make sure of your prior P have at least some validity.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Bob: "X is distinct from Y."
Ted: "There is no evidence that X is distinct from Y."
Bob: "But X just has to be distinct from Y!"
Ted: "Why?"
Bob: "Because the distinction between X and Y is where my favorite Woo goes!"

 

[Jabba]

- Ok. One step at a time.

1. Once I die, there is no bio-chemical recipe, which followed, would bring ME back to life.
- Anyone disagree with that?