Prayer and power

[drkitten]

Christianity is based on principles otherwise rationally believed true,

Oh? I think I disagree. If you can actually name those principles and justify them,.... well, let's just say that others before you have tried and failed.

so that definition doesn't seem to work without applying circular logic (that belief in Christianity is based on irrational principles which are irrational because they are based on other irrational principles).

I think I'm asking what defines a principle as being "rationally" believed true.

No, I think I'm willing to stand (informally) behind what I wrote.

There are lots of reasons for believing something that aren't "rational." For example, "believe me or I'll hit you with a big stick" (formally known as argumentem ad baculum). Similarly, "appeal to pity" or "appeal to consequences" (I'll save the pretentious Latin) are not rational reasons for believing in something. In general, a principle is "rationally" believed in if there is legitimate evidence/reason to support it -- but "evidence" here is taken in a much broader sense than simple empiricism.

For example, Paley's argument from design -- "A watch-implies a watch-maker, therefore a universe implies a universe-maker" was quite rational in the early 1800s, and still has some force today. However, to step from this universe-maker to the Christian God was never warranted, even then.

Most Christians probably have reasons to believe, although likely not reason enough for you or I to believe. However, the fact that one might rationally not be convinced by the reasons held for belief that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy doesn't make such a belief irrational.

Of course not. We can "rationally" hold differing beliefs, depending upon our assessment of the degree of support offered by a particular set of evidence, or the credibility of the necessary theoretical scenario to support it. If you tell me that the reason you missed the final is because your car broke down on the way in to campus -- well, I might "rationally" disregard that statement because I've been told that particular lie so many times in the past years of teaching. It lacks credibility (to me), while my first-year colleague down the hall might buy it, either because he's naive or because his experiences with students involved more truthful ones.

However, just because someone has "reasons to believe" doesn't mean they're rational reasons. Pascal's wager, for example, is not a rational reason to believe (despite the fact that it's often presented as one in the apologetics literature), but an elaborate example of the "appeal to consequences" fallacy.

 

[drkitten]

Is it irrational for drkitten's mother to believe that drkitten hasn't lied to her without evidence to the contrary?

Bri, please re-read the claim:

It's theoretically possible that I might have flown to Monte Carlo last weekend and won fifty billion Euros. It violates no law of physics. It is immensely implausible, to the point where any rational observer would dismiss it out of hand without further supporting evidence.

The central problem, and what makes it implausible to the point that my mother should dismiss me out of hand, is not the trip to Monaco.

It's the fifty billion euros in winnings. No casino -- or set of casinos, for that matter -- has that kind of money lying around. The largest casino company in the world -- Las Vegas Sands, IIRC -- has a market capitalization of a little more than ten billion euros. And that's market capitalization, not cash reserves. No casino in its right mind -- and they're professional companies that are very much into their right minds -- would accept a bet for that kind of money precisely because there's no way they could pay it off. Tables have maximums for a reason, and a typical table maximum is less than 10,000 Euro.

The point is not that winning in Monte is so improbable. But winning that much in a casino, anywhere, is so improbable that it goes right through to the other side and surfaces at "unbelievable" and "can be rejected out of hand."

 

[I less than three logic]

Sorry, it wasn't a lack of sense of humor -- just a lack of use of smilies. I was joking myself (the first paragraph anyway).

Oh, ok. Reads much better when I know it was a joke then.

Is it irrational for drkitten's mother to believe that drkitten hasn't lied to her without evidence to the contrary?

Possibly, it seems to be human nature to lie sometimes. In fact, to always tell the truth in every situation can, at times, be considered socially unacceptable.

I agree, which is pretty much my point. I wouldn't necessarily say that drkitten's mother's belief is irrational without more evidence that drkitten is lying despite the lack of evidence that drkitten is telling the truth.

-Bri

Well, as Sagan said, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I don’t think someone’s word on such a claim is quite enough. Perhaps her mother is just a bit gullible when it comes to DrK’s claims.


ETA – Guess I didn’t read the claim well enough either. Fifty billion? Yeah, there is much more to consider now.

 

[drkitten]

ETA – Guess I didn’t read the claim well enough either. Fifty billion? Yeah, there is much more to consider now.

I probably should have highlighted the amount.

Basically, I can think of at least four independent criteria that will make a belief "irrational." Independent in the logical, not the probabilistic, sense, because they of course mostly correlate.

But I'd be happy calling a belief irrational if it did any of the following

• contradicted well-established empirical observations
• contradicted well-established theory without strong direct empirical support
• was theoretically possible only with negligible probability, and again without empirical support
• was based on no rational supporting evidence of any sort

A belief can be irrational because it's theoretically wrong. But it can also be practially wrong, or in other words theoretically possible -- but only in theory. In theory, there's no limit to the amount I can win on a casino trip. You'd probably believe me if I claimed to have won a hundred or so. Mum certainly would. But that doesn't mean you'll believe any number I throw out.

 

[Bri]

There are lots of reasons for believing something that aren't "rational."

I agree that not all reasons are rational. However, there are likely reasons given by Christians for belief in prayer that aren't logically irrational. There are also reasons for belief in intelligent life elsewhere in the galaxy that are based on logical fallacy.

For example, "believe me or I'll hit you with a big stick" (formally known as argumentem ad baculum). Similarly, "appeal to pity" or "appeal to consequences" (I'll save the pretentious Latin) are not rational reasons for believing in something. In general, a principle is "rationally" believed in if there is legitimate evidence/reason to support it -- but "evidence" here is taken in a much broader sense than simple empiricism.

For example, Paley's argument from design -- "A watch-implies a watch-maker, therefore a universe implies a universe-maker" was quite rational in the early 1800s, and still has some force today. However, to step from this universe-maker to the Christian God was never warranted, even then.

I agree that to step from this universe-maker to the Christian God may not be warranted (although I'm not certain that such a step is never warranted). However, even if holding a particular opinion isn't warranted (i.e. there isn't enough evidence to support the opinion), it isn't necessarily irrational either (i.e. there isn't enough evidence against the opinion to make the opinion irrational). Some would consider it unwarranted to hold an opinion that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy without more evidence, but wouldn't consider the belief irrational.

However, just because someone has "reasons to believe" doesn't mean they're rational reasons. Pascal's wager, for example, is not a rational reason to believe (despite the fact that it's often presented as one in the apologetics literature), but an elaborate example of the "appeal to consequences" fallacy.

I agree that not all reasons for belief are rational. Likewise, not all reasons for belief are irrational.

Pascal's wager may be a false dichotomy (because it is premised on certain assumptions about God), but does not seem to be an example of appeal to consequences (an argument that concludes a premise to be either true or false based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences).

Pascal's wager is not an argument for the existence of God, but rather one for the belief in God. Pascal's wager doesn't question whether God's existence is true or false, but rather whether or not it is rational to believe that God exists based on the consequences of belief vs. non-belief. See this Wikipedia article under the section "Decision-theoretic arguments:"

However, the second inequality holds only if one regards the benefits of an ill-founded belief in God to be no less than those from a well-founded disbelief in God. This is patently a matter of personal choice. Many people maintain they do indeed get tangible benefits here and now from their belief in God, and that these exceed those that would accrue from not having such a belief (e.g. no requirement for regular observance of religious practices). On the other hand, many agnostics would argue the opposite case. The analysis shows atheists are not absolved from having to assess the utilities through setting P = 0; they must also be confident that d > b.

It would seem that one rational reason for belief in God is that the tangible benefits here and now are no less those that would accrue from not having such a belief.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

It's the fifty billion euros in winnings. No casino -- or set of casinos, for that matter -- has that kind of money lying around.

Well, I admit that I didn't notice the amount given. In that case, there seems to be strong empirical evidence against the belief that you won that much money. We were talking about beliefs for which there is little or no empirical evidence.

The point is not that winning in Monte is so improbable. But winning that much in a casino, anywhere, is so improbable that it goes right through to the other side and surfaces at "unbelievable" and "can be rejected out of hand."

I agree, but there is no such evidence that prayer never works or that intelligent life doesn't exist elsewhere in the galaxy.

-Bri

 

[I less than three logic]

It would seem that one rational reason for belief in God is that the tangible benefits here and now are no less those that would accrue from not having such a belief.

-Bri

Sounds like confirmation bias.

 

[drkitten]

I agree that not all reasons are rational. However, there are likely reasons given by Christians for belief in prayer that aren't logically irrational.

Cool. If you can name one, you will be the first apologist in Christian history to do so.

Pascal's wager may be a false dichotomy (because it is premised on certain assumptions about God), but does not seem to be an example of appeal to consequences (an argument that concludes a premise to be either true or false based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences).

No, it's a statement that you should believe X because you will (may) benefit from believing X. Not because X is true. That's an "appeal to consequences."

Any statement that tells you that you should believe in something for any other reason that because it is true is fallacious -- and irrational.

It would seem that one rational reason for belief in God is that the tangible benefits here and now are no less those that would accrue from not having such a belief.

That might indeed be rational if it were true -- but it's demonstrably untrue. See any of the threads in the past several years about "what harm can come from religion?" or the "Statistical argument" section of the Wikipedia article you cite.

And, of course, it wouldn't even be rational if the assumption were true; the classic Damager-god counter argument to Pascal's wager -- the God I hypothesize will give you infinite joy only if you don't believe in the Christian God, but will give you infinite pain if you do. You have no rational basis for choosing between the Christian God and the Damager-god, and therefore belief is not Pareto-superior to nonbelief.

 

[drkitten]

Well, I admit that I didn't notice the amount given. In that case, there seems to be strong empirical evidence against the belief that you won that much money.

Nope. Only a theoreticalargument about the improbability of the event described. I could theoretically win 50 billion euros in a few days of constant high-odds betting and never losing at a high-stakes table. We also know, theoretically, that casino employees do make mistakes, so I have no reason to be certain that the pit boss would cut me off when he was supposed to. Empirically, all I know is that no one we've observed has ever done it. We don't even have reason to assume that we would know about it if it happened.

.

I agree, but there is no such evidence that prayer never works or that intelligent life doesn't exist elsewhere in the galaxy.

You're right that there is no such evidence that intelligent life doesn't exist elsewhere in the galaxy; we haven't observed enough to guage the probability.

We do know that prayer doesn't work, because we've done the experiments often enough that we can guage the probability of petitionary prayer being effective at the Monte Carlo odds.

 

[Bri]

Sounds like confirmation bias.

Confirmation bias (at least according to Wikipedia) is a tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions, leading to statistical errors. Essentially, it is the tendency to seek evidence to confirm rather than to deny a hypotheses.

In the case of Pascal's wager, no assumption is made about the existence of non-existence of God. The argument is that it is rational to believe in God if one regards belief in God to result in no less tangible benefit than non-belief.

-Bri

 

[I less than three logic]

Confirmation bias (at least according to Wikipedia) is a tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions, leading to statistical errors. Essentially, it is the tendency to seek evidence to confirm rather than to deny a hypotheses.

In the case of Pascal's wager, no assumption is made about the existence of non-existence of God. The argument is that it is rational to believe in God if one regards belief in God to result in no less tangible benefit than non-belief.

-Bri

My comment had nothing to do, directly, with Pascal's wager. It was about this part.

Many people maintain they do indeed get tangible benefits here and now from their belief in God, and that these exceed those that would accrue from not having such a belief (e.g. no requirement for regular observance of religious practices). On the other hand, many agnostics would argue the opposite case.

From which you seemed to draw the conclusion that:

It would seem that one rational reason for belief in God is that the tangible benefits here and now are no less those that would accrue from not having such a belief.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Nope. Only a theoreticalargument about the improbability of the event described. I could theoretically win 50 billion euros in a few days of constant high-odds betting and never losing at a high-stakes table. We also know, theoretically, that casino employees do make mistakes, so I have no reason to be certain that the pit boss would cut me off when he was supposed to. Empirically, all I know is that no one we've observed has ever done it. We don't even have reason to assume that we would know about it if it happened.

I think that we can guage the probability to be very small if for no other reason than because we know the odds of winning that much money at Monte Carlo (not to mention the other factors involved).

You're right that there is no such evidence that intelligent life doesn't exist elsewhere in the galaxy; we haven't observed enough to guage the probability.

Exactly my point. Now, what evidence do you have to gauge the probability that the Christian belief in prayer works?

We do know that prayer doesn't work, because we've done the experiments often enough that we can guage the probability of petitionary prayer being effective at the Monte Carlo odds.

There is no reason to assume that there would be evidence of prayer working, just as there is no reason to assume that there would be evidence that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy.

On the other hand, there is evidence of the odds of winning that much money in Monte Carlo.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

My comment had nothing to do, directly, with Pascal's wager. It was about this part.

Your point is well-taken, and it is certainly possible that someone incorrectly believes that they benefit at least as much from belief in God than they would from non-belief.

However, unless you can show that they don't really benefit at least as much from belief in God as they would from non-belief, it seems that such a belief might be rational.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Cool. If you can name one, you will be the first apologist in Christian history to do so.

I doubt that I would be the first to name one. Many people maintain they do indeed get tangible benefits here and now from their belief in prayer (such as prayer helping them to cope with illness, etc). I believe that elliotfc has listed some in this very thread. On the other hand, what benefits do people claim to receive from belief that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy?

No, it's a statement that you should believe X because you will (may) benefit from believing X. Not because X is true. That's an "appeal to consequences."

Not according to Wikipedia. An appeal to consequences would be an argument that X is true because of the benefits gained by belief in X. Pascal's wager doesn't qualify since it doesn't argue that X (belief in God) is true.

Any statement that tells you that you should believe in something for any other reason that because it is true is fallacious -- and irrational.

That might be a different fallacy, but it's not appeal to consequences (nor any fallacy that I know of). Furthermore, it seems that we all believe things for reasons other than that they are true (these beliefs are usually termed "opinions"). Not all such beliefs are considered irrational.

That might indeed be rational if it were true -- but it's demonstrably untrue. See any of the threads in the past several years about "what harm can come from religion?" or the "Statistical argument" section of the Wikipedia article you cite.

If you're going to argue that religion has direct and opportunity costs, so do other beliefs that are considered rational. How much time, energy, computing power, etc. that is spent on the SETI project? Does that indicate that the belief in the existence in communicating intelligent life elsewhere in the galaxy is irrational? Furthermore, there is very little cost to reciting a brief prayer for a loved one who is sick. Does that make such a belief rational?

And, of course, it wouldn't even be rational if the assumption were true; the classic Damager-god counter argument to Pascal's wager -- the God I hypothesize will give you infinite joy only if you don't believe in the Christian God, but will give you infinite pain if you do. You have no rational basis for choosing between the Christian God and the Damager-god, and therefore belief is not Pareto-superior to nonbelief.

What you are stating here is the false dilemma I acknowledged is inherent in Pascal's wager (it assumes some specific attributes of God). This is the same false dilemma posed by your counter argument, which is outlined in the "Assumes God rewards belief" and "Assumes only Christianity makes such a claim" section of the Wikipedia article.

-Bri

 

[I less than three logic]

Now, what evidence do you have to gauge the probability that the Christian belief in prayer works?

The fact that doing so would violate the first law of thermodynamics is enough for me to consider the idea irrational without substantial proof.

Even for something as insignificant as God picking up a small rock would violate the law. If I pick up the rock, I am giving the rock potential energy. That energy is ultimately derived from a very small amount of matter being converted into energy within the Sun, and through a very long and complex series of conversions I have put some of that energy into the rock.

God, by definition, does not seem to be a part of this universe. If he were to pick up the same rock he would be adding energy, however small, to this universe, thus violating a very well-founded principle within science. Any and all actions within the universe require energy of some sort, whether it be picking up a rock or killing cancer cells. So any action performed within this universe by God would violate that law.

Perhaps when someone invents perpetual energy, I might be slightly more lenient.

 

[drkitten]

I doubt that I would be the first to name one. Many people maintain they do indeed get tangible benefits here and now from their belief in prayer (such as prayer helping them to cope with illness, etc).

They do indeed. I have reason -- strong reason -- to believe them to be mistaken, as has amply been demonstrated elsewhere.

On the other hand, what benefits do people claim to receive from belief that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy?

Not relevant. See below.

If you're going to argue that religion has direct and opportunity costs, so do other beliefs that are considered rational.

Again, not relevant.

I don't think I ever made the argument that you should believe in SETI because of the benefits it gives you. That's a classic "appeal to consequences" fallacy. (Either you are wrong, or Wikipedia is -- and I frankly don't much care which. Your causistic attempt to try to distinguish and argument for believing in something vs. an argument that something is true is another fallacy, that of equivocation, since to "believe" something is to hold it to be true. They're equivalent if you look at it. If you want me to believe it, you want me to think it's true, so to try to convince me to believe something it to try to convince me of its truth.)

So the question of whether or not SETI comes with opportunity costs -- or whether people get benefits from that belief -- are irrelevant to the question of whether the ET life actually exists.

However, you claimed -- fallaciously, as I pointed out -- that belief in God is justified if that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. It's fallacious because it's an appeal to consequences. But it's also simply an argument that rests on a false premise.

 

[drkitten]

There is no reason to assume that there would be evidence of prayer working,

Er, wrong. 2000 years of theological writing assures me of exactly that.

 

[Bri]

Er, wrong. 2000 years of theological writing assures me of exactly that.

Reference, please. It seems to me that in order to assume that there would be evidence of prayer working, a Christian would have to believe that all prayers are granted (specifically, those that have been tested).

-Bri

 

[Bri]

They do indeed. I have reason -- strong reason -- to believe them to be mistaken, as has amply been demonstrated elsewhere.

Where has it elsewhere been amply demonstrated that those people who maintain that they get tangible benefits here and now from their belief in prayer are mistaken?

I don't think I ever made the argument that you should believe in SETI because of the benefits it gives you. That's a classic "appeal to consequences" fallacy. (Either you are wrong, or Wikipedia is -- and I frankly don't much care which. Your causistic attempt to try to distinguish and argument for believing in something vs. an argument that something is true is another fallacy, that of equivocation, since to "believe" something is to hold it to be true. They're equivalent if you look at it. If you want me to believe it, you want me to think it's true, so to try to convince me to believe something it to try to convince me of its truth.)

I pointed out that Pascal's wager does not attempt to prove the existence of God, and therefore does not qualify for the "appeal to consequences" fallacy. Simply arguing that a belief is rational is not the same as arguing that it is true. The two are not equivalent.

So the question of whether or not SETI comes with opportunity costs -- or whether people get benefits from that belief -- are irrelevant to the question of whether the ET life actually exists.

My comments were in response to your citation of the "Statistical argument" section of the Wikipedia article I cited. That section concerns the fact that:

The wager fails to mention any costs relating to belief. It is argued that there may be both direct costs (time, health, wealth) and opportunity costs. Most modern religions require their followers to spend time attending religious services at temples and to donate money to these temples when possible so that they can be maintained. As a result, if a person believes in a God that does not exist, then that person has lost time and money that could have been used for some other purpose.

The implication of this argument is that the costs aren't taken into account when looking at the benefits of belief in God. This argument claims that Pascal's wager is invalid because the costs associated with belief in God presumably outweigh the benefits. So, I'm not certain what the purpose was of your pointing me to this section of the article, but if you were implying that the costs of belief in God make such belief irrational, you would have to also calculate costs in relation to the SETI project in order to determine whether it is irrational to believe in communicating intelligent life elsewhere in the galaxy.

However, you claimed -- fallaciously, as I pointed out -- that belief in God is justified if that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. It's fallacious because it's an appeal to consequences. But it's also simply an argument that rests on a false premise.

Please be clear that you brought up Pascal's wager, not me. I did not mean to imply that belief in God is justified because of Pascal's wager. I said that because some Christians might use Pascal's wager to justify their belief in God doesn't indicate that all reasons Christians may have for belief are irrational.

That said, Pascal's wager (since you brought it up) brings up a valid point, which is that perhaps in the absence of evidence either way, a belief may be rational if its benefit is at least as great as the benefit of holding the opposite belief.

-Bri

 

[I less than three logic]

Bri, your argument with Pascal's wager seems to be that it can be rational to believe something because of rational conclusions drawn from fallacious arguments.