Prayer and power

[ceo_esq]

Not everything. Not by a long stretch. Please see false dichotomy.

I'm at home in the back yard.
I have three visitors.

1.) The Probation officer knocks on my front door I don't want him to know I'm home so I sneak off and hide in the bushes hoping that if he comes back he won't see me.

2.) My neighbor knocks on the door. I don't care if he knows that I'm home. I don't care enough to go to the front and let him know I'm home and I don't care enough to hide in the bushes. If he sees me fine. If he doesn't fine.

3.) Heidi Klum knocks on my door. I jump to my feet and run around the house with visions of sugar plumbs dancing in my head.

It can't be said that I either want my visitors to know that I'm home or that I don't want them to know that I'm home.

Your argument is demonstrably fallacious.

I disagree. If for some reason the Law of the Excluded Middle doesn't seem to apply, it's because the predicates haven't been adequately defined.

When you say "Not wanting someone to know is most certainly not the same as not caring if one knows", you're using an inexact, though common, sense of "not wanting someone to know" that basically equates to "wanting someone not to know". Technically, however, "not wanting someone to know" describes everything (including but not limited to complete indifference) other than actually wanting someone to know. So formally speaking, not caring one way or the other is a subset of not wanting.

That is, I believe, what Hyver was getting at, and he was correct.

 

[Hyver]

It can't be said that I either want my visitors to know that I'm home or that I don't want them to know that I'm home.

You're right, my initial statement (God wants/doesnt want us to know about him) has a lack of specificity preventing it from forming a proper dichotomy. If we are to take each of your examples and create a specific statement (I do not want the probation officer to know that I am at my house exactly in the instance for only this moment) we could probably specify properly to make it into a dichotomy.

I then propose the statement "God at this very moment in time does want me, and me alone to have evidence of his existence without any exertion of effort on my part to obtain said evidence, or it is not the case that God at this very moment in time does want me, and me alone to have evidence of his existence without any exertion of effort on my part to obtain said evidence." in replacement of my previous statement 5.

When you say "Not wanting someone to know is most certainly not the same as not caring if one knows", you're using an inexact, though common, sense of "not wanting someone to know" that basically equates to "wanting someone not to know". Technically, however, "not wanting someone to know" describes everything (including but not limited to complete indifference) other than actually wanting someone to know. So formally speaking, not caring one way or the other is a subset of not wanting.

that actually was what I was getting at, thank you for stating it more eloquently.

 

[RandFan]

When you say "Not wanting someone to know is most certainly not the same as not caring if one knows", you're using an inexact, though common, sense of "not wanting someone to know" that basically equates to "wanting someone not to know".

No, "not caring" is null. It is neutral. It is neither wanting or not wanting. You are incorrectly equating a neutral response to "not wanting". I could as easily assign a neutral response to not not wanting.

Neutral != wanting.
Neutral != not wanting.

The 3 possibilities are:

1. God wants.
2. God does not want.
3. God is indifferent.

 

[RandFan]

...that actually was what I was getting at, thank you for stating it more eloquently.

Unfortunately it fails. (see above)

 

[RandFan]

Now for something completly different.

• John is afraid of Steve.
• John wishes to speak to whoever is in charge.
• The person in charge is Steve.

? So, does John Want to talk to Steve or not?

I will grant that God would likely not be afraid and also would likely not be conflicted. However this clearly belies the notion that everything other than wanting is a subset of not wanting.

 

[Hyver]

No, "not caring" is null. It is neutral. It is neither wanting or not wanting. You are incorectly equating a neutral response as "not wanting". I could as easily assign a neutral response as not not wanting.

Neutral != wanting.
Neutral != not wanting.

we seem to have a difference in opinion as to what is implied by "not".

When I say "It is not the case that I want a candy bar" I imply only that the statement "I want a candy bar" is false. whatever it is that falsifies that statement doesn't matter. All that matters is that the statement "I want a candy bar" is not true. It is a passive denial of the phrase "I want a candy bar". If I were to say "I do not want a candy bar" It is a statement of truth rather than a denial of another statement.

When I set up a dichotomy "I want a candy bar or it is not the case that I want a candy bar" there are two options. Option 1 says that I want a candy bar, option two is accurate in every other possible emotional state which does not include "I want a candy bar".

As for the Steve-John conflict, I don't know. I'll assume that being afraid will be similar to not wanting to talk to. If that's the case it would be true that John wants to talk to Steve (in the active sense), and that John does not want to talk to Steve(in the active sense), but not true in either of the passive senses (it is not the case that John wants to talk to Steve, and it is not the case that John does not want to talk to Steve). Atleast that's how I read it anyway.

 

[RandFan]

we seem to have a difference in opinion as to what is implied by "not".

It's the programing in me. We use null values all of the time. It gives you an intuitive understanding of neutral values.

When I say "It is not the case that I want a candy bar" I imply only that the statement "I want a candy bar" is false.

Ok, but what about when I say "it is not the case that I want a candy bar and it is not the case that I don't want a candy bar".

In your world their is no indifference. The problem is that the world is full of indifference. such neutral values have been understood for thousands of years.

I would that thou wert cold or hot. So then, because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew thee out of my mouth. Rev 3:15-16

When I set up a dichotomy "I want a candy bar or it is not the case that I want a candy bar" there are two options. Option 1 says that I want a candy bar, option two is accurate in every other possible emotional state which does not include "I want a candy bar".

And that is the problem, you are denying that it is possible to be indifferent. That is precisely why it is a false dichotomy. You can't exclude the possibility that an entity can be indifferent.

in·dif·fer·ent
adj.

1. Having no particular interest or concern; apathetic: indifferent to the sufferings of others.
2. Having no marked feeling for or against: She remained indifferent toward their proposal.
3. Not mattering one way or the other: It's indifferent to me which outfit you choose.
4. Characterized by a lack of partiality; unbiased: an indifferent judge.
5. Being neither too much nor too little; moderate.
6. Being neither good nor bad; mediocre: an indifferent performance. See Synonyms at average.
7. Being neither right nor wrong.
8. Not active or involved; neutral: an indifferent chemical in a reaction.
9. Biology. Undifferentiated, as cells or tissue.

Reading the definitions do you see my point?

As for the Steve-John conflict, I don't know. I'll assume that being afraid will be similar to not wanting to talk to. If that's the case it would be true that John wants to talk to Steve (in the active sense), and that John does not want to talk to Steve(in the active sense), but not true in either of the passive senses (it is not the case that John wants to talk to Steve, and it is not the case that John does not want to talk to Steve). Atleast that's how I read it anyway.

No need to make it all that complicated. Steve is conflicted wanting and not wanting simultaneously. It is a very real possibility as to humans and logic. We are not computers. But we can have null values.

 

[ceo_esq]

1.) I could simply not care if anyone knew I was home.
2.) I could want everyone to know I was home.
3.) I could not want anyone to know that I was home.

#1 is neutral.
#2 is affirmative.
#3 Is negative.

That is correct, but no one is disputing that. No one is saying that something must be either affirmative or negative in the sense you mean above.

You don't seem to have grasped my point, which that is you are interpreting "Not wanting X" as "Wanting the opposite of X", and indeed the phrase is often used that way. Note how in your example you've actually had to resort to an inconsistency in defining "X": in #1 and #3 you use the word "anyone" and in #2 you say "everyone", which subtly changes the meaning.

In order to reason this properly, let's not be changing X around. Let X be a state of affairs where everybody knows I'm home. "I want X" will be either true or false, as Hyver suggested it must be:

1. If I want everybody to know I'm home, it's obviously true that "I want X".
2. If I want only some people to know I'm home, or don't care at all, then it's false that "I want X".
3. If there is nobody that I want to know I'm home, then it's also false that "I want X".

It can be the case that A is B, or that A is not B, but as long as A (the subject) and B (the predicate) are being adequately and consistently defined in both cases, then as we say in logic, tertium non datur. There is no third option. In your example above, there really isn't a third kind of possibility; the "neutral" and "negative" cases are both examples belonging to the same category. (This has nothing to do with not recognizing indifference or neutrality.)

Recall that, as I said, Hyver was using "not wanting X" it in the stricter way that logicians do, meaning simply, and accurately, the absence of wanting X. I may feel neutrally or negatively about X, but these are both subsets of the absence of wanting X (as distinguished from "wanting the opposite of X").

There is not, as you suggest, a separate "logic about wanting something". There's just a common linguistic ambiguity in "not wanting something", and (without realizing it, I think) you are exploiting that ambiguity to suggest that Hyver was wrong, when in fact he was simply adhering to a different sense of "not wanting" (and by reference to that sense, he was entirely right).

ETA: By the time I posted this, I saw that Hyver tried to point out the language problem.

 

[RandFan]

In order to reason this properly, let's not be changing X around. Let X be a state of affairs where everybody knows I'm home. "I want X" will be either true or false, as Hyver suggested it must be:

But you are excluding the possibility that you could be indifferent to X.

I want X
I don't want X
I'm indifferent to X

1. If I want everybody to know I'm home, it's obviously true that "I want X".
2. If I want only some people to know I'm home, or don't care at all, then it's false that "I want X".
3. If there is nobody that I want to know I'm home, then it's also false that "I want X".

Again, you are excluding indifference. Indifference is defined as neither wanting or not wanting. Yet you are equating it to not wanting. This makes no sense. Please see the definitions above.

There is not, as you suggest, a separate "logic about wanting something".

I'm not suggesting a separate "logic" about anything. I'm simply telling you that there is such a thing as a neutral response. Indifference is defined as neither for or against.

You are now telling me that indifference is against. Not by definition it is not.

 

[Hyver]

It's the programing in me. We use null values all of the time. It gives you an intuitive understanding of neutral values.



Ok, but what about when I say "it is not the case that I want a candy bar and it is not the case that I don't want a candy bar".

In your world their is no indifference. The problem is that the world is full of indifference. such neutral values have been understood for thousands of years.



And that is the problem, you are denying that it is possible to be indifferent. That is precisely why it is a false dichotomy. You can't exclude the possibility that an entity can be indifferent.

Reading the definitions do you see my point?

No need to make it all that complicated. Steve is conflicted wanting and not wanting simultaneously. It is a very real possibility as to humans and logic. We are not computers. But we can have null values.

well, atleast we can agree on something now. I am not in anyway trying to say there are not null values (I would retract my statement saying "Something is either true, or it's not true." That was too black and white and didn't really say what I wanted it to say anyway). I fully agree with you that people can be indifferent. In no way, however, does the dichotomy "I want a candy bar or it is not the case that I want a candy bar" deny indifference. All that it does is set up two possible scenarios. In the first statement is encapsilated all possible worlds in which the idea "I want a candy bar" is true. Every other possible world, those that are null, those that are indifferent, those in which I don't even exist, cause the statement to be true via the second part.

let's change it around a bit. "Pete wants a candy bar, or it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar". That statement is always true. always. If we erased everything from the universe so we just had empty space it would still be true. If Pete were indifferent then it would not be the case that he wanted the candy bar, he would of course be indifferent to the idea. If Pete hated candy bars and didn't want one, it would still be true becouse it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar. If candy bars didn't exist then it would still be true becouse Pete would not even have a notion of what a candy bar is. The statement is always true.

 

[RandFan]

Note how in your example you've actually had to resort to an inconsistency in defining "X": in #1 and #3 you use the word "anyone" and in #2 you say "everyone", which subtly changes the meaning.

Fair enough. Let's forgoe any ambiguity.

1. God wants.
2. God does not want.
3. God is indifferent.

 

[Hyver]

ok, lets redo the origional argument only I will set up a 3 part or statement as step 5, the argument turns out the same only instead of proving that "It is not the case that God wants me to know about him" it will prove "It is not the case that God wants me to know about him, or God is indifferent to my knowledge of him" Is that more satisfying to you?

In the end it proved the same thing, one might be easier to read than the other, but that was all that was being implied to begin with.

edit: reading back at my first post, it was very vague, and you were absolutly right to question the validity of the language.

 

[RandFan]

All that it does is set up two possible scenarios. In the first statement is encapsilated all possible worlds in which the idea "I want a candy bar" is true. Every other possible world, those that are null, those that are indifferent, those in which I don't even exist, cause the statement to be true via the second part.

Let's turn it around.

"I don't want a candy bar" is true. Every other possible world, those that are null, those that are indifferent, those in which I don't even exist, cause the statement to be true via the second part.

"Pete wants a candy bar, or it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar".

False dichotomy.

1.) Pete wants a candy bar.
2.) Pete doesn't want a candy bar.
3.) Pete is indifferent to having or not having a candy bar.

That statement is always true. always.

No, it is a false dichotomy. It is possible for me to, as the dictionary says, have "no marked feeling for or against".

 

[RandFan]

ok, lets redo the origional argument only I will set up a 3 part or statement as step 5, the argument turns out the same only instead of proving that "It is not the case that God wants me to know about him" it will prove "It is not the case that God wants me to know about him, or God is indifferent to my knowledge of him" Is that more satisfying to you?

In the end it proved the same thing, one might be easier to read than the other, but that was all that was being implied to begin with.

edit: reading back at my first post, it was very vague, and you were absolutly right to question the validity of the language.

I have no idea what you are getting at.

 

[Hyver]

Let's turn it around.

"I don't want a candy bar" is true. Every other possible world, those that are null, those that are indifferent, those in which I don't even exist, cause the statement to be true via the second part.

So your statement looks like this. "Pete does not want the the candy bar, or it is not the case that pete does not want the candy bar"

When pete is activly not wanting the candy bar, it is true via the first part, when pete is not activly not wanting the candy bar it is also true.
Let's actually flip it around, by puting a not infront of the whole thing and see what happens.

"Pete wants the candy bar, or it is not the case that pete wants the candy bar"

I'm going to simplify this to "A or not A". You are telling me that "It's not that case that A or not A". If that were true then it would also be true that "Not A and A" is true, becouse that's what happens when you negate a disjunction. (example, "it is a dog or a cat", negated becomes "it is niether a dog nor a cat.") So you are comited to the statement "It is not the case that pete wants a candy bar, and it is not the case that it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar." That statement is patently absurd.

 

[RandFan]

I'm going to simplify this to "A or not A".

This is where you are making your mistake. "A or not A or null".

You are telling me that "It's not that case that A or not A". If that were true then it would also be true that "Not A and A" is true, becouse that's what happens when you negate a disjunction. (example, "it is a dog or a cat", negated becomes "it is niether a dog nor a cat.")

Yeah, and I have a bird which is neither a dog nor a cat. To be fair you should have siad It is a dog or it is not a dog.

So you are comited to the statement "It is not the case that pete wants a candy bar, and it is not the case that it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar." That statement is patently absurd.

No, I'm committed to the statement, It is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar and it is not the case that Pete doesn't want a candy bar. Pete is indifferent. As the dictionary says Pete has "no marked feeling for or against".

 

[RandFan]

Let me try this.

You ask Pete if he wants a candy bar and he says that he doesn't care. He says you can leave it on the desk in which case he will eat it or you can take it with you in which case he won't.

Does Pete want or not want the candy bar? Remember, you can only choose one.

 

[RandFan]

Recall that, as I said, Hyver was using "not wanting X" it in the stricter way that logicians do, meaning simply, and accurately, the absence of wanting X. I may feel neutrally or negatively about X, but these are both subsets of the absence of wanting X (as distinguished from "wanting the opposite of X").

1
X = The ignorance by people of Gods existence.
God wants X.
Neutral or negative are both subsets of the absence of wanting X.
By this logic neutrality would dictate that God wants us to know that he exists.

2
X = Knowledge of God's existence.
God wants X.
Neutral or negative are both subsets of the absence of wanting X.
By this logic neutrality would dictate that God does not want us to now that he exists.

 

[Hyver]

This is where you are making your mistake. "A or not A or null".

No, for the statement which I'm using as an example, "A or not A" will do.

Yeah, and I have a bird which is neither a dog nor a cat. To be fair you should have siad It is a dog or it is not a dog.

No, I don't really care about how that turns out, becouse I was just using it as a common language way to show what happens when you negate a disjunction.

No, I'm committed to the statement, It is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar and it is not the case that Pete doesn't want a candy bar. Pete is indifferent. As the dictionary says Pete has "no marked feeling for or against".

Right, but you are now using a straw man. I'm not saying that "Pete wants a candy bar or pete doesn't want a candy bar" is a dichotomy. I made that mistake and corrected it in another post. The current disjunction "Pete wants a candy bar or it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar" is an accurate representation.

As I said before, if you want to claim that the above statement is a false dichotomy then you must be wedded to the position that the opposite is true, that is, the statement "It is not the case that the disjunction "Pete wants a candy bar or it is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar"". If we use DeMorgan's Law to rewrite this we get "It is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar and it is not the case that it is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar." If we call "It is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar" A, then we have "A and not A". "A and not A" is a contradiction, which is why you are wrong that the origional statement about pete was wrong.

 

[RandFan]

The current disjunction "Pete wants a candy bar or it is not the case that pete wants a candy bar" is an accurate representation.

As I said before, if you want to claim that the above statement is a false dichotomy then you must be wedded to the position that the opposite is true, that is, the statement "It is not the case that the disjunction "Pete wants a candy bar or it is not the case that Pete wants a candy bar"".

No, if I want to claim that the above statement is a false dichotomy then I must demonstrate that there are more options.

False choice

The fallacy of this type of argument is that it tries to eliminate the middle ground. A typical false choice is the assertion "You are either with me or you are against me." The chooser is forced to decide between absolute commitment or absolute non-commitment. Thus, the possibility of compromise is discounted. Such absolutism is applicable in science and mathematics, in which problems can have one and only one solution. In philosophy, however, there are few if any absolutes.

Instead of stating that "Pete wants an apple" what if we state that "Pete is either for his friend or he is against him" or to state it in another way, "Pete either wants to help is friend or he doesn't". Do you now see the false dichotomy?

Let's go back to my earlier example.

John is afraid of Steve.
John wants to speak to whoever is in charge.
The person in charge is Steve.

The mistake that you are making is assuming that wanting or not wanting is an absolute and that there is no middle ground or that there are no conflicts in wanting something. You are trying to make want an absolute, you are trying to force fit want, a desire that is not absolute, into an either/or proposition and you can't do that.

I want to eat the candy bar.
I don't want to gain weight.

So, which is it?

You are either for me or you are against me is a classical false choice (see the wikipedia article above). Let's reword that using your statement in the hopes of getting you to understand.

You either want to help me or you don't want to help me.

As I said before, if you want to claim that the above statement is a false dichotomy then you must be wedded to the position that the opposite is true, that is, the statement "It is not the case that the disjunction "you want to help me or it is not the case that you want to help me"".