I'm wondering if some people see the label of 'evidence' only relative to the objective event that produced that observation, while I'm seeing it as relative to all possible events that produce the observation. My problem with the former is that it is not practical, let alone possible that we can know with absolute certainty that an observation is therefore 'evidence'.
OK, I think I see what you're geting at here.
If the evidence in question is the
only bit of evidence you have available at the moment, then philosophically speaking I would agree that it is at least
potentially evidence for more than one (though perhaps not
all) possible event(s) which may have produced the observation.
If on the other hand you do have additional evidence available -- e.g., previous research has been done concerning the existence of fairies, and you are aware of the outcome of at least some of that research -- then the new bit of evidence in question doesn't exist in a vaccuum, but must be evaluated in light of the other evidence already available.
The difference, ultimately, is this - We might agree that observing X is evidence supporting model Y. Another observation, Z, is seen which goes against model Y being true. The observation of Z is stronger evidence.
The former label suggests that X is no longer evidence, as model Y is no longer useful. I tend to think X retains the label of 'evidence', even though it is weak and Y is no longer useful.
I would say that once observation Z shows Y to be untrue, what has been revealed is that the original evidence X had been
misinterpreted. X may still be evidence, but at this point you don't know
what it is evidence
of, other than that is is
not evidence for Y, because Y has been disproven.
In other words, once you observe Z, X is no longer evidence of Y, though it may possibly be evidence of something else.
Is this clear, or do I need to think more on my phrasing?
You tell me, after reading my response, above.
The philosophy of skepticism is simple enough to define. However, defining a 'skeptic' is not. To what extent does a person have to apply that epistemology to their decision making to be called a skeptic, for instance? Life doesn't present simple categories of knowledge against which skepticism can easily be applied.
I know I have such an epistemology, however I also know I encounter a lot of decisions where I don't think skeptically, either intentionally or through habits of social thinking.
That's maybe the problem with trying to put sloppy biological beings with fuzzy habits into neat dialectical boxes with sharp boundaries.
It's like trying to determine whether someone might not
really be a Catholic because they don't cross themselves when they drive by a church, and don't say 'grace' every time they pop a stick of gum into their mouth--even though the go to church every Sunday, receive the sacrements, and in every other way perform the expected duties of a Catholic.
I'd say it's enough to apply the epistemology to situations in which you are giving serious consideration to important claims about reality. What constitutes "important" may well vary with context.
To paraphrase a discussion from another list, if someone tell's me it's raining outside, I may not always seek out five pieces of objective evidence to support that claim -- I may simply grab an umbrella before I dash out of the house, just in case. I don't think that minor lapse makes me any less of a skeptic, or any more willing to swallow any bit of anecdotal evidence as "truth" without subjecting it to critical examination.
On the flip side (hmm... there's a dated idiom), if someone tells me not to have my child vaccinated against polio because there's a high risk they will contract autism from preservatives in the vaccine, I'm going to want to collect a
lot of supporting evidence one way or the other before making a decision on whether to have the kid vaccinated or not.
Likewise if someone tells me "flies come from rotting meat," "the universe is only 6000 years old," or "God said George Bush should invade Iraq", because these are all claims which are in one way or another about the fundamental nature of reality, and such things are important to me.
Ok, cool. We're on the right track then.
Yeah, have to see what can be done about that. ;-)
Now, on that first observation of data suggesting the possibility of a new particle, there would be a number of considerations. Observing the data representing the particle would be evidence for all manner of hypotheses - it is evidence of a mistake,
That's why I inserted the clause "if it were observed many times". If it only happened once, or only 3 times in ten thousand, or something like that, a reasonable conclusion would be that it was due to experimental error.
evidence of a flaw in the method, evidence of a new particle etc. If the experiment is done again and the data is not repeated, then that in itself is evidence in favour of the 'mistake' model explaining the observation, and the previous maths is upheld. Yet I contend that that observation of anomalous data is still evidence of a new particle, even if it is weak and (on its own) insufficient to lend credibility to the 'new particle' model.
I would agree with that under the same conditions I stated above: if that anomalous bit of information was the
only evidence at hand. Because if there is strong evidence that the observation was in fact due to experimental error, then you have effectively proven that it is
not evidence of a new particle, because it is instead evidence of experimental error.
Well at some stage speculation has to arise, which I guess in some ways has to emerge from little more than the imagination. The vast majority of speculations die at first breath, which is good. I don't think we disagree at all there. But whether the observation that inspired the speculation could be called 'evidence' at all is what I'm contending.
Perhaps what we have is a question of "at what point does information become 'evidence'?"
Evidence is generally assumed to be evidence
of something, or evidence
for something.
Is a single unconnected observation "evidence" immediately, or does it only become evidence when we start trying to
connect it with other observations or information?
Once we connect it to something else, then of course it becomes part of a chain of evidence for whatever it is we imagine that it might be telling us. But a single observation, by itself, unrepeated -- what is that "evidence" of? I suppose it's evidence that 'I think something just happened,' but that seems like a rather trivial case.
The observation has to come first, I agree. I can't possibly imagine how one could seriously speculate anything without an observation to speculate on.
Indeed; I would call that sort of speculation 'creative fiction'.
Interesting point. I'd be more inclined to think that a speculation arises from a single observation initially, which can immediately on further thinking collect more collaborating observations, or 'evidence'. However in itself this is pure speculation - I wonder if there are any psychology papers on the matter.
A single observation, or a series of observations, I agree.
As in my example of demons and the flat Earth, someone may "find" collaboration or corroboration in all sorts of wild juxtapositions if they're relying solely or primarily on speculation and not on a rational plan for collecting hard evidence.