Well, yeah, things are more complex. Isn't that usually the case?
But I think that one should also be aware of extensional vs intensional contexts.
A) In an extensional or referentially-transparent context, you can substitute identicals: if X=Y and P(X) then P(Y). Best known as Leibniz's Law. E.g., if Batman is Bruce Wayne and Bruce Wayne has a butler named Alfred, then Batman has a butler named Alfred.
B) In an intensional or referentially-opaque context, Leibniz's Law doesn't apply. In fact, that's pretty much the definition of such a context. Usually just about anything that involves personal opinions, or stuff like "knows", "believes", "says", is intensional. So is just about any modal context.
E.g., Clark Kent is Superman, Lois Lane says she knows where Clark Kent lives, therefore Lois Lane says she knows where Superman lives... is quite false, actually. That's not at all what she's saying. As far as she knows or says, she doesn't know who Superman is or where he lives.
E.g., to use a proper masked man

Don Diego de la Vega is Zorro, Sgt. Pedro Gonzales is an enemy of Zorro, therefore Sgt. Pedro Gonzales is an enemy of Don Diego de la Vega... again is actually quite false. The sergeant is actually a friend of Diego, not having any idea that he's Zorro.
While that's not strictly a strawman -- it's actually the
Masked Man Fallacy -- it sure looks that way to someone who doesn't even know, or thought it through that the two entities are identicals or even intersect.
So, yeah, if you're saying "so you're saying that", it's usually a good sign that it's a fallacy. Unless that person explicitly said exactly that.
I do understand that at times it's a very useful device to make someone realize the enormity implied by what they're saying, but strictly speaking it
is a fallacy.