Pearl Harbor Conspiracy

[Andy_Ross]

No honour in attacking a mere tanker.

 

[SpitfireIX]

That undoubtedly had a lot to do with it, but the higher-ups should have impressed upon the pilots the necessity of attacking any oilers/tankers found.

Another aspect of this mentality was demonstrated by the dive bombers in the second wave. Many of them attacked Nevada while she sortied from Battleship Row, even though their bombs couldn't penetrate her deck armor, just because she was the juiciest target in sight. Those bombs could have inflicted a lot of damage on the US cruisers, which were largely unscathed, and sunk or disabled several of them.

 

[theprestige]

It still amazes me that no Japanese bombers targeted Neosho at Pearl Harbor. Even if she'd only been put out of action for a few months, it would have made a big dent in US logistics.

The bombers were given their priority targets before the first strike ever launched. They were flying in formation, following their flight leader to a priority target. Nobody was going to break off from their flight to take pot-shots at a secondary target. No flight leader was going to point his planes at secondary targets while battleship row still needed attention.

It's not like each pilot had a head's up display with a big green flashing arrow pointing at the Neosho, labeled, "this ship will be very interesting in hindsight, hit it now!"

 

[SpitfireIX]

The bombers were given their priority targets before the first strike ever launched. They were flying in formation, following their flight leader to a priority target. Nobody was going to break off from their flight to take pot-shots at a secondary target. No flight leader was going to point his planes at secondary targets while battleship row still needed attention.

It's not like each pilot had a head's up display with a big green flashing arrow pointing at the Neosho, labeled, "this ship will be very interesting in hindsight, hit it now!"

That was only true for the level bombers in the first wave. The other aircraft did, in fact, break off and attack independently. Again, the dive bombers in the second wave had virtually no chance of inflicting significant damage on a battleship; they should have been ordered to attack cruisers and tankers.

 

[kookbreaker]

That was only true for the level bombers in the first wave. The other aircraft did, in fact, break off and attack independently. Again, the dive bombers in the second wave had virtually no chance of inflicting significant damage on a battleship; they should have been ordered to attack cruisers and tankers.

You are basically asking them to not be Imperial Japanese Navy Pilots.

 

[Andy_Ross]

The bombers were given their priority targets before the first strike ever launched. They were flying in formation, following their flight leader to a priority target. Nobody was going to break off from their flight to take pot-shots at a secondary target. No flight leader was going to point his planes at secondary targets while battleship row still needed attention.

It's not like each pilot had a head's up display with a big green flashing arrow pointing at the Neosho, labeled, "this ship will be very interesting in hindsight, hit it now!"

The point us a fleet tanker should have been a priority target as should fuel storage.

It was a common failure right through the war for the Japanese, prioritising the warships escorts rather than transports and landing ships which were assaulting islands and were the important targets.

It also resulted in anti submarine and mine countermeasures ships being neglected and having poor quality crews. There was no honour in defending.

Even when Kamikaze attacks were sent against landing forces the pilots aimed at escorting warships rather than the landings themselves.

 

[kookbreaker]

There have been analytics done about the attack and it has shown attacking the fuel-oil depots probably wouldn't have been as effective as some folks claim. IIRC it was for several reasons:

1) The storage system had pumps, berms, and fire control mechanisms.
2) Fuel-Oil is actually very hard to start burning.
3) Direct hits with bombs would be needed to start fires - near misses might cause spills but very unlikely to start fires. Direct hits would have been tricky at best.
4) Japanese canon and bullet rounds would have done little more than punch holes in the tanks.

Despite some complaints by US Admirals the analysis showed that even complete destruction of the fuel-oil tanks would have done very little long-term to the US war effort. IIRC the effect of complete destruction would have meant some tankers from the US would need to be diverted (which there were enough of) and the tanks rebuilt (which needed steel). The damage would have meant a several month delay of the building of about 6 destroyers.

Further, said attacks would need to have happened in the two attack waves. The mythical "cancelled third wave" was always revisionism as Japanese casualties would have been much worse on such an attack as all battle stations would have been manned, etc.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

It still amazes me that no Japanese bombers targeted Neosho at Pearl Harbor. Even if she'd only been put out of action for a few months, it would have made a big dent in US logistics.

Not really. It would have taken 9 tankers thirty days to completely the fuel stores at Pearl Harbor, or 3 tankers ninety days.

And Neosho had finished offloading its cargoto the storage tanks via the peir pipping before the IJN arrived. This misconception is the fault of the movie makers and 15 seconds of video misrepresenting the situation.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

The point us a fleet tanker should have been a priority target as should fuel storage.

It was a common failure right through the war for the Japanese, prioritising the warships escorts rather than transports and landing ships which were assaulting islands and were the important targets.

It also resulted in anti submarine and mine countermeasures ships being neglected and having poor quality crews. There was no honour in defending.

Even when Kamikaze attacks were sent against landing forces the pilots aimed at escorting warships rather than the landings themselves.

Also the IJN refueling was done by trailing hoses to the target ship behind the tanker. No specialize equipment was used, just floats and ropes. Any ship could refuel another with the system used by the Nagumo Kido Butai.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

No honour in attacking a mere tanker.

I think that was a command problem. They needed to at least try to rein in the bushido ◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Also the IJN refueling was done by trailing hoses to the target ship behind the tanker. No specialize equipment was used, just floats and ropes. Any ship could refuel another with the system used by the Nagumo Kido Butai.

It was the system used by the RN but they switched to beam fuelling.
It was more efficient and could be done while keeping a decent speed.

There's a reason why trailing fuel pipes aren't used sny longer

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

It was the system used by the RN but they switched to beam fuelling.
It was more efficient and could be done while keeping a decent speed.

There's a reason why trailing fuel pipes aren't used sny longer

I agree. Another legacy of the One Great All-out Battle philosopy.

 

[Andy_Ross]

I think that was a command problem. They needed to at least try to rein in the bushido ◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊.

As the senior officers were sll part of top Samurai clans and were known to have officers from other clans assassinated, who would do it?
There's a reason the Japanese Navy and Army refused to cooperate in any way at all.

 

[Andy_Ross]

I agree. Another legacy of the One Great All-out Battle philosopy.

The RN didn't need to refuel at sea very often, they mainly operated in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian oceans where there were plenty of fuelling stations.
It wasn't until they started working in the Pacific they needed to start doing it more often.
They started using the beam system that the US Navy had recently put in to regular use.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

As the senior officers were sll part of top Samurai clans and were known to have officers from other clans assassinated, who would do it?
There's a reason the Japanese Navy and Army refused to cooperate in any way at all.

If they had tried they may have been surprised. Or assassinated out of hand. They couldn't admit that they couldn't win under extant circumstances. Still went with "conventional wisdom" in strategy AND tactics. A national tragedy result.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

The RN didn't need to refuel at sea very often, they mainly operated in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian oceans where there were plenty of fuelling stations.
It wasn't until they started working in the Pacific they needed to start doing it more often.
They started using the beam system that the US Navy had recently put in to regular use.

I was referring to the Japanese model, "fight close to home so your ships don't need "legs". This was fueled by defeat of the Russian European fleet by IJN ships who could basically have breakfast at home and fight the Tsar's navy at lunch. Samurai spirit wasn't very flexible, and this resulted in them fighting the last war instead of the current one.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Ibiblio.org/pha Have fun.

 

[theprestige]

I was referring to the Japanese model, "fight close to home so your ships don't need "legs". This was fueled by defeat of the Russian European fleet by IJN ships who could basically have breakfast at home and fight the Tsar's navy at lunch. Samurai spirit wasn't very flexible, and this resulted in them fighting the last war instead of the current one.

This take makes no sense to me at all. The Japanese were the first to build and operate a dedicated naval aviation fleet. Like the other major powers, they also invested heavily in battleships, but they were leaders in moving beyond the lessons of the last war, and among the first to start learning the lessons of the next war.

And they didn't fight close to home at first. Using their new carrier-based way of war, they ranged far and wide, conquering vast swaths of the western Pacific. This included the oil fields they needed to enable their long-legged strategy.

They only fought closer to home later in the war, when aggressive US submarine warfare against their supply routes cut their "legs" out from under them. If the Japanese model consisted of fighting close to home, they never would have gotten into the war at all, because everything worth fighting for was too far away from Tokyo.

 

[Andy_Ross]

The Japanese doctrine was straight from for a single 'Decisive Battle (Kantai Kessen)
It was Japan's core naval strategy before and during WWII, aiming to win the war with one single, massive battleship-centric action.
The plan was to weaken the US fleet with submarines and long-range aircraft as it moved across the Pacific, followed by a final, decisive clash of heavy battleship fleets.

They saw the carriers as secondary to the main Battle Fleet.

 

[dudalb]

There have been analytics done about the attack and it has shown attacking the fuel-oil depots probably wouldn't have been as effective as some folks claim. IIRC it was for several reasons:

1) The storage system had pumps, berms, and fire control mechanisms.
2) Fuel-Oil is actually very hard to start burning.
3) Direct hits with bombs would be needed to start fires - near misses might cause spills but very unlikely to start fires. Direct hits would have been tricky at best.
4) Japanese canon and bullet rounds would have done little more than punch holes in the tanks.

Despite some complaints by US Admirals the analysis showed that even complete destruction of the fuel-oil tanks would have done very little long-term to the US war effort. IIRC the effect of complete destruction would have meant some tankers from the US would need to be diverted (which there were enough of) and the tanks rebuilt (which needed steel). The damage would have meant a several month delay of the building of about 6 destroyers.

Further, said attacks would need to have happened in the two attack waves. The mythical "cancelled third wave" was always revisionism as Japanese casualties would have been much worse on such an attack as all battle stations would have been manned, etc.

Most Historians have pretty much decided that a third wave of atacks at Pearl would not have done that much more damage, certainly not enoug to force the US fleet back to San Diego.