Poll about realism

[cpolk]

I realize that this is philospophical in nature. The point I'm making is that whether the environment is real or artificial makes no difference to the brain. The brain is experiencing directly from its environment either way. So it is direct.

 

[PixyMisa]

I realize that this is philospophical in nature. The point I'm making is that whether the environment is real or artificial makes no difference to the brain. The brain is experiencing directly from its environment either way. So it is direct.

Right. It's a single continuous physical process. How is that indirect?

 

[Vagabond]

I wouldn't say it's irrelevant. There were experiments done with hallucinogens and sensory deprivation tanks. A movie was made called altered states that supposed that any hallicination you would have in such a state would cause an actual change in matter so you would take the form of whatever you thought about. The ancient indians also used to believe this and Carlos Castaneda wrote books about it that were very popular and well recieved in the late 60's. You might not believe it. But, don't dismiss it as irrelevent either.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

PM

Geoff wrote: "No. Both direct and indirect realism claim that the world is real. The difference is that indirect realism claims that the thing we directly experience isn't that real world. You can accept the argument from hallucination and still be a realist, but only an indirect realist."

Define "direct" then.

"Direct" just refers to "that of which we are immediately aware", as opposed to "mediately aware." For example, if you are watching a game of football on TV, are you directly aware of the players? It's hard to claim that you are, because there is such an enormous causal chain between yourself and the players. So you can say you are mediately aware of the players. They are still real, but you do not perceive them immediately and directly. So now you have to decide whether the same argument applies when you are actually at the match. Are you ever really directly aware of objects in the physical world, or are you only ever directly aware of sense-data and mental images

The point remains: It makes no difference, and cannot possibly make any difference. Exactly the same applies to Berkelian Idealism and Simulational Idealsim for exactly the same reason. It is an argument that doesn't argue anything.

Makes no difference to what? Our existential situation? Yes, I agree. This is an argument about philosophy, pure and simple.

No matter whether materialism is true, the universe is the mind of god, the universe is all a simulation, or I am a brain in a vat, as long as it behaves in all respects exactly as one would predict from materialism, naturalism is true and direct realism is true.

Naturalism, yes. But direct realism? No, you can't employ an argument for regularity of laws to defend direct realism. That happens to be the argument used by Berkeley himself. That was his only means defending the difference between dreams and reality. Reality behaves according to laws, dreams don't. Naturalism and law-compliance don't require that direct realism is true.

 

[Vagabond]

Unless we are a brain in a vat, simple mechanics can determine that. Our biology is similar, so our senses are also similar. Similar things function similarly. As long as your eyes are working fine, and the biology is similar to others, you will visualize colors according to the same spectrum and your brain will interpret them similarly (because it is built similar as well).

You are probably correct and and there isn't any reason to think otherwise but there also isn't any way to know for certain either.

 

[PixyMisa]

"Direct" just refers to "that of which we are immediately aware", as opposed to "mediately aware." For example, if you are watching a game of football on TV, are you directly aware of the players? It's hard to claim that you are, because there is such an enormous causal chain between yourself and the players. So you can say you are mediately aware of the players. They are still real, but you do not perceive them immediately and directly. So now you have to decide whether the same argument applies when you are actually at the match. Are you ever really directly aware of objects in the physical world, or are you only ever directly aware of sense-data and mental images

Well, in that case you are not directly aware of anything. Most certainly not sensory data, which goes through an awful lot of processing before reaching higher consciousness. And not, it would seem, mental images either.

Makes no difference to what? Our existential situation? Yes, I agree. This is an argument about philosophy, pure and simple.

Makes no difference to whether experience is direct or indirect. The answer is exactly the same regardless of whether the BIV scenario is true or not; the BIV simply doesn't address the point.

Naturalism, yes. But direct realism? No, you can't employ an argument for regularity of laws to defend direct realism. That happens to be the argument used by Berkeley himself. That was his only means defending the difference between dreams and reality. Reality behaves according to laws, dreams don't. Naturalism and law-compliance don't require that direct realism is true.

Actually, metaphysical naturalism says nothing at all about law-compliance. It just says that the universe acts in all ways as if it were what was real. That's why I say it necessarily supports direct realism. Under naturalism, there has to be an unbroken physical causal chain between event and experience. Now, is that direct or indirect? Our studies of the brain show - as I said - that there is a chain of processing between sensory data and conscious awareness, and, in fact, between memory and conscious awareness. There's a continuum of processing. So you can say all our experiences are direct, none are, or you can arbitrarily mark a cut-off point somewhere in the chain.

Where? And why?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's inconsistent. The BIV argument holds that the world is not real, so if indirect realism holds that it is real, it can't accept the BIV argument.

Some people think that indirect realism is a complete non-starter because it is definitionally incoherent - because if we aren't directly aware of physical objects then why is it that the things we are directly aware of look just like physical objects? I am sympathetic to this view, and I believe it means that if you reject direct realism then you are probably forced into non-realism e.g. Kantian transcendental idealism.

However..... The BIV argument does NOT hold that "the world is not real". It holds that what we experience directly isn't the same thing as the mind-independent reality.

Which is why I talk about things in terms of what the do, because talking about what they are just generates confusion.

It exposes already-existing confusion. Talking about it gives us some hope of finding our way through that confusion.

 

[cpolk]

"Direct" just refers to "that of which we are immediately aware", as opposed to "mediately aware." For example, if you are watching a game of football on TV, are you directly aware of the players? It's hard to claim that you are, because there is such an enormous causal chain between yourself and the players. So you can say you are mediately aware of the players. They are still real, but you do not perceive them immediately and directly. So now you have to decide whether the same argument applies when you are actually at the match. Are you ever really directly aware of objects in the physical world, or are you only ever directly aware of sense-data and mental images.

We know how a television works; therefore, although we are mediately aware of the players, we are immediately aware of the television, the screen, and the process through which the image is being displayed. When we are at the stadium watching the players first-hand, then we are watching the players directly.

Was this in question before television? LOL

 

[cpolk]

oops... accidental double post

 

[PixyMisa]

However..... The BIV argument does NOT hold that "the world is not real".

Yes, it does. The world, for the brain in the vat, is the data transmitted to it. Whatever physical world there may be that contains the vat and the brain is irrelevant, because it is impossible in principle to experience it.

It holds that what we experience directly isn't the same thing as the mind-independent reality.

Except that it is. What the brain in the vat is experiencing is a mind-independent reality. Just an artificial one.

It exposes already-existing confusion. Talking about it gives us some hope of finding our way through that confusion.

Yes.

 

[PixyMisa]

We know how a television works; therefore, although we are mediately aware of the players, we are immediately aware of the television, the screen, and the process through which the image is being displayed. When we are at the stadium watching the players first-hand, then we are watching the players directly.

Well, I could say that this is also an arbitrary cut-off, even if it's one I agree with.

 

[cpolk]

However..... The BIV argument does NOT hold that "the world is not real". It holds that what we experience directly isn't the same thing as the mind-independent reality.

I'll agree with that - but it is our reality, and due to the boundaries of our senses, the only reality we can explore. Therefore, like with the real/artifical reality, it is irrelevant that our senses do not completely detect everything that is in existent right down to micro-organisms. Other mechanisms (technology) allow us to do that, by enhancing our senses; however, our senses are what determines our only reality. Am I getting off track here?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

PM

Well, in that case you are not directly aware of anything.

I don't understand this response. Surely we must be directly aware of something!? If we aren't directly aware of anything at all, then how can we be indirectly aware of physical objects???

Makes no difference to whether experience is direct or indirect. The answer is exactly the same regardless of whether the BIV scenario is true or not; the BIV simply doesn't address the point.

Which point?

Actually, metaphysical naturalism says nothing at all about law-compliance. It just says that the universe acts in all ways as if it were what was real. That's why I say it necessarily supports direct realism.

"behaving as if it is real" equally applies to both direct and indirect realism. This is not a debate about naturalism at all. I know plently of naturalists who are representational realists, especially in the cognitive science department (rather than the philosophy department) at my uni. My metaphysics prof is a direct realist, but he has a very long and complicated means of defending it. What you are defending is what is known as "commonsense realism" or "naive realism", and this isn't generally considered to be a credible philosophical position. Direct realism can be defended, but you can't just do the samuel johnson defence and kick a rock. You need to work much harder than that to defend direct realism from the argument from hallucination.

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/DRPC.htm

(H1) Hallucination premise:

It is possible to have a completely hallucinatory experience, subjectively indiscernible from a case of perception, in which there is no normal, public object of which the hallucinator is aware. (p. 269, p. 266).

So,

(H2) Hallucination conclusion:

In cases of hallucination, we are directly aware of a ‘non-normal, non-public’ object (p. 230).

(H3) Generalization premise:

If we are directly aware of a non-normal, non-public object in the case of hallucination, then we are directly aware of such objects in any cases of perception as well (p.230).

Conclusion: Any perception of public objects is indirect.

Under naturalism, there has to be an unbroken physical causal chain between event and experience. Now, is that direct or indirect? Our studies of the brain show - as I said - that there is a chain of processing between sensory data and conscious awareness, and, in fact, between memory and conscious awareness. There's a continuum of processing. So you can say all our experiences are direct, none are, or you can arbitrarily mark a cut-off point somewhere in the chain.

Where? And why?

You need to think about the argument as it's presented. Do you believe the objects of direct awareness during BIV-style "hallucinations" are the same as the objects of direct awareness during veridical experiences? Nobody is denying that there is a continuous causal chain between object and perception. The problem is about having a consistent set of definitions which can cope with the BIV scenario without exposing contradictions. If you want to defend direct realism you either have to deny the BIV scenario is possible (so the argument fails because the premises are rejected) or you have to find a set of definitions which can cope with a BIV without suffering from logical inconsistencies.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'll agree with that - but it is our reality, and due to the boundaries of our senses, the only reality we can explore. Therefore, like with the real/artifical reality, it is irrelevant that our senses do not completely detect everything that is in existent right down to micro-organisms. Other mechanisms (technology) allow us to do that, by enhancing our senses; however, our senses are what determines our only reality. Am I getting off track here?

No. But you aren't defending indirect realism. You are defending a form of kantian transcendental idealism. You have brought what we call "physical objects" into our side of the "veil of perception". There can still be "things in themselves", they just aren't like the physical objects we directly experience. The noumenal world is closed to us.

breakfast calls......

 

[cpolk]

No. But you aren't defending indirect realism. You are defending a form of kantian transcendental idealism. You have brought what we call "physical objects" into our side of the "veil of perception". There can still be "things in themselves", they just aren't like the physical objects we directly experience. The noumenal world is closed to us.

breakfast calls......

I didn't know I was defending indirect realism at any point! LOL You'll have to excuse me, I am not familiar with all of the classifications of thought. I was told not to long ago that I am a western athiest materialist skeptic. I have no clue what that means.

Anyway, this is why I believe it is direct, after reading Wikipedia.

According to direct, the process of awareness of the external world is based on what is external, while in indirect, it is based on what is internal. They both sound good. However, by "external/internal", I will have to call for definition - I choose to say that the brain is the determining factor. If I am wrong in this, let me know.

If I see a tree, I am not seeing it with my brain; I am seeing it with my eyes. If I touch the tree, I am not feeling it with my brain; I am feeling it with my skin. If I smell... you get the idea. All of that happens externally. All my brain does is process the information that is gathered externally in a way that "I" can rationalize. If I am seeing the color red, it is because my eyes have created that color and sent that image to my brain.

In your hypothetical, the brain would not be a floating brain in its artificial world - it will need a body with sensory organs (all artificial) that will serve to 'send' the information to the brain. Therefore, since the actual gathering of information is external, it is a direct relationship.

The world is closed to us only in the sense that we haven't created the technology to open it up.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't understand this response. Surely we must be directly aware of something!?

Why? Consciousness is a physical process. It is only aware of itself through physical processes. If that means that awareness of external objects is indirect, it means that self-awareness is also indirect.

Which point?

The point of whether experiences are direct or indirect.

"behaving as if it is real" equally applies to both direct and indirect realism. This is not a debate about naturalism at all. I know plently of naturalists who are representational realists, especially in the cognitive science department (rather than the philosophy department) at my uni. My metaphysics prof is a direct realist, but he has a very long and complicated means of defending it. What you are defending is what is known as "commonsense realism" or "naive realism", and this isn't generally considered to be a credible philosophical position. Direct realism can be defended, but you can't just do the samuel johnson defence and kick a rock. You need to work much harder than that to defend direct realism from the argument from hallucination.

My point is that naturalism makes any distinction between direct and indirect realism arbitrary. There is always a physical causal chain between the event and the experience of the event, even when the event is an internalisation of an external event.

You need to think about the argument as it's presented. Do you believe the objects of direct awareness during BIV-style "hallucinations" are the same as the objects of direct awareness during veridical experiences?

Yes.

Nobody is denying that there is a continuous causal chain between object and perception. The problem is about having a consistent set of definitions which can cope with the BIV scenario without exposing contradictions. If you want to defend direct realism you either have to deny the BIV scenario is possible (so the argument fails because the premises are rejected) or you have to find a set of definitions which can cope with a BIV without suffering from logical inconsistencies.

The BIV is experiencing a real world. It's that simple. There is no possible meaningful distinction. Edit: To the brain.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

We know how a television works; therefore, although we are mediately aware of the players, we are immediately aware of the television, the screen, and the process through which the image is being displayed. When we are at the stadium watching the players first-hand, then we are watching the players directly.

Was this in question before television? LOL

This has been in question ever since Descartes.

 

[PixyMisa]

One other point: It has been experimentally demonstrated (in a few different ways) that conscious awareness lags a couple of hundred milliseconds behind what the rest of the brain is actually doing. What's more, conscious awareness of conscious decisions actually lags behind the initiation of the action.

So if you want to put the cut-off between the event and where significant information processing occurs, we do not experience anything directly.

 

[PixyMisa]

This has been in question ever since Descartes.

Descartes was a football player?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, it does. The world, for the brain in the vat, is the data transmitted to it.

So you are saying that the BIV is aware of the data coming down its optic nerve, not physical objects. In this case it would be indirectly aware of non-existent objects and directly aware of something equating to sense data. This begs the question: why don't you then also say that during veridical experiences we are aware of sense data? What is the difference from the point of view of the brain? Surely there is just one case of experiencing a world of fake sense data and one is experiencing a world of veridical sense data. If so, then this position would have to be indirect realism.

Except that it is. What the brain in the vat is experiencing is a mind-independent reality. Just an artificial one.

Please clarify what you think the brain in the vat experiences, directly and indirectly, and what the normal brain experiences, directly and indirectly, because I'm not sure what your position is.