On Materialism

[Interesting Ian]

Q-Source,



You know x exist, but can't define what x refers to? What does that mean?

How can you make any claims about consciousness without first defining what you mean by the term? Your above statement is utterly devoid of any meaning.



Can you be specific? What does science offer? What does scientific materialism offer that science does not?

[edited to add]

In your first sentence above, you claim that you accept materialism, but recognize the limitations of science. In your las sentence you claim that you accept science, but not materialism. Could you explain how this is not contradictory?


Dr. Stupid

Told you she was a materialist. It's not often you're right and you're wrong again.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Told you she was a materialist. It's not often you're right and you're wrong again.

Of course she is. Why else would she be claiming that materialism is false, and promoting Berkely's Idealism in another thread?

Wanna see a neat trick, Ian?

I am a fundamentalist Christian.

See that? Now you can claim that some Fundamentalist Christians are also atheists. Isn't that cool?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Suggestologist]

I think that actually cleared up quite a bit. I will remain comfortable with thinking at the level of an actual "person". That this person can be seen as a walker, runner, thinker or anything-elser is essentially dissection, albeit functional rather than structural dissection. That the person can be seen as an arbitrary collection of matter in a space-time continuum is an abstraction in the other direction. The apparant autonomy of behavior (in that the only strings attached are metaphorical--certainly we obey TLOP and behave in accordance with other laws--say, of learning) of this particular collection of matter over the course of what we'll label a "lifetime" is, to my thinking, a more natural line of demarcation. I'll be willing to consider other lines of demarcation as soon as any practical reason to arises. From my perspective, then, arbitrary as it may be from your philosphical view, concrete blocks, bathtubs, and people can be put into wheelbarrows, "walkers" cannot because as soon as they are put in they become "sitters", walks and qualia cannot be put in.

But a walker need not be walking at the time you place her into the wheelbarrow, she need only have the potential ability to walk. Just as a bathtub need not be filled with water and have a person bathing in it in order to be called a bathtub, at any particular moment. And "person" stands for all of the abilities (and processes) that the prototypical person can potentially "do".

In terms of actions, they are accomplished by things (even though they may be technically accomplished by actions composed of actions composed of actions, ad infinitum), such that concrete blocks and bathtubs tend to just sit around, people walk and talk and see and feel and hear. They don't hear qualia, they simply hear. They don't see qualia, they simply see. Given my arbitrary level of abstraction, does this make sense?

Yes. But my impression of qualia is that people are including cognitive processes that are triggered by the raw sensory data; and confusing that with the low-level reality (what linguists might call the deep-structure) of the source of the sensory data.

 

[Mercutio]

But a walker need not be walking at the time you place her into the wheelbarrow, she need only have the potential ability to walk. Just as a bathtub need not be filled with water and have a person bathing in it in order to be called a bathtub, at any particular moment. And "person" stands for all of the abilities (and processes) that the prototypical person can potentially "do".

I'll disagree here, but only mildly. A "potential walker" is not a "walker"--the proper noun there is "person". A "walker" is partially defined by walking. Yes, a person does all those things (I'll quibble with "stands for"), if we are talking about walking, singing, thinking, etc., or is all those things if we are talking about walker, talker, thinker, but they do or are all these things only in a molar sense. There's nothing wrong with that, but if we are going to talk in the molar sense, we already have the approprate word--person. The others are needlessly narrow.

Yes. But my impression of qualia is that people are including cognitive processes that are triggered by the raw sensory data; and confusing that with the low-level reality (what linguists might call the deep-structure) of the source of the sensory data.

And that is one of the key problems of the term "qualia"--our introspective understanding may have little to do with the actual processing that goes on. What one person calls raw qualia, another calls semi-processed qualia...When seeing is viewed as a behavior, we can simply look at all the processes involved as contributing, without teasing apart which are which arbitrary category. (It may be possible to tease those things apart, and it may be worthwhile, but it would take better evidence to convince me that introspection is the way to do this. Since qualia are defined in introspective terms, it is quite possible that you will (can?) never separate out what is unprocessed from what is processed. (after all, some processing takes place at the level of the retina itself, long before it gets to "cognitive processing".

 

[Suggestologist]

I'll disagree here, but only mildly. A "potential walker" is not a "walker"--the proper noun there is "person". A "walker" is partially defined by walking. Yes, a person does all those things (I'll quibble with "stands for"), if we are talking about walking, singing, thinking, etc., or is all those things if we are talking about walker, talker, thinker, but they do or are all these things only in a molar sense. There's nothing wrong with that, but if we are going to talk in the molar sense, we already have the approprate word--person. The others are needlessly narrow.

I'll quibble back that not all persons are (immediately) potential walkers -- so the categorization isn't needlessly narrow. And I'm not a singer; most people wouldn't want to hear my attempts at singing.

 

[Mercutio]

I'll quibble back that not all persons are (immediately) potential walkers -- so the categorization isn't needlessly narrow. And I'm not a singer; most people wouldn't want to hear my attempts at singing.

And, of course, the only way that we can possible know if they are walkers or singers is for them to engage (or try, I suppose, for singers like us) in those behaviors. I still say that's a functional dissection of a natural "whole" unit, the person.

Of course, in particular contexts, walkers and singers and the like may be the level of analysis needed. There, however, the context has already dissected out the function required by the person--in fact, on first thought such contexts already will presume which whole organism is the one being functionally dissected. ("how many singers do we have here?", being asked to a group of people getting ready to put on a show, will typically not count birds among the total number of singers.)

 

[Dub]

I don't expect anyone to care, I am not asking YOU to care and I am not proposing any other alternative. I DO care because I haven't found a full description in Science about how a very simple physical process takes place. Not a single one.
Q-S

Perhaps thats because they arent 'very simple' processes. Your assumption that they are may be why you look down on the scientific method for not being able to currently describe them fully.

 

[jan]

While I agree that the actual computational-emergentist hypothesis regarding the nature of consciousness [which reject even the 'interactionist dualism' of Eccles'] is the most supported by the empirical data gathered so far I don't think science need the 'epistemical' assumption that it is actually 'true' [albeit still fallible].As I've argued before,for the moment at least,it is only a mere conjecture.We need much more evidence to go beyond the simple conjecture status:an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being or at least a successful 'holistic' theory of mind.

Moreover I don't think that science should presuppose [as an 'epistemological' assumption based on the actual objective data] the materialistic approach of consciousness in general [where as materialistic count also Chalmers' panpsychism,Eccles' interactionist dualism or Penrose-Hameroff's 'quantum consciousness'] as being 'true'.For the same reasons as above.

After all the assumption made by science that consciousness can be understood does not entail us to assume the computational-emergentist hypothesis or materialism in general as being enough to explain consciousness.Not even as an 'epistemological assumption':the 'for the moment we don't know' is a better alternative...Indeed there is still possible that we will never understand consciousness in its entirety not because of some evident experimental limitations but simply because a form of idealism is true [which we will never know from 'inside'].

All we can derive from the actual findings in the neurology field is a rational basis for a personal belief that consciousness is entirely material [or in a stronger form an emergent,computational,phenomenon of matter].Of course this does not mean that all would be rational people should also believe the same...

But with any scientific theory, you can imagine that it might be incomplete and that there might be something else you until now failed noticing. Maybe adaptive selection is not the only driving force of evolution, and there is something else nobody has discovered yet? So wouldn't it be better to claim over and over again that Darwinism is nothing but a plausible hypothesis? So wouldn't it be better science would avoid the epistemologic position that Darwinism is true?

Maybe there is a big cavity in the middle of the earth (regardless how unlikely this may sound), so science shouldn't be that quick in claiming that the earth is solid? Maybe it should avoid the epistemical, if not even metaphysical assumption that the statement "the earth is solid" is true?

Of course you can imagine that there is something about consciousness that can't be explained in terms of physics. Sounds possible. But there are a lot of things you can imagine. Why should anybody bother, as long as there is not the slightest evidence? As soon as there is the slightest evidence that a specific theory is incomplete and that there is a new aspect yet unexplored, this new aspect will be explored. Why, often enough they are explored cheerfully even without the evidence (think of all the UFO nuts).

Maybe there is something about consciousness that can't be explained in terms of physics. But if, then what is it? Any idea? Some mentions Qualia as an example. I don't think that this is valid, but at least it is a hint where we should search, not a general suspicion.

If I meet an android that perfectly mimics human behaviour, it may be possible that it does not have a mind like mine. But as long as I don't have any evidence (and "mimics human behaviour perfectly" means that there is no evidence per definition), why should I start a quest for that mysterious possible difference that may or may not exist?

There are just too many possible theories to disprove them all. Therefore, you start with a testable theory you hope to be true, not by disproving all the false theories (until just one remains). And if your theory stands the tests, that's the best you can and will ever get. Since you mentioned Popper, I guess you knew that.

You may imagine that materialism is incomplete (that is, there is something about consciousness that doesn't depend on anything physical), but by it's specific nature, it will never be discovered by mankind. But that objection can always be raised. Maybe all of our theories are false in a way we will never notice. Suggest a better approach than science.

 

[Suggestologist]

And, of course, the only way that we can possible know if they are walkers or singers is for them to engage (or try, I suppose, for singers like us) in those behaviors. I still say that's a functional dissection of a natural "whole" unit, the person.

Is your bathtub a hot-tub? Is a person a projectile? Is your bathtub a bird-bath? Is a person an impure mass of carbon and H2O?

To say that "walker" is a dissection of the whole of a "person" -- is like saying that a "person" is a dissection of the whole of "matter-that-exists". (You probably have to be a materialist to say this, and it's probably why people who don't like this idea aren't.)

Describing some person as a walker means that we think they can do everything that walking entails (this may depend on how we have defined walking). Not every person can.

Of course, in particular contexts, walkers and singers and the like may be the level of analysis needed. There, however, the context has already dissected out the function required by the person--in fact, on first thought such contexts already will presume which whole organism is the one being functionally dissected. ("how many singers do we have here?", being asked to a group of people getting ready to put on a show, will typically not count birds among the total number of singers.)

I don't agree that the context always makes the distinctions we intend to make clearer.

 

[Pyrian]

Maybe there is a big cavity in the middle of the earth (regardless how unlikely this may sound), so science shouldn't be that quick in claiming that the earth is solid?

Earthquake studies have mapped the substance of (or, more specifically, the time and energy it takes waves to pass through) the earth's core well enough to rule out any cavities large enough to be considered worth calling the Earth non-solid. Just being obnoxious.

 

[jan]

Earthquake studies have mapped the substance of (or, more specifically, the time and energy it takes waves to pass through) the earth's core well enough to rule out any cavities large enough to be considered worth calling the Earth non-solid. Just being obnoxious.

I guess it should be clear that every claim can be defended an infinite amount of time as long as we allow infinite many ad-hoc hypotheses for every evidence against our claim. Just to be stern.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Jan,

I guess it should be clear that every claim can be defended an infinite amount of time as long as we allow infinite many ad-hoc hypotheses for every evidence against our claim. Just to be stern.

That's why science does not allow such nonsense. Proper application of Occam's razor eliminates such ad-hoc hypotheses.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Suggestologist]

Jan,



That's why science does not allow such nonsense. Proper application of Occam's razor eliminates such ad-hoc hypotheses.


Dr. Stupid

Nonsense, Science thrives on ad hoc interpretations of results.

 

[jan]

Jan,

That's why science does not allow such nonsense. Proper application of Occam's razor eliminates such ad-hoc hypotheses.

Dr. Stupid

Yes, but what exactly are you trying to teach me? That there isn't a large cavity in the middle of the earth? That Darwinism is right? That there is no immortal soul? That there is nothing oh so special about consciousness? That's just what I tried to explain a few posts ago.

And to Suggestologist,

maybe you should buy some popular science paper like science or nature or scientific american and count how many articles contains sentences like "it was considered that it works like ..., but we now have shown it works like ... instead", and how many articles countains sentences like "it was considered that it works like ..., and that is still true, and any evidence against can be explained away by the following roundabout ad-hoc hypothesis".