DGM
Skeptic not Atheist
I'm wondering if there would be any reason to think the fire protection in the twins was substandard in the collapse zones? 
The posters here may want to read the written history of the WTC collapses a little better before producing the typical and predictable knee-jerk reactions expected within an environment like this.
James Quintiere also didn't seem aware that the collapse progression mechanism some of us call 'ROOSD' existed. Neither did David Benson, co-author of BLGB. Neither did Bazant. This is a very hard pill for many people to swallow as is clearly being documented in this revealing and intriguing thread.
Friends and JREF/ISF regulars, the the written technical history of the WTC collapses is rich and fascinating..and troubling, containing many internal contradictions. Please don't trivialize it by turning it into a simplified set of memes like the refrain of a pop song.
Sander - If you stop at that point you have made a reasonably clear and correct point. Structures with multiple interconnected sub-units tend to have more inbuilt redundancy than structures built with single point failure. And I'll leave that assertion of a base level engineering principle as pedantically generic as I can as a measure of defence against nit-picking. If I write it as "multiple redundancies tend to mean less prone to catastrophic single point failures" it almost goes circular. It should be bleeding obvious - more redundancy - greater separation of sub-entities SHOULD mean less prone to catastrophic global failure.
True, but with respect to the WTC, while the open office space moved columns to the perimeter, it put a lot of columns on the perimeter, which had enough redundancy to to survive the jet crashes.
The "issue" is not whether the columns were strong enough or not... They were obviously... the building stood through several hurricanes... The issues was the structural DESIGN.
I can't imagine what sort of high rise would topple from such a plane strike. THAT is not a test of much.
Do you think the ESB would collapse from the plane strike?
Do you think it would experience a global collapse after an hr.?
Don't use the Golden Gate bridge? Or the Bay bridge...... Say you have a river to cross and you need to build a bridge. You can do one large clear span or have several shorter spans... one after the other. In the first if the span drops the entire bridge is kaput. In the second case if one span fails the rest of the bridge remains and the repair is certainly not as expensive. In both cases the river crossing function has been lost. ...
DO you think the ESB would have survived such an strike?
Sure - and that point was what I was reinforcing for Sander who had already correctly identified the key issue of redundancy at sub system level so that single point failure is avoided.True,Sander - If you stop at that point you have made a reasonably clear and correct point. Structures with multiple interconnected sub-units tend to have more inbuilt redundancy than structures built with single point failure. And I'll leave that assertion of a base level engineering principle as pedantically generic as I can as a measure of defence against nit-picking. If I write it as "multiple redundancies tend to mean less prone to catastrophic single point failures" it almost goes circular. It should be bleeding obvious - more redundancy - greater separation of sub-entities SHOULD mean less prone to catastrophic global failure.
Yes - that was part of my starting point for WTC but the assertion about redundancy as a protection against single point failures is a generic principle. It is not guaranteed to be globally true but I covered my arse with pedantic care - "multiple interconnected sub-units tend to have..." and "less prone to" neither of which are global guarantees but certainly "more likely than not".but with respect to the WTC, while the open office space moved columns to the perimeter, it put a lot of columns on the perimeter, which had enough redundancy to to survive the jet crashes.
Agreed and there is little difference between you and I Sander on the engineering reality that the design dominated the ultimate collapse mechanisms. The difference between us - same as it has been for several years - I do not agree with your insistence on retrospective findings of liability based on levels of CURRENT understanding which were not available when the towers were designed.The "issue" is not whether the columns were strong enough or not... They were obviously... the building stood through several hurricanes... The issues was the structural DESIGN.
Sure - and that point was what I was reinforcing for Sander who had already correctly identified the key issue of redundancy at sub system level so that single point failure is avoided.
Yes - that was part of my starting point for WTC but the assertion about redundancy as a protection against single point failures is a generic principle. It is not guaranteed to be globally true but I covered my arse with pedantic care - "multiple interconnected sub-units tend to have..." and "less prone to" neither of which are global guarantees but certainly "more likely than not".
Agreed and there is little difference between you and I Sander on the engineering reality that the design dominated the ultimate collapse mechanisms. The difference between us - same as it has been for several years - I do not agree with your insistence on retrospective findings of liability based on levels of CURRENT understanding which were not available when the towers were designed.
Put simply we agree on engineering we disagree on the legal and regulatory policy aspects.
Same sort of reason.Then why not try the written statement by James Quintiere from the same transcript of the same congressional hearing?I will not support you with this nonsense. Nor will I waste effort rebutting your parroting of Ms. Regenhard's emotive bigoted part truths and lies by omission.
I doubt than many posters "may want to". Try making a claim using external material as source evidence - THEN some of us "may want to read" IF we have a topic to discuss which calls on the material. If you ever do make a proper claim I may decide to respond.The posters here may want to read the written history of the WTC collapses a little better before producing the typical and predictable knee-jerk reactions expected within an environment like this.
Neither did Santa Claus. So what? Whatever the value of Quintiere's narrow and specific focus it neither supports not rebuts the MECHANISM you call ROOSD not the linguistic evasions of your opponents who deny the need for and the legitimacy of the acronym "ROOSD".James Quintiere also didn't seem aware that the collapse progression mechanism some of us call 'ROOSD' existed.
Stop flogging this dead horse when responding to me. Read this slowly. "I agree that Benson was wrong" - there is no point in keep putting the issue to me.Neither did David Benson, co-author of BLGB.
You are wrong BUT not as much wrong as your opponents. However both you and your opponents keep making false global assertions - you say "Neither did Bazant". They say "Bazant did describe it" or words to that effect. You are whatever 10-15% wrong they are 85% wrong. You are partly wrong because he did identify that there was a mechanism. He did not describe it and his attempts at description are more wrong than right. You opponents are wrong in several ways - the critical one being the false claim that he "described" the mechanism.Neither did Bazant.
Please stop preaching to the choir. Read the thread for how many times I have invited debate of the base technical facts with little serious response. I am aware of where Bazant in B&Z was wrong and where he was right and where his supporters with 20/20 hindsight can read into his words what is not there.This is a very hard pill for many people to swallow as is clearly being documented in this revealing and intriguing thread.
Then why not post some serious discussion points?Friends and JREF/ISF regulars, the the written technical history of the WTC collapses is rich and fascinating..and troubling, containing many internal contradictions. Please don't trivialize it by turning it into a simplified set of memes like the refrain of a pop song.
Then why do you keep raising the same issues of retroactive changes in standards and resulting retrospective liability after I and others have explained the reality?I don't want to get into legal "stuff" because I am not a lawyer.
You should be well aware that variations from code are both routine and valid practices. By their nature most changes will be "concessions" - specific situations where the normal blanket rules are unnecessarily conservative. In my diverse career at one stage I sat for about three years in the seat where I signed off on code variations. Those were in the arena of plumbing hydraulics and my professional role was to assess the specific situation to determine if the change was safe and valid. Most were. Some I rejected.There did seem to be some code "concessions" and bending granted to PANYNJ when those buildings were built...
You are wrong BUT not as much wrong as your opponents. However both you and your opponents keep making false global assertions - you say "Neither did Bazant". They say "Bazant did describe it" or words to that effect. You are whatever 10-15% wrong they are 85% wrong. You are partly wrong because he did identify that there was a mechanism. He did not describe it and his attempts at description are more wrong than right. You opponents are wrong in several ways - the critical one being the false claim that he "described" the mechanism.
One example being this: "They" hang a lot of house of cards "logic" about the progression stage on this phrase "the failure of the connections of the floor-carrying trusses to the columns is either..." IGNORING that he is referring to the initiation stage.
Bazant & Zhou 2002 said:The basic question to answer is: Can the fall of the upper part be arrested by energy dissipation during plastic buckling, which follows the initial elastic deformation? Many plastic failure mechanisms could be considered, for example: (1) the columns of the underlying floor buckle locally (Fig. 1, stage 2); (2) the floor-supporting trusses are sheared off at the connections to the framed tube and to the core columns and fall down within the tube, depriving the core columns and the framed tube of lateral support, and thus promoting buckling of the core columns and of the framed tube under vertical compression (Fig. 1, stage 4, and Fig.2(c));or (3) the upper part is partly wedged within the emptied framed tube of the lower part, pushing the walls of the framed tube apart (Fig. 1, stage 5). Although each of these mechanisms can be shown to lead to total collapse, a combination of the last two seems more realistic (the reason: multistory pieces of the framed tube, with nearly straight boundaries apparently corresponding to plastic hinge lines causing buckles on the framed tube wall, were photographed falling down, ‘‘Massive 2001’’; American 2001).
Baloney.
And - not your fault Sander - but one of the dishonesties in Ms Reganhard's submission is the persistent lie by implication that "concessions" to Code are illegitimate. They are not in principle and specific examples can be professionally tested.
A lot of that was bolt sheer, not connections.Quote is not accurate description of the event.
Where is the evidence of "sheared" truss connections?
Banzant did not say the top block would hollow out the floor failures would occur firstWhere is the evidence that a hollowed upper section wedged itself into the lower section?
Sure unbraced columns WITH loads will buckle. Slenderness ratio and all.
A lot of that was bolt sheer, not connections.
Not just that even the core columns, suffer weld damage from off center strikes.
I saw a fair amount of bent over truss seats... did you?
Stop flogging this dead horse when responding to me. Read this slowly. "I agree that Benson was wrong" - there is no point in keep putting the issue to me.
You are wrong BUT not as much wrong as your opponents. However both you and your opponents keep making false global assertions - you say "Neither did Bazant". They say "Bazant did describe it" or words to that effect. You are whatever 10-15% wrong they are 85% wrong. You are partly wrong because he did identify that there was a mechanism. He did not describe it and his attempts at description are more wrong than right. You opponents are wrong in several ways - the critical one being the false claim that he "described" the mechanism.
Please stop preaching to the choir.
Hey guys, Is there anyone besides Ozeco or SanderO that can see that there is something not quite right about how David Benson, co-author of BLGB, perceived the collapse progression process of the WTC towers?
The comment was directed at M_T who has an encyclopaedic collection of misrepresentations which includes that one. If you can prove that one wrong - go for it. I'm confident M_T will get the point - and almost certainly ignore it.Baloney.me said:One example being this: "They" hang a lot of house of cards "logic" about the progression stage on this phrase "the failure of the connections of the floor-carrying trusses to the columns is either..." IGNORING that he is referring to the initiation stage.
Never any doubt that he identified the mechanism (a) as "complicated" and (b) partly described it as one probable option. What are you disagreeing with the 85%Originally Posted by Bazant & Zhou 2002
The basic question to answer is: Can the fall of the upper part be arrested by energy dissipation during plastic buckling, which follows the initial elastic deformation? Many plastic failure mechanisms could be considered, for example: (1) the columns of the underlying floor buckle locally (Fig. 1, stage 2); (2) the floor-supporting trusses are sheared off at the connections to the framed tube and to the core columns and fall down within the tube, depriving the core columns and the framed tube of lateral support, and thus promoting buckling of the core columns and of the framed tube under vertical compression (Fig. 1, stage 4, and Fig.2(c));or (3) the upper part is partly wedged within the emptied framed tube of the lower part, pushing the walls of the framed tube apart (Fig. 1, stage 5). Although each of these mechanisms can be shown to lead to total collapse, a combination of the last two seems more realistic (the reason: multistory pieces of the framed tube, with nearly straight boundaries apparently corresponding to plastic hinge lines causing buckles on the framed tube wall, were photographed falling down, ‘‘Massive 2001’’; American 2001).
As for ozeco's facts and procedural rules:
Fact #1a Bazant in B&Z identified that the real collapse mechanism was complicated and chose a simpler model which was valid for a "limit case argument";
Fact #1b Bazant in B&Z clearly distinguished the two different mechanisms - the more complicated real event and the simpler version supporting a "limit case" argument;
Fact #1c Bazant's "limit case" argument was conceptually valid, it has not been successfully challenged and he did not confuse the two mechanisms.
Procedural Rule #2 Discussion of WTC collapses should not use or rely on confusion of any issues of fact including the facts derived from Bazant's work.
Fact #3 The progression collapse stage for WTC1 and WTC2 was dominated by a mechanism in which material falling down the office space tube stripped floors leaving perimeter columns to fall away.
Fact #4 The real event collapse is a different mechanism to the column crushing model of the limit case argument.
Procedural Rule #5 Arguments should not be confused over the two mechanisms and any relationship they may have.
Fact #6 The later papers by Bazant et al are wrong if and whenever they apply 1D simplification models to the WTC real event".
What I colored red is numbers I changed or added. I propose to use these for the sake of clarity and continuity.
Quote is not accurate description of the event.
Where is the evidence of "sheared" truss connections?
.Above the aircraft impact floors, the failure modes were randomly distributed. However, over 90 percent of floor truss connections at or below the impact floors of both buildings were either bent downwards or completely sheared from the exterior wall suggesting progressive overloading of the floors below the impact zone following collapse initiation of the towers.
http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub_id=853462
Where is the evidence that a hollowed upper section wedged itself into the lower section?