On Consciousness

[shuttlt]

I do not know what it means to "perform green".

I've been dipping in and out of the thread for a while and I think this sums up the problem. If you don't know what this means, I don't know how you can form a judgement about whether Piggy is right or wrong.

 

[Piggy]

I do not know what it means to "perform green".

Green is a bodily function.

Your confusion comes from clinging to the naive (but understandable) notion that color is a property of light.

But as we saw in our earlier thought experiment, it cannot be.

If light from the sky hits the eyes of the normal person, the dog, the person with tritanopia, the person who ate the mushroom, and the sensor for your floodlights, we have five different color responses -- blue, grey, green, yellow, and none.

So is the light blue, grey, green, yellow, or transparent?

You see, it makes no sense to say that one -- and only one -- particular RESPONSE to light is somehow a property of the light, especially since the light which caused the response is now too far away to have any communication with the body where the response is occurring.

The question is: What causes the blue, green, yellow, and gray, and why is no such thing caused inside the floodlight sensor?

In the case of the animals, the colors are bodily functions your body performs, like digestion or pain. Your body performs green, and all other colors, and everything else in your conscious palette.

You say that you can get a machine to store a value (which is itself an abstraction, but we'll skip that problem for now) as a result of being hit by certain wavelengths of light.

But then you said that this was somehow an example of consciousness.

But it's not. That's not consciousness. You might as well say "I got a machine to store a value when I put food into it" and call it digestion.

But storing a value, digestion, and consciousness are all very different things.

Consciousness = phenomenology.

To make a machine conscious, you have to construct it so that it generates this hologram-like thing we call consciousness, or phenomenology, or qualia, even the spirit or soul or self or person or mind at times.

Without that, you have a non-conscious machine, no matter how intelligent it is.

 

[Piggy]

It can perform a mapping of wavelengths just like a human brain.

The problem is, it lacks the one key response which we're looking for if we're looking for consciousness -- color and brightness.

(Brightness is another one of those terms we now need two words for, unfortunately.)

I mean, heck, I can perform a mapping of wavelengths by hand, but it doesn't make the paper conscious. See what I'm saying?

To make the machine conscious, you have to make it form the hologram (metaphorically speaking) and perform the phenomenology.

What you're doing is confusing consciousness with intelligence (or something even less similar than that).

 

[Dancing David]

The problem is, it lacks the one key response which we're looking for if we're looking for consciousness -- color and brightness.

(Brightness is another one of those terms we now need two words for, unfortunately.)

I mean, heck, I can perform a mapping of wavelengths by hand, but it doesn't make the paper conscious. See what I'm saying?

To make the machine conscious, you have to make it form the hologram (metaphorically speaking) and perform the phenomenology.

What you're doing is confusing consciousness with intelligence (or something even less similar than that).

There are other issues with color perception, there are 'field'effects and saturation.

I am just reading, hoping to find a synthesis between the neurological functions of consciousness and the great phenomenological stance you have taken.

 

[steenkh]

Do you think it's possible that those processes might have a consciousness of their own?

Certainly. I think the brain has many autonomous systems that are conscious, among them whatever system it is that takes decisions before the "master system" is aware of it.

It is also often described that the two brain halves are having each their consciousness that merges together somehow - and does not merge for some unfortunate brain damaged people, so this is not a new concept.

 

[steenkh]

The problem is, it lacks the one key response which we're looking for if we're looking for consciousness -- color and brightness.

I am more convinced than ever that you are only dealing with human consciousness, and that all of this phenomenology stuff is just put there to define human consciousness as the only consciousness.

 

[GlennB]

Certainly. I think the brain has many autonomous systems that are conscious, among them whatever system it is that takes decisions before the "master system" is aware of it.

My bolding.

That sounds like reflexes to me, which operate beyond anything that I could call "consciousness". When the Doc taps your knee with the rubber mallet the reflex happens before any awareness or choice kicks in. The movement that resulted was automatic and entirely unconscious.

As it happens I believe that insects, for example, lack consciousness entirely and operate wholly by a complex set of such reflexes.

But I might be misinterpreting your point

 

[Piggy]

I am more convinced than ever that you are only dealing with human consciousness, and that all of this phenomenology stuff is just put there to define human consciousness as the only consciousness.

When you're awake or dreaming, the phenomenology is being produced.

When you're deeply asleep or under general anesthesia, the phenomenology is not being produced.

That's what consciousness is.

Period.

Without phenomenology, there is nothing that we call consciousness.

Of course, if you're into AI and you want to convince yourself (or others) that you're studying consciousness when you're not, you can simply create your own personal definition and go with that.

But it's a waste of time.

I mean, I can give you a theory of quantum gravity, as long as I call electromagnetism "gravity" and claim that we don't need a universal attractive force to be talking about gravity.

But that's totally bogus.

 

[Piggy]

I am more convinced than ever that you are only dealing with human consciousness, and that all of this phenomenology stuff is just put there to define human consciousness as the only consciousness.

By the way, mammal brains are the only objects in the world which we can be sure produce consciousness. That's why we study them.

Objecting to that is just silly.

 

[shuttlt]

I am more convinced than ever that you are only dealing with human consciousness, and that all of this phenomenology stuff is just put there to define human consciousness as the only consciousness.

I'm not going to get sucked into the thread, but I honestly think, if you could only unpack what Piggy means by "perform green", everything else about Piggy's position would be obvious to you. Whether you'd agree with it is something else of course.

 

[steenkh]

My bolding.

That sounds like reflexes to me, which operate beyond anything that I could call "consciousness". When the Doc taps your knee with the rubber mallet the reflex happens before any awareness or choice kicks in. The movement that resulted was automatic and entirely unconscious.

As it happens I believe that insects, for example, lack consciousness entirely and operate wholly by a complex set of such reflexes.

But I might be misinterpreting your point

Yes, I think you did not get my point. I am talking about real decisions such choosing the right or left button (and presumably also decisions such as staying at home or going to the cinema). Research has shown that these decisions can be seen in brain scans before the test person himself is aware that the decision has been taken. If this research is correct, it is obvious that there are other processes in the brain taking decisions, and this is what I am talking about, not reflexes, which are not about decisions at all.

 

[steenkh]

By the way, mammal brains are the only objects in the world which we can be sure produce consciousness. That's why we study them.

Objecting to that is just silly.

I am not objecting to understanding mammal brains. I am objecting to the - imagined or real - attempt to elevate mammal consciousness to the only possible. When synchronous pulses are claimed to be 'defining', then you also say that if there are no synchronous pulses, there is no consciousness, thereby ensuring that if we one produce an apparently conscious computer, it can be claimed that it is not conscious because it has no synchronous pulses.

The study of mammalian intelligence is important, and I have nothing against synchronous pulses being an important aspect of that intelligence.

 

[Piggy]

Yes, I think you did not get my point. I am talking about real decisions such choosing the right or left button (and presumably also decisions such as staying at home or going to the cinema). Research has shown that these decisions can be seen in brain scans before the test person himself is aware that the decision has been taken. If this research is correct, it is obvious that there are other processes in the brain taking decisions, and this is what I am talking about, not reflexes, which are not about decisions at all.

Steenkh, you're misinterpreting the research.

Those studies simply tell us what the brain can do without bothering to involve consciousness.

It takes time and resources to render things consciously, so the brain just doesn't bother for many key tasks, such as determining the emotion expressed by a face.

Those studies are indeed informing our notions of what consciousness is and how it works.

But they don't show what you think they show.

 

[Piggy]

I am not objecting to understanding mammal brains. I am objecting to the - imagined or real - attempt to elevate mammal consciousness to the only possible. When synchronous pulses are claimed to be 'defining', then you also say that if there are no synchronous pulses, there is no consciousness, thereby ensuring that if we one produce an apparently conscious computer, it can be claimed that it is not conscious because it has no synchronous pulses.

The study of mammalian intelligence is important, and I have nothing against synchronous pulses being an important aspect of that intelligence.

Steenkh, stop it.

I've already said CLEARLY that I don't think machine consciousness is impossible.

So stop saying that I'm trying to demonstrate that.

The problem with your approach is that you just leap off into the air, dismissing any and everything we actually know about the only conscious objects in the universe to which we have access.

At that point, you're talking about nothing.

Maybe clouds are conscious, by your reasoning. Maybe the 4th of July is conscious.

 

[steenkh]

Steenkh, you're misinterpreting the research.

Those studies simply tell us what the brain can do without bothering to involve consciousness.

Taking decisions does not involve consciousness? OK ...

It takes time and resources to render things consciously, so the brain just doesn't bother for many key tasks, such as determining the emotion expressed by a face.

Which is not a decision making process.

But they don't show what you think they show.

Or you can interpret the results in different ways.

 

[steenkh]

Steenkh, stop it.

I've already said CLEARLY that I don't think machine consciousness is impossible.

So stop saying that I'm trying to demonstrate that.

OK, I will accept your claim, but then perhaps you could explain what you mean by synchronous pulses being "defining" for consciousness. You could have avoided a lot of this debate by qualifying the statement to mean "defining" for human consciousness, or whatever. After all, this is a thread about all kinds of consciousness, so you will have to forgive me when I take your statements literally.

The problem with your approach is that you just leap off into the air, dismissing any and everything we actually know about the only conscious objects in the universe to which we have access.

Strawman.

I have not dismissed anything about what we know about human consciousness. But it is correct that I am dismissing its application on consciousness that we have never encountered, and might never encounter.

Maybe clouds are conscious, by your reasoning. Maybe the 4th of July is conscious.

By what reasoning?

 

[Piggy]

Taking decisions does not involve consciousness? OK ...

Making decisions, per se, does not REQUIRE consciousness.

Surprising, yes, but that's what the evidence clearly shows.

Yet not so surprising when you watch, for example, plants make decisions.

 

[Piggy]

Which is not a decision making process.

Now you're simply tailoring your definitions to suit your needs.

Of COURSE deciding which emotion a person is feeling based on their facial expression is a decision-making process.

 

[Piggy]

OK, I will accept your claim, but then perhaps you could explain what you mean by synchronous pulses being "defining" for consciousness. You could have avoided a lot of this debate by qualifying the statement to mean "defining" for human consciousness, or whatever. After all, this is a thread about all kinds of consciousness, so you will have to forgive me when I take your statements literally.

I have no need to change anything.

Look, the only objects in this universe which we know for sure are conscious are mammalian brains.

There are no "all kinds of consciousness" for us to observe -- only mammalian consciousness.

So, in the only known conscious objects in the universe which we can observe, we find certain signature behavior associated with consciousness, in the brain stem, in the outer cortices (the synchronous pulsing), and 3 particular deep brain waves.

These behaviors in the brain are tightly correlated with the generation and cessation of consciousness (waking up and falling asleep, or being put under anesthesia) and with changes in the phenomenal landscape.

Whatever it is that these behaviors are doing, or whatever behaviors they are side-effects of, it's clear that those processes are the engines of the phenomenology.

Because we haven't worked out what's going on sufficiently to understand how the brain is creating the phenomenological hologram, and changing it over time, we have no way to design any artificial conscious systems right now.

So this is all we have to talk about.

If you want to speculate on artificial systems that are doing something completely different, but are also conscious, you're talking about nothing at all. It's just empty patter.

 

[Piggy]

I have not dismissed anything about what we know about human consciousness. But it is correct that I am dismissing its application on consciousness that we have never encountered, and might never encounter.

Fine, but there's no point talking about "consciousness that we have never encountered, and might never encounter".

That's a fantasyland where you can let your imagination roam free, like a prancing unicorn in fields of blue ether.

I won't be joining you there for your romp.