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On Consciousness

Is consciousness physical or metaphysical?


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I'm starting to think the Blue Brain Project is for wimps. Simulating the brain at a molecular level? Has it been shown that there's computation at that level? That would be like simulating a computer but simulating each transistor at a molecular level. There isn't any computation going on at that level. Why would we think there is in the brain? I'd think that a functional simulation of neurons would be sufficient.
Yes, they agree. But one of the things they want to do with the molecular level model is establish a reference point for neuron level models.
 
I don't see how conclusion (1) follows.
Facts 1-5.

At best you've listed necessary conditions for consciousness. It's like saying if you've got flour, yeast, and water, you've got bread.
If you want to say that my definition is necessary but not sufficient to your definition, I'm amenable to that. But first you have to provide a definition, and a reason for preferring it.

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.
They are, so it is.
 
If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

Evidence for the highlighted part?


If feedback loops are SRIPs, then there are many feedback loops [SRIPs] in the human nervous system - those that monitor and control our organs, for example - whose information-processing is unconscious (that we aren't conscious of at the system level, where we are the system: my pancreas, afaik, has been pumping out hormones and enzymes all day, though I haven't been conscious of any messages to do so).

This implies that, at least for human consciousness (at the human system level), while SRIP may be necessary, by itself it isn't sufficient (one can, of course, define "consciousness" so it occurs at lower levels within the system, which in human systems would mean, paradoxically, within us in ways we're not conscious of - I think this is the source of much of the confusion in this thread - but then we're talking about something quite different from ordinary human consciousness, where events we're not conscious of must by definition be "unconscious"; however, that said, while SRIP may not fully account for human consciousness - we'd obviously have to bring in discussions of the synchronization, action potentials, connections, pathways, specialized functions, strengths and frequencies of neurons and neuron firings to do that, to begin to get a fuller picture of how human consciousness might emerge from all these events in the nervous system we're unconscious of - it's almost certainly one of its constituent bases).
 
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If feedback loops are SRIPs, then there are many feedback loops [SRIPs] in the human nervous system - those that monitor and control our organs, for example - whose information-processing is unconscious (that we aren't conscious of at the system level, where we are the system: my pancreas, afaik, has been pumping out hormones and enzymes all day, though I haven't been conscious of any messages to do so).
Well, feedback loops aren't necessarily self-referential, and even if they are, there's no reason you should be conscious of them, any more than you're conscious of what someone else is thinking.

My definition (and the empirical evidence from neuroscience) means that there are multiple conscious processes going on in your brain; it's just that only one of them is you.
 
Well, feedback loops aren't necessarily self-referential,

Okay, I was hazy on "self-referential". I think I've seen it sometimes defined as equivalent to self-regulatory (which the pancreas' loop is); but defined more strictly, self-reference refers only to itself. Is that your usage (the previous output the next input of the loop sort of thing)?

and even if they are, there's no reason you should be conscious of them, any more than you're conscious of what someone else is thinking.

My definition (and the empirical evidence from neuroscience) means that there are multiple conscious processes going on in your brain; it's just that only one of them is you.
Then only one of them is "conscious" in the subjective, self-aware, human sense. While the other conscious processes are "conscious" in some 'systemic' sense I guess outside our subjective consciousness, like other people are conscious outside our subjective consciousness; except, unlike other people, these other conscious processes are not "conscious" in the same subjective, self-aware, human way (which is a bit difficult to define but let's say lacking the moment-to-moment integration of environmental input into a sensory map of our world and ourselves in it we call experience, though even that's problematic; maybe without a weakness for Chinese takeout and Catwoman would be simpler...)... so there is a meaningful difference between what we speak of as "conscious" (where I've noticed something, part of the process of consciousness which is noticing things myself) and "unconscious" (where I haven't, not part of that process).

I think that's the danger of defining SRIP as consciousness: it eliminates the ordinary distinction between consciousness (even in the most general sense of one's being awake) and unconsciousness, and will inevitably lead to confusion; as if talking about consciousness isn't confusing enough already. I'd rather, at least find it much less confusing personally, call SRIP "SRIP" and leave it at that (its role in human consciousness, the goal of our enquiry, why from some SRIP human consciousness may emerge but not from every SRIP, not yet fully determined).
 
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I'm starting to think the Blue Brain Project is for wimps. Simulating the brain at a molecular level? Has it been shown that there's computation at that level? That would be like simulating a computer but simulating each transistor at a molecular level. There isn't any computation going on at that level. Why would we think there is in the brain? I'd think that a functional simulation of neurons would be sufficient.
The goal is to create a simulation of the brain, not merely to create consciousness. The level they have chosen - whether it is molecular or not - has been chosen because it will be necessary in order to study brain malfunctions.
 
Okay, I was hazy on "self-referential". I think I've seen it sometimes defined as equivalent to self-regulatory (which the pancreas' loop is); but defined more strictly, self-reference refers only to itself. Is that your usage (the previous output the next input of the loop sort of thing)?
Yep.

Then only one of them is "conscious" in the subjective, self-aware, human sense.
Well.... Only one of them is conscious at the human level. All of them have subjective experience and are self-aware, they're just less complex.

While the other conscious processes are "conscious" in some 'systemic' sense I guess outside our subjective consciousness, like other people are conscious outside our subjective consciousness; except, unlike other people, these other conscious processes are not "conscious" in the same subjective, self-aware, human way
Yep.

I think that's the danger of defining SRIP as consciousness: it eliminates the ordinary distinction between consciousness (even in the most general sense of one's being awake) and unconsciousness, and will inevitably lead to confusion; as if talking about consciousness isn't confusing enough already. I'd rather, at least find it much less confusing personally, call SRIP "SRIP" and leave it at that (its role in human consciousness, the goal of our enquiry, why from some SRIP human consciousness may emerge but not from every SRIP, not yet fully determined).
As I've noted, I'm amenable to a definition of consciousness that holds SRIP as necessary but not sufficient. But why from some SRIP human consciousness emerges but not others is not complex: You add the other functions of the brain (speech, visual perception, memory) and that's what you get. The details, of course, are immensely complicated, but the overall picture is not.
 

If it's so obvious why don't you just make it explicit?

This sort of ":confused:" or ":boggled::eye-poppi" argument is just not very meaningful.

I mean, yeah, maybe I just said something completely crazy, but that's not clear to me, so why don't you just explain what's crazy about it, rather than just posting an emoticon? There's no discussion happening here.
 
Well.... Only one of them is conscious at the human level. All of them have subjective experience and are self-aware, they're just less complex.

Yeah. Again, I think this gets to the point I made earlier: "consciousness" is not simply human consciousness, the information processing that occurs in a conscious system can be more or less complex, and the question "What is it conscious of" is important. If there are numerous conscious systems in a single person, that doesn't imply that there are numerous conscious systems that are analogous to "me".
 
Short summary of the facts, yet again:
Yet again, the summary, short of facts.

1. The brain is a computer. (Empirically.)
I agree the brain appears to have some computer-like features. But there is other stuff happening in the brain that has little or nothing to do with what we would normally associate with a computer, and yet could easily have a significant part to play in what the brain as a whole is actually doing.

5. When we speak of consciousness, we are speaking of something self-referential. See Descartes' cogito: I think is self-referential.
This is silly. We don't have to speak of consciousness for it to exist. Where is the self-reference in the short program I posted earlier once it was "compiled"? Rocketdodger agreed that program implemented "SRIP" and it was based on a template he provided.

6. The Universe is quantised. (At least effectively, see Planck's constant.)
This is a conjecture. (Not an established fact. See Quantised Time.)

7. There is no model of computation more powerful than the Universal Turing Machine that does not rely on performing infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Church-Turing Thesis, hypercomputation.)
Thesis... not necessarily a fact. There is no proof whatsoever that the next step "up" from a UTM necessarily requires infinite amounts of work in finite time. Just because it might seem that way to your intuition doesn't mean that it is so.

Short summary of the conclusions we can draw from these facts:
No. You are fabricating "facts" from conjectures and hypotheses in order to force "conclusions" that fit your belief system - apparently that the true nature of the universe must necessarily be as described by "digital physics". Is that is an unwritten premise?

You may want to read this: Uses and Misuses of Logic
 
I agree the brain appears to have some computer-like features. But there is other stuff happening in the brain that has little or nothing to do with what we would normally associate with a computer, and yet could easily have a significant part to play in what the brain as a whole is actually doing.

Share with us some examples, if you will, of this other stuff happening in the brain, and how it's different from, or can't be considered data processing or what computers can do.
 
I agree the brain appears to have some computer-like features.

What un-computer-like features does it have ?

This is silly. We don't have to speak of consciousness for it to exist. Where is the self-reference in the short program I posted earlier once it was "compiled"? Rocketdodger agreed that program implemented "SRIP" and it was based on a template he provided.

In case you missed it, SRIP is the definition of consciousness that Pixy uses, therefore he is right by definition. If you disagree with his definition, then by all means give us yours so we at least have a way to understand each other.

Thesis... not necessarily a fact. There is no proof whatsoever that the next step "up" from a UTM necessarily requires infinite amounts of work in finite time. Just because it might seem that way to your intuition doesn't mean that it is so.

Assertion vs counter-assertion. Hmm.. who to believe ?
 
I agree the brain appears to have some computer-like features.
No. It is a computer.

But there is other stuff happening in the brain that has little or nothing to do with what we would normally associate with a computer
What you personally may or may not associate with a computer is rather beside the point.

and yet could easily have a significant part to play in what the brain as a whole is actually doing.
What stuff, and what part, and how?

This is silly. We don't have to speak of consciousness for it to exist.
No. But we do if we are to define it.

Where is the self-reference in the short program I posted earlier once it was "compiled"? Rocketdodger agreed that program implemented "SRIP" and it was based on a template he provided.
And I disagreed. It has self-reference, but it doesn't do anything, so it does not implement SRIP.

This is a conjecture. (Not an established fact. See Quantised Time.)
It doesn't matter to this point whether time is quantised, only space. (In fact, it almost certainly doesn't matter that space is quantised either, but that's another argument for another day.)

No matter how finely you subdivide time, you are still bound by thermodynamics on the number of operations you can perform, and no hypercomputer is physically possible.

Thesis... not necessarily a fact. There is no proof whatsoever that the next step "up" from a UTM necessarily requires infinite amounts of work in finite time. Just because it might seem that way to your intuition doesn't mean that it is so.
My statement is precisely correct. There is no model of computation between the Church-Turing thesis and hypercomputation, and the latter is physically impossible.

Do you really want to argue that brains might be more powerful than Turing Machines in some manner that no-one has been able to formulate, by a mechanism no-one has been able to postulate, for reasons no-one has been able to demonstrate?

No. You are fabricating "facts" from conjectures and hypotheses in order to force "conclusions" that fit your belief system - apparently that the true nature of the universe must necessarily be as described by "digital physics".
Nope.
 
Assertion vs counter-assertion. Hmm.. who to believe ?
Actually, both statements are correct. There is no model of computation between Church-Turing and hypercomputation, but there is also no proof that there can't be such a model.

Hypercomputation is physically impossible, and all possible models of computation (that mathematicians have so far been able to postulate) have been proven to be Turing-equivalent. So what Clive is effectively arguing is that (a) there will be some extraordinary breakthrough in the mathematics of computation and (b) that's how the brain works. There is of course not the slightest evidence that either one is possible, let alone true.
 
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