On Consciousness

[Piggy]

He answered you quite clearly, as many others have. The two are actually the same. They are the same observation as Beelzebuddy stated:

>> Because the Ps are the Ns. Or more accurately, the Ns are the Ps, and the Ps are illusory. They do not produce the Ps, they do not perform the Ps, they are the Ps. <<

You seem to think that the Ps are something different and extra, that display this apparent amazing correlation which has to be explained. That extra bit is why people have mentioned a magic bean, because it just seems unnecessary.

The neural responses ARE the experience. They ARE the phenomenology.

There is no perfect correlation necessary between N and P, because they are the same thing. P is N.

When the brain produces a neural response due to certain frequencies of light, that neural response IS the experience of red. Why do you think there is an extra step required?

Everybody assumes, and rightly so, that the phenomenology is caused by the correlating brain behavior. That's never been at issue.

There is no "extra step" required. Nobody is saying that there is.

The problem with y'all's position, rather, is that you're not providing any theory which bridges the two sets of observations. That is what is missing, an explanatory theory, not some "extra step".

We have explanatory theories which allow us to explain why things bouncing off our bodies, or bouncing around in our bodies, triggers the specific neural activity that it does.

But nobody yet has any theory that explains why the neural activity then gives rise to the specific phenomenological observations which they give rise to, rather than some other arrangement, or some other set altogether, or no phenomenology at all.

Why doesn't activity in the cerebellum give rise to any phenomenology? Why are there no Ps for those Ns?

Gravity "is" an attractive force which diminishes in proportion with the square of the distance between objects. That's what it is. Everybody agrees with this.

But that's not an explanation of why we observe that ratio, rather than some other ratio.

The problem right now is that the assignment of Ps to Ns appears entirely arbitrary. And yet we know that it can't be.

In other words, just by observing the neural activity associated with an experience of seeing green, unless you also have a brain that does the same thing and therefore know the answer in advance, there is absolutely no way you could predict that green would be the conscious correlate.

Right now, with our current understanding, such prediction is literally impossible. (And please don't tell me "It's because the light's green" -- color is not a property of light, it's a brain's response to light, and different brains respond with different colors to the same sort of light.)

In fact, since birds respond to magnetic fields, it's likely that magnetic fields produce something within their phenomenological palette, but it is quite impossible for us to predict or even imagine what that might be.

That's what cognitive neurobiologists are trying to figure out.

While the informationalists sit on their hands and are content to merely observe that this neural state is associated with seeing green, and that neural state is associated with smelling cinnamon, biologists are attempting the hard work of answer the question "Why?"

 

[Piggy]

What you propose is ridiculous and useless. If 'light as sound' was just as useful, we would have called hearing 'seeing', and you would now argue the other way around, so it only makes sense if the alternative is less effective, and that makes for less survivability.

So you're of the opinion that evolution always hits on the optimal solution?

You don't understand evolution either, then.

 

[Piggy]

Every time we examine a red ball, we observe that it is both red and round.

What explains this perfect correlation?

There is no such thing as a "red ball".

And if you actually examine your experience, you'll discover that you don't actually experience it as round, either.

 

[PixyMisa]

Dualism comes with baggage and you know it (magic beans… ‘childish’ would be a compliment!). In this situation it’s of no value. Play games if you want to…you’re fooling no one but yourself.

No. Dualism is the baggage. It's logically incoherent (or requires a logically inconsistent universe). Either way it's entirely useless. So when someone raises a dualistic argument, it's worthless by definition, and this should be pointed out.

…and possibly you’re just wrong.

About what?

Part of the argument is that there is something phenomenologically unique about consciousness.

Yes, that's the argument. It's dualism.

Thus…’red’ exists as a unique condition distinct from neurons or wavelengths or retinas etc. etc.

The experience of the colour red is brain function. It's not neurons, it's the operation of neurons.

Here we have one of the most highly respected cognitive scientists in the world apparently agreeing.

No. Not even slightly. He explicitly says that consciousness is brain function.

 

[annnnoid]

He answered you quite clearly, as many others have. The two are actually the same. They are the same observation as Beelzebuddy stated:

>> Because the Ps are the Ns. Or more accurately, the Ns are the Ps, and the Ps are illusory. They do not produce the Ps, they do not perform the Ps, they are the Ps. <<

You seem to think that the Ps are something different and extra, that display this apparent amazing correlation which has to be explained. That extra bit is why people have mentioned a magic bean, because it just seems unnecessary.

The neural responses ARE the experience. They ARE the phenomenology.

There is no perfect correlation necessary between N and P, because they are the same thing. P is N.

When the brain produces a neural response due to certain frequencies of light, that neural response IS the experience of red. Why do you think there is an extra step required?

If that is what Beelzebuddy stated...then Beelzebuddy was wrong.

Lets see…how to put this intelligibly????

There is a brain. Billions of things in the brain. Some of them are understood to some degree. Very few are understood even remotely well enough to understand how ‘me’ is produced.

…but that’s academic.

Basically…there’s billions ...trillions…of things in the brain. Lots of different parts with lots of different names. Lots of parts combine to create bigger parts with even more different names.

Simple question:

Are you a neuron?

IOW…when (for example) a bird craps on your face…do you encounter electrical impulses, mutating biological conditions, electromagnetic fields, cells, atoms, molecules, etc. etc.

OR

….do you encounter filth, disgust, wetness, shock, displeasure (…and onwards to infinity and beyond)?

If you find yourself leaning towards the latter, you may conclude that this is evidence that P and N are quite obviously NOT the same thing.

Lets review:

On the one hand we have a massively complex arrangement of electro-bio-chemical activity.

On the other hand we have filth, disgust, wetness, shock, displeasure (…to infinity).

Presumably…it is fairly obvious that there is some kind of difference between these two conditions.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is no such thing as a "red ball".

We observe it: It's red; it's round. It is a red ball by definition.

As I said earlier, if you have to redefine the entire English language to have your argument make sense, this would suggest that there is a problem with your argument.

And if you actually examine your experience, you'll discover that you don't actually experience it as round, either.

I checked, and yes I do.

 

[PixyMisa]

If that is what Beelzebuddy stated...then Beelzebuddy was wrong.

Lets see…how to put this intelligibly????

There is a brain. Billions of things in the brain. Some of them are understood to some degree. Very few are understood even remotely well enough to understand how ‘me’ is produced.

…but that’s academic.

Basically…there’s billions ...trillions…of things in the brain. Lots of different parts with lots of different names. Lots of parts combine to create bigger parts with even more different names.

Simple question:

Are you a neuron?

Your question has no bearing on what is being said.

I am the collective function of a large network of neurons.

If you find yourself leaning towards the latter, you may conclude that this is evidence that P and N are quite obviously NOT the same thing.

No, merely that you have failed to follow the discussion.

On the one hand we have a massively complex arrangement of electro-bio-chemical activity.

On the other hand we have filth, disgust, wetness, shock, displeasure (…to infinity).

Presumably…it is fairly obvious that there is some kind of difference between these two conditions.

On the one hand, we have a red object. On the other hand, we have a round object.

Presumably…it is fairly obvious that there is some kind of difference between these two conditions.

 

[PixyMisa]

The problem right now is that the assignment of Ps to Ns appears entirely arbitrary.

No.

In other words, just by observing the neural activity associated with an experience of seeing green, unless you also have a brain that does the same thing and therefore know the answer in advance, there is absolutely no way you could predict that green would be the conscious correlate.

No.

Right now, with our current understanding, such prediction is literally impossible.

No.

(And please don't tell me "It's because the light's green" -- color is not a property of light, it's a brain's response to light, and different brains respond with different colors to the same sort of light.)

Colour is a property of light, no matter how often you deny it, and that is part of the reason why we say the light is green when the light is green.

In fact, since birds respond to magnetic fields, it's likely that magnetic fields produce something within their phenomenological palette, but it is quite impossible for us to predict or even imagine what that might be.

No.

That's what cognitive neurobiologists are trying to figure out.

Working out how bird brains respond to sensory data? Sure.

While the informationalists sit on their hands and are content to merely observe that this neural state is associated with seeing green, and that neural state is associated with smelling cinnamon

No.

biologists are attempting the hard work of answer the question "Why?"

How, not why.

 

[GraculusTheGreenBird]

Lets review:

On the one hand we have a massively complex arrangement of electro-bio-chemical activity.

On the other hand we have filth, disgust, wetness, shock, displeasure (…to infinity).

Presumably…it is fairly obvious that there is some kind of difference between these two conditions.

Not at all. Why should there be a difference?

In fact, my position would be that it is precisely because we have such a massively complex arrangement of electro-bio-chemical activity that we have the more emotional responses.

And those emotional responses, and consciousness itself is that activity.

 

[PixyMisa]

Not at all. Why should there be a difference?

In fact, my position would be that it is precisely because we have such a massively complex arrangement of electro-bio-chemical activity that we have the more emotional responses.

And those emotional responses, and consciousness itself is that activity.

Yes. Emotional responses are brain activity, and measuring the brain activity doesn't change the fact of the emotional response.

The same way that a red ball is round and red at the same time - the two are perfectly correlated because they are two properties of the same object. Something Piggy also has a problem with. (Admittedly the analogy is not perfect, but that's not the problem.)

 

[tsig]

If that is what Beelzebuddy stated...then Beelzebuddy was wrong.

Lets see…how to put this intelligibly????

There is a brain. Billions of things in the brain. Some of them are understood to some degree. Very few are understood even remotely well enough to understand how ‘me’ is produced.

…but that’s academic.

Basically…there’s billions ...trillions…of things in the brain. Lots of different parts with lots of different names. Lots of parts combine to create bigger parts with even more different names.

Simple question:

Are you a neuron?

IOW…when (for example) a bird craps on your face…do you encounter electrical impulses, mutating biological conditions, electromagnetic fields, cells, atoms, molecules, etc. etc.

OR

….do you encounter filth, disgust, wetness, shock, displeasure (…and onwards to infinity and beyond)?

If you find yourself leaning towards the latter, you may conclude that this is evidence that P and N are quite obviously NOT the same thing.

Lets review:

On the one hand we have a massively complex arrangement of electro-bio-chemical activity.

On the other hand we have filth, disgust, wetness, shock, displeasure (…to infinity).

Presumably…it is fairly obvious that there is some kind of difference between these two conditions.

IOW the brain works in mysterious ways.

 

[shuttlt]

The neural responses ARE the experience. They ARE the phenomenology.

You don't think there is anything surprising about this process? If one didn't already know that phenomonology, qualia etc existed... from our own experience of them, I don't see that one could predict/discover them. Is there a way?

 

[PixyMisa]

You don't think there is anything surprising about this process? If one didn't already know that phenomonology, qualia etc existed... from our own experience of them, I don't see that one could predict/discover them. Is there a way?

Look for the self-referential information processing.

 

[Belz...]

Part of the argument is that there is something phenomenologically unique about consciousness.

How would you know ?

Seriously, how would you know there's something unique about consciousness, since consciousness is the only thing you experience ?

 

[shuttlt]

Look for the self-referential information processing.

Yes, I can see how it works from an information processing angle... what I don't see is how, in that account you get to the step where you say "and of course from this we see that the first person phenomenological qualia experience must occur". I don't see from an information processing angle why one would imagine that there should be any such experience. Why aren't we just automata functioning by some kind of blindsight style information processing lacking in phenomenology? It appears to be possible to do quite a lot that must surely involve some degree of modelling of the real world without generating Piggy's phenogram. I don't see why we would expect qualia to appear rather than just more and more complicated versions of qualia-free blindsight.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, I can see how it works from an information processing angle... what I don't see is how, in that account you get to the step where you say "and of course from this we see that the first person phenomenological qualia experience must occur".

That's simply what the first person experience is.

Is it informational? Yes. Every attribute of it is informational.

Is it self-referential? Yes. The key identifying feature of consciousness is that you are aware of your own thought processes, including consciousness itself.

Is it static or dynamic? Dynamic. I'm not even sure what it would mean for it to be static.

So - self-referential information processing.

I don't see from an information processing angle why one would imagine that there should be any such experience.

Simple: That's what experience is.

Why aren't we just automata functioning by some kind of blindsight style information processing lacking in phenomenology?

Because we have that self-referential loop.

It appears to be possible to do quite a lot that must surely involve some degree of modelling of the real world without generating Piggy's phenogram.

Absolutely. But, significantly, it is far easier and more efficient to do complex adaptive modelling with a self-referential system than with a system that isn't self-referential. Consciousness is thus a survival trait. (Cf. sphex wasp.)

I don't see why we would expect qualia to appear rather than just more and more complicated versions of qualia-free blindsight.

Well, qualia don't exist, but if you already have a moderately large brain it's not all that hard to generate conscious experiences, and it's a real evolutionary advantage.

 

[Mr. Scott]

It doesn't do you any favors to assume that those who disagree with you simply haven't considered your "novel idea"… which, as I've pointed out, is merely conflating conscious and non-conscious processes, which isn't even novel, being an old ploy of the informationists.

You know, if someone says they have a theory of gravity, I expect that they'll be able to answer basic questions, such as why gravity is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between objects, rather than the distance or the cube of the distance.

If their "theory" can't do that, then it's not a theory of gravity, plain and simple, end of story.

If any informationists want to be taken seriously, they'll answer the simple question of why the known neural correlates of consciousness correlate to the specific phenomenologies to which they are known to correspond, rather than to others, or none at all.

If said theory can't do that, it's not a theory of consciousness, plain and simple, end of story.

And if their answer is that the phenomenology is somehow bound to external stimuli, then they simply don't know enough about basic physics to check their work.

Piggy, nothing in your response suggests to me that you actually read what I wrote, beyond the first sentence or so. I figure you think that, since you've pegged me as an "informationalist" you don't need to be conscious of my ideas.

Explain how my hypothesis conflates conscious and unconscious processes. You keep saying it but it strikes me as a bare assertion which doesn't match what I'm actually saying.

The bandwidth of this conversation is quite low because of the aggression, defensiveness, and meanness of the anti-informationalists.

Since you and annnnoid bridle when the dualism label is applied, maybe it would be helpful to explain exactly how you are not dualistic.

For reference purposes, here's wiki's definition so we can be on the same page and get past semantic quibbles:

In philosophy of mind, dualism is any of a narrow variety of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which claims that mind and matter are two ontologically separate categories. In particular, mind-body dualism claims that neither the mind nor matter can be reduced to each other in any way, and thus is opposed to materialism in general, and reductive materialism in particular. Mind-body dualism can exist as substance dualism which claims that the mind and the body are composed of a distinct substance, and as property dualism which claims that there may not be a distinction in substance, but that mental and physical properties are still categorically distinct, and not reducible to each other. This type of dualism is sometimes referred to as "mind and body" and stands in contrast to philosophical monism, which views mind and matter as being ultimately the same kind of thing. See also Cartesian dualism, substance dualism, epiphenomenalism.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Please explain why the perfect correlation between the two sets of observations exists, keeping in mind that an assertion regarding the existence of the correlation is not an explanation.

I know they're different aspects of the same behavior. I'm not disagreeing with you on that point, and neither are the cognitive neuroscientists who specialize in consciousness.

What you still, inexplicably, fail to understand is that simply observing that there is a perfect correlation does not explain the correlation.

The problem with y'all's position, rather, is that you're not providing any theory which bridges the two sets of observations. That is what is missing, an explanatory theory, not some "extra step".

"They're the same thing" is the explanation. It is your answer to why. By rejecting that you're implying an extra step. I don't know how many more ways I can describe this.

There's a subjective experience we're trying to find the physical cause of. There's a physical behavior that perfectly correlates, near as we can tell, with the subjective experience. Eureka. We're done. Why is that not a satisfactory answer? If you truly do think that subjective experiences are purely physical in origin with no metaphysical causes, why is a physical system with perfect correlation (which is, incidentally, as good a relationship as we will ever hope to find given the unfalsifiable nature of subjective experience) not good enough evidence for you?

I can give you one reason someone might reject it: they believe in a soul, where consciousness actually resides. Or spirit, or quantum woo consciousness or however they want to disguise it. They would say the subjective experiences are on the spiritual side of the dualism, and that the perfect correlation is really just the final material input interface, that it's necessary but insufficient, for the final final cause is whatever crosses the material/metaphysical barrier in their hokum. Inversions of the great universal pyramid. Thetans winging the neural activity there and back.

Why are you inserting an additional step, if not to bridge your way to dualism with a magic bean?

 

[Belz...]

Since you and annnnoid bridle when the dualism label is applied, maybe it would be helpful to explain exactly how you are not dualistic.

You'd also think that, since he doesn't like being labeled, he'd be careful not to make the same mistake.

 

[Belz...]

There's a subjective experience we're trying to find the physical cause of. There's a physical behavior that perfectly correlates, near as we can tell, with the subjective experience. Eureka. We're done. Why is that not a satisfactory answer?

Maybe Piggy could look at it another way: If we ask why two massive objects attract each other, one may answer that it's because of the force of gravitation, and present a short summary of how it works and how they know that it does. But if we keep asking "but that doesn't tell us why", aren't we looking for an answer to a question that is nonsensical ? It operates as it does, and we know how.

In the case of the brain, there is no need for an added step. We perceive something, and correlate this something with the real object being observed. We thus conclude that the experience is a direct result of the observation of the object by our brains. "But why is it red ?" is just pushing for an added "layer" of reality that is not required.

The problem here is that one's consciousness has always enjoyed a special status in the history of mankind. Can you imagine not having consciousness ? Of course not. People attach quite a bit of importance to it because it's pretty much all we have. But to then surmise that this somehow means that it is ontologically different from anything else, when we have no experience of anything else except through consciousness, is quite simply a leap of faith based on emotional attachment to the idea that also led to spiritualism.

Look at idealism and solipsism. Those are two other schools of "thought" that have sprung from this irrational, magical thinking. And how useful are they ? That's why matrialism/physicalism and the science we use to determine how those material/physical things work are so superior to the alternatives: they're not dependent wholly on the observer i.e. it removes consciousness from the equation.

To now wish to study consciousness by giving it back its special status in the form of an extra step (or magic bean or qualia or whatever one wants to call it) goes against the very foundation of evidence-based inquiry.