Proof of Immortality II

[abaddon]

- And, that perfect copy would be ME?

You continue to miss the point. The ME that exists right now is different from the ME of last month, or last week, or 5 minutes ago or even between when I started this post and posted it.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, have you read the post by xtifr I linked to?
In the meantime, here's a little brain exercise.
Yesterday I brewed a brown ale. I used a recipe I've used many times in the past. My hope is that, in six to eight weeks, if all goes well, I will end up with a beer that tastes exactly like the brown ales I've brewed many times over the last fifteen years.
There is no recipe that I could follow that would bring one of those previous batches back. Once my friends and I have drunk it all, it's gone. All I can hope to do is brew another batch that tastes exactly like it.
With all that in mind, did the batch I brewed yesterday have a 1/infinity likelihood of coming into existence?

xtifr,
- You seem to be accepting that my claim that there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF is true – it just isn’t relevant (to my claims of infinity). Is that correct?

Dave,
- To make your question a little more specific, I would have asked, "Did the same batch as I brewed yesterday have a 1/infinity likelihood of coming back into existence?" Hopefully, that's what you meant -- only, a little more explicit.
- My answer to that question is, "No. It would have a zero chance of coming back into existence."

Jabba, I was trying to draw an analogy with your statement that a particular self has a 1/infinity chance of coming into existence the first time.
So my question is, did the batch I brewed yesterday have a 1/infinity likelihood of coming into existence before I brewed it?

Dave,
- If I understand your question, the answer is, "No -- but, the likelihood would be 1/(a HUMUNGUS number)."

Correct.
So why do you think the likelihood is different for selves?

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

 

[Giordano]

Again I find it interesting that a precisely duplicated Jabba that looks and thinks exactly like him would not, in Jabba's view, bring him "back to life" but that a reincarnation of his "soul" that may think it is Alice Kramden, will not recognize his loved ones, hates all the food and art that he likes, has a different personality, and looks completely differently from Jabba would be close enough to Jabba to reassure him that he has returned to life. In fact, Jabba after repeated questions, cannot even describe what would be reincarnated to assure him that it was him. How would anyone tell it was his soul (even the reincarnated Jabba)?

 

[Giordano]

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

Very wrong- but keep repeating it. It only highlights that you have nothing more to say. If you want to find out why you are wrong, read the other posts here.

Again, does anyone else here agree with Jabba that a "self" as he uses the term does not require a continuing, functional, physical brain?

 

[Akhenaten]

- And, that perfect copy would be ME?

No, it would be a perfect copy of YOU.

For the infinitieth time.

 

[Giordano]

By the way Jabba: of course I have no idea if some of us have been placed on official ignore status on your form preferences, but you do realize that "ignore" doesn't make these posts invisible to others, but only to you? They are displayed like anyone else's on the thread. So you continuing to ignore these posts only makes it look to everyone else like you have no response to them.

 

[Akhenaten]

Very wrong- but keep repeating it. It only highlights that you have nothing more to say. If you want to find out why you are wrong, read the other posts here.

I suspect that a big part of the problem here is that Jabba doesn't want to know why he's wrong.

Again, does anyone else here agree with Jabba that a "self" as he uses the term does not require a continuing, functional, physical brain?

Not one person in the Two Lands has agreed with such nonsense for millennia.

Our beliefs these days are far more sophisticated than that.

 

[John Jones]

Very wrong- but keep repeating it. It only highlights that you have nothing more to say. If you want to find out why you are wrong, read the other posts here.

Again, does anyone else here agree with Jabba that a "self" as he uses the term does not require a continuing, functional, physical brain?

Again, no.

 

[godless dave]

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

There's no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular batch of beer, either.

 

[Mojo]

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

You're trying to insert your claims into your premises again.

 

[pakeha]

- And, that perfect copy would be ME?

Jabba have you forgotten how ME is defined?

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

Jabba, are you really ignorant of the fact that the SELF is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem?

 

[Jabba]

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

There's no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular batch of beer, either.

- That being the case, there is no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to ME. Following my recipe would produce an identical me, but not ME.

 

[Akhenaten]

- That being the case, there is no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to ME. Following my recipe would produce an identical me, but not ME.

Do you even remember what the topic is?

 

[carlitos]

- That being the case, there is no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to ME. Following my recipe would produce an identical me, but not ME.

I'll take non-sequiturs for $400, Alex.

ETA - As always, if you can't make your point without using ALLCAPS, underlines, italics, etc., you probably don't have a point.

 

[godless dave]

- That being the case, there is no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to ME. Following my recipe would produce an identical me, but not ME.

Yes, exactly like following my recipe for Brown Ale a second time.

 

[Akhenaten]

Yes, exactly like following my recipe for Brown Ale a second time.

Dave,

- So you agree with me that Brown Ale is immortal. Is that correct?

 

[Loss Leader]

- That being the case, there is no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to ME. Following my recipe would produce an identical me, but not ME.

Jabba - Do you agree with the following?

If I brew a new batch of beer, it will be different than the first batch. Thus, there is no recipe that exclusively produced the first batch. Thus, there is no finite pool of batches from which the first batch could come from. So, there are an infinite number of ways the first batch could have turned out. The chance of making the first batch under the scientific model is 1/inf, or zero. But the first batch exists. The most likely explanation is that the first batch is immortal.

Do you agree? If you disagree, why?

 

[xtifr]

144

Back to this again? Can't you open multiple tabs in your browser?

xtifr,
- You seem to be accepting that my claim that there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF is true – it just isn’t relevant (to my claims of infinity). Is that correct?

I said it's irrelevant. I certainly don't accept it, since I provided a counterexample that disproves it, but it's irrelevant in any case, so why are we even arguing about it? (Unless you want to try to establish its relevance.)

- And, that perfect copy would be ME?

In the one instance I outlined, yes, for all practical purposes, the copy would be you. There would be no way to tell it wasn't you, or that anything had happened!

No, it would be a copy of you.

No, it really would be you in the case I mentioned.

I want to address this to all the people who responded "no" to Jabba's question about my example.

In general, yes, a separate copy would be a copy. But that's not the case I proposed. In the case I proposed, the copy is created and immediately replaces the original. It's a different set of atoms, but nothing else has changed. In that case, I cannot think of any way in which the copy would not be you.

If anyone can think of a way in which the copy in my example is not you, I'll be interested to hear it.

ETA: The crucial question here (and this is addressed to everyone, not just Jabba) is: how do you distinguish teleportation from copying? Can you distinguish making a copy at a new location from teleporting the original and making the copy at the original location? I say you can't. Can you distinguish simple teleportation from making a copy and destroying the original? I say you can't. And that seems to me to contradict Jabba's statement that there is no "biochemical recipe" that "defines" you. (Although both the words I put in scare quotes are dubious terms to use for what's really going on.)

ETA2: I do understand that teleportation is impossible, but so is making perfect copies of a person. This is all gedankenexperiment.

 

[Giordano]

Post deleted due to lack of context to posts moved to AAH.

 

[Giordano]

No, it really would be you in the case I mentioned.

I want to address this to all the people who responded "no" to Jabba's question about my example.

In general, yes, a separate copy would be a copy. But that's not the case I proposed. In the case I proposed, the copy is created and immediately replaces the original. It's a different set of atoms, but nothing else has changed. In that case, I cannot think of any way in which the copy would not be you.

If anyone can think of a way in which the copy in my example is not you, I'll be interested to hear it.

The duplicate would be (at least in part) different atoms. So is it really Jabba? Part of it had to come from elsewhere (non-Jabba) at the moment of replication. But actually I don't care. The duplicate would think it was Jabba in all ways, but if it were actually Jabba is only a matter of what definition one likes. Am I me even though I replace part of my blood every few weeks? Am I me even though my very bio-molecules are mostly different then when I was 5 years old? Am I my red blood cells or my brain? If my brain, what if I have a brain lesion and I begin to think I am a dog?

Would it be Jabba if he were copied digitally, stored in a hard drive, and reassembled back in the "transporter" only after his original was destroyed? What if his brain and CNS were transplanted into a woman? Define identity using philosophy if one wishes, but I don't think it matters all that much how one defines it. Both examples would think like Jabba at time zero (presumably the woman example would begin to think differently if they looked down).