Only Atheists Have The Capacity To Be Truly Moral?

[Robin]

I wasn't actually making any assumption about whether free will exists or not.

You misunderstand me. I am saying that if a person that comes before a court does not have free will then the judge and politician that frames the laws also do not have free will.

So how can a person without free will behave unethically? So a person who does not believe in free will can never consider a legal system to be unethical.

 

[Bri]

In fact I think that this is the opposite of the common sense of the word. We commonly believe that we have exercised free will when our actions are predictable at least to ourselves. When our actions are unpredictable to ourselves then we think we have been influenced by something. If I go into a showroom to buy a sensible family car and drive out with a sports car I would think that it would have been due to the influence of some chemical in my brain produced by the sight and feel of the car.

I think most people would disagree with that statement, although it's unclear what you mean by "predictable to ourselves" (do you predict your own decisions before you make them?) In fact, most people assume that all of their actions are the result of free will. Even someone who acts on impulse will (usually) acknowledge responsibility of that action, and will say that perhaps it was a stupid decision in hindsight (they didn't consider all of the information they had), but that it was a result of free will.

If I set out to drive to some location and find myself going an entirely different direction then I would not think this was free will.

Does that happen to you a lot? You might want to see a professional about that. It's more likely the result of Alzheimer's than free will. Diseases like Alzheimer's would actually rob a person of their free will by removing the ability to control (choose) their actions.

Not splitting hairs - impulses and whims have causes. I don't go into shops and buy surgical support hose on impulse.

Ummm...does that happen to you a lot? No, but if you were really hungry and had no money on you, you might steal some food on impulse.

Perhaps not normally distributed randomness, but if you predict a result with no information at all you can't really be said to be exercising a choice.

Perhaps. Like I said, I think having no information whatsoever isn't an option, and I honestly don't know what a person would do in that situation (probably nothing).

Not so, I could have a deterministic system that produced different results from the same data each time - I just alter the method after each processing cycle. (Note that different results each time is not the same as unpredictable).

Remember, we're talking about going back in time here. That means that everything would be exactly the same. "Altering the method" isn't an option in a deterministic system. The data, as well as the method used to process it, are both the result of prior cause and effect, and therefore cannot be changed.

Everybody wants to buy their randomness at the qm shop. I can get just as good effective randomness from rolling some numbered marbles round in a barrel as I can sampling quantum states of particles (or however it is done).

There are a few theories (such as QM) that are deterministic but not predeterministic. QM and similar theories aside, determinism deems that everything that occurs is a predictable effect of causes that preceed it. In other words, everthing that occurs has been predetermined since the big bang (and presumably before that). Someone around during the big bang who knew every variable and had a big enough computer to calculate the physics would be able to predict that you are going to stub your toe on the sidewalk on your way to the store tomorrow.

But suppose we go back to the thought experiment where we roll forward a slice of time with the exact same internal and external circumstances and suppose each time the resulting choice was different. Wouldn't that mean that our behaviour was unpredictable even to ourselves? If so then that would not be free will.

Again, I don't know what you mean by "predictable to ourselves." If the result is different each time then it's not predictable, and it's not determinism -- it's free will.

What I am looking for is some justification for this statement. I cannot see anything in the process of making a choice or arriving at a decision that contravenes some known physical law.

That's the very definition of free will, at least according to Webster:

free will
n.

1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.
2. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

You misunderstand me. I am saying that if a person that comes before a court does not have free will then the judge and politician that frames the laws also do not have free will.

So how can a person without free will behave unethically? So a person who does not believe in free will can never consider a legal system to be unethical.

A person who doesn't believe in free will would assume that our legal system is inethical by its own definition, but not necessarily by theirs. In fact, my argument is that without free will, ethics as we know it might not even exist (our system of ethics assumes that we have free will). Therefore, someone who doesn't believe in free will could conclude that the only important function of a justice system would be to prevent crimes regardless of the means, and might therefore decide to change the system so that everyone who commits any crime is killed. That would certainly deter crime, but would not be ethical according to our current understanding of ethics.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

Does that happen to you a lot? You might want to see a professional about that. It's more likely the result of Alzheimer's than free will. Diseases like Alzheimer's would actually rob a person of their free will by removing the ability to control (choose) their actions.

Thank you, you have just conceded my point. If I behaved in the unpredictable manner I described you went straight to the conclusion that I would be acting from something other than free will - in this case a brain condition. So even if say you disagree with me your conclusion here shows that you agree. When we think of free will we think of predictable behaviour. When we consider unpredictable behaviour we immediately assume a loss of free will as you did.

Ummm...does that happen to you a lot? No, but if you were really hungry and had no money on you, you might steal some food on impulse.

Again you have conceded the point. I might steal some food on impulse if I was really hungry. Impulses have causes. In this case a well understood physical cause. But the causes might equally be internal mental events, even ones of which we are not conscious.

Perhaps. Like I said, I think having no information whatsoever isn't an option, and I honestly don't know what a person would do in that situation (probably nothing).

But you were the one that claimed mental events like the ones I described were not causes, only influences. So I said OK, let's take away all the influences and see what is left. So if what is left is probably nothing then it is reasonable for me to reinstate my original contention that mental events are causal factors in decisions and choices.

Remember, we're talking about going back in time here. That means that everything would be exactly the same. "Altering the method" isn't an option in a deterministic system. The data, as well as the method used to process it, are both the result of prior cause and effect, and therefore cannot be changed.

We are not talking about going back in time here - re-read my post. My hypothetical was of a mind operating with only knowledge and reasoning. Theoretically this would mean that the same conclusion should be reached with the same data each time (this does not require going back in time). But "Altering the method" is always an option with deterministic systems - for example a computer program that alters it's own code as a result of the processing. This is probably analogous to what happens in a mind.

Again, I don't know what you mean by "predictable to ourselves."

Well say I sit down at my desk with a cup of coffee and then carefully pour it over my head. Unless I am working in a comedic profession you might concede that I might find such behaviour unpredictable. Yes? If I simply sip the coffee while doing my work as was the intention in making the coffee then this is predictable. If I start finding my own behaviour unpredictable I would immediately conclude that I was operating from something other than free will.

If the result is different each time then it's not predictable, and it's not determinism -- it's free will.

If all inner and outer circumstances were the same and the result is different then it is not determinism. But I don't see how that is free will - that would just leave you with the situation where you don't know what you are going to do next.

That's the very definition of free will, at least according to Webster:

free will
n.

1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.
2. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

That is right - external circumstances. There is no contradiction with free will being caused by internal mental constructs and events.

A person who doesn't believe in free will would assume that our legal system is inethical by its own definition, but not necessarily by theirs. In fact, my argument is that without free will, ethics as we know it might not even exist (our system of ethics assumes that we have free will). Therefore, someone who doesn't believe in free will could conclude that the only important function of a justice system would be to prevent crimes regardless of the means, and might therefore decide to change the system so that everyone who commits any crime is killed. That would certainly deter crime, but would not be ethical according to our current understanding of ethics.

Well there are two things wrong with this analysis. Firstly killing everybody who commits a crime would simply not be effective. It would lead to an increase in violent crime as criminals would have a motivation to kill victims and witnesses even for simple crimes.

Secondly it is not realistic that the only end is the reduction of crime. This end would merely be a factor in the overall equation. So if your end was to maximise the ability of people to live their own life according to their own nature where pragmatically possible and not inconsistent then your strategy might be very different. You would probably devise a minimalistic set of interventions in recognition of the fact that you are dealing with a system that already has some self-regulating features and that over-intervention is inconsistent with your ends.

As a determinist you would look at the evidence and see how top heavy highly interventionist states have not given good results in the past.

So the intelligent determinist might be a moderate libertarian.

 

[Bri]

Thank you, you have just conceded my point.

I have enjoyed our discussion, but I can see that you're going to argue that somehow you have proven your premise despite the faulty reasoning, and at the same time claim that anything I say is somehow proving your premise as well.

I don't really have time right now to go through each of your arguments and show where your logic breaks down, but if you re-read the previous posts you should be able to figure that out.

Suffice it to say that by definition "free will" (that we have the ability to choose our own actions) and "determinism" (all events are inevitable consequences of their causes -- i.e. that we do not have the ability to choose our own actions) cannot exist simultaneously, and despite mental gymnastics you cannot change the definitions to somehow make them compatible.

I've already posted the definition of free will, which simply indicates that we have free choice independent of cause and effect. Here's the definition of determinism:

determinism
n : (philosophy) a philosophical theory holding that all events are inevitable consequences of antecedent sufficient causes; often understood as denying the possibility of free will.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

I have enjoyed our discussion, but I can see that you're going to argue that somehow you have proven your premise despite the faulty reasoning, and at the same time claim that anything I say is somehow proving your premise as well.

Well lets replay the exchange in question (with italics added):

Me:
If I set out to drive to some location and find myself going an entirely different direction then I would not think this was free will.

You:
Does that happen to you a lot? You might want to see a professional about that. It's more likely the result of Alzheimer's than free will. Diseases like Alzheimer's would actually rob a person of their free will by removing the ability to control (choose) their actions.

It is clear that your statement says pretty much what my statement says - my behaviour is a sign that I am not acting according to free will. Do you deny this? If this is faulty reasoning then why did you also follow it?

No this is quite clear, what we generally think of as free will is predictable behaviour. We generally do not think of unpredictable behaviour as being compatible with free will. This was in response to your statement:

Without free will you simply don't have an actual decision in the common sense of the word. Instead, you have causes producing a single predictable effect, but there is no choice and no decision because the resulting effect is both determined and predictable.

So where is the faulty reasoning?

And when I said that impulses have causes, you came back with an example of an impulse that had a cause. To prove your point you would have had to come back with an impulse that didn't have a cause.

But then you would have to show an impulse that didn't have a cause that could nonetheless be regarded as being free will. I don't think you can do that.

I've already posted the definition of free will, which simply indicates that we have free choice independent of cause and effect.

If you posted that I missed it, you posted:

That's the very definition of free will, at least according to Webster:

free will
n.

1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.
2. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

which says nothing about being independent of cause and effect.

Here's the definition of determinism:

determinism
n : (philosophy) a philosophical theory holding that all events are inevitable consequences of antecedent sufficient causes; often understood as denying the possibility of free will.

And my position put earlier was that mental entities and events (intelligence, reasoning ability, skill, knowledge, belief, attitude, biases, emotions, desires etc...) can be regarded as sufficient cause for our actions.

Certainly you can disagree but I cannot see what else there is in the process of making a choice or arriving at a decision.

Finally what is the alternative? All I am saying is that our mental processes are ultimately dependent on some underlying order. How could such a complex process not be dependent on underlying order?

 

[Bri]

It is clear that your statement says pretty much what my statement says - my behaviour is a sign that I am not acting according to free will. Do you deny this? If this is faulty reasoning then why did you also follow it?

You are making some assumptions in your argument that simply are not true. Therefore, the conclusion you jumped to is faulty.

Free will (if it exists) is not an absolute. For example, inanimate objects don't have free will. It's also possible that people with full blown Alzheimer's don't have free will. The wouldn't preclude other people from having free will.

No this is quite clear, what we generally think of as free will is predictable behaviour. We generally do not think of unpredictable behaviour as being compatible with free will.

These statements are wrong on many levels. It may be that you're confusing cause and effect here, and it may be that you're confusing the use of the term "predictable."

"Predictable" doesn't mean "rational." Nor does it mean that you or I can necessarily predict it. It means that it is following the laws of cause and effect. For example, when a pool ball is struck by another pool ball, we can predict its behavior. Theoretically, if you knew all of the variables, you could predict the behavior with 100% accuracy. But even pool balls are too complex for us to predict with 100% accuracy (you would have to model every fiber of the felt surface, wind current, and many other variables). Still, science would consider the behavior of pool balls to be "predictable" since IF you were able to model every single variable, you could predict their behavior with 100% accuracy.

Even someone who believes in free will would say that pool ball behavior is scientifically predictable (and that pool balls don't have free will). It is clear that pool balls don't have a choice as to how they will react to their circumstances. Someone who believes in free will would say that people are different -- that people do have a choice as to how they react to their circumstances, therefore their behavior is scientifically unpredictable. That doesn't mean that it's irrational, but simply that even if you knew all of the variables you still wouldn't be able to predict the behavior with 100% accuracy, because humans possess the ability to choose their behavior. The choice may be influenced by the variables, but it's not determined by them.

Determinism believes that everything -- including people -- act according to strict rules of cause and effect. If you were able to know every variable, you could reliably predict the behavior of people -- just like with the pool balls. Does a pool ball have a choice as to which direction it goes when it is hit by another pool ball? Of course not! If you believe in determinism, then the same holds for human beings. We have absolutely no choice as to our next action -- it is completely determined by the sum of all circumstances, following strict cause and effect, according to the laws of physics and chemistry.

And my position put earlier was that mental entities and events (intelligence, reasoning ability, skill, knowledge, belief, attitude, biases, emotions, desires etc...) can be regarded as sufficient cause for our actions.

Certainly you can disagree but I cannot see what else there is in the process of making a choice or arriving at a decision.

If you believe that, then you believe in determinism. But if you believe that, then you don't believe that human beings can choose their actions, since their actions are completely determined by their circumstances, including their intelligence, reasoning ability, skill, knowledge, belief, attitude, biases, emotions, desires etc.

Finally what is the alternative? All I am saying is that our mental processes are ultimately dependent on some underlying order. How could such a complex process not be dependent on underlying order?

Influenced by, yes. Dependent on, maybe. Determined by, no. Unless you don't believe in free will.

If you believe that our mental processes are completely determined by the sum of our internal and external circumstances, then you also believe that the resulting actions are predictable. That is, if you knew all of the circumstances, you would be able to model them on a (very big) computer and predict the resulting action with 100% accuracy.

However, if our behavior is scientifically predictable, then we have no choice but to act that certain way under those circumstance, which is determinism, not free will.

If you believe in free will, then we would have a choice to act differently independent of the circumstances.

It is true that science has determined no mechanism by which we can choose, and that free will would have to be caused by something currently unknown to science.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

And my position put earlier was that mental entities and events (intelligence, reasoning ability, skill, knowledge, belief, attitude, biases, emotions, desires etc...) can be regarded as sufficient cause for our actions.

One cause of the confusion might be that you are assuming that these "internal circumstances" are somehow not determined by prior causes. If you believe in determinism, then everything is the result of cause and effect, and the internal circumstances are the result of prior causes. So even internal circumstances are scientifically predictable according to determinism, meaning that if you knew all of the variables, you could predict these internal circumstances with 100% accuracy. If that's true, then human beings cannot choose their actions.

Put another way, IF I can theoretically predict your behavior with 100% accuracy (as is assumed by science), then by definition you have no choice but to behave in that way. If you behaved differently, then I failed to predict it, which would go against anything science has ever seen before.

Conversely, if you have free choice, then it would be impossible for me to predict your behavior beforehand (because you could easily choose differently than the prediction). That would be free will.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

You are making some assumptions in your argument that simply are not true. Therefore, the conclusion you jumped to is faulty.

Now you are putting words in my mouth. I didn't say or imply that "predictable" meant "rational" or that internal circumstances didn't have causes. Or anything like that.

When I say "predictable" I mean "predictable". Able to be predicted. When I set out in my car for Parramatta I predict that I will arrive at Parramatta. Whether it is rational or not is beside the point. If I actually arrive in Wooloomoloo then I would consider this to be unpredictable behaviour. Maybe a scientist with a quantum computer and a quantum measuring device could predict it, but I could not - it would be as I said earlier "unpredictable to me". I would also not consider it to be the result of free will.

So here is the points I did make:

1. In the normal usage of the words we do not equate unpredictable behaviour with free will

When I described a case of unpredictable behaviour you leapt at the conclusion of Alzhiemers so I think you do agree. So is there something faulty with this assumption and if so what?.

2. Impulses and whims have causes

I gave an example of an impulse that I would never have because there was no previous desire or need. Is there something faulty about this assumption? If so what?

Now something that was not predictable to us might be predictable in some other way. But:

3. Something that was absolutely unpredictable would also be unpredictable to me

Is this there something faulty about this assumption? If so what?

4. Deterministic systems are characterised by predictability (if only theoretical predictability), so whatever alternative you are proposing to determinism would not be characterised by predictability

5. Say I have two options open to me. I believe that if I choose one option over the other then there was some reason for me to prefer this option. If not an intelligent reason then something to do with desire (a whim) or attitude or somesuch. The difference between the options might have been tiny or subtle. I think that if there were no reason at all for me to have preferred the option I chose then I would not consider this to be free will. Moreover I think that this is what the majority of people think of as free will.

Put another way, IF I can theoretically predict your behavior with 100% accuracy (as is assumed by science), then by definition you have no choice but to behave in that way. If you behaved differently, then I failed to predict it, which would go against anything science has ever seen before.

So by this definition, free will is some behaviour that contains at least some element that could never, even theoretically, be predicted by any means whatsoever. If so then my free will would contain some element that could I could never predict (from 3 above).

But in normal usage I do not consider the unpredictable aspects of my behaviour to be free will (from 1 above).

So the very thing that defines free will to you (unpredictability) is also the very thing that defines a lack of free will in normal usage.

So back to my original conclusion - what most people naturally think of as free will is deterministic free will.

 

[Bri]

Now you are putting words in my mouth. I didn't say or imply that "predictable" meant "rational" or that internal circumstances didn't have causes. Or anything like that.

When I say "predictable" I mean "predictable". Able to be predicted. When I set out in my car for Parramatta I predict that I will arrive at Parramatta. Whether it is rational or not is beside the point. If I actually arrive in Wooloomoloo then I would consider this to be unpredictable behaviour. Maybe a scientist with a quantum computer and a quantum measuring device could predict it, but I could not - it would be as I said earlier "unpredictable to me". I would also not consider it to be the result of free will.

As I was trying to explain, that is not even close to the scientific meaning of "predictable." In fact, your statement "maybe a scientist with a quantum computer and a quantum measuring device could predict it" is far closer to the definition science uses than "but I could not." Science doesn't care if you or anyone else could actually predict it or not, it cares whether it is theoretically predictable. Note that predictability of a person's behavior would also have absolutely nothing to do with whether the person in question could predict their own behavior. Predictability is not subject to your or anyone else's opinion.

Determinism, by definition, dictates that a certain cause will always have the same predictable effect -- predictable meaning scientifically predictable, not whether or not you or anyone else might predict it.

All of the points that you did make (especially your conclusion) are based on your faulty assumption of what "predictable" means.

Take a look at this reference. It's very easy to read, and I think explains the situation very nicely:

http://dubinserver.colorado.edu/prj/kch/index.html

-Bri

 

[Robin]

That is not even close to the scientific definition of "predictable," as I was trying to explain. All of the points that you did make are based on this faulty definition.

That is a very odd assertion since you included the quote where I had both definitions and made the distinction clear.

But you also missed where I made the connection "3. Something that was absolutely unpredictable would also be unpredictable to me". I don't have predictive powers that are unavailable to science. Anything unpredictable under your scientific definition would also be unpredictable to me under the definition I gave.

So you are proposing a model of free will that contains elements of unpredictability (using a scientific definition). Then those elements would also be unpredictable to me and isasmuch as they were unpredictable I would not consider them to be free will.

Take a look at this reference. It's very easy to read, and I think explains the situation very nicely:

http://dubinserver.colorado.edu/prj/kch/index.html

I already read this. Have a look at the two reasons the author says that determism cannot be believed:

Pragmatically, it would be terrible to believe that all human actions are predetermined and outside of our control

You can't believe it because it would be an unpleasant conclusion. Do you buy that?

For these reasons, determinism is fundamentally unprovable, and it is necessary that at least some semblance of free will be assumed

You can't believe it because it can't be proved. And there is this:

As already stated, determinists do have an explanation as to why humans would perceive that they have free will, even though they do not. However, in a way, our collective experience of free will is more believable than scientific inquiry

What does "our collective experience of free will" mean? Experience is not collective. Who does "our" include? He is not speaking for me. As I have already stated I can find nothing in my own experience that would suggest uncaused free will. If anybody else can they are unable to precisely describe exactly what.

And as usual he claims that dualism solves the problem of free will without explaining exactly how.

I stand by my contention that the everyday understanding of free will is compatible with determinism. Most people will say that their actions are determined by intelligence, knowledge, skills, attitude, belief, emotion, desire, instinct etc.

 

[Bri]

That is a very odd assertion since you included the quote where I had both definitions and made the distinction clear.

But your arguments are only using one of the definitions. The incorrect one.

I stand by my contention that the everyday understanding of free will is compatible with determinism.

I feel quite certain from our conversation that this statement is true -- that you will stand by your contention, regardless of the facts.

Most people will say that their actions are determined by intelligence, knowledge, skills, attitude, belief, emotion, desire, instinct etc.

Except that this statement is false. Most people are not determinists, but instead believe in free will. Most people would say that those things influence their actions, but that they still have choices and therefore those things do not determine their actions.

A determinist would say that all of those things are the result of cause and effect and therefore are the scientifically predictable results of prior causes. If they are scientifically predictable, and they determine your actions (as opposed to just influencing your actions), then your actions are also scientifically predictable. If something is scientifically predictable, then there is no choice involved.

A choice would make it scientifically unpredictable, which by definition, would preclude determinism.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

But your arguments are only using one of the definitions. The incorrect one.

No, because you again skip the crucial step, even after I drew attention to it.

I set out both definitions, made the distinction clear and then I made the connection between them, so for the third time:

3. Something that was absolutely unpredictable would also be unpredictable to me

That is the key. Something that is scientifically unpredictable must be absolutely unpredictable. Otherwise it is just something that science has not yet reached. And if it is absolutely unpredictable then it is unpredictable by any other definition you care to use.

But if you want to say that free will means that science can never, even in principle, predict your behaviour 100%, the inevitable consequence is that you cannot predict your behaviour 100% either.

No mental gymnastics or ambiguity of definition here. It means that you can never be completely sure what you will do next. You will never really know what your next move will be until after you have done it.

And if so there is a serious dissonance with what most people think of as free will.

I feel quite certain from our conversation that this statement is true -- that you will stand by your contention, regardless of the facts.

Er.. what facts are those precisely?

But I have done better than stand by my contentions - I have provided justification for them. You have not even attempted to provide justification for yours. For example:

Except that this statement is false. Most people are not determinists, but instead believe in free will. Most people would say that those things influence their actions, but that they still have choices and therefore those things do not determine their actions.

That is just an assertion. You assume that everybody feels as you do. Most believers in uncaused free will do this. But can you really get many people to say that a choice is some mysterious unpredictable thing that exists independent of intelligence, reasoning ability, knowledge and experience? You never really precisely define this idea. What, for example, is the basis of a choice?

But really it would take some sort of research to really tell, to frame some questions to really get at what people actually think their behaviour is without influencing their answer.

Without that neither you nor I can claim to be right on this one. I contend that at least the answers I provided have the ring of truth and am happy to let others decide, if anybody else is reading this.

A choice would make it scientifically unpredictable, which by definition, would preclude determinism.

And scientifically unpredictable would mean absolutely unpredictable, which would make it unpredictable by any definition which would preclude control and therefore free will.

So as far as your uncaused free will or uncaused choice goes, it is really heads we lose, tails we lose.

 

[Bri]

But if you want to say that free will means that science can never, even in principle, predict your behaviour 100%

Yes, Robin, that's EXACTLY what I'm saying.

the inevitable consequence is that you cannot predict your behaviour 100% either.

Correct. You cannot scientifically predict your own behavior either. There is always a chance (if you believe in free will) that you'll change your mind at the last moment.

No mental gymnastics or ambiguity of definition here. It means that you can never be completely sure what you will do next. You will never really know what your next move will be until after you have done it.

You cannot know with 100% accuracy what you'll do next until you actually choose to do it, that's correct. This is fairly obvious if you're an impulsive person (i.e. you often make choices without thinking about them beforehand). If you're not impulsive, you could probably make a reasonable guess as to how you might decide on something, but again if free choice is involved there is always the chance of your changing your mind after your prediction.

Try it now for yourself. Predict whether or not you'll stand up from your computer in 30 seconds. Then in 10 seconds, ask yourself if you feel compelled to do exactly as you predicted, or if you could possibly change your mind. Then in 20 seconds, change your mind and do the opposite. See?

And if so there is a serious dissonance with what most people think of as free will.

I can't speak for "most people," but I would imagine that most people would say that they are free to change their minds about any decision at any time right up until the very moment the actual choice of action is made.

Not that being able to predict one's own actions or not has anything to do with scientific predictability.

Scientifically, predictability simply means that the same set of causes will always produce the same exact result. These causes would include both internal and external circumstances, all of which are in turn the result of prior causes, which are in turn the result of prior causes, which are in turn the result of prior causes. In other words, since the beginning of time, every behavior that any human being has ever exhibited could not have happened in any other way. Likewise, the behavior that any human being will exhibit in the future can happen only one specific way that was completely determined by causes millions of years ago and cannot be changed by anything.

That means that human beings have no choice but to act exactly as prior causes would dictate, and therefore human beings have no free will to choose their actions whatsoever.

The term you used "deterministic free will" is a contradiction. Free will (that we can choose our actions) and determinism (that we cannot choose our actions) cannot both be right!

-Bri

 

[Robin]

Yes, Robin, that's EXACTLY what I'm saying.

Then we are in agreement

Correct. You cannot scientifically predict your own behavior either. There is always a chance (if you believe in free will) that you'll change your mind at the last moment.

Ah, thought it was too good to be true - you went and put back the the 'scientifically' qualifier that I had shown to be superfluous in step 2. "You cannot completely predict your own behaviour". Whether scientifically or otherwise is now irrelevant.

You cannot know with 100% accuracy what you'll do next until you actually choose to do it, that's correct. This is fairly obvious if you're an impulsive person (i.e. you often make choices without thinking about them beforehand). If you're not impulsive, you could probably make a reasonable guess as to how you might decide on something, but again if free choice is involved there is always the chance of your changing your mind after your prediction.

Try it now for yourself. Predict whether or not you'll stand up from your computer in 30 seconds. Then in 10 seconds, ask yourself if you feel compelled to do exactly as you predicted, or if you could possibly change your mind. Then in 20 seconds, change your mind and do the opposite. See?

OK. ... Right, nothing I did during the 30 seconds was a result of free will - my line of thinking was determined by the parameters of the experiment as well as my internal mental states. Try it yourself. For the next 30 seconds try exactly the same thought experiment and do something that is entirely due to free will. OK what was it that you did that was entirely a result of free will and not some consequence of the line of thinking initiated by the experiment?

Even if you fall to the floor and start speaking in tongues, was that spontaneous or as a result of the instruction "do something that is entirely due to free will"?

 

[Bri]

OK. ... Right, nothing I did during the 30 seconds was a result of free will - my line of thinking was determined by the parameters of the experiment as well as my internal mental states. Try it yourself. For the next 30 seconds try exactly the same thought experiment and do something that is entirely due to free will. OK what was it that you did that was entirely a result of free will and not some consequence of the line of thinking initiated by the experiment?

Even if you fall to the floor and start speaking in tongues, was that spontaneous or as a result of the instruction "do something that is entirely due to free will"?

Yes, that's exactly what I've been saying.

If, as you indicated, you believe that everything you do is the direct result of these "parameters," then you're a determinist. In other words, you believe that everything that was done during the 30 seconds including the final result was the predictable effect of those parameters. Nothing wrong with that belief at all.

Just don't kid yourself into thinking that you somehow had free choice at the same time! If what you did was a direct result of those parameters, there was absolutely no choice -- it couldn't have happened any other way.

On the other hand, if you believe that you actually exercized some choice at the 30-second mark, then you believe in free will. In other words, you believe that the final result was completely unpredictable (even to yourself) because you could have changed your mind at the last moment. Anything that involves free choice is, by definition, unpredictable. Anything that is unpredictable is, by definition, not deterministic.

Therefore, determinism and free will are incompatible. That's all I'm saying on the subject.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

Anything that involves free choice is, by definition, unpredictable. Anything that is unpredictable is, by definition, not deterministic.

Therefore, determinism and free will are incompatible. That's all I'm saying on the subject.

-Bri

"Anything that involves free choice is, by definition, unpredictable" But you never did give this definition.

The one you did give (from Webster) said that "free" meant "free from external circumstances". That is the one I am using also. But your definition has to say more, to say that it was free also from internal circumstances - in other words free from any circumstances whatsoever - free from anything. I don't really understand what that might mean. Is my control an internal circumstance? If it were free from everything it would be free from my control.

There is no incompatibility between determinism and free will if you take the free to mean, as Webster says, free from external circumstances. The laws of physics are not an external circumstance.

Deterministic free will is as free from external circumstances as uncaused free will is, it is just not free from internal circumstances.

I always imagine that even if I change my mind a millisecond before acting that there will be some reason for this change. But if I change my mind at any time for no reason at all I don't personally consider that to be free will. A choice free from bias, external influence, habit etc might be good, but a choice free from intelligence, knowledge, experience would not.

Nobody really knows the truth of the matter. But from what I can identify I make a choice based on my intelligence, influenced by other mental factors as well as some external.

I can't see what else there is and nobody is prepared to describe precisely what is meant by a free choice so I can only go by what I can definitely identify. And if nobody can give me any good reason to reject determinism other than "it would be depressing" and "you can't prove it", then it is a good working hypothesis on the available evidence.

And that is all I am saying on the subject. If you make a free choice to change your mind and rebut these points and I am happy to let you have the last word.

 

[Bri]

"Anything that involves free choice is, by definition, unpredictable" But you never did give this definition.

Perhaps the source of the confusion has to do with what free will means. Free will is sometimes referred to as "volition" in order to distinguish it from "freedom." Volition can be thought of as your ability to make choices, whereas freedom can be thought of as your ability to choose in a particular situation. Volition is an absolute -- you either have it or you don't. In contrast, your degree of freedom depends on your circumstances.

For example, if I lock you in jail, I remove your freedom to go wherever you want. However, I do not remove your volition (that is, your ability to make choices). Similarly, the laws of physics keep you from having the freedom to flap your arms and fly. However, you still have volition.

Our choices may very well be constrained, but as long as we have the ability to make choices, we have free will.

The one you did give (from Webster) said that "free" meant "free from external circumstances". That is the one I am using also.

If you're a determinist, then all circumstances -- both internal and external -- are the result of cause and effect. It can also be argued that at conception human beings have no internal circumstances, therefore all of our internal circumstances are caused by external circumstances. Therefore, as far as free will is concerned, internal and external circumstances are exactly the same; both are affected by cause and effect, and both are the result of prior causes.

If you believe that our circumstances always completely determine our behavior, then you must believe that we do not have the ability to make choices. If you believe that our circumstances only influence our behavior, then you believe that we have the ability to make choices -- that we have free will.

In other words, if your action is determined by causes, then you don't have any choice but to take the action that is determined by the causes. If your action is only influenced by causes, then you can potentially choose any action you want regardless of those causes.

That is not to say that with free will your decisions aren't influenced by your circumstances, just that your decisions aren't always completely determined by them.

Deterministic free will is as free from external circumstances as uncaused free will is, it is just not free from internal circumstances.

"Deterministic free will" doesn't make any sense because determinism dictates that EVERYTHING (including internal circumstances) is ALWAYS the absolute result of cause and effect. Therefore, if you're a determinist, then you would believe that we don't have free will (i.e. the ability to make choices).

I always imagine that even if I change my mind a millisecond before acting that there will be some reason for this change. But if I change my mind at any time for no reason at all I don't personally consider that to be free will. A choice free from bias, external influence, habit etc might be good, but a choice free from intelligence, knowledge, experience would not.

It doesn't matter whether you change your mind an hour before you act or a millisecond before you act. It also doesn't matter whether you consider that all choices have reasons (both free will and determinism support this notion). The only question is whether the resulting action is always completely determined by prior causes or might only be influenced by them.

I would agree that a choice that isn't influenced by carefully weighing both external and internal circumstances wouldn't be a good choice. However, that doesn't mean that you don't have the ability to make whatever choice you want, good or bad (and people make bad choices all the time).

I can't see what else there is and nobody is prepared to describe precisely what is meant by a free choice so I can only go by what I can definitely identify. And if nobody can give me any good reason to reject determinism other than "it would be depressing" and "you can't prove it", then it is a good working hypothesis on the available evidence.

Hopefully, this has cleared up what is meant by free choice. And if you don't think we have free choice, that's OK. In fact, you're in very good company. Scientific evidence supports determism, and there has never been a non-causational event reliably observed in the history of the world. Then again, human behavior is very complex, so it would be very difficult to demonstrate a human behavior that could be proven to be non-causational.

Like you said, nobody knows for sure whether we have free choice or not. There are a lot of people who hold that until science has proven something to exist, there is no reason to believe in it. By the same logic, some hold that things that are unprovable (such as the existance of God) should never be believed. Ironically, determinism itself is arguably unprovable.

As I was pointing out in previous posts (back when we were talking about ethics) there are possible implications to not believing in free choice. Our justice system assumes free choice. On a basic level, the belief in free will allows us to hold people responsible for their actions. None of this has any bearing on whether or not free will actually exists (I've never made an argument one way or the other as to whether free will actually exists), just that there are implications to whether or not you believe that free will exists.

And that is all I am saying on the subject. If you make a free choice to change your mind and rebut these points and I am happy to let you have the last word.

Apparently, I have "chosen" to rebut these points despite my previous "decision" not to. Was I was exercizing free will by doing so, or was it simply the result of cause and effect? That's the question that frankly nobody knows the answer to.

-Bri

 

[JAR]

However, you then proceed to demonstrate how even religious people choose to cherry-pick from their scripture in order to adapt to the non-religious urge for morality. This, IMHO shows us that even in spite of their religion, (some) people manage to remain moral.

A portion of the time religious people change their morality, the change makes their practice of religion worse. In example of this is the Holy Inquisition.

 

[pmurray]

As an atheist my moral judgment is based on the premise that "if it hurts or inconveniences another human it is wrong" and then make a judgemental based on the answer.[/B]

I'm a little more nuanced: "if it would reasonably make an uninvolved observer afraid of me, then it is wrong". That's what makes the difference between a criminal shooting innocent bystanders and a cop shooting the criminal.

 

[w@ntonsoup]

I would agree to an extent - if being moral means being able to make sacrifices to do what someone knows is right, then no, religious people can't be truly moral. They're always doing it for selfish reasons (to get to heaven, etc.) It's akin to hero worship in this country. We call people heros when they didn't risk something for a greater good. I consider someone a hero only when they risk or sacrifice to protect or save someone else. A firefighter, is a hero. A man who throws or catches or hits or clubs a ball? Not so much. But that's a serious tangent.