Proof of Immortality II

[Akhenaten]

Jabbadano!

 

[John Jones]

I think that the soul is not a product of the physical brain and I think Akhenaten's posts agree with me on this.

Okay, perhaps I should not have used "not" above.

How am I doing?

It's beautiful!

 

[Jabba]

- I suspect that the key at this juncture is how the self -- or sense of self – relates to consciousness.
- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively. This is one of those principles. What’re ya gonna do…?

1. There is a general physical situation (formula/recipe/prescription) that results in what we call consciousness.
2. Each new consciousness brings with it – or, takes on -- a new, particular, sense of self (hereafter, referred to as simply a new, particular "self)".

- It’s #2 causing the problem. I’m claiming that the scientific model should hold that 2.1) each new instance of consciousness naturally involves a new particular self (or, sense of self), 2.2) each of these selves has a different “identity” than does any other self, and 2.3) a particular new identity IS simply a natural part of a new consciousness.
- But then, this difference in identity doesn’t seem to have a bio-chemical explanation – at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.
- Here, it seems to me that our biggest problem is the meaning of "identity." What I mean by identity has nothing to do with the features (or, characteristics) of the person.

- Could be that there is a physics explanation, but that seems to have problems too – which I’ll be happy to discuss if we can ever agree upon (for a moment at least) the bio-chemical issue.

 

[godless dave]

It's 2.2 and 2.3 I have a problem with. I have repeatedly asked you for some kind of evidence or reasoning to justify this claim.

 

[MRC_Hans]

- I suspect that the key at this juncture is how the self -- or sense of self – relates to consciousness.
- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively. This is one of those principles. What’re ya gonna do…?

1. There is a general physical situation (formula/recipe/prescription) that results in what we call consciousness.
2. Each new consciousness brings with it – or, takes on -- a new, particular, sense of self (hereafter, referred to as simply a new, particular "self)".

- It’s #2 causing the problem. I’m claiming that the scientific model should hold that 2.1) each new instance of consciousness naturally involves a new particular self (or, sense of self), 2.2) each of these selves has a different “identity” than does any other self, and 2.3) a particular new identity IS simply a natural part of a new consciousness.
- But then, this difference in identity doesn’t seem to have a bio-chemical explanation – at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.
- Here, it seems to me that our biggest problem is the meaning of "identity." What I mean by identity has nothing to do with the features (or, characteristics) of the person.

- Could be that there is a physics explanation, but that seems to have problems too – which I’ll be happy to discuss if we can ever agree upon (for a moment at least) the bio-chemical issue.

I can't see your problem. Why should each new consciousness NOT involve a separate self?

Hans

 

[Giordano]

- I’m claiming that the scientific model should hold...

So now you are claiming not that this is the scientific or standard model, but what you think the science model should be. Got it. So this is your theory despite what you said last time? And with no evidence? Or citations? And no one who agrees with you that you can name? Got it.

 

[Giordano]

-
- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively. This is one of those principles. What’re ya gonna do…?

As mentioned before, this difficulty in communicating your concept comes from it being wrong. Give up.

 

[Giordano]

... at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.
- Here, it seems to me that our biggest problem is the meaning of "identity." What I mean by identity has nothing to do with the features (or, characteristics) of the person.

- Could be that there is a physics explanation, but that seems to have problems too – which I’ll be happy to discuss if we can ever agree upon (for a moment at least) the bio-chemical issue.

Boy did you get that wrong! Most of us (all of us?) have explained that a duplicated brain does indeed produce an exactly duplicated sense of identity, but any duplicate can not be the same as the original because there are now two,and not one. Physics, (coordinates) differ, not the biochemistry or psychology or sense of identity.

Are you adding your intended explanation of the problems in the physics that you promise to discuss to your ever lengthening list of things you promise to get to, but never have?

 

[Loss Leader]

- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively.

No, the concepts are very easy to communicate effectively. Nearly every religion on earth is framed around similar concepts. Everyone taking part in this discussion has a long, long history of exposure to these concepts. Christians, especially, are cognizant of the idea of the unchanging immortal soul that can be afixed with guilt or salvation.

The problem is not your ability to communicate these concepts, the problem is these concepts are wrong. They are not logical. They are not supported by evidence. In fact, evidence exists that contradicts these concepts.

Your repeated assertion that the scientific model should embrace these concepts does nothing to make them more true.

 

[HighRiser]

- Here, it seems to me that our biggest problem is the meaning of "identity." What I mean by identity has nothing to do with the features (or, characteristics) of the person.

Then what does the identity have to do with? How is the sense of self not a characteristic of a person?

Science says the mind is an emergent property of the brain!

 

[godless dave]

In case my previous comment wasn't clear, the way to get us to accept points 2.2 and 2.3 is to provide evidence supporting them.

 

[carlitos]

And yet here is a link that says a beer's container is very important to the finished product. So, not only are you wrong about metaphysics, you're wrong about how beer is made.

I hope that this doesn't surprise you?

 

[Mojo]

But then, this difference in identity doesn’t seem to have a bio-chemical explanation...

No, it has a spatial and/or chronological explanation, because two brains cannot be in the same place at the same time. The consciousnesses two entirely identical brains produce will be identical, but in different places and/or times. There will be two of them, but they will be identical.

...at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.

Most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will produce a consciousness identical to that produced by that particular brain. The only person, as far as I can see, who thinks that identical brains will produce non-identical consciousnesses is you. And you have provided no reason that they would not be identical.

 

[Akhenaten]

- I suspect that the key at this juncture is how the self -- or sense of self – relates to consciousness.

Your suspicions are unfounded. There is no key. There is no juncture.

All we have going on here is an obdurate refusal to provide evidence of souls.

- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively.

And by the most amazing of coincidences they just happen to be the very concepts and principles that you are trying to communicate.

What are the odds of that happening?

I'll bet they're comparable to the odds of you being the only one unable to grasp the concepts and principles with which everyone else here has been in agreement for almost two years.

This is one of those principles. What’re ya gonna do…?

Why would we do anything other than continue to wonder if you'll ever get the message?

1. There is a general physical situation (formula/recipe/prescription) that results in what we call consciousness.

Apart from the clumsy way you're expressing it, this is trivially obvious. It's about the only thing you've ever been more-or-less right about.

2. Each new consciousness brings with it – or, takes on -- a new, particular, sense of self (hereafter, referred to as simply a new, particular "self)".

- It’s #2 causing the problem.

That's because it's wrong.

Although I'd dare to suggest that the bigger problem is your obsession with repeating it, despite being made aware of its wrongevity many, many months ago.

I’m claiming that the scientific model should hold that 2.1) each new instance of consciousness naturally involves a new particular self (or, sense of self), 2.2) each of these selves has a different “identity” than does any other self, and 2.3) a particular new identity IS simply a natural part of a new consciousness.

No, what you're claiming is that each new self consists of a consciousness + an immortal soul. Unfortunately the impenetrable fog of obfuscation that you've generated to mask this claim has rendered it invisible even to yourself.

- But then, this difference in identity doesn’t seem to have a bio-chemical explanation – at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.

You clearly have not the faintest idea of what most of us think, given that the above statement is its exact opposite.

- Here, it seems to me that our biggest problem is the meaning of "identity."

No, our biggest problem is your refusal to take part in any meaningful discussion, although in truth, it's no biggie.

Your biggest problem is a complete dearth of evidence for immortal souls.

What I mean by identity has nothing to do with the features (or, characteristics) of the person.

Of course it doesn't, since your meaning of identity includes the presence of a soul and the rest of us are well aware that there's no such thing.

- Could be that there is a physics explanation, but that seems to have problems too – which I’ll be happy to discuss if we can ever agree upon (for a moment at least) the bio-chemical issue.

Bio-chemical issues have nothing to do with your ultimate claim. Either you have evidence to support the existence of immortal souls or you don't. "Put up or shut up" would seem to be the way ahead.

 

[godless dave]

- But then, this difference in identity doesn’t seem to have a bio-chemical explanation – at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.

The reason a perfect replica of a particular brain would not produce the same self as the original brain is the same reason one brain cannot be in two skulls. The exact same reason.

 

[John Jones]

- I suspect that the key at this juncture is how the self -- or sense of self – relates to consciousness.
- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively. This is one of those principles. What’re ya gonna do…?

It has been explained to you repeatedly that everyone hear understands what you're trying to convey, but they just don't agree.

If you're going to tell the discipline of science what it ought to hold with, I'll have to see some credentials showing your qualification.

 

[Jabba]

- I suspect that the key at this juncture is how the self -- or sense of self – relates to consciousness.
- I swear that there are concepts and principles that are impossible -- or at least, ALMOST impossible – to communicate effectively. This is one of those principles. What’re ya gonna do…?

1. There is a general physical situation (formula/recipe/prescription) that results in what we call consciousness.
2. Each new consciousness brings with it – or, takes on -- a new, particular, sense of self (hereafter, referred to as simply a new, particular "self)".

- It’s #2 causing the problem. I’m claiming that the scientific model should hold that 2.1) each new instance of consciousness naturally involves a new particular self (or, sense of self), 2.2) each of these selves has a different “identity” than does any other self, and 2.3) a particular new identity IS simply a natural part of a new consciousness.
- But then, this difference in identity doesn’t seem to have a bio-chemical explanation – at least most of us have been thinking that a perfect replica of a particular brain will not produce the same identity as that of the original brain.
- Here, it seems to me that our biggest problem is the meaning of "identity." What I mean by identity has nothing to do with the features (or, characteristics) of the person.

- Could be that there is a physics explanation, but that seems to have problems too – which I’ll be happy to discuss if we can ever agree upon (for a moment at least) the bio-chemical issue.

It's 2.2 and 2.3 I have a problem with. I have repeatedly asked you for some kind of evidence or reasoning to justify this claim.

Dave,
- I think that you had agreed that a bio-chemically perfect replica of my brain would produce an "identical" me, but not the SAME ME -- it wouldn't be ME looking out of two sets of eyes.
- Unfortunately, it's the SAME ME that houses my "identity." The identical me does not. Maybe that has caused the confusion?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I think that you had agreed that a bio-chemically perfect replica of my brain would produce an "identical" me, but not the SAME ME -- it wouldn't be ME looking out of two sets of eyes.
- Unfortunately, it's the SAME ME that houses my "identity." The identical me does not. Maybe that has caused the confusion?

What confusion? I'm denying that this "identity" property exists at all.

The reason it wouldn't be YOU looking out of two sets of eyes is because one brain cannot be in two skulls.

 

[Giordano]

Dave,
- I think that you had agreed that a bio-chemically perfect replica of my brain would produce an "identical" me, but not the SAME ME -- it wouldn't be ME looking out of two sets of eyes.
- Unfortunately, it's the SAME ME that houses my "identity." The identical me does not. Maybe that has caused the confusion?

If you ever seek to end your confusion, just read the other posts here. Including, but not limited to, those by Godless Dave. They have explained this issue extraordinarily well.

 

[Jabba]

In case my previous comment wasn't clear, the way to get us to accept points 2.2 and 2.3 is to provide evidence supporting them.

Dave,
- It's my opinion, so far, that if I could express my position better, you would agree with it and not need any evidence.