ontological materialism vs. physicalism

[BillyTK]

Could have been Buddha. Could have been Jesus. But it was probably Lao Tse.

Yup, it was Lao Tse. Helluva guy, but you wouldn't want to go drinking with him...

 

[BillyTK]

Is that not what psychology/sociology is all about?

Sociology is about social phenomena, so no, not really. Some psychology is about trying to define logical rules for the mind, particularly the more science stuff, like behaviourism (although strictly speaking, it's the study of behaviour 'cos the guy who invented considered the mind to be inaccessible to study), cognitive and experimental psychology. but then there's the phenomenological approach which says that the psychological science stuff only tells us about what psychological science does, and it's more revealing and effective just to ask people...

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Neo,



This just reinforces my argument. In order for both sets of rules to be true, one must necessarily be reducible to the other. If you truly got up and poured yourself a glass of water because you were thirsty, and the rules describing your actions in terms of environmental stimuli and physical brain processes are also correct, then it necessarily follows that either the fact that you were thirsty was a purely physical phenomenon (materialism), or the physical processes involved were somehow reducible to mental states (Idealism). Either way you have some form of monism.

Dr. Stupid

I will not use this "physcial" word until someone defines how it is being used!

To use the glass of water example, to say I am thirsty is a causal explanation. There is the causal world where science works, then there is the "agent". The "agent" can percieve the causal world but is not caused by it. The "agent" can, however, introduce new causal chains into the causal world, but it is not caused and does not participate in any causal chains at all.

So we have:

Causal world (materialistic)
Agent

I only assert two things about the "agent":

1) The "agent" is not a part of any causal chain, nor can it be.
2) The "agent" can introduce new causal chains into the causal world.

So the explanation would be such as:

1) The "agent" introduces a new cause into the causal world (possibly through my brain, mind, or consciousness).
2) This cause is such that it will result in a causal chain that is entirely explainable through cause + effect that results in my getting a glass of water.

This is dualism, correct?

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Or as we used to say "obvious to the meanest intelligence".

Problem I do have is what does Win see that I don't? Or is he really a monist just jerking our chains?

You are confused by the compatabilist.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,



The question is, in what sense is the above system dualistic? What does it mean to say that the body and mind operate under different rules? As long as they interact with each other, those interactions must be described according to rules as well. So where is the distinction between mind and body? Which rules are "mental" and which rules are "physical"?

The distinction is arbitrary. Under such a system, your dualism is logically equivalent to monism. It is only a semantic distinction.



There are many problems with the above scenario. First and foremost is, which observable characteristics of the universe are you attributing to this "agent", and why? I know of no aspects of the mind, or consciousness, that cannot be clearly shown to be subject to effects from the body.

And of course there is the above issue of the separate laws. If there is any interaction at all, even one-way, then the laws that describe those interactions cannot be "purely physical" or "purely mental".

If reality is split into two subsets which are truly governed by distinct natural laws, then those two subsets can not interact with each other in any way. If the two subsets of laws are not distinct, then you have monism. Arbitrarily dividing reality up into different subsets does not change the logical relationships between the elements of those sets.

Dr. Stupid

It appears that if you say that world cannot cause agent but agent can cause world you are saying this is monism? Again, it appears we have a misunderstanding of the terms.

If that is monism then I believe it is monism that is correct.

But what makes dualism? A mind that cannot interact with the body? Then what does it do? By your terms it cannot do anything with the effects being shown to be here.

I assert you have misunderstood dualism.

 

[metacristi]

Rusty

In its widest definition materialism=the belief that everything that exists ['all that is'] is material [physical].The scope of this definition is not limited by what we can 'measure' today or by 'our universe' [maybe there are more universes].
Thus ontological assumptions are made,not proved obectively yet,that's why it fully deserves to be called 'metaphysical belief'.As far as I know,generally,philosophers and scientists do not make a distinction between materialism and physicalism,both are defined as above.

There is an exception however.In the philosophy of science,especially under the influence of logical positivism,physicalism has gained a different meaning.
In this view physical objects=all the objects that can be described using language and respect the principle of observational intersubjectivism [all persons make,in principle-providing the skills and the technical devices,the same observations].From what I've seen Stimpson J Cat identifies this type of physicalism with Modern Materialism.

 

[metacristi]

Rusty

It appears that if you say that world cannot cause agent but agent can cause world you are saying this is monism? Again, it appears we have a misunderstanding of the terms.If that is monism then I believe it is monism that is correct.

Dualism=the belief that there are [at least] two fundamental but incommensurable 'substances' of 'all that is'.
Monism=the belief that at the fundamantal level of reality does exist a single substance.
Pluralism=the belief that at the fundamental level exist more substances [but they can interact with each other].

Here,in my acception,'incommensurable' means that these substances cannot interact with each other and probably this is also Stimpson's view.He talked there of 'monism';probably he refered at the fact that,due to the existing interaction,the 'agent' and the 'world' belong to the same 'whole' because,of course,pluralism is still a possibility that cannot be discarded.

But what makes dualism? A mind that cannot interact with the body? Then what does it do? By your terms it cannot do anything with the effects being shown to be here.

We should make a difference between 'causation' and 'interaction'.As far as I know dualism refers entirely at 'interaction'.
An example of one way causation is epiphenomenalism.It states that mind is caused by the body but the reverse causation is not possible,mind does not interact directly with the body.Given the total lack of interaction between mind and body epiphenomenalism is a form of dualism.
But if the 'agent' does interact with the 'world' then they belong to the same 'whole'...

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty




Dualism=the belief that there are [at least] two fundamental but incommensurable 'substances' of 'all that is'.
Monism=the belief that at the fundamantal level of reality does exist a single substance.
Pluralism=the belief that at the fundamental level exist more substances [but they can interact with each other].

Here,in my acception,'incommensurable' means that these substances cannot interact with each other and probably this is also Stimpson's view.He talked there of 'monism';probably he refered at the fact that,due to the existing interaction,the 'agent' and the 'world' belong to the same 'whole' because,of course,pluralism is still a possibility that cannot be discarded.





We should make a difference between 'causation' and 'interaction'.As far as I know dualism refers entirely at 'interaction'.
An example of one way causation is epiphenomenalism.It states that mind is caused by the body but the reverse causation is not possible,mind does not interact directly with the body.Given the total lack of interaction between mind and body epiphenomenalism is a form of dualism.
But if the 'agent' does interact with the 'world' then they belong to the same 'whole'...

I do not believe this to be the case. If a dualist is to assert that there is mind and there is body and that they can interact, even if the causal bit cannot cross whatever barrier is between them, then they are dualist. If they cannot even interact then nothing can belong to multiple 'realms' which leave the dualism argument as idiotic nonsense. You have misunderstood the dualist argument. In a dualist the "mind part" can interact with the "body part" and perhaps the "body part" can interact with the "mind part" but what is important is that the causal bit doesn't cross over.

To say they cannot even interact is ridiculous.

And I learn materialism 16 years ago in my university to be:

1) All things that exist can be percieved or rendered to such a state that they can be percieved.
2) The definition of the universe is such that all things that exist exist within the universe.

So all things in the universe can be percieved or rendered to such a state that they can be percieved.

The assertion of all things are made of the same material is physicalism, and is much weaker an argument then materialism.

If we take materialism - "everything that exist is of a physical material" then you are limiting your world-view on say energy to be a physical thing. Indeed, you are taking a closed-minded approach that is not what science has intended. Materialism as in science is the approach that all things can be percieved.

But it appears that on this board physical simply means "can be perceived or rendered to such a state that they can be perceived." Unforutantely not a single person on this board seems willing to offer a defintion of physical that will make what I assert materialism is different from what they assert materialism is.

It appears you all simply want to argue without even using the same terms. [sarcasm] Very useful [/sarcasm]

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

This just reinforces my argument. In order for both sets of rules to be true, one must necessarily be reducible to the other. If you truly got up and poured yourself a glass of water because you were thirsty, and the rules describing your actions in terms of environmental stimuli and physical brain processes are also correct, then it necessarily follows that either the fact that you were thirsty was a purely physical phenomenon (materialism), or the physical processes involved were somehow reducible to mental states (Idealism). Either way you have some form of monism.

Dr. Stupid
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I will not use this "physcial" word until someone defines how it is being used!

I use the scientific definition of physical. Something is physical if it interacts with something else that is physical, and the things which we can directly empirically observe are taken to be physical by definition.

To use the glass of water example, to say I am thirsty is a causal explanation. There is the causal world where science works, then there is the "agent". The "agent" can percieve the causal world but is not caused by it. The "agent" can, however, introduce new causal chains into the causal world, but it is not caused and does not participate in any causal chains at all.

If this agent introduces new causal chains into the causal world, but is not causal itself, then by definition, your causal World is not causal.

So we have:

Causal world (materialistic)
Agent

I only assert two things about the "agent":

1) The "agent" is not a part of any causal chain, nor can it be.
2) The "agent" can introduce new causal chains into the causal world.

So the explanation would be such as:

This is self-contradictory. See above.

1) The "agent" introduces a new cause into the causal world (possibly through my brain, mind, or consciousness).
2) This cause is such that it will result in a causal chain that is entirely explainable through cause + effect that results in my getting a glass of water.

If it is entirely explainable through cause and effect, then in what sense did the "agent" introduce it? Did the agent have an effect on the causal World, or didn't it?

This is dualism, correct?

I have no idea. All I can say is that it sounds incoherent. If the physical World (using the definition I gave above) is causally closed, then nothing which is not a part of it can possibly have any effect on it.


The way I see it, Dualism can take four possible forms:

A = material/physical.
B = mental/non-physical.

1) A and B exist, but do not interact in any way.

This is logically coherent, but essentially meaningless, since both the brain and mind must clearly belong to the same set, which removes any reason to believe the other set exists at all. Thus you end up with either Materialism or Idealism.

2) A and B exist. A affects B, but B does not affect A.

Similar problem to (1). The brain and mind must both belong to A, since the mind affects the brain. Thus set B can only possibly contain things which we have no reason to believe exist in the first place.

3) A and B exist. A does not affect B, but B effects A.

This seems to be what you are suggesting. If A is causally closed, then this scenario is simply not possible. If A is not causally closed, then this is not dualism, but rather simply supernaturalism. The scientific method is not valid in such a scenario.

4) A and B exist, and interact with each other.

This is simply monism wearing a funny hat. By the definition of physical, B is also physical. Dividing the physical World up into arbitrary subsets does not change anything, it is just semantics.

It appears that if you say that world cannot cause agent but agent can cause world you are saying this is monism? Again, it appears we have a misunderstanding of the terms.

No. What I am saying is that if World and agent interact in a bi-directional way, then it is meaningless to say that they are any more distinct than any other two things that interact with each other. Dualism seems to differ from monism only semantically then.

If that is monism then I believe it is monism that is correct.

OK. This only leaves the question of why you believe there is some non-physical agent which affects the physical World, but is not affected by it?

But what makes dualism? A mind that cannot interact with the body? Then what does it do? By your terms it cannot do anything with the effects being shown to be here.

I assert you have misunderstood dualism.

Maybe. But that is simply because nobody has ever described dualism to me in a way that is not either incoherent, or indistinguishable from monism.

I do not believe this to be the case. If a dualist is to assert that there is mind and there is body and that they can interact, even if the causal bit cannot cross whatever barrier is between them, then they are dualist. If they cannot even interact then nothing can belong to multiple 'realms' which leave the dualism argument as idiotic nonsense.

I would agree. Unfortunately, this is exactly what many dualists are asserting. I realize that this is not what you are asserting, however, I fail to see how you notion of an "agent" which is not affected by the physical World, but which affects it, makes any more sense? How does this differ from random influences? How does it affect the physical World without rendering the physical World not causally closed?

You have misunderstood the dualist argument. In a dualist the "mind part" can interact with the "body part" and perhaps the "body part" can interact with the "mind part" but what is important is that the causal bit doesn't cross over.

Not all dualists believe this. What's more, I have no idea what you mean by the "causal bit" not crossing over? An interaction is an interaction. If the interaction can be observed (directly or indirectly), and described with logical rules, then how is it different from any other physical interaction? If it cannot be described with logical rules, then this is just supernaturalism. And if it cannot be observed, then why assume it exists at all?

And I learn materialism 16 years ago in my university to be:

1) All things that exist can be percieved or rendered to such a state that they can be percieved.
2) The definition of the universe is such that all things that exist exist within the universe.

So all things in the universe can be percieved or rendered to such a state that they can be percieved.

The assertion of all things are made of the same material is physicalism, and is much weaker an argument then materialism.

Actually, physicalism is essentially the same as what you listed above, except that it is stated differently. The notion of different ontological substances is pretty much meaningless. What is a "substance"? Can anyone even define the term?

If we take materialism - "everything that exist is of a physical material" then you are limiting your world-view on say energy to be a physical thing.

Well, it interacts with other physical things, so sure, energy is physical. What's the problem with that? Why is this limiting?

Indeed, you are taking a closed-minded approach that is not what science has intended. Materialism as in science is the approach that all things can be percieved.

What makes you think that the term physical does not include all things that can be perceived? Since perception is itself a type of interaction, it necessarily follows that anything that can be perceived is physical.

But it appears that on this board physical simply means "can be perceived or rendered to such a state that they can be perceived." Unforutantely not a single person on this board seems willing to offer a defintion of physical that will make what I assert materialism is different from what they assert materialism is.

See above. If you had been around here longer, you would no that the term "physical" has been defined here by the materialists many, many times.

It appears you all simply want to argue without even using the same terms. [sarcasm] Very useful [/sarcasm]

Why don't you set a good example by defining your terms then? What does "substance" mean? Or "causal" (as you have used it)? Or "interaction" (as you have used it)? What would you say the distinction between monism and dualism is?

Dr. Stupid

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,

I use the scientific definition of physical. Something is physical if it interacts with something else that is physical, and the things which we can directly empirically observe are taken to be physical by definition.

So something is physical if it interacts with something else that is physical? You can't use the term you are defining in the definition. I can assume what you meant but since you seem to be unable to do the same I insist that your definition is meaningless. Please try again.

If this agent introduces new causal chains into the causal world, but is not causal itself, then by definition, your causal World is not causal.

The causal world is the world where the TLOP applies. I will call it something else for you, to help you understand.

The "agent" introduces new causal chains into the parts of the world that are ruled by TLOP.

This is self-contradictory. See above.

If it is entirely explainable through cause and effect, then in what sense did the "agent" introduce it? Did the agent have an effect on the causal World, or didn't it?

Are you reading what I wrote?

The "agent" can create new causal chains but is not itself subject to causal chains. Is this that difficult to understand?

I have no idea. All I can say is that it sounds incoherent. If the physical World (using the definition I gave above) is causally closed, then nothing which is not a part of it can possibly have any effect on it.

Your definition of physical was not a definition. You need to try again.

The way I see it, Dualism can take four possible forms:

A = material/physical.
B = mental/non-physical.

1) A and B exist, but do not interact in any way.

This is logically coherent, but essentially meaningless, since both the brain and mind must clearly belong to the same set, which removes any reason to believe the other set exists at all. Thus you end up with either Materialism or Idealism.

I agree

2) A and B exist. A affects B, but B does not affect A.

Similar problem to (1). The brain and mind must both belong to A, since the mind affects the brain. Thus set B can only possibly contain things which we have no reason to believe exist in the first place.

3) A and B exist. A does not affect B, but B effects A.

This seems to be what you are suggesting. If A is causally closed, then this scenario is simply not possible. If A is not causally closed, then this is not dualism, but rather simply supernaturalism. The scientific method is not valid in such a scenario.

4) A and B exist, and interact with each other.

This is simply monism wearing a funny hat. By the definition of physical, B is also physical. Dividing the physical World up into arbitrary subsets does not change anything, it is just semantics.

You are mistaken again. A and B exist, they interact with each other, but B (the "agent") is not subject to TLOP (which binds things together in such a way we call "causal").

B can observe A but is not affected in it in the same way that A is affected by A. The 'causal bit' which neccesitates a response is unable to be transfered from A to B. B, however, can initiate something that will introduce a 'causal bit' somewhere into A. This is possibly inserted into the brain.

A 'causal bit' is something that neccesitates a response. Everything in A is causal, the causal bit is whatever it is that neccesitates a response (sometimes people claim it is TLOP).

No. What I am saying is that if World and agent interact in a bi-directional way, then it is meaningless to say that they are any more distinct than any other two things that interact with each other. Dualism seems to differ from monism only semantically then.

Dualism is relatively new to me. Perhaps you are correct.

OK. This only leaves the question of why you believe there is some non-physical agent which affects the physical World, but is not affected by it?

That is answered in the Free Will thread. Basically I assert that I have free will. I then prove that free will requires an "agent". The conclusion is that there is an "agent". It is the basic libertarian argument.

Maybe. But that is simply because nobody has ever described dualism to me in a way that is not either incoherent, or indistinguishable from monism.

I would agree. Unfortunately, this is exactly what many dualists are asserting. I realize that this is not what you are asserting, however, I fail to see how you notion of an "agent" which is not affected by the physical World, but which affects it, makes any more sense? How does this differ from random influences? How does it affect the physical World without rendering the physical World not causally closed?

If you press further I would assert that the "agent" is what gives us the "self" or identity that we posses. Therefore, ultimately, we are the "agent". Perhaps we are the "agents".

It is different from random influences because the existence of the "agent" allows for a non-determined, non-random act to take place. Not only a single act but many such acts. I assert every time you exercise your free will you are (initially) performing such an act.

Not all dualists believe this. What's more, I have no idea what you mean by the "causal bit" not crossing over? An interaction is an interaction. If the interaction can be observed (directly or indirectly), and described with logical rules, then how is it different from any other physical interaction? If it cannot be described with logical rules, then this is just supernaturalism. And if it cannot be observed, then why assume it exists at all?

It is different from other interactions because it orignated not from a causal chain but from the "agent".

It is observable every time you exercise your free will.

Actually, physicalism is essentially the same as what you listed above, except that it is stated differently. The notion of different ontological substances is pretty much meaningless. What is a "substance"? Can anyone even define the term?

Well, it interacts with other physical things, so sure, energy is physical. What's the problem with that? Why is this limiting?

Please define physical without using the word physical.

What makes you think that the term physical does not include all things that can be perceived? Since perception is itself a type of interaction, it necessarily follows that anything that can be perceived is physical.

That is useful. So is the definition of physical "anything that can be perceived"?

See above. If you had been around here longer, you would no that the term "physical" has been defined here by the materialists many, many times.

Give me time

Why don't you set a good example by defining your terms then? What does "substance" mean? Or "causal" (as you have used it)? Or "interaction" (as you have used it)? What would you say the distinction between monism and dualism is?

Dr. Stupid [/B]

I don't use substance.

I am not here to argue about what "cause" means. Try this:
http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/c2.htm#cause
or start a new thread for such a new discussion.

By interaction I mean that they interact in any way. By saying an interaction where the 'causal bit' does not cross over I mean to say a non-causal interaction. I should have made this part more clear.

I'm not sure what the distinction between monism and dualism is, but I would like to know.

-Rusty

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

I've been thinking and I'd like to apologize. I do owe you a definition of how I am using cause.

Here is cause:

Something is causal if:

1) It neccisitates that some effect follows it.

The "agent" is causal to the world that is ruled over by TLOP.

Something ("it") is subject to causation if:

1) Anything can happen that will necessitate some effect from "it".

The "agent" is not subject to causation from the world that is ruled over by TLOP.

I use the word "causal bits" to mean:

1) The "thing" that neccisitates.

I hope that will help clear up my argument and I apologize for not offering it before. But now I am leaving work, hooray!

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

I use the scientific definition of physical. Something is physical if it interacts with something else that is physical, and the things which we can directly empirically observe are taken to be physical by definition.
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So something is physical if it interacts with something else that is physical? You can't use the term you are defining in the definition. I can assume what you meant but since you seem to be unable to do the same I insist that your definition is meaningless. Please try again.

I most certainly can. It is called a recursive definition. I can break it down into formal logic if you like.

1) If A can be empirically observed, then A is physical.

2) If A and B interact, and B is physical, then A is also physical.

Thus I have stipulated the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to qualify as physical. That is a complete formal definition.

Incidentally, when you consider that the process of observing the effect that something that cannot be directly observed has on something that can be, is essentially what is meant by "indirect observation", it is clear that this formal definition essentially amounts to what you described as materialism. "All things that exist can be perceived or rendered to such a state that they can be perceived."

If this agent introduces new causal chains into the causal world, but is not causal itself, then by definition, your causal World is not causal.
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The causal world is the world where the TLOP applies. I will call it something else for you, to help you understand.

The "agent" introduces new causal chains into the parts of the world that are ruled by TLOP.

Is their introduction into the World describable through TLOP? If so, then in what sense did this "agent" introduce them? And if not, then you are asserting that there are observable phenomena which cannot be described by TLOP, which would render the entire conception of "laws of physics" incoherent.

This is self-contradictory. See above.

If it is entirely explainable through cause and effect, then in what sense did the "agent" introduce it? Did the agent have an effect on the causal World, or didn't it?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Are you reading what I wrote?

The "agent" can create new causal chains but is not itself subject to causal chains. Is this that difficult to understand?

No, it is very easy to understand. What I don't understand is how you can claim that there are natural laws at all, when you have posited the existence of some "agent" that affects the physical World, but which itself not subject to those natural laws.

You are mistaken again. A and B exist, they interact with each other, but B (the "agent") is not subject to TLOP (which binds things together in such a way we call "causal").

Does B have any affect on things which obey TLOP? If so, then B must also obey TLOP, otherwise it is not possible for A to obey TLOP.

It is really quite simple. If something physical, for example, your brain, can be described completely in terms of the laws of physics, then it is a contradiction to say that something which is not subject to the laws of physics (your agent), can have any effect on it.

B can observe A but is not affected in it in the same way that A is affected by A. The 'causal bit' which neccesitates a response is unable to be transfered from A to B. B, however, can initiate something that will introduce a 'causal bit' somewhere into A. This is possibly inserted into the brain.

A 'causal bit' is something that neccesitates a response. Everything in A is causal, the causal bit is whatever it is that neccesitates a response (sometimes people claim it is TLOP).

So you are saying that the B can initiate a response in A, but that A cannot initiate a response in B. And you are also saying that B cannot be described by TLOP. This is nothing less than a rejection of the concept of TLOP in the first place. If B, which does not obey TLOP, can initiate a response in A, then it necessarily follows that A does not obey TLOP either.

OK. This only leaves the question of why you believe there is some non-physical agent which affects the physical World, but is not affected by it?
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That is answered in the Free Will thread. Basically I assert that I have free will. I then prove that free will requires an "agent". The conclusion is that there is an "agent". It is the basic libertarian argument.

OK. But do you not realize that this just amounts to the argument that Libertarian free will requires supernaturalism?

If you press further I would assert that the "agent" is what gives us the "self" or identity that we posses. Therefore, ultimately, we are the "agent". Perhaps we are the "agents".

How is this sensible? I don't know about you, but my sense of identity is strongly tied in with the physical World. Indeed, it is clear to me that who I am, how I feel about things, how I interpret my sensory inputs, and indeed everything about me that makes me "me", depends in a very fundamental way on the things I have experienced, and the things that have happened to me. In other words, it is quite clear that my identity is affected by the physical World.

It is different from random influences because the existence of the "agent" allows for a non-determined, non-random act to take place. Not only a single act but many such acts. I assert every time you exercise your free will you are (initially) performing such an act.

I have no idea what this means. I know of no definition of the word "random" that is not equivalent to "non-determined". Precisely what characteristic does a random event possess, which a non-determined, non-random event does not possess?

Not all dualists believe this. What's more, I have no idea what you mean by the "causal bit" not crossing over? An interaction is an interaction. If the interaction can be observed (directly or indirectly), and described with logical rules, then how is it different from any other physical interaction? If it cannot be described with logical rules, then this is just supernaturalism. And if it cannot be observed, then why assume it exists at all?
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It is different from other interactions because it orignated not from a causal chain but from the "agent".

It is observable every time you exercise your free will.

Only if the observable world does not obey TLOP. Is this what you are asserting? Supernaturalism?

What makes you think that the term physical does not include all things that can be perceived? Since perception is itself a type of interaction, it necessarily follows that anything that can be perceived is physical.
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That is useful. So is the definition of physical "anything that can be perceived"?

That is not the formal definition of it, but when you combine the definition of physical that I gave with the assumption that reality obeys consistent logical rules, then it becomes a true statement.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Rusty,



I most certainly can. It is called a recursive definition. I can break it down into formal logic if you like.

1) If A can be empirically observed, then A is physical.

2) If A and B interact, and B is physical, then A is also physical.

Nonsense. Something is physical if it in principle can be directly or indirectly seen ie plays some fruitful role in our theories describing our empirical reality. Given that our world is supposedly physically closed the role of phenomenal consciousness is supererogatory and therefore cannot be claimed to be physical.

If on the other hand the world is not physically closed, so that phenomenal consciousness is itself causally efficaceous, it is a cheat to call that physical in its turn. As I've said before, the way you define "physical" means that materialism must be true by definition. But if consciousness or the self is of such a character that it is for example immortal, doesn't obey any of the physical laws of nature, has no location etc, I see nothing gained in describing it as "physical"!

 

[metacristi]

Rusty...

You have misunderstood the dualist argument. In a dualist the "mind part" can interact with the "body part" and perhaps the "body part" can interact with the "mind part" but what is important is that the causal bit doesn't cross over.

There are some philosophers who hold this Cartesian interactionist view,in a modern version however.The problem with Cartesian dualism is how can and why should mind and matter interact if they are incommensurable.Descartes was not able to resolve this logical contradiction,his solution was that God is responsible for that...clearly not acceptable for someone who seek to respect logic without resorting to supernatural explanations.The proposed 'interaction' is 'forced',Descartes used it in order to defend his other philosophical views.
That's why modern philosophers holding this view 'shifted' the problem from 'interaction' to 'causality' by arguing that the real problem is not the interaction but the currently accepted notion of causality [which presupposes some kind of interaction at least initially].They argue,for example,that exactly how energy seems to convert into matter without the need to exist a direct interaction between matter and energy it is also possible that 'mental substance' can convert into matter and reversely.
Thus the interaction problem is totally skipped,ceasing to be a 'problem' for dualism in this view.But this form of dualism still resorts to the 'interaction' principle:mind and matter are incommensurable and do not interact though they can cause each other.
Personally I am not at all sure that 'energy' (understood as a 'substance') and matter do not interact be it only with infinitesimal strength.Besides I am not even sure if what we name 'energy' in physics is the 'substance' from which quantum particles 'pop-up'...some even say that they pop up out of 'nothing'...

It appears you all simply want to argue without even using the same terms. [sarcasm] Very useful [/sarcasm]

I thought you were genuinely interested to know other positions...Sorry if I understood you wronlgy,I will not bother you any more.
And by the way you are only the first person on my ignore list.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I most certainly can. It is called a recursive definition. I can break it down into formal logic if you like.

1) If A can be empirically observed, then A is physical.

2) If A and B interact, and B is physical, then A is also physical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nonsense.

Are you saying that my definition is incoherent, or that you use a different definition. If the former, point out the contradiction. If the latter, who asked you? Rusty asked me for how I define "physical", and I told him. How you define it is irrelevant.

Something is physical if it in principle can be directly or indirectly seen ie plays some fruitful role in our theories describing our empirical reality.

If you had read my entire post, you would have seen where I pointed out that the definition I gave, when combined with the assumption that reality obeys some set of consistent logical rules, directly leads to the conclusion that physical things can, in principle, be directly or indirectly observed.

Given that our world is supposedly physically closed the role of phenomenal consciousness is supererogatory and therefore cannot be claimed to be physical.

What evidence do you have for this extraordinary claim? Is it not clear that since your physical body is capable of typing those words, that your phenomenal consciousness has, in fact, had an affect on the physical World, and as such can, at least in principle, be indirectly observed?

If on the other hand the world is not physically closed, so that phenomenal consciousness is itself causally efficaceous, it is a cheat to call that physical in its turn.

If the World is not physically closed, then my definition of physical is pointless, because in such a scenario there could be physical things that cannot, even in principle, be observed. Since no method could then exist for determining whether something is physical or not, my definition would be pretty much useless.

Of course, in such a scenario, the scientific method cannot function either, since one can never rule out the possibility that a given observation was influenced by these non-physical sources.

As I've said before, the way you define "physical" means that materialism must be true by definition.

No, it just isn't a very useful definition unless Materialism, or more specifically, Naturalism, is true. Naturalism plus the definition of physical I gave equals Scientific Materialism.

But if consciousness or the self is of such a character that it is for example immortal, doesn't obey any of the physical laws of nature, has no location etc, I see nothing gained in describing it as "physical"!

Of course not. If the Supernatural exists, then there is nothing to be gained by any of this. Under such a scenario the scientific method is invalid, so unless you know some other method for acquiring reliable information about the nature of reality, we are pretty much done before we even get started.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

SNIP

Another utterly vacuous response as per usual. Why am I not surprised?