On Consciousness

[tsig]

I don't know of any machines which are undetectable or which exist outside the material world.

That's the difference.

You believe in a soul?

 

[Piggy]

Quick note to the computerists….

If you're describing a bounce-back system, a system in which things contact a machine of some sort, and that machine simply routes the response around and then produces an overt response, you're describing a non-conscious system, like what we see in flies or worms, for example.

In order to be describing a conscious system, you have to be working with a machine that produces some sort of phenogram. And at the moment, we don't know how to build such machines, because we don't know how that feat is accomplished.

If your machine is responding directly to the world, it's non-conscious. The machine can only be conscious if it produces some sort of phenogram and navigates against that instead.

It's trivial, for example, to program a machine that responds to having a certain frequency and wavelength of light shined on a sensor by indicating that it sees a green light. Because you could take that same machine and have it report instead that it felt cold, or became hungry, or smelled hay.

Right now, all work on computers, AI, and cellular automata, for example, are working in the old bounce-back, non-conscious systems.

Only research on animals can be considered direct research on consciousness systems at the moment.

Machine consciousness (note that I don't say "computer consciousness") will only be possible once we figure out how to build (note that I don't say "program") machines which are capable of doing something similar to what our brains do when we wake up, or start dreaming.

Right now, you can get a machine to respond in many ways to light, for example, but nobody knows how to build a machine that performs color.

As we saw in our thought experiment, color is not a property of light. It is a behavior.

We don't yet know how to build machines which perform behaviors such as color, odor, sound, etc.

 

[Prometheus]

What's the difference between a conscious phenogram and a simulation in which the interpreting 'other' is itself?

 

[Belz...]

Information processing is a very loose and ill-defined term. There are many definitions of information, and all of them are problematic. But they all have one common feature -- information is an abstraction, a measurement.

There is no independent "information" in the real world, just as there are no independent kilometers in the real world.

Information is always a measurement or abstraction of something else which is not information.

Perhaps. But even granting that, the biological consciousness is a process. Processes can be replicated and/or simulated.

A poem is another example of the kind of thing which exists only in a system involving an object and an interpreting mind.

Well, isn't consciousness pretty much the same ? Only existing in a system involving an object and other interpreting minds ?

In other words, a poem about a lion is not a lion.

Yeah, but that's not what Pixy was talking about.

 

[Piggy]

What's the difference between a conscious phenogram and a simulation in which the interpreting 'other' is itself?

Can you describe a set-up for me, of that last scenario?

 

[Belz...]

Quick note to the computerists….

I sense a pattern, here.

 

[Prometheus]

Start with a bounce-back system that responds directly to the external world through an array of sensors. Program a simulation of that part of the external world which can be accessed through those sensors. Route the output from the simulation through the same pathway as the sensors into the bounceback system. Route the output from the sensor array into the simulation's input parameters.

 

[eijah]

It sounds to me as if a lot of people here are saying something along the lines of...
consciousness being an iterative process of the form (dd+li)**n(cp1+cp2), where dd is degree of differentiating and li is level of integrating, and cp1 and cp2 are canonical pairs defining end-points during each moment of consciousness.

 

[Piggy]

Start with a bounce-back system that responds directly to the external world through an array of sensors. Program a simulation of that part of the external world which can be accessed through those sensors. Route the output from the simulation through the same pathway as the sensors into the bounceback system. Route the output from the sensor array into the simulation's input parameters.

OK. What exactly do you mean by "program a simulation"? How is that to be done?

 

[Piggy]

It sounds to me as if a lot of people here are saying something along the lines of...
consciousness being an iterative process of the form (dd+li)**n(cp1+cp2), where dd is degree of differentiating and li is level of integrating, and cp1 and cp2 are canonical pairs defining end-points during each moment of consciousness.

How does that produce color, sound, odor, feelings of emotion, etc?

And how does that produce an integrated experience, and a single implied point of view?

 

[Belz...]

How does that produce color, sound, odor, feelings of emotion, etc?

Maybe that's the wrong question. Maybe the question is: how could it not ?

I mean, we're programmed to feel special, Maybe those special-feeling experiences aren't that at all.

 

[Prometheus]

OK. What exactly do you mean by "program a simulation"? How is that to be done?

I mean the simulation would be much the same as, say, something like a climate model, but of the real world space in which our physical bounce-back device operates. so it's parameters would be the same as the possible range of inputs that could be received from the sensor array to which the device normally responds to.

I'm thinking it would be accomplished via a genetic algorithm that tests how closely the simulation's outputs predict reality (data actually received from the physical sensor array a short time later), and adjusts the simulation accordingly.

 

[Piggy]

I mean the simulation would be much the same as, say, something like a climate model, but of the real world space in which our physical bounce-back device operates. so it's parameters would be the same as the possible range of inputs that could be received from the sensor array to which the device normally responds to.

I'm thinking it would be accomplished via a genetic algorithm that tests how closely the simulation's outputs predict reality (data actually received from the physical sensor array a short time later), and adjusts the simulation accordingly.

It sounds to me like you're describing a more complex bounce-back system, in which the simulation wouldn't be producing a phenomenon with the essential hallmarks of consciousness, i.e. a unique and integrated phenomenology with a single implied point of view.

But maybe I'm wrong.

Worth exploring.

How do you propose to achieve integration and a unitary point of view, first of all? We'll leave the thorny issue of phenomenology for later.

 

[Prometheus]

It sounds to me like you're describing a more complex bounce-back system, in which the simulation wouldn't be producing a phenomenon with the essential hallmarks of consciousness, i.e. a unique and integrated phenomenology with a single implied point of view.

But maybe I'm wrong.

Worth exploring.

How do you propose to achieve integration and a unitary point of view, first of all? We'll leave the thorny issue of phenomenology for later.

Well, I don't know what the simulation would be producing internally, but it seems to me that this set up would allow the system to function in much the same way that consciousness allows us to function. That it would confer the same sort of advantages that we have over non-conscious organisms.

I don't see how it would even be possible to discern what sort of phenomenology might be present, beyond that the simulation would be generating a representation of the real world against which the system can navigate. Of course, it should also be able to navigate against stored memories of previous states as well.

I'm not sure I understand exactly what you mean by a "single implied point of view" though.

 

[Piggy]

Well, I don't know what the simulation would be producing internally, but it seems to me that this set up would allow the system to function in much the same way that consciousness allows us to function. That it would confer the same sort of advantages that we have over non-conscious organisms.

I don't see how it would even be possible to discern what sort of phenomenology might be present, beyond that the simulation would be generating a representation of the real world against which the system can navigate. Of course, it should also be able to navigate against stored memories of previous states as well.

I'm not sure I understand exactly what you mean by a "single implied point of view" though.

Well, there are 2 key hallmarks of consciousness, irrespective of the mechanism which is another consideration.

You might want to check out Tononi and Balduzzi's work on integrated information theory (IIT). There's a good vid online in which Tononi gives a general description... I think it's part of a panel with Ned Block.

Anyway, the first is the ingegration of experience.

I'm not at home right now so I can't give you a quote from The Cognitive Neurosciences, but Tononi uses the example of a digital camera. For the digital camera, there is no ingegration, the diodes do their work separately.

And in non-conscious brain processes we see something similar in the neural chain.

However, conscious processes are different, and that difference is likely anchored in the simultanaitey of the synchronized oscillations across the brain which are the mechanical hallmarks of conscious experience.

In other words, consciousness isn't in the neural chain. It's something different.

And the result is an integrated experience. You can't simply decide to experience the color of the sky separate from its brightness, for instance, or the shape of a cup separate from its color. It's a unified experience.

The second feature is an implied single point of view, which is actually the solution to Descartes problem of irreducibility. You probably are aware of this, but the problem is, if there's some sort of image of the world in your head, like a movie on a screen, who's watching it? Some little man in your head? If so, who's watching the movie in HIS head?

But the model of consciousness I described doesn't have this problem, because the "movie" is you. The illusion is that the movie is the outside world, but it's not.

What feels like you is simply the implied point of view produced by the phenogram. But there's really nothing there. This is the brilliant illusion of consciousness.

It's kind of like a reverse vanishing point. The single point of view doesn't result from any little man in your head, or anything in your head which is "observing" anything at all. There is no observer, or even any observation. You ARE the movie, so to speak.

Think about your visual vanishing point. It's not real, it's an illusion. There is no point at which the railroad tracks meet, it only seems that way.

The same thing's happening in reverse. There is no point where the observer stands. That point (and the observer) are merely implied by the structure of the phenogram.

Does that make sense?

 

[Belz...]

The second feature is an implied single point of view

But does it only feel like a single POV, though ?

 

[Prometheus]

Well, there are 2 key hallmarks of consciousness, irrespective of the mechanism which is another consideration.

You might want to check out Tononi and Balduzzi's work on integrated information theory (IIT). There's a good vid online in which Tononi gives a general description... I think it's part of a panel with Ned Block.

Anyway, the first is the ingegration of experience.

I'm not at home right now so I can't give you a quote from The Cognitive Neurosciences, but Tononi uses the example of a digital camera. For the digital camera, there is no ingegration, the diodes do their work separately.

And in non-conscious brain processes we see something similar in the neural chain.

However, conscious processes are different, and that difference is likely anchored in the simultanaitey of the synchronized oscillations across the brain which are the mechanical hallmarks of conscious experience.

In other words, consciousness isn't in the neural chain. It's something different.

And the result is an integrated experience. You can't simply decide to experience the color of the sky separate from its brightness, for instance, or the shape of a cup separate from its color. It's a unified experience.

The second feature is an implied single point of view, which is actually the solution to Descartes problem of irreducibility. You probably are aware of this, but the problem is, if there's some sort of image of the world in your head, like a movie on a screen, who's watching it? Some little man in your head? If so, who's watching the movie in HIS head?

But the model of consciousness I described doesn't have this problem, because the "movie" is you. The illusion is that the movie is the outside world, but it's not.

What feels like you is simply the implied point of view produced by the phenogram. But there's really nothing there. This is the brilliant illusion of consciousness.

It's kind of like a reverse vanishing point. The single point of view doesn't result from any little man in your head, or anything in your head which is "observing" anything at all. There is no observer, or even any observation. You ARE the movie, so to speak.

Think about your visual vanishing point. It's not real, it's an illusion. There is no point at which the railroad tracks meet, it only seems that way.

The same thing's happening in reverse. There is no point where the observer stands. That point (and the observer) are merely implied by the structure of the phenogram.

Does that make sense?

Thank you. Whenever I read one of your explanations on this topic, I oscilate between moments of clarity when I think you've given me some brillian insight, and periods of confusion when I can't remember exactly what that last insight was and I'm trying to get it back.

For the part about consciousness being outside the neural chain, I'm envisioning something analogous to looking at a video monitor right up close, and seeing only 3 colors of stationary pixels flashing on and off (the neural chain), then stepping back and seeing a visual subject dancing across the screen (the simulataneous oscilations). I'll look up the Tononi reference and see if I glean a better understanding. I'm wondering if these oscilations can be understood mathematically in a similar way to, say the integrated movements of a flock of birds or a school of fish. Actually, looking at it that way makes me wonder if maybe such phenomena arise from some common evolutionary principal. Are you familiar with Gerald Edelman's work on Neural Darwinism?

As to the implied point of view, isn't it possible that's just an artifact of having sensory processing and language processing done by different systems that are in intimate communication with each other?

 

[Piggy]

Thank you. Whenever I read one of your explanations on this topic, I oscilate between moments of clarity when I think you've given me some brillian insight, and periods of confusion when I can't remember exactly what that last insight was and I'm trying to get it back.

For the part about consciousness being outside the neural chain, I'm envisioning something analogous to looking at a video monitor right up close, and seeing only 3 colors of stationary pixels flashing on and off (the neural chain), then stepping back and seeing a visual subject dancing across the screen (the simulataneous oscilations). I'll look up the Tononi reference and see if I glean a better understanding. I'm wondering if these oscilations can be understood mathematically in a similar way to, say the integrated movements of a flock of birds or a school of fish. Actually, looking at it that way makes me wonder if maybe such phenomena arise from some common evolutionary principal. Are you familiar with Gerald Edelman's work on Neural Darwinism?

As to the implied point of view, isn't it possible that's just an artifact of having sensory processing and language processing done by different systems that are in intimate communication with each other?

I think your oscillation comes from the extreme difficulty of wrenching oneself out of the illusion that "you" are the observer inside your head "looking out" at the "outside world".

Even once I firmly understood why this view is incorrect, it still took months of effort until I could consistently, on a moment to moment basis, know that I have no access to "the outside world" and that there was no "me" looking out at it, but rather everything which seems like the outside world is in fact me, and that what felt like "me" was an illusionary reverse vanishing point.

The illusion is enormously powerful, and has been ingrained every moment of our lives.

Right now, my head turns so that my eyes are pointed at a map on my wall. Am I "seeing the map"? No. It's just that when I turn my eyes in that direction, the hologram-like-thing in my head which IS me (or, more precisely, the part of me which IS my conscious self, or my mind) changes as a result.

There is something out there, but it has none of the qualities I experience -- not shape, or color, or texture, or smell, or meaning, none of it.

To better grasp this, it's probably a good idea to stop considering oneself and to move into a situation in which the hologram-like-thing isn't linked with what's bouncing off of the body.

So let's consider our friend Bob, who's asleep and dreaming.

Let's say Bob is dreaming of climbing Mount Everest on a bright sunny day.

Now, obviously, the sense he has that there is a landscape spread around him, outside of his head, is entirely wrong. His body is lying in a bed inside a dark room in the middle of the night with eyelids firmly closed.

So how can he have this experience?

It's because one of his bodily functions is the production of a hologram-like-thing, which we're calling a phenogram, which only appears to extend beyond his body.

And unlike the kind of hologram we're familiar with, this one is composed not just of light and color and shapes, but also sounds and smells and flavors and textures, as well as representations of things which exist outside his head but inside his body such as pain and pleasure and emotion.

From this we know that Bob's brain is capable of creating an illusion of extension. But in reality, none of this exists anywhere outside Bob's skull.

Now, is Bob observing this stuff?

No.

Bob IS this stuff, just as surely as Bob is his digestion, his heartbeat, his temperature, and all the other bodily functions which go on in the organism we call Bob. This is Bob's mind, which is simply another bodily function. Mount Everest, the sky, the snow, the cold, the brightness, even the bodies and voices of his hiking companions, every bit of it IS Bob -- there is no other possible conclusion to come to.

But it doesn't seem that way to Bob's mind, does it?

No, to Bob's mind, it seems as though all of this is outside of him.

Furthermore, it seems to Bob's mind that Bob's mind is at the center of this "world", looking out into it.

But in reality, the thing which appears to Bob to be him, is actually just an implied center toward which the phenomenal world points. But that's just an empty space, where nothing exists.

There are two vanishing points to Bob's phenogram. One is the vanishing point he sees when he dreams that he's looking outward toward the horizon. The other is the implied central point of view, a reverse vanishing point to which everything points inwardly.

As Bob surveys the landscape, looking around the horizon about him, sweeping his gaze from left to right and from right to left, up and down and down and up, the external vanishing point swivels and moves, and the dream landscape warps with it in an impossible geometry. But the internal vanishing point remains stable.

Yet both are entirely illusory.

Bob wakes up.

Two things happen.

First, his body which has been disconnected from the dreaming phenogram is now connected to the waking phenogram. Also, the bounce-back system is connected to the phenogram so that the latter is significantly influenced by the former.

This allows his body to begin navigating against the phenogram, and aligns the phenogram with what's "bouncing in" so that his navigation against the phenogram results in a successful navigation of the real world.

But the nature of the phenogram itself hasn't changed one bit.

He's not "looking out" at the world in waking life, any more than he was when he was asleep. It's all still 100% contained inside his skull. The sense of "looking out" -- or "hearing out" or "smelling out" or "touching out" or what have you -- is still entirely illusory.

And so is his sense of a self "observing" from the center.

The sense of an observing self is simply a side effect of the phenogram. There's nothing there.

This is the magic trick that we must see through in order to understand what's really going on. What seems like the outside world, is ourselves. And what seems like the self, observing that world, is nothing at all.

The bounce-back system -- no matter how complex we make it -- cannot produce a mind, cannot produce consciousness.

First, the bounce-back system isn't integrated.

Now that I'm at home, I can quote Tononi's camera analogy:

Consider… a digital camera -- say, one whose sensor chip is a collection of a million binary photodiodes, each sporting a sensor and a detector. Clearly, taken as a whole, the camera's detectors could distinguish among 2^1,000,000 alternative states, an immense number…. Indeed, the camera would easily respond differently to every frame from every movie that was ever produced. Yet few would argue that the camera is conscious. What is the key difference between you and the camera?

…[T]he difference has to do with integrated information. From the point of view of an external observer, the camera may be considered as a single system with a repertoire of 2^1,000,000 states. In reality, however, the chip is not an integrated entity: since its 1 million photodiodes have no way to interact, each photodiode performs its own local discrimination between a low and a high current, completely independent of what every other photodiode might be doing. In reality, the chip is just a collection of 1 million independent photodiodes, each with a repertoire of 2 discriminable states. In other words, there is no intrinsic point of view associated with the camera chip as a whole. The point is easy to see: if the sensor chip were cut into 1 million pieces each holding its individual photodiode, the performance of the camera would not change at all.

By contrast… phenomenologically, every [conscious] experience is an integrated whole, one that means what it means by virtue of being one and that is experienced from a single point of view.

That's why a hologram is a much better analogy for consciousness than is a general purpose computer.

The neural chain, and the bounce-back system, cannot account for this phenomenon, because that system does not, and cannot, produce this integrated phenomenon with a single unified point of view.

And it's telling that the signature physiology of consciousness isn't the neural chain -- which is involved in all sorts of processes which are clearly outside of consciousness, and which therefore cannot possibly, by itself, explain consciousness. Because if it did, we'd be conscious of everything going on in our brains, which we clearly aren't.

Rather, the signature physiology of consciousness is the synchronization of simultaneous rapid electrical oscillations across the brain real estate, in the environment of a trio of deep brain waves.

Consciousness appears to be more electrical than neural.

I like to use the analogy of a choir.

Suppose that there were a choir of robot voices (which don't have to breathe air to survive) which were all singing in a vacuum. This would be like the camera with its photodiodes, each one doing its own thing, and nothing changes if you put them all in separate rooms.

But, put them in one room, and fill that room with air, and if they're singing in synch, the informational environment changes. Now we have integrated information, and the amount of information produced by the synchronized choir in the atmosphere of air is higher than the sum of the information produced by each robot separately with each in its own room, due to the subtones produced by their interaction.

The signing robots are analogous to the synchronized electrical oscillations. The air is analogous to the signature deep brain waves of consciousness.

Somehow, it seems, evolution has used the "junk" produced by the bounce-back system -- as evolution so often does -- to produce something new and unique. Which is this hologram-like-thing that plays in our heads.

Our conscious minds, and what seems to us to be the outside world, are one and the same thing, and that is the song that the synchronized electrical activity is singing in the atmosphere of the brain waves.

Nobody knows yet how the brain is pulling this off, or why this singing results in a song whose notes are colors and smells and textures and everything else that makes up our conscious minds.

Finding out is the great challenge ahead of us.

 

[Dancing David]

But does it only feel like a single POV, though ?

I would say so, we have many points of internal reference, attention and focus on them varies and is plastic and fluid.

So just like the illusion of persistence of motion we perceive them as one when the processes are disparate and separate.

 

[Dancing David]

It's because one of his bodily functions is the production of a hologram-like-thing, which we're calling a phenogram, which only appears to extend beyond his body.

This is a wonderful point of the perceptions, it appears as though e exist in a three dimensional visual, auditory realm of touch and kinethetic perception, we perceive and interpret ourselves as being three dimensional and existing in three dimensional perceptual space. The 'vestibular' sense helps produce this incredible integration of the perception of the body's position in visual, auditory and touch/kinesthetic space.

All provided for and happening solely in our bodies.